Madhyamakaloka における無自性性の二段階論証について

抄録

In his Madhyamakaloka (MA) Kamalasila undertakes the following two kinds of proofs in order to show that entities do not have any permanent or impermanent ultimate intrinsic natures: (1) The proof of the absence of sadhakapramana (i. e., the valid cognition which can prove those intrinsic natures); (2) The counter-proof (badhakapramana) against the opponent's idea that an ultimate intrinsic nature is existent. In this paper we examine why Kamalasila undertakes both these proofs (1) (2) as explained above and how he logically connects both proofs. In the first proof (1) Kamalasila intends to show that the ultimate intrinsic natures of entities are simply imagined (kalpita) by the opponents. This first proof (1) is requisite for the second proof (2), which proves the negation of the opponents' imagination of those intrisic natures. On the other hand, both vajrakanahetu and ekanekaviyogahetu, which are stated in the counter-proof against the opponent's idea, can be regarded as the [sadhya] viparyaye badhakapramanas (i. e., the means of valid cognition which serves to refute the presence of reason in the opposite [of the property being proved]) which prove that the reason consisting in the nonperception of an imperceptible object (adrsyanupalabdhihetu), which is stated in the proof of the absence of sadhakapramana, does not have the fallacy of being inconclusive (anaikantika). Therefore, the present writer shows the possibility that undertaking both those proofs (1) (2) as explained above, Kamalasila tries to systematize the proof of nihsvabhavata by means of viparyaye badhakapramana.