Some problems concerning \textit{tatputratva},

an apparent logical reason*

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I Preliminary remarks. \textit{sa syāmas tatputratvāt, paridṛṣṭyamāṇatatputravat.} “He is swarthy in complexion, because he is the son of the man, like the other sons\textsuperscript{1}) of the man who are seen.” The logical reason used in this inference is known as an “apparent” reason, and a few scholars already discussed it. However, there are some issues that still need to be solved. In general, the logical reason is flawed in connection with the ascertainment of the implication (vyāpti). In that frame, this inference scheme is regarded false in roughly five kinds of contexts. Furthermore, Buddhist logicians refute this inference scheme in different ways, thereby revealing its different flaws according to their criticisms of it. In this article, I will examine briefly the background of the \textit{tatputratva}-argument and its historical development.

II Examples of \textit{tatputratva}. <1> The Jaina logicians use this logical reason — according to them, it has three characteristics, but doesn’t have one characteristic, namely “the fact of being inexplicable otherwise\textsuperscript{2)}” (\textit{anyathānupapannatva}) — in order to attack \textit{trairūpya}-theory of Buddhist logicians. [\textit{TS} 1369ab, \textit{TSP} 495,19; 508,11, \textit{NBPS} P115a7f; D93b7, \textit{PS} P92b1; \textit{D82a}2, \textit{TDN} 34b4, \textit{NAV} 35,4, \textit{NAV} 36,29f, \textit{NAV} 103,7, \textit{SV} 374,8; 553,5, \textit{PM} 45,4. Cf. \textit{JTBh} 13,5) It is likely that the Buddhists’ quote and use of the \textit{tatputratva}-argument reproduces faithfully the Jaina texts. It is the Jains who are to be refuted. The refutations are as follows: (a) \textit{anaikāntikahetu}, namely \textit{samādigdhaśavatireka} [\textit{TS} 1416b], or \textit{samādigdhaśavipakṣavārtytika} [\textit{TS} 508,13f]. (b) It cannot be applied to the three kinds of logical reason [\textit{TS} 1417/TSP 508,18-509,10, \textit{PS} P92b5ff; \textit{D82a}5f]. (c) The implication is not ascertained by means of having included every dharmin [\textit{PS} P92b2f; \textit{D82a}2f].

<2> Examples of \textit{tatputratva}, in the case that \textit{nīcita}-restriction is not added to the three characteristics. [\textit{HB} 222,18f; 224,28, \textit{HB} 95,6-96,1 (Cf. \textit{TBh} 48,8-10, \textit{VC} 33*, 7-34*, 16) \textit{HB} (V) P220a5, 221b2f; \textit{D178b}3,179b3f] It is remarkable that the term

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samidghavipaksavyāvrttika is clearly given to the tatputratva in the example of NBṬ. 

<2> corresponds to the Buddhist refutation (a) against <1> at this point. We must consider what here the vipakṣa in this case concretely indicates. The son in the womb of his mother is the pakṣa. The sapakṣas are the other sons of the man who are seen to be swarthy in complexion, and then the “vipakṣas” are the unborn sons of the man who are expected to be non-swarthy in complexion excepting the son in the womb. We cannot discuss the necessity of the vipakṣas being grounded empirically.

<3> An example used in the context of bahirvyāpti, where the implication is not ascertained through sarvopasamhāra. [NBṬ 62,27f] This false inference scheme appears here as an example of a bahirvyāpti, in the sense that the implication is not ascertained in all cases including the pakṣa, but is ascertained only in the sapakṣa. <3> corresponds to the Buddhist refutation (c) against <1>, though they differ in some details.

<4> Examples used by certain opponents: in the case that the knowledge once obtained by anumāna is rejected by means of pratyakṣa, or in the case that there is a contradiction between anumāna and pratyakṣa with regard to the object of anumāna. [TSP 200,10f, PVInṬ P333a6; D277b3f, PVṬ(S) P10b3; D88a5] <4> is the counter-argument of an opponent. Dharmottara, commenting on PVIn II 43*, 34-44*, 2, answers it as follows3): Once the knowledge is ascertained by means of anumāna which is defined as stated before, namely that is an essential connection (tadatmya, tadutpatti) between hetu and sādhyā, it cannot be denied by pratyakṣa or anumāna. Anumāna from a hetu—e.g. tatputratva or ekaśākhaprabhavatva etc.—may be denied by pratyakṣa, because these two have no valid connection with the sādhyā. In sum, the contradiction between pratyakṣa and anumāna occurs precisely because the anumāna was faulty from the very beginning.

<5> The connection between the hetu and the sādhyā is not svābhāvika, but it is based on upādhi (an accidental condition), and therefore the hetu incurs the fallacies of anyathāsiddha or vyāpyatvāsiddha. [NVṬṬ 140,16f (Cf. VC 6*,18-7*,1); 387,7, TBh(K) 37,5, TBhP 132,9-18. Cf. NRM 75,25ff, MMU 31,10-32,2; 34,5f] Vācaspatimiśra says in NVṬṬ that this fallacious reason is anyathāsiddha (otherwise proved) because the complexion of the son who will be born varies according to his mother’s digestion of certain foods and drinks. He also says elsewhere that this digestion is an upādhi with regard to the tatputratva-argument when one considers the connection between the hetu and the sādhyā. Hence, the connection is not svābhāvikasambandha. — 492 —
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<6> Others. [PVinṬ P6b6 ; D6a6, PV Bh 284,33]

III Relations between <1>-<4>. <2>=Buddhist refutation (a) against <1>; <3>=Buddhist refutation (c) against <1>; Buddhist refutation against <4>=Buddhist refutation (b) against <1>. Except for <4>-<6>, <2>-<3> are connected to the Buddhist controversy with the Jaina logicians in respect to <1>. Regarding <4>, this fallacious reason was probably first used by Dharmottara and Kamalaśīla in the case where there is contradiction between pratyakṣa and anumāna.

IV Relations to Dignāga’s and Dharmakirti’s theory. We must first of all consider if Dignāga’s trairūpya-formula is used exactly to indicate the fallacies of the inference scheme in question. I suppose that the Jaina logicians understood the second and third characteristics literally when they criticized the Buddhist trairūpya-theory, and used this fallacious reason. The niścita-restriction added to the trairūpya, which can refute the fallacious reason, was conceptualized not by Dignāga, but later on by Dharmakirti. In fact, Dignāga didn’t use the niścita-restriction⁷, and the term saṃdīgḍhavipaksavyāvratikatva is also absent from his writings.

On the other hand, both are present in Dharmakirti, suggesting the kind of logical fallacies of tatputratva. He indirectly refers to such a hetu in PV I and PVin II. This is found in his consideration on the sesavad anumāna⁸, which he uses in his own particular way (PVin II 67–PV 14).

V Conclusion. The apparent logical reason tatputratva exerted some influences on the ways in which the Buddhist logicians established their theory of logical reasons and implication. To synthesize what we’ve examined above, they did not use the tatputratva-argument as a fallacious logical reason for the sake of convenience. Rather, when the Jaina logicians used it in their polemics against the Buddhist trairūpya-theory, the Buddhist logicians became aware that this argument was presented a logical problem for their anumāna-theory. Thus, the polemics having to do with this fallacious reason may have been a reflex of Dignāga’s bahirvyāpti-theory which was based on previous experiences. Though the final conclusion about these developments cannot be made at the present time, we may hypothesize that this lies behind the use of the tatputratva-argument and that, at least from the time of Vinitadeva, the Buddhist logicians indirectly criticized the Jaina logicians, who insisted on the one-characteristic-theory of the hetu.
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[Abbreviation]  
D : sDe dge version of Tibetan Tripitaka.  
HBT(V) : *Hetubinduṭīkā*, P5734 ; D4235.  
MMU : *Mānameyodaya*, Madras 1933.  
NAV : *Nyāyāvatārāvṛtti*, Bombay 1928.  
NAVT : *Nyāyāvatārāvṛttitippana*. See NAV.  
HBT(V) : *Hetubinduṭīkā*, P5734 ; D4235.  
P : Peking version of Tibetan Tripitaka.  
PS : *Pramāṇa-samuccayaṭīkā*, P5766 ; D4268.  
PVBh : *Pramāṇavārttikabhaṣya*, Patna 1953.  
PV( S) : *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*, P5721 ; D4223.  
TBh(K) : *Tarkabhāṣā*, Bombay 1937.  
TBhP : *Tarkabhāṣāprakāśikā*. See TBh(K).  
TDN : *Tshad ma mdo'i rnam bshad*, Tohoku 5437, New Delhi n.d..  
TSP : *Tattvasamgrahapaññikā*. See TS.  

[Bibliography]  
Balcerowicz 2000 : On the Date of the Nyāyāvatāra, On the Understanding of the Other Cultures, Warsaw, 17-57.  

1) See TBhP 132,13.  
2) See Balcerowicz 2000 : 44.  
3) PVin(t) P333a5f.  
4) anyatha-siddha in NVT : 387,8, vyāpyavāsiddha in TBh(K) : 88,12f.  
5) Cf. TBh(K) : 37,5-9  
6) See NVT : 140,16-19.  

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