Udayana's Critique of the Intrinsic Theory of Validity: With Respect to the Origination of the Validity

SHIDA Taisei

Since Mīmāṃsaka Kumāṛila (ca 7C) posed a problem about whether the validity and invalidity of cognition are, respectively, intrinsic (*svataḥ*) or extrinsic (*parataḥ*), Naiyāyikas and Buddhists argued over this problem and generated their own theories, mainly in opposition to Kumāṛila's Intrinsic Theory of Validity.

One of the issues against the background of this problem is the authorship of Vedic scripture; whether we should postulate the omniscient author of the Veda, or whether the Veda does not have any author because of its eternity.

In this paper, I will clarify the method of Udayana's critique of the Intrinsic Theory of Validity, especially with respect to its origination (*utpatti*), in the 2nd Chapter (*stabaka*) of the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* (NKus).

Udayana, against the opponent's Intrinsic Theory of Validity, does not put forward his own theory but puts forward instead a third theory in which the intrinsic and extrinsic properties are reversed, and compares it to the opponent's theory. By doing so, he criticizes the opponent's theory on the grounds that it leaves room for the existence of another antagonistic theory (**satpratisādhana*).

A similar critique of the Intrinsic Theory of Validity is found in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* (TS) of Śāntarakṣita (ca 8C). However, there is a difference between the theory of Udayana and the theory of Śāntarakṣita; whether the antagonistic theory put forward to the opponent is argued at the ontological level or at the epistemological level.

1 Critique of the Intrinsic Theory of Validity in the NKus

In the NKus, the *svataḥ/parataḥ* problem of validity/invalidity is discussed at the opening of the 2nd chapter (k.1a) and in his auto-commentary thereon. The content is divided into two parts; the former argument refers to the ontological aspect of the validity (*utpatti*) and the latter refers to the epistemological aspect of it (*jñāpti*).

Among the two arguments, the issue of the former argument on *utpatti* is, at first, the validity and invalidity of general cognition. Afterwards, the issue is focused on those of verbal cognition. The opponent shows various reasons why the causal factor for the validity is not the *guṇa*, or epistemic excellence, but is in fact the absence of the *doṣa*, or fault. Udayana, when he criticizes those assertions, does not put forward Naiyāyika theory but puts forward the third theory as the Intrinsic Theory of Invalidity.

	Validity	V's causal factor	Invalidity	I's causal factor
Opponent	<i>svataḥ</i>	(<i>doṣābhāva</i>) ¹⁾	<i>parataḥ</i>	<i>doṣa</i>
Naiyāyika	<i>parataḥ</i>	<i>guṇa</i>	<i>parataḥ</i>	<i>doṣa</i>
Third Theory	<i>parataḥ</i>	<i>guṇa</i>	<i>svataḥ</i>	(<i>guṇābhāva</i>)

Three theories in the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*

To explain, the opponent's theory is that the validity and invalidity are ontologically determined by means of, respectively, the absence and presence of the *doṣa* (henceforth I refer to this theory as intrinsic "arising" of the validity). On the other hand, Udayana puts forward the Intrinsic Theory of Invalidity which asserts that both properties are ontologically determined by means of the presence/absence of the *guṇa* (henceforth, intrinsic "arising" of the invalidity). By doing so, Udayana shows that both theories are compatible whether the causal factor for the validity is the *doṣābhāva* or the *guṇa*. (NKus pp.211.1–217.1)

Lastly, Udayana, having made the opponent admit that we can establish the two compatible theories to explain the properties of the validity and the invalidity regarding mundane verbal cognition, then proceeds to a discussion of those properties of the Veda which are not attributed to any author.²⁾

■Argument presupposing the Veda as being authorless (NKus p.218.2–4)

The opponent, presupposing that no-one composed the Veda, proposes a syllogism which leads to the validity of the Veda. For, the absence of the author, which means the absence of the ontological cause, implies the absence of the *doṣa* in the cause.

Against this, Udayana shows the antagonistic syllogism which leads to the opposite conclusion on the grounds of the third theory (*i.e.* intrinsic "arising" of the invalidity). By doing so, he points out that the opponent's theory results in an undesirable

consequence of having another antagonistic syllogism (**satpratipakṣa*).³⁾

■ **Argument presupposing the generality of the validity** (NKus pp.218.4–220.2) Then the opponent asserts that we cannot have even any doubt about the validity of the Veda on the grounds of intrinsic validity at the epistemological level, which means that we are inclined to believe or accept what manifests initially on our cognition as true (henceforth I refer to this as intrinsic “acceptance” of the validity).

NKus pp.218.4–220.2: *svata eva prāmāṇyaṇiścayaḥ, kin tu śaṅkā mātram anenāpaniyate, doṣanibandhanatvāt tasya tadabhāve 'bhāvāt, ato nedam anumānavat satpratisādhāṇī-kartum ucitam iti cen na/ guṇanivṛttinibandhanāyāḥ śaṅkāyāḥ sulabhatvāt/*

[Opponent:] The determination of the validity is precisely intrinsic. But only the doubt [about the validity of the Veda] is removed by this (*i.e.* the property of not having the *doṣa* of the speaker). For, the doubt is based on the *doṣa*, and there is not [doubt about the validity of the Veda] in the case that [the Veda] does not have it (*i.e.* the *doṣa*). Therefore, we cannot let it (*i.e.* the justification of the Veda based on the intrinsic “acceptance” of the validity) have another antagonistic theory (**satpratisādhana*). [Udayana:] [It is] not [correct]. Because we can easily have doubt based on the lack of the *guṇa*.

In the above argument, the opponent asserts, first of all, the principle of the intrinsic “acceptance” of the validity, which means that a cognizer believes or accepts what manifests on his cognition in the meanwhile.⁴⁾ Moreover, he asserts that the property of not having the *doṣa* of the speaker removes the doubt about the validity of the Veda. Therefore, the intrinsic “arising” of the validity, which means that the validity and the invalidity are ontologically determined respectively by means of the presence/absence of the *doṣa*, with support from the intrinsic “acceptance” of the validity, rules out even the doubt about the validity of the Veda. The opponent therefore concludes that we cannot make any antagonistic theory against it.

Then Udayana shows the possibility of doubt about the validity of the Veda based on the theory of intrinsic “arising” of the invalidity. However, he does not propose the antagonistic theory against the intrinsic “acceptance” of the validity, but rather states in the above argument that we have doubt about the validity of the Veda on the grounds of the absence of the *guṇa*; and to come to doubt something implies acceptance of the thing as true in the meanwhile.⁵⁾

Nonetheless, Udayana criticizes the intrinsic “arising” of the validity on ac-

count that it cannot prove the authority of the Veda because there remains the possibility of the intrinsic “arising” of the invalidity.

2 Critique of the Intrinsic Theory of Validity in the TS

We can confirm a similar critique of the Intrinsic Theory of Validity in the TS of Śāntarakṣita. What differentiates the critique of Udayana and that of Śāntarakṣita is as follows; while Udayana shows the third theory (*i.e.* the Intrinsic Theory of Invalidity) only when he argues the ontological aspect of validity, Śāntarakṣita mainly shows the third theory regarding the epistemological aspect. Therefore we can say that Udayana's third theory is intrinsic “arising” of the invalidity, and Śāntarakṣita's third theory is intrinsic “acceptance” of the invalidity.⁶⁾

■ **Unrestricted Theory of Buddhists** Several later texts, such as the *Sarva-darśanasamgraha* (SDS, ca 14C), state that Buddhists asserted the Intrinsic Theory of Invalidity.⁷⁾ But more than a few scholars have refuted such a fact.⁸⁾ For example, in the 25th chapter of the TS, Śāntarakṣita having counterposed the *restricted theory* (**niyamapakṣa*) and the *unrestricted theory* (**anīyamapakṣa*) states explicitly that Buddhists accept the following unrestricted theory; the validity of some kind of cognition is intrinsic, and the validity of other cognition is extrinsic.⁹⁾

TS k.2944 p.938.7–8: *yenaikaiḥ svata eveti proccair niyama ucyate/ kiñcit svato 'nyataḥ kiñcit paraś cāniyamo mataḥ//*

For, some [polemicists] assert loudly the restriction; “[Validity is] precisely intrinsic.” On the other hand, some [polemicists] (*i.e.* Buddhists) hold the unrestricted; “Some [validity of cognition] is intrinsic, and some [validity of cognition] is extrinsic.”

Incidentally, INAMI [1993] and KRASSER [2003] reported that the prototype argument of this unrestricted theory had been already stated by Devendrabuddhi and Śākhyabuddhi (ca 7C), and that later Buddhists after Śāntarakṣita instead state the unrestricted theory almost solidly.¹⁰⁾

■ **Intrinsic Theory of Invalidity in the TS** However, the Intrinsic Theory of Invalidity is hypothetically referred to in the TS. For example, verses kk.3000, 3001 show the Intrinsic Theory of Invalidity, with small parts of Kumārila's verses changed.¹¹⁾ There, the Intrinsic Theory of Invalidity is stated as follows; If Mīmāṃsakas assert the Intrinsic Theory of Validity, then we can assert the opposite in the same manner.¹²⁾

This Intrinsic Theory of Invalidity in the TS is argued at the epistemological level. It would be, regardless of whether it is valid or not, intrinsic “acceptance” of the invalidity. The keystone of the theory is to doubt the validity of every cognition in principle. Therefore this theory seems to be an extreme skepticism. And it represents the point that differs from the argument of Udayana in the NKus.

3 Conclusion

Regarding the *svataḥ/parataḥ* problem, Udayana shows the third theory as the Intrinsic Theory of Invalidity in the NKus, as did Śāntarakṣita in the TS.

Śāntarakṣita, however, hypothetically showed the Intrinsic Theory of Invalidity in the TS. His theory is argued mainly at the epistemological level, and therefore seems to be a theory of intrinsic “acceptance” of the invalidity, which is a kind of skepticism.

On the other hand, Udayana shows the Intrinsic Theory of Invalidity only when he argues the origination of the validity, which explains the origination of validity/invalidity on the grounds of the presence/absence of the *guṇa* (i.e. intrinsic “arising” of the validity). But he does not propose such a theory at the epistemological level. This means that Udayana should have differentiated clearly the *svataḥ/parataḥ* problem into the two aspects of origination (*utpatti*) and justification (*jñapti*).

This critique of Udayana disadvantages the opponent's theory in that it leaves room for the existence of another antagonistic theory (**satpratisādhana*). Moreover, it is estimated that the concept of the **satpratisādhana* is something which has merely generalized the concept of having another antagonistic syllogism (*satpratipakṣa*) in the case of inference, which is one of the logical fallacies (*hetvābhāsa*).¹³⁾

⟨Abbreviations & References⟩

NKus: *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, Śrī Padmaprasāda Upādhyāya & Śrī Dhunḍhirāja Śāstri (ed.), Kashi Sanskrit Series 30, Varanasi, 1957.

TS(P): *Tattvasamgraha (Pañjikā)*, S. D. Shastri (ed.), Varanasi, 1968.

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*As to other references, see those in my article SHIDA [2006].

1) Though I propose this schema for the sake of convenience, it might not be relevant. For, the actual Mīmāṃsakas must not have needed any causal factor for the validity. Therefore, even the expression “V[alidity]'s causal factor” itself might not have been accepted by them. 2) Cf. NKus p.217.1–2: *pauruṣeyaviṣaye iyam astu vyavasthā, apauruṣeye tu doṣanivṛtyaiva prāmāṇyam iti*,... 3) NKus p.218.2–4: *tathāpi vedānām apauruṣeyatve siddhe, apetaavaktr̥doṣatvād eva prāmāṇyam setsyati, tataḥ siddhe prāmāṇye guṇābhāve 'pi tad iti doṣābhāva eva hetur akāraṇam guṇā iti cen na/ apetaavaktr̥guṇatvena satpratipakṣatvaprasaṅgāt/* 4) Commentaries of NKus also interpret that the opponent here discusses the intrinsic “acceptance” of the validity. cf. NKusBo pp.235.23–236.1, NKusPra p.218.4–6. 5) Regarding whether the intrinsic “acceptance” of the validity means the intrinsic justification or not, Udayana will argue in the following section of the NKus about *jñapti*. 6) I have mentioned the demarcation problem between the ontological aspect (*utpatti*) and epistemological aspect (*jñapti*) of the validity in SHIDA [2006]. 7) Cf. INAMI [1993: p.113]. 8) INAMI [1993], HATTORI [1997], KRASSER [2003]. 9) Cf. TSP ad TS k.3122 p.981.12–15, INAMI [1993: pp.86–88], HATTORI [1997: p.368]. 10) Cf. HATTORI [1997: pp.368.6b–369.6]. 11) TS kk.3000, 3001: *tasmāt svato'pramāṇatvaṃ sarvatraut-sargikam sthitam/ bādhakāraṇaduṣṭatvajñānābhāvād apodyate// tathā bodhātmakatvena buddheḥ prāptāpramāṇatā/ yathārthajñānāhetūtthaguṇajñānād apodyate//*, cf. ŚVc k.53, SASTRI [1928]. 12) Cf. TS k.2999 p.954.1–2: *anayaivopapattyā syād aprāmāṇyam api svataḥ/ tatrāpi śakyate vaktum yasmān nyāyo 'yam idr̥śah//* “Invalidity would be intrinsic too just in the same logic. For, [we] can state the following logic regarding it (i.e. invalidity).” cf. TS k.2845 p.911.11–12. 13) Comparing the two concepts of *satpratipakṣa* and *satpratisādhana*, the former means that an inferential syllogism has another antagonistic syllogism which leads to the opposite conclusion (cf. ONO [2002]). On the other hand, it is supposed that the latter means we can establish two compatible theories, both of which have no deciding clincher. At least, we can safely say that Udayana takes something different from inferential syllogism into account, because he let the opponent state “unlike inference (*na ... anumānavat*).”

(Key Words) Udayana, *prāmāṇyavāda*, *satpratisādhana*, *Nyāyakusumāñjali*

(Part-time Lecturer, Tōkai University, D.Litt.)