Jayantabhaṭṭa on Tātparyaśakti-theory

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0. We cannot explain the multiplicity of what language can convey without assuming that the constituents of a sentence denote a definite meaning. In ancient Indian thought, the anvitabhidhāna-theory (ANV) and the abhihitānvaya-theory (ABH) were the two representative views that explained the cognition of sentence meaning on this line of thought. In Nyāyamañjarī (=NM) ¹), criticizing these two theories, Jayantabhaṭṭa (=Jayanta) advocates his own view, i.e. tātparyaśakti-theory. But here we must note that ANV and ABH described in NM are to some extent different from the “standard” ones described in other texts such as Prakaraṇapañci (PrP), in which both of these theories are stated in lucid and systematic way. Since Jayanta’s tātparyaśakti-theory is formed under the influence of these two theories, I must first outline the characteristic features of these two theories described in NM.

1. ABH described in NM is summed up as below:

   (abh1) Each word denotes an unconnected meaning (anunvitārtha) at first. Then the meanings obtain the mutual connection to form a sentence meaning.

   (abh2) Ākāṅkṣā, sannidhi, and yogvata are the means for the connection of the word meanings ²).

   (abh3) In the process of learning a language, the word meaning is acquired as unconnected one. Among these (abh2) is problematic to some extent. In ABH, words stop their function when the unconnected meaning is denoted. Accordingly the expounder of ABH must give an explanation on how the isolated meanings denoted by each word obtain the unity to form a sentence meaning. Regarding this problem, the standard ABH adopts a metaphor (laksanā) as intermediate function through which the sentence meaning is indicated. Nevertheless, the ABH in NM lacks this sort of function. As a consequence, I suppose, the upholder of ABH in NM is obliged to accept the unreasonable assumption such as (abh2), even though ākāṅkṣā etc. have not been generally accepted as means, but as conditions for syntactical connection.

¹) Nyāyamañjarī
²) [Note: The original text contains a symbol that might be interpreted as a mathematical or logical symbol, but its meaning is not clear without additional context or a clear explanation in the text.]
ANV described in NM is summed up as below:

(anv1) Each word denotes a meaning connected with meanings of other words in a sentence.
(anv2) Words cooperate together (samhatyakr) to denote the connected meaning.
(anv3) In the process of learning a language, the word meaning is obtained as connected with anything that has ākāṅkṣā, sannidhi and yogyatā.

(anv1) is a basic principle of ANV, and (anv3) too is established as standard device to explain the language acquisition in PrP etc. (anv2) is expounded with an analogy: External agents (kāraka) such as fuels work together to cause a single effect, i.e. cooking. Similarly words in a sentence cooperate together to produce the cognition of the sentence meaning. The connected-denotation (anvitābhidhāna) is none other than this cooperative function.

Although the idea of cooperation appears as early as in Śābarabhaśya, the upholders of ANV generally do not attach so much importance to it. In this sense, the emphasis on the cooperative function in NM is noteworthy.

2. Jayanta rejects both of these two theories. In the position of ABH, one must accept the unreasonable assumption such as (abh2), whereas in ANV, many difficulties are inevitable. Against these two views, he declares his own standpoint, i.e. tātparyaśakti-theory. According to the theory, each word denotes an unconnected meaning first, and then the connected meaning (sentence meaning) is comprehended through the cooperation of the words. Although Jayanta never identifies the cooperative function with denotation, he obviously borrows the idea of cooperative function from ANV in NM, and lays the responsibility on tātparyaśakti. With regard to the denotation of word, the standpoint of Jayanta is the same with that of ABH.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>means for the cognition of unconnected(isolated)meaning</th>
<th>means for the cognition of connected (sentence) meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>abhihitānvaya-theory</td>
<td>denotation</td>
<td>ākāṅkṣā, sannidhi, yogyatā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anvitābhidhāna-theory</td>
<td>ϕ</td>
<td>cooperative function (denotation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tātparyaśakti-theory</td>
<td>denotation</td>
<td>cooperative function (by tātparyaśakti)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From above we can safely say that Jayanta’s tātparyaśakti-theory has been formed under the influence of both ANV and ABH described in NM: The above mentioned deficiency of ABH requires the means of the cognition of connected meaning, and the cooperative function of ANV fills up the request.
3. Why does Jayanta call the potency or function "țătparyașakti"? We cannot consider, as later Naiyāyika-s do, that țătparya is related to the speaker’s intention, because in the context of sentence meaning Jayanta does not refer to the intention of speaker. For him, moreover, sentence meaning is not an intention, but an external construct consisting of chief and subsidiary objects. Regarding this notion, the main point is that each word, playing a role in denoting its own meaning, cooperates with each other to attain the single purport, i.e. the sentence meaning. The bearer of țătparya is not the speaker but each word that intend a sentence meaning. This can be confirmed from Jayanta’s expression.

We do not employ words for mere cognition of its own meaning but for cognition of a sentence meaning. And in fact, words accomplish the aim by some means or other. Jayanta explains this aspect of words with the notion of țătparya; each word is *țătpara (having an intention toward it) and țătparya (*țatparațva) is such a potency or function belonging to the word. In addition, various other texts inform us of the same usage of "țătparya" in the context of sentence meaning. Jayanta displayed his characteristics only in associating the notion with the cooperative function. If separate words are regarded as semantic units, it is natural to think both that they denote (abhidhā) their own meaning and that they cooperate with each other (samhatyakr) to form a sentence meaning. It seems that Jayanta’s țătparyașakti-theory directly reflects these ideas even at the cost of simplicity of its system.

1) Ed. by K. S. Varadacharya, 2vols (=NM I, II). 2) NM II, p. 204.15-16. 3) NM II, p. 206.1-7.4) NM II, p. 208.3-5. 5) According to Jayanta, pramāṇa is defined as aggregate (sāmāgri) of agents (kāraka). Cf. NM I, pp. 31-38. 6) Śābarabhāṣya 3.3.14. 7) NM II, p. 216.12-13; pp. 216.19-217.1. 8) NM II, p. 139.5-8; NM I, pp. 695.9-696.13. 9) NM II, p. 218.9-10; p. 216.19; p. 190.13-14; pp. 217.9-10; p. 218.9-10, etc. 10) PrP (ed. by A. Subrahmanya Sastri), p. 400.12-13; p. 401.8-12; Tatvabindu (ed. by M. Biardeau), p. 82.3-4; p. 85.4-5; p. 87.20-22; Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭikā (ed. by A. Thakur), p. 367. 6-10; Nyāyaratnamālā (ed. by A. Subrahmanya Sastri), p. 103.6-7; p. 108.8-12.

(Key Words) Nyāyamañjarī, țătparyașakti-theory, țătparya, vākyārtha

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