Durvekamiśra's Reference to a Jaina Theory*

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In the *Hetubinduṭīkāloka*, Durvekamiśra (ca. 970-1030) refers to the Jaina refutation of *kṣaṇikatvānumāna*. Although this polemic between Jains and Buddhists is a crucial issue, only few attempts have so far been made to it. The purpose of this paper is to examine the Jaina refutation and their own standpoint by analyzing the passages introduced in HBṬĀ and to locate them in the history of Jaina logic by comparing them to other Jaina texts.

The opponent begins by claiming that existence (*sattva*) as the logical reason for inferring momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) is contradictory: "Since the [logical reason] which proves that every entity is neither non-momentary nor momentary proves the opposite of the property to be proved, it is just contradictory."¹⁾ In other words, he maintains that 'existence' is contradictory because it does not prove one aspect of entity but in fact manifold aspects (*anekāntikatva*). Here a certain Jaina logician's statement is borrowed: "In the *Vādanyāya*, Syādvādaśaśarin²⁾ stated: every entity is manifold because of existence; otherwise (=if not manifold) how could causal efficiency (*arthakriyā*) occur?"³⁾ The use of *sattva* as the logical reason and the term *arthakriyā* in this proof make us assume that Syādvādaśaśarin knew Dharmakīrti's *sattvānumāna* and expressed his own idea by replacing *kṣaṇikatva* with *anekāntikatva*. We can find similar formulations in other Jaina works, such as SVin 39,2f, PSaṃV 113,24f, TAŚ 202,26, PNT 3.38f and TRD 352,8f. Of these, the example of PNT is noteworthy since the proof of manifoldness is presented as an inference by means of intrinsic pervasion (*antarvyāpti*).⁴⁾ This situation is similar to *sattvānumāna* in terms of formulating an inference in which the logical subject includes all cases and examples cannot be offered. Furthermore, it may be assumed that the inference of manifoldness and the refutation of *sattvānumāna* are closely linked for the Jaina logicians.

After his statement of the *anekāntatva*-proof, the Jaina logician, supposedly a

commentator on the *Vādanyāya* (*Ṭīkāḥṭ*), tries to justify it as follows: "From the above, it is shown that the valid cognition which negates [the logical reason] in the opposite (*viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa*) is capable [of proving] (*samarthaka*) on the ground of 'impossibility otherwise' (*anyathānupapatti*)"⁵⁾ by the following logic: What possesses [the single characteristic of] 'impossibility otherwise' is accepted as a [valid] logical reason.⁶⁾ Both examples might exist or not, for these [examples] are not the cause.^{7)~8)} Two problems need to be clarified here. The first concerns the relationship between the two concepts, *bādhakapramāṇa* and *anyathānupapatti*. One of the clues to solving this problem is found in Akalaṅka's SVin: "When there is an exclusion [through] the valid cognition which negates the presence of a logical reason in the dissimilar, the logical reason is endowed with capability solely on the ground of impossibility otherwise."⁹⁾ For the Jaina logicians, the fact that a logical reason possesses the single characteristic of impossibility otherwise is the essential element for correct inference. If a logical reason meets the element, the validity of the logical reason can be confirmed also by *bādhakapramāṇa* which the Buddhists adopt as the means of ascertainment of pervasion in the case of *svabhāvahetu*. The second concerns the purpose of citing Pātrasvāmin's verse. Judging from the first half of the verse, the word *anyathānupapatti*, which is found just before the verse, is used at the level of the characteristic of logical reason rather than at the level of the relation between two concepts like *vyāpti*.¹⁰⁾ The second half, on the other hand, supports the Jaina view that the *anekāntatva*-proof does not need or cannot have both examples and is established only through *antarvyāpti* as seen in PNT 3.38f.

According to Durvekamiśra, the Jaina logician sets two alternatives: (a) a momentary thing has the nature of producing an effect at the time of its own existence, or (b) it has the nature of producing an effect at a different time.¹¹⁾ Alternative (a) would lead to the unfavourable conclusion that the whole world would occur at a single moment if a momentary thing produced an effect only at the time of its own existence.¹²⁾ Namely, when a certain cause ($=X_1$) produces a certain effect ($=Y_1$) at the same time as its ($=X_1$'s) existence, the effect ($=Y_1$) is a cause ($=X_2$) of another effect ($=Y_2$), and so forth ... Thus, everything would be linked and produced at a single time.¹³⁾ Furthermore, even though a momentary thing has the nature of producing an effect only at the moment of its own existence, effects are not produced then but

at a different time. In the same manner, even though a permanent thing has the capability of producing effects at any time, the effects in fact occur gradually and slowly (*vilambya vilambya*). Therefore, the way in which a momentary thing produces effects does not differ from the way in which a permanent thing does, and there is no difference between the non-momentary and the momentary in that there is no activity (*nirvyāpārātā*) at the second moment.¹⁴⁾ Alternative (b) is included in the above-mentioned argument, and this forms the Jaina standpoint.

Akalaṅka (ca. 720-780) also refutes *sattvānumāna*. His well-defined descriptions are found in his NVin 344f and 348. In NVin 348, for example, he states: "Existence (*sattva*), causal efficiency (*arthakriyā*) and other properties of entity when [proving] momentary destruction (*kṣaṇakṣaya*) are apparent logical reasons called the contradictory, for they prove transformation (*pariṇāma*¹⁵⁾)." The argumentation in these three verses has much in common with those of HBṬĀ. The reason for classifying the logical reason *sattva* and others as contradictory is that they are correctly connected with *pariṇāma* on account of the presence of the activity (*kriyā*) in *pariṇāma*.¹⁶⁾ It is to be noted that the term *anekāntika* in HBṬĀ is replaced here with *pariṇāma*. In LTV 12,6-10, however, Akalaṅka argues a bit differently. The points absent in HBṬĀ are as follows: (1) the nature of a momentary thing is not ascertained; (2) therefore, the causal relation is not established through perception and non-perception like isolated objects where no valid cognition functions. And according to him, as long as one approves of the *kṣaṇabhāṅga*-theory, the definition of the causal relation ("What [=Y] occurs only when something [=X] exists is the effect of X, and X is the cause."¹⁷⁾) is not established since cause and effect would occur simultaneously. This reasoning is indirectly linked to alternative (a) in HBṬĀ.

The Jaina logicians insist that existence (*sattva*) is a contradictory logical reason and try to prove manifoldness (*anekāntatva*) by means of the very same logical reason. It is revealed that the refutation of *kṣaṇikatvānumāna* and the *anekāntatva*-proof are two sides of the same coin. The Jaina logicians are aware of logical affinity between *anyathānupapatti* and *bādhakapramāṇa* and do not deny the latter, which was first proposed by Dharmakīrti. As a result of the comparison between the view in HBṬĀ and that of Akalaṅka, one can safely state that the theoretical preparation for refuting *sattvānumāna* was already in place at least at the time of

Akalaṅka, and that the method of the refutation in HBṬĀ basically corresponds to Akalaṅka's.

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(Abbreviations) **HBṬĀ**: *Hetubinduṭīkāloka*. S. Sanghavi and Jinavijayaji (ed.), Baroda 1949. **LTV**: *Laghīyastrayavṛtti*. See NVin. **NVin**: *Nyāyaviniścaya*. Mahendra Kumar Shastri (ed.), Ahmedabad-Calcutta, 1939. **PSam**: *Pramāṇasaṃgraha*. See NVin. **PST**: *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*. (Tib.) D4268, P5766. **SP**: *Sambandhaparikṣā*. E. Frauwallner (ed.), Wien 1934. **SVin**: *Siddhiviniścaya*. Mahendra Kumar Jain (ed.), Varanasi 1959. **TAAS**: *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra*. H. Jacobi (ed.), Leipzig 1906. **TAŚ**: *Tattvārthaslokavārttika*. Manoharalāl, Ramacandra Nātha Raṅgaji (ed.), Bombay 1918. **TRD**: *Tarkarahasyaḍṭipikā*, Mahendra Kumar Jain (ed.), Varanasi 1969. **TS**: *Tattvasaṃgraha*. S. D. Shastri (ed.), Varanasi 1968. **VN**: *Vādanyāya*. T. Much (ed.), Wien 1991. Bhattacharya[1986]: K. Bhattacharya, Some Thoughts on *Antarvyāpti*, *Bahirvyāpti*, and *Tairūpya*, *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*, Dordrecht 1986, 89-105. Shiga[2003]: Suiriron wo meguru Bukkyoto to Jainakoto no Ronso (in Jpn.), *Journal of the Nanto Society for Buddhist Studies* 83, (60)-(97). Uno[1997]: *Pramāṇanayatatvāloka* —Wayaku to Kaisetsu (3)— (in Jpn.), *Journal of Jaina Studies* 3, 1-24. (Notes) 1) HBṬĀ 373,22f. 2) The author of the *Vādanyāya* seems to be Kumāranandin. See SVin, intro. 49 and TAŚ 280,8. 3) HBṬĀ 373,23f. 4) See Uno[1997: 19f], Bhattacharya[1986: 90 with n.8]. 5) I would like to correct my former translation in Shiga[2003: (92), n.98]. 6) TS 1364ab, PST D81b6; P92a5. 7) TS 1367cd. 8) HBṬĀ 374,1-4. 9) SVin 345,21f. 10) See Shiga[2003: 65 with n.57-65]. 11) HBṬĀ 374,6f. 12) HBṬĀ 374,7f. 13) HBṬĀ 374,8ff. 14) HBṬĀ 374,15-20. 15) For the definition of *pariṇāma*, see TAAS 5.40f. Cf. TAAS 5.29. 16) NVin 345ab. 17) LTV 12,8; SVin 193,7f. Cf. SP 16, VN 4,2f.

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