The Development of \textit{Avīta}  
— From the Trairūpya theoretical point of view —

Yasuhiro OKAZAKI

Hadano [1944] says that the old Saṃkhya theory of \textit{avīta} was reformed by Uddyotakara on the new system of inference. Hadano’s view must be noticed. His study, however, was made before Frauwallner’s reconstruction of \textit{Ṣaṭṭitantra}. The aim of this essay is to clarify Uddyotakara’s contribution to this theory from the \textit{trairūpya} theoretical point of view.

First of all, we must examine \textit{avīta} in \textit{Ṣaṭṭitantra}. Although Franco[1999] reports that the term “\textit{avīta}” is found in an earlier manuscript than \textit{Ṣaṭṭitantra}, we can not trace this theory back to works earlier than \textit{Ṣaṭṭitantra}.

In this field, Frauwallner [1958] is monumental. His reconstruction of \textit{Ṣaṭṭitantra} enables us to overview the epistemology and logic of the classical Saṃkhya system. However, there remain some problems with his study. He did not seem to pay sufficient attention to the formulations of \textit{vīta} and \textit{avīta}. Although neither \textit{vīta} nor \textit{avīta} in \textit{Ṣaṭṭitantra} is directly connected with the \textit{trairūpya} theory, taking into consideration their later development on the \textit{trairūpya} theory, I think that their formulations deserve special attention. This is because we can regard \textit{trairūpya} as a theory for the evaluation of demonstrative formulae, and because some demonstrative formulae in earlier periods had been transformed by Dignāga or other authors on the basis of the \textit{trairūpya} theory.

Comparing Frauwallner’s reconstruction of \textit{Ṣaṭṭitantra} with the description of \textit{vīta} and \textit{avīta} in NAA, I think there are two points to be noted.

The first point is found in the definition of \textit{avīta}. \textit{Avīta} is defined in NAA as follows:

\begin{quote}
pariśeṣād \textit{avītasiddhiḥ}, yadā (1)nedam ato ‘nyathā sambhavati (2)asti cedam (3) tasmāt pariśeṣato “hetur evāyam” ity avadhārya kāryasiddhāv apadiśyate tadā avitākhya bha-
vatīti prayogalaksanam, svalaksanam tu asya parapakṣapratīṣṭhedhena svapakṣaparigra-
\end{quote}

—1133—
The Development of Avīta (Y. OKAZAKI)

hakriyā āvīta iti (NAA, p.314.1-3, cf. PST, 200b6-201a1)

The words underlined, which are not found in PST and hence omitted in Frauwallner's reconstruction, would give us a hint as to the interpretation of āvīta in Śaṭṭitantra, that is to say, if the phrase “nedam ato...kāryasiddhāv apadiśyate” is a description of formulation (prayoga), we can interpret (1), (2) and (3) as the process of a demonstration, and postulate that each of them corresponds to each step of a demonstration or is each member of a demonstrative schema.

Secondly, as Frauwallner himself noticed, the examples of āvīta-formulation other than the first one are omitted in his reconstruction. Frauwallner's omission, I think, prevents us from understanding the āvīta-formulation of Śaṭṭitantra. Śaṭṭitantra mentions five vita-demonstrations. They are as follows: The pradhāna or primordial cause exists because of (a) similarity (anvaya), (b) measure (parimāna), (c) causation (kāryakāraṇa) (d) potency (sakti) and (e) variety (vaiśvarūpya). These vita-demonstrations are also followed by the five āvītas corresponding to them (“(x’)” stands for the āvīta corresponding to the vita based on (x)). While the āvītas other than (a’) are not found in PST's description of āvīta, NAA gives us detailed information about the five āvīta-demonstrations as follows: (a’) NAA, p. 321.12-17, cf. PST 202b7-203a2; (b’) NAA, p.322.1-5; (c’) NAA, p.323.4-11; (d’) NAA, p.323.11-12; (e’) NAA, p.323.12-17.

Among them, while (a’), (b’) and (c’) contain the process of pariśeṣa, which is mentioned in the definition of formulation, (d’) and (e’) do not. Does it follow from the stylistic feature of NAA or avoidance of redundancy that the descriptions of (d’) and (e’) lack the process of pariśeṣa? I cannot fathom the real reason. Whatever the reason may be, (d’) and (e’) would not give us the full sketch of demonstrative schema. Therefore, we must begin our task by organizing the three examples, (a’), (b’) and (c’).

Viewed in this light, the demonstrative schema of the āvīta described in Śaṭṭitantra might be represented as follows: (The boldfaced letters indicate the phrases of Nayacakra that are cited in NAA.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(a')</th>
<th>(b')</th>
<th>(c')</th>
<th>From Def.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-1</td>
<td><code>yadi vyaktasyasata utpatir yonyabhavad ekatvaprasan-gaḥ</code></td>
<td><code>tad eva yonyabhavad anavasthaprasamgh, parimāṇasya sansarga- pūrvakatvāvinabhavād ity arthaḥ</code></td>
<td><code>kāryakāraṇayos ca vyaktam idam dvidhā kṛtvā kāryarāsim kāraṇa- āsim ca kṛtvā na sata utpatih ’sambhavati iti vākyaviśesah kramayau- gapadyaparvṛttyasambhavāt</code></td>
<td><code>nedam ato ’nyathā sambhavati</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>pradhānābhāvāt sāmānyamātram vyaktam nirvissam ity etat prasajyeta</td>
<td>pradhānābhāvād nisparimāṇam idam vyaktam avyavasthitam ity etat prasajyeta</td>
<td>parasparārthaṁa- lābhābhāvāt kāryakāraṇayor anyonyānurūpātmalābhābhāvah. atāh kramaṇa prarvṛttyabhāvas cakrākaś- vat asattvād asadvādinaḥ. tathā yugapad ahy abhūta- vinaṣṭayor anepaṣṭavāt kharaviṇāvat kriyādi- madhyāvāsanesu atattvād eva</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>na tv asati bhāvah kas cid asti yatpūrvakā vyaktavisesāḥ syuḥ</td>
<td>na tv asati bhāvah kas cid asti yah pratipadyamānaḥ parimāṇe ‘vatiṣṭeta</td>
<td>tasmāt kramayau- gaparvṛt- tyasambhavāt akāryakāra- naṭvaprasaṅgāt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>tasmāt sāmānyamātram idam vyaktam nirvīṣam ity etat</td>
<td>tasmān nisparimāṇam idam avyavasthitam ity etat prasajyeta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This table indicates that \((a')\) is parallel to \((b')\) at each step, and each part of \((c')\) corresponds to a certain step of \((a')\) or \((b')\). Besides the definition of formulation \((1)\), \((2)\) and \((3)\) seem to play the role of a framework of these demonstrations. Therefore, we can safely say that \((a')\) or \((b')\) are the prototype of \(\text{avita}\)-demonstration.

From the \textit{trairūpya}-theoretical point of view, \((a')\) bears some problems. Firstly, an inferential subject is shifted in the process of demonstration. That is to say, \text{vyakti} seems to play the part of the subject in propositions from \((1)-1\) to \((3)-1\), but \text{pradhāna} appears in the final conclusion \((3)-2\). It is common to \((a')\) and \((b')\). Secondly, these demonstrations contain the process of parisesa. Judging from the explanation of PST \((204b1-2)\), this parisesa means the negation of all possible theses other than his own. The demonstrative process of such parisesas is complicated. It seems to consist of several syllogism-like inferences. We would have much difficulty in discussing the validity of such demonstrations from the \textit{trairūpya} theoretical point of view. I think that these points would prevent \(\text{avita}\) from incorporating with the \textit{trairūpya}-theory.

On the contrary, the \(\text{avita}\) that is criticized by Dignāga in PSV under PS III k.16-
The Development of Avita (Y. OKAZAKI)

17, which mainly discusses the first condition of valid reasons, can be expressed with the following formulae (V: 44a5-6; K: 129a8-b1).

F-1 [Statement] gsal ba ni med pa skye ba ma yin te
[Reason] tha dad par thal ba'i phyir ro
[Exemplification] rjes su 'gro ba ni gcig sngon du 'gro ba ca nyid du mthong la de med pa la ma mthong ba.

The above forms a three-membered proof procedure, and has no process of paris-gesa. Nevertheless, it seems to have some relationship with Śaṣṭitantra's āvīta. The statement of F-1 is similar to (2)-2 in the first table, and the reason of F-1 seems to be derived from (1)-1 or (1)-5. It is noteworthy that the words derived from pra-sanj are used in both cases. Someone, possibly Dignāga, seems to integrate some clauses or phrases of (a') into F-1. The validity of F-1 can be easily discussed from the trairūpya-theoretical point of view.

Of course, Dignāga rejects the demonstration of F-1. He says that it does not fulfill the first condition of a reason (paksadharmatā). That is to say, the property of vyakti is not “tha dad pa(bheda/viseṣa: dissimilarity)” but “rjes su 'gro ba(anvaya: similarity).” Therefore Dignāga proposes that the reason of the above should be transformed into one of positive form (PSV, V: 44a6-b1; K: 129b2-3; cf. PST, 159a7-b1; Kitagawa[1965], p.165). From another angle, all valid āvīta -demonstrations are reducible to vīta in the case of Dignāga, while he says that some kinds of āvīta which are irreducible to vīta are not demonstrations(sādhana) but refutations(duṣana).

In this case of Dignāga’s transformation, no distinction would be drawn between āvīta and vīta. He also says “āvīta is not actually different from vīta.” Therefore, Dignāga’s view would lead to the abandonment of āvīta.

On the other hand, Uddyotakara salvages the āvīta which has prasamga-form from Dignāga’s criticism. The schema that Uddyotakara calls avīta or vyatirekin is as follows (NV under NS 1. 1. 5 and NS 1. 1. 35).

F-2 [Statement] nedam nirātmakaṁ jivacchariram
[Reason] aprāṇādimmattivaprasaṅgāt....

F-2 is accepted as a valid demonstration by Uddyotakara. He states that it fulfills the first condition of a valid reason. About the logical reason of F-2, he says, “(the
reason) pervading the intended subject (vivakṣitavyāpakatve: NV, p.143, 1)." In this case, however, we may wonder what property can be its logical reason. According to the well-known trairūpya-theory, aprāṇādīmattvā cannot be a logical reason for the existence of the self (ātman). Such a property is to be negated in pākṣa or a subject. To solve this problem, some new ideas need to be introduced. Although Uddyotakara does not clearly explain what is the property to be its logical reason and how to fulfill the first condition of a valid reason, I think its solution is related to the fact that he regards the negative properties as an inferential object. He considers that an inferential object is not only an affirmative property (vidhiyāmaṇa-dharma) but also a negative one (pratiṣṭhyāmaṇa-), and that the former is the object of vīta and the latter the object of āvīta (NV, p.158. 4-7; p.311, 14). Besides, Uddyotakara defines the avīta as an inference where the negation of the property is deduced from the observation of the negation of the other one (NV, p.212, 6-7).

It follows from these facts that Uddyotakara succeeds in incorporating trairūpya-theory into avīta having prasasāga-form, expanding the concept of pākṣa-dharma. This is his contribution to the development of avīta-theory.

This research is supported in part by KAKENHI. Besides my special thanks are due to Dr. Hideyo Ogawa and Mr. David Pack. for correcting my English.

(Key Words) āvīta, Śaṣṭitantra, Dignāga, Uddyotakara

(Instructor at Takayama High School, Ph. D.)