Anyataratva in Prakaraṇasama-hetvābhāsa

—The nyāya procedure of Judging Two Inferences Conflicting with Each Other —

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According to Naiyāyikas, the fourth fallacious reason prakaraṇasama supposes a case where an inference has the same strength (sama-bala) as its counter. Vātsyāyana adduces the following example; ‘Sound is non-eternal because we do not find in it the property of being eternal’. ‘Sound is eternal because we do not find in it the property of being non-eternal’. This is the case of the fallacy of begging the question. On the other hand, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and Bhāsarvajña mentioned also quite a different example; ‘Sound is non-eternal because it is either of pakṣa (i.e. sound) or sapakṣa (i.e. pot), such as a pot.’ ‘Sound is eternal because it is either of pakṣa (i.e. sound) or sapakṣa (i.e. ether), such as ether. Bhāsarvajña defines prakaraṇasama as a reason that satisfies the first three conditions in both of the two conflicting inferences. Whereas Vātsyāyana referred to two different reasons, the one reason that verbally appears to be same may lead to two conflicting conclusions in this reasoning. This example satisfies Bhāsarvajña’s definition of prakaraṇasama.1)

But this example may sound rather cunning. Both Bhāsarvajña and Jayanta criticize this reasoning for its unreality. While Bhāsarvajña gives this reasoning by the term ‘anyataratva’ as an instance of prakaraṇasama, he attacks Čārvāka’s use of the term ‘anyataratva’ in the context of criticism of inference. There he says that one may always fabricate any counter if one employs the term ‘anyataratva’, but it is only based on one’s mere imagination without any ontological basis.2) Jayanta also negates the same reasoning. He introduces it as a view of others (apare), who justify their view by stating that the term ‘anyataratva’ may denote a real entity and that it is necessary for ‘pakṣa’ or ‘sapakṣa’ to always denote the same thing.3) Concerning this view, he states that every reason submitted to his disputant must follow his own comprehension, whether true or false, but this reasoning cannot be
based on it. Their criticisms are similar in that they agree that this reasoning is not supported by reality.

The reasoning with the term ‘anyataratva’ could be attributed to Cārvāka’s view that threatens the validity of inference. Bhāsarvajña introduces some kinds of reasoning as Cārvāka’s view. There can be found three instances employing ‘anyataratva’ for indicating that contradiction is possible in every inference. He shows its absurdity by demonstrating three similar instances for himself. Here we find the reasoning by ‘being either of pakṣa or sapakṣa’. Although being Bhāsarvajña’s, this reasoning is similar to Cārvāka’s original instances in its purpose to invalidate every inference by indicating its counter. The phrase ‘anyataratva’ also occurs in ‘the reasoning having a companion (sadvitiyapravayoga)’ by Cārvāka, which Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña discuss in the context of prakaraṇasama. In this case both of them reject this reasoning on the ground that one of the two alternatives is just imaginary. Jayanta regards it as a case of non-effecting reason (aprayojaka), whereas Bhāsarvajña considers it to be fallacious due to the absence of inevitable concomitance. Thus they defend the validity of inference against Cārvāka’s tricky criticism.

By the time of Uddyotakara, Naiyāyikas knew that two inferences conflicting each other could not have the same strength in reality. On the reasoning based on ‘non-erroneous contradiction (viruddhāvyabhicārin)’ both Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña refused the coexistence of two conflicting inferences of the same object and demanded a sole conclusion. As a result, Jayanta regards it as a kind of futile answer (jāti), and Bhāsarvajña states that such reasoning may falls under the category of reason of defeat (nigrahaśthāna). Accordingly prakaraṇasama cannot help being concerned with the context of argument (vāda) apart from direct connection with reality.

Bhāsarvajña borrows Cārvāka’s cunning reasoning and adopts it as instance of prakaraṇasama in NSū. In so doing, he succeeds in showing the fact that two conflicting inferences hold the same strength, and in justifying his definitions of prakaraṇasama as well. But by its non-realistic procedure, the strength of inferences was clarified as being nominal or formal. Here, there is no direct connection with reality i.e. inevitable concomitance or one’s own comprehension. This problem is related to the fact that traditionally prakaraṇasama was on occasion dealt with the context of argument.
1) This cunning example was attributed to Bhasarvajña and criticized as an inadequate instance of *prakāraṇasama*, because of three reasons. First, the phrase is against the rule that a term must always denote the same thing. Second, the phrase 'being either of the two (*anyatratva*)' should be meaningless. Third, there should be no reason that brings out conclusions that conflict with each other. Cf. TR 223.1ff, TRT 222.21ff, MMU 83.3ff


3) NM 2.619.5ff. Who invented this view? Supposing that Jayanta Bhaṭṭa preceded Bhasarvajña, Bhasarvajña could not be the inventor of this view, although this view was well known as his. In any event, unspecified Carvakas must have had great influence on their views.

4) Cārvākas introduce following instances: (1) NBhūṣa 212.9f: dharmadharminor anyataratvāt sādhyaśabhārtīhāvayavatvād vā, sādhyavat. (2) NBhūṣ: 213.7ff: sadasator anyataratvāt, paṭavat. (3) NBhūṣ 212.17f: pakṣavipakṣayor anyataratvād vipakṣavat, pakṣakharaśrīṅgayor anyataratvāc ca kharāśrīṅgavat. Bhasarvajña demonstrates for himself as follows: (1) NBhūṣ 227.10f: pakṣasapakṣayor anyataratvāt sapakṣavat (2) NBhūṣ 227.11f: tathākāśāsadbhayor anyataratvād ākāśavat, ghaṭasabdhyor anyataratvād ghaṭavat (3) NBhūṣ 227.12f: sādhyad armaśabdhyor anyataratvāt sādhyadarmaṇavat.


6) NM 1.325.11f / 2.621.6ff, NBhūṣ 228.3ff

7) NM 2.608.15f, NBhūṣ 319.14ff, 313.1 ff

8) It should be added that in the system of NSū prakāraṇasama is treated as a kind of fallacious reason and a kind of futile answer as well, whereas fallacious reasons belong to the category of reason of defeat. Cf. NSū 5a16: ubhayasādharmyāt prakriyāśiddheḥ prakāraṇasamah.

9) Strange to say, he does not mention this reasoning in NBhūṣ at all. He refers to only the instance of Vātsyāyana. The difference in his attitude between NSū and NBhūṣ needs to be inquired further.

(Key Word) prakāraṇasama, hetvābhāsa, anumāna

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