Necessity in the Nyāya-school

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That something is necessary means that it could not be otherwise, or that its negation is impossible. And we sometimes distinguish between physical necessity and logical necessity. That something is physically necessary means that it physically could not be otherwise, or that its negation is physically impossible. That something is logically necessary means that it logically could not be otherwise, or that its negation is logically impossible. In India, we find a similar distinction. As to the vyāpti relation of x with y, some distinguish between one in which x can deviate from y and one in which x cannot deviate from y.

In the Tattvacintāmani, perception that x coexists with y, and absence of suspicion (or conviction) that x deviates from y, produces recognition that x has vyāpti relation with y. When we perceive that x coexists with y, but suspect (or are convinced) that x deviates from y, we cannot recognize vyāpti relation of x with y.1)

Among these causes, absence of suspicion comes in two types2). The first is, suspicion of deviation may arise because there are causes of suspicion, but if it arises, tarka (reductio ad absurdum) dispels it. For example, when recognizing vyāpti relation of smoke with fire, suspicion that there is smoke without fire (= smoke deviates from fire) may arise, but tarka 'If there is smoke without fire, then causal relation does not hold between fire and smoke' dispels the suspicion. And the suspicion that causal relation does not hold between fire and smoke is dispelled by tarka 'if causal relation does not hold between fire and smoke, then we would not build fire to produce smoke'. And the suspicion that we do not build fire to produce smoke does not arise because our act cannot be doubted. In this way, the
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Suspicion that smoke deviates from fire is swept away by tarka.

The second is, suspicion of deviation cannot arise because there are no causes of suspicion. This seems to mean that non-deviation is self-evident. The Manikanā, a summary of the Tattvacintāmani, gives an example. When recognizing vyāpti relation of pot-ness with mutual-nonexistence of what has mutual-nonexistence of pot, suspicion that the former deviates from the latter cannot arise. Let us consider this case in detail.

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Vyāpti of pot-ness with mutual-nonexistence of what has mutual-nonexistence of pot is recognized by perception that the former coexists with the latter and absence of suspicion that the former deviates from the latter.

Let us consider the perception that the former coexists with the latter. But before that, we must describe non-existence of non-existence. Nonexistence is divided into relational-nonexistence (samsarga-abhāva) and mutual-nonexistence (anyonya-abhāva). Relational-nonexistence is like 'this is not here' (idam iha nāsti), for example 'there is no pot on the ground' (iha bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti). Mutual-nonexistence is like 'this is not that' (idam idam na bhavati), for example 'a pot is not a cloth' (ghaṭaḥ pato na bhavati). Therefore, we can divide non-existence of non-existence into relational-nonexistence of relational-nonexistence and relational-nonexistence of mutual-nonexistence. Among these, relational-nonexistence of relational-nonexistence is the pratiyogin itself. For example, relational-nonexistence of relational-nonexistence of pot is the pot itself. Why is that? Mathurānātha explained it in the following way. When there is a pot on the ground, perception that there is a pot arises. And we also perceive that there is no non-pot with the help of non-perception of non-pot (ghaṭa-atyantabhāva). That is, when we see a pot on the ground, we perceive both pot and relational-nonexistence of relational-nonexistence of pot. Therefore relational-nonexistence of relational-nonexistence of pot is the pot itself. On the other hand, relational-nonexistence of mutual-nonexistence is the limiter (avacchedaka) of pratiyogitā of mutual-nonexistence. For example, relational-nonexistence of mutual-nonexistence of pot is pot-ness. This may be explained in the same way. When we see a pot, perception that this is a pot
arises, but perception that this is not a pot does not arise. And with the help of non-perception of non-pot (ghaṭa-ananyābhāva), we perceive that this is not a non-pot. That is, we perceive both pot-ness and <relational-nonexistence of mutual-nonexistence of pot>. Then <relational-nonexistence of mutual-nonexistence of pot> is pot-ness itself. In this way, pot and <relational-nonexistence of relational-nonexistence of pot>, and pot-ness and <relational-nonexistence of mutual-nonexistence of pot> are perceived to be coexistent. The same observation may apply to the perception that pot-ness coexists with <mutual-nonexistence of what has mutual-nonexistence of pot>. When we see a pot, we perceive both the former and the latter.

After perceiving this coexistence, the suspicion that the former deviates from the latter cannot arise, because it is self-evident that the former does not deviate from the latter. This may be based on the principle described in the Nyāyakusumā-ṇjali. A and non-A are each other's negation. Non-A is negation of A and A is negation of non-A. If something is not A, it is non-A. If something is not non-A, it is A. Therefore something cannot be neither A nor non-A. And something cannot be both A and non-A. For example, if something is not existent, it is non-existent. If something is not non-existent, it is existent. There is nothing that is neither existent nor nonexistent. And also there is nothing that is both existent and nonexistent. Similarly if something is not a pot, it is a non-pot. If something is not a non-pot, it is a pot. And there is nothing that is neither a pot nor a non-pot. And also there is nothing that is both a pot and a non-pot. According to this principle, if something is a pot, it is not a non-pot. And something cannot be both a pot and a non-pot. In other words, pot-ness cannot deviate from <mutual-nonexistence of what has mutual-nonexistence of pot>. This deviation is logically impossible. So suspicion that the former deviates from the latter cannot arise because that deviation is logically impossible.

As to vyāpti in which x can deviate from y, this deviation seems to contradict facts. As to vyāpti in which x cannot deviate from y, we cannot generalize easily from a single instance, but at least the Manikāṇa seems to consider that its deviation
is logically impossible.

In the Tärkikarakaśā, we find similar vyāpti. If x is the pratiyogin of similarity whose anuyogin is y, then x is the anuyogin of similarity whose pratiyogin is y (=If y resembles x, x resembles y) 7).

But it needs further consideration to say that they recognize the distinction between physical (or non-logical) necessity and (broadly) logical necessity in India.

1) TC, 210.2-211.1. vyabhicāra-jñāna-viraha-sahākṛtam saha-cāra-darśanām vyāpti-grāhakam, jānām niścayāh, śankā ca.
2) TC, 211.1-212.1. tad-virahaś ca kvacīd vipakṣa-bādhaka-tarkāt kvacīt svataḥ siddha eva.
4) Cf; NK, 67.5-9. atyaṁtabhāva-abhāvaḥ dhvaṁsa-prāgabhāvaḥ prāgabhāva-dhvamsaś ca nātiṁktaḥ, api tu pratiyogī-śvarūpā eveti prāṇaḥ, navyaś tu tatrāntabhāva-abhāvo 'tirikta eva. tṛtiya-abhāvaś ca prathama-abhāva-rūpa iti nānavaṁsveti prāḥuḥ, anyonyabhāva-abhāvaś tu sva-pratiyogī-bheda-pratiyogītā-avacchedaka-rūpa iti bodhyam.
6) NKus, 398.20-24. na hi bhāva-abhāvābhavyām anyāḥ prakāraḥ saṁbhāvaniyāh, papaspara-viḍhi-nisēdhā-rūpavatvā, na bhāva iti bhāva-nisēdha-mātṛenaīvabhāva-viḍhiḥ, tatas tam viḥāya katham sva-vacanenaiva punah saḥdayo nisēdhī nābhāva iti. evam, nābhāva iti nisēdhā eva bhāva-viḍhiḥ, tatas tam viḥāya sva-vācaīvunnamattāḥ katham punar nisēdhī na bhāva iti. ata evam-bhūtānāṁ ekatāpy aśakya-pprātipatīḥ. pratisēdha-viḍhyor ekatrasambhavāt. tasmād bhāva-abhāvāv eva tattvām.
NKus, 398.25-399.3. bhāvavate 'pi guṇavan nirṛtānam veti dvaṁy eva pūrvavat. pūrvam dṛavyam eva. uttarāṁ cāśrītāṁ anāśrītām veti dvaṁy eva pūrvavat. tato bhāvāna saha saptai pādārthā iti niyamah.
This is described as someone's view. And he must be Vaiśeṣika. It is notable that padārthā was divided into seven before the age of Udayana.
7) TR, 93.3-5. yo yad-gata-sādrṣya-pratiyogī sa tat-saḍṛṣṭaḥ yathā yamo yamāntaraṇaḥ.

Texts
A Pāda index and Reverse Pāda index to Early Pāli Canonical Texts

Suttanipāta, Dhammapada, Theragāthā and Therīghātā

by Moriichi Yamazaki and Yumi Ousaka