This essay consists of three main parts: linguistic, historical and

(1) The textual part is taken from the author's Doctoral Dissertation: Middle
Way thought and Its Historical Development, which was submitted to the
Imperial University of Tokyo in 1941 and published in 1944 (Kyoto: Hozokan).
Material used here is from pp. 162-192. Originally this fromed the second part
of "Philosophical Studies of the Middle," which was delivered at the Annual
Meeting of the Philosophical Society, Imperial University of Tokyo, in 1939
Since at that time there was no other essay published on the time concept in
Buddhism, these earlier studies represented a new and original contribution
by the author. Up to now, in fact, such texts as "The Time of the Sage,"
"The Pith and Essence" have survived untouched. The subject of "time and
the Timeless" has been treated more recently by Dr. Ananda K. Coomaras-
wamy in his article "Time and Eternity," (Ascona, Switzerland, 1942), pp.
40-41, and again in "Time and Eternity in Indian Thought" by Professor
Mircea Eliade of Chicago: the seventh essay in "Man and Time" (Eranos
opportunity, or the moment of fulfillment of purpose. Finally, adhvan refers to a stretch or length of space or time. It may mean a road or journey in space and time past, present or future.

Thus, with the exception of adhvan, these terms signify the moment of time as something appointed or expected. They are to be compared with kairos, the time of purpose measured by quality.

It is quite usual in the history of religions to find the word “time” used in the sense of the moment of fullness of a realization or aim. Among these terms, however, it is the word samaya...coming together...which is most frequently employed in the Buddhist scriptures. For instance, almost all of the sutras begin with the words “Evaṃ mayā śrutam: ekasmin samaye Bhagavān Rājagrhe viharati sma...etc.” In these introductory phrases, the four conditions...time, place, the master and his audience...are posited. The coming together of these four necessarily indicates an auspicious event which happens once for all in the long eons of sacred history. It is the appointed time for the accomplishment of the Bodhisattva’s vow (pranidhāna) or firm resolution and striving, which he attains through his untiring acts of meritorious conduct (Bodhisattva-carya). From the standpoint of his audience, it is conceived as an opportunity which may be an “eternal once.”

Among all of these kinds of appointed times and opportunities, the most important and auspicious one is the moment of Buddha’s enlightenment under the Bodhi tree at Buddhagaya. This single moment of the Great Awakening (ekakṣanābhisambodhi) is the prototype after which all Buddhist sacred time is patterned. From the attainment of arhatship down to the satori of Zen and the single moment of the faith-experience of Shinran (1173-1262), there is no kind of religious time which is not centered upon this first great attainment of Nirvāṇa. This is also true of the Buddhist concept of eternity. Another application of this term kṣaṇa-moment is in speaking of the moment of the conversion of sinners. For criminals this moment can be that in which the decisive act is committed which causes one to fall into damnation, but it can also mean the rare moment
of one’s emergence from hell after expiation and purification. A parable says:

If there were a yoke with one hole in it floating in the ocean and borne about by the four winds, it would be easier for a one-eyed turtle rising to the surface once in a hundred years to put its head through the hole than for such a being to attain man’s estate.

It is clear that this concept of kṣaṇa-moment has been accentuated in Buddhist theories of time. Moreover, this has led to the “theory of momentariness” (kṣanika-vāda) and also to the idea of continuity (santāna). The synthetic unification of kṣaṇa-momentariness and santāna-continuity has been accelerated by the philosophical studies of Adhidharma, completed by the Vijñāna-vāda, the School of Buddhist Idealism, and further developed in the time theory of Fa-tsang (643–712) in the Hua-yen school in China, synthesizing sānyata (emptiness) thought with the constructive idealist position.

II. The Buddhist view that all things are in a state of flux is well known. But few realize that there were two basically different schools of thought. On the one hand, Theravāda, representing the elders and conservative disciples, tended to be moralistic in practice and analytic in theory. They were called “Abhidharmists,” which means scholars of the analytic study of Dharma. They contributed many psychological studies of the body, the mind, and of things and their relationships. But their observations of the details of structures, attributes and relationships were always bound up with a fundamental ethical viewpoint. Among the Abhidharmists, the Theravādins of the Pāli tradition and the Sarvāstivādins of the Sanskrit tradition were the most influential. The Sarvāstivādins’ role was especially important.

(2) The word kṣaṇa or “moment” means the minimal unit of time. But the “theory of momentariness” was a later term of the Abhidharmists, who imputed to kṣaṇa not only momentariness but also duration (sthiti) and continuity (santāna). It must be noted that even the Sarvāstivādins strictly held to the principle of the Middle Way as seen in the Mahāvibhāṣā (Vols. 8, 49, 199, 200), which has been referred to in the author’s Middle Way Thought, pp. 298–346.
from the broader viewpoint of the history of Buddhist thought, because they carried out their scholarly achievements amid the attacks and counterattacks not only of many Buddhist schools, but also of several schools of Brahmanic and Non-Brahmanic thought on the continent of India. Moreover, being the largest and most widespread school, it split into many smaller currents of thought. At their headquarters in North India, they were called “orthodox” and “traditional,” because the mountainous surroundings of Kashmir tended to keep them conservative. On the contrary, the Gandhāra group, situated along the East-West international highway, became more progressive and their way of thought was naturally quite tolerant and inclusive, as has been shown, for instance, by the examples of Greco-Gandhāra art of that area. The famous systematizers of the Vijnāna Idealist school of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the brothers Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, were reared and educated in this atmosphere and environment of Gandhāra.

The other main school, the Mahāsaṅghikas, representing a young and miscellaneous multitude, avowed claims of religious faith and devotion. To them Buddha was simply a supernatural figure and the Dharma was the Logos of cosmic unity. The Mahāyāna doctrines of Buddha-kāya and Dharma-ta had a close connection with these notions. These, then, were the two main opposing schools. The one centered upon the humanity of Buddha and the ethical and psychological analysis of Dharma, while the other tended to worship the mystical figure of Buddha in the way of faith.

One cannot fail to perceive this deep gulf which existed from the earliest phase. The Mahāsaṅghikas simply emphasized the “present” or “now” in life and ignored the past and future, but the conservative analysts evaluated every functional aspect of past, present and future while at the same time substantiating continuity. The contrast was that of direct, intuitive knowledge on the one hand and of discursive on the other.

Now I should like to trace briefly the highlights of the various theories concerning time. First of all, Buddhists opposed the eternalist school, the Kālavādins, who insisted upon absolute time as the first cause and creation of everything, and they also opposed the ideological theories of per-
manence (nitya) and self (atman) of ego-centric Aryan nationalism along with the upper-class ritualistic formalism of the Brahmins. The Buddhist situation can be likened to that of a certain critic who emphasizes the opposing notions, since they hinted at the new ideas of impermanence (anitya) and egolessness (anatman). This kind of negativistic innovation can be seen as an outgrowth of the times, for with the deeper penetration of Aryan colonization into the heart of India the needs of an ever expanding frontier had to be met. These negative but novel theories shattered the ideology of a closed society and opened the vista of religious truth to the oppressed and underprivileged multitudes. Thus arose a new Aryan universalism including all classes of men and becoming the solid basis of Buddhism as a universal religion. It was out of this same need that the Middle Way principle appeared for the first time in Buddhism.

The time theory of early or primitive Buddhism is identical with that of the Mahásaṅghikas noted earlier, that is, “the past and future are without existence; the present is the real existent.” The analytic Sarvāstivādins(everything-exists-school), however, developed also a realism which held that the self exists (svabhava). Subsequently, they elaborated a theory of the simultaneous formation of past, present and future. Even among the Sarvāstivādins, scholars are found to differ with each other on the discrimination of the present, past and future. Traditionally, it has been said that among the different theories, Vasumitra’s condition or situation theory is (avastha) correct. He likens the three kinds of time to three

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(4) The three periods of time (past, present and future) are called trayo ‘dhvānah or tayo addhā. Nāgarjuna’s criticism on time was also based upon this adhvan-time.
straws in a lottery or drawing (vartika, gulika). The difference is merely one of position or situation, as being put in the “situation of one, of ten, or of a hundred.” Vasubandhu, the most representative scholar of Vijñānavāda, enumerated four theories of time. 1) Dharmatrāta says that past, present and future are differentiated by their appearance or existing nature (bhāva-anythinga). But their substance (dravya) remains the same, just as a golden vase may change its form through the process of melting and remolding. Their shapes or appearances may differ from each other, but the substance of goldness is always kept as gold. 2) Ghoṣaka says that past, present and future are differentiated by their character (laksananyayathātva). When a thing is united with the character of the past, it is the past, and in like manner, that which is united with the character of the present, and of the future, future. 3) Vasumitra’s theory was given above. 4) Bhuddadeva says times are differentiated according to their relationships (annualityathātva, apeksa) just as a woman is called “mother” by her child and “daughter” by her parent.

Nāgārjuna, the most representative thinker of early Mahāyana Buddhism and the author of the famous “Verses on the Middle” or Madhayamaka-kārikā, synthesizing two opposing theories by the Middle Way principle, wrote in the nineteenth chapter of his Criticism on Time (Kalapartic) as follows:

1) If because of the past there are future and present, then future and present must be in the past.

2) If within the past there were neither future nor present, then of future and present How are they caused by the past?

3) Independent of the past there is no future nor any present, therefore these two periods do not exist.

(5) For the four great masters on time among the Sarvāstivādins see: Mahāvibhaṣa, Vol. 75; S. Miyamoto, Mahāyāna and Hinayāna (Tokyo, 1944), p.21; L. de la Vallée Poussin, L’Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, V, pp. 52–54, 1925.
Because such is the case, we know that the two other periods and above, between, below, unity, difference...
all such states as these have no existence.

Time standing still cannot be had, and time cannot be had.
If time cannot be had how can one teach time's qualities?

Because of things there is time,
Apart from things how can time be?
Even things do not exist,
How much less can time exist?

Nāgārjuna agreed with the Sarvāstivādins' denial of the existence of time, but opposed their concept of entity-realism (svabhāvavāda). He drew the conclusion of the non-existence of time from the Madhyamaka standpoint of non-substantiality (nihsvabhāvavāda), which was a restatement of the original Buddhist teaching of non-self.

In the course of time a reaction arose to offset the non-subjectivity among the traditional schools in North India. Diverging streams of thought gradually took shape and even opposing ideas and theories were integrated into a system. The full flowering of this tendency is found in the Vijnana-vāda, the school of so-called Buddhist Idealism. Its adherents were quite proud of their new theory of the “Vijnana Middle Way.” They criticized the Mādhyamika view of non-substantiality and the Prajñāpāramitā teaching on emptiness as the other extreme of the Abhidharma concept of entity-realism. This was a most interesting situation, but a most subtle and delicate affair. First of all, we recall that the Gautama's enlightenment was based upon the Middle way principle. Thus it has been said that whatever Buddha taught was always in the light of this principle. With the rise of Mahāyāna, there appeared the Middle May school (Mādhyamika) of Nāgārjuna, and now, as the final culmination of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism, the Vijnana-vāda arises, stating. “Ours is the latest theory, the third sermon, supplementing not only the Buddha's first sermon, but also the second sermon of the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra and that of Nāgārjuna.” While these claims may appear to be antagonistic to each...
other, one thing is quite clear: all of these schools claim to be based upon the Middle Way principle.

The Viśṇavādins, setting up time as a category, and adapting the causation theory of bija or seed, differentiate the present from the past and future. It was really they who conceived of time not only in its momentariness (kṣanika), but also in its continuity (santāna). Fa-tsang, the systematizer of Hua-yen philosophy, synthesized Mādhyamika's Fourfold propositions or catuḥkotikas and Eight Noes or aṣṭaviṣeṣaṇa-pratiṣedhāḥ: fourfold non-duality, and the Viśṇavādins' six qualities of seed: 1) momentariness, 2) simultaneous existence with the effect, 3) continuity in flux, 4) determined transmission of moral characteristics, 5) dependence on multiple conditions, 6) fruition of its own effect, in the doctrine of "six qualities of interdependent causation." Hua-yen philosophy centered upon the actuality of a singleness of mind in which the cosmic and creative structure of being and non-being are integrated, and also elaborated on the conventional time divisions by making past, present and future each a threefold category, thus making nine. Since each one of these nine is interdependent with each of the others and since all of them interpenetrate, these nine functions are generalized into one single instant of actuality, resulting in the composition of ten kinds of time altogether. Fa-tsang proposed this so-called "Doctrine of the ten mysteries of harmonious interdependence," expounding thereby his time concept in the theory of "simultaneous appearance in completeness" and in that of "differential formation in the multiple dimensions of ten ages," on the basis of interdependent causation and cosmic unity.

III. Now let us turn to a very old passage which reveals the Buddha's insight into time. It is found in a text called The Sage of Time, or

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(6) "Yōan-chi yin-mên liu-i fa" (Engi inmon rokugi hō), in Wu-chiang chang (Gokyo sho) (Nanjio 1591, Taisho 45, pp. 502-03). S. Miyamoto, Ultimate Middle and Voidness (Tokyo, 1943), pp. 577-583. The author presents in the form of a table and diagram the theoretical development of the synthesis of opposing ideas such as momentariness and continuity, voidness and self-existence, cause and conditions, etc.
Bhaddekaratta (literally, the night of the sage), in the Middle Discourses of the Buddha (Nos. 131–134, M. N.), with equivalents in both Chinese Āgamas and Pāli Nikāyas:

Do not chase after the past; do not seek for the future.
The past is already no more; the future is not yet.
And see the elements of present in every place,
Without attachment, without moving......yet clearly see and strive in the present.
Do earnestly the task for today; who knows the nearness of death on the morrow?
Truly who can say he will not meet the great army of death?
Such a man of realization, earnestly striving day and night without indolence,
He, surely, is the sage of time, the peaceful one, the steady one.

This Time of the Sage is the realization of the oneness of man with the absolute or Dharma in which one brings his entire being into the instant of the real present and strives toward utter selflessness and consequent gratefulness to all of life. It is the basis of religious practice and leads to wisdom, enlightenment, and Nirvāṇa.

In one of the scriptures of Jātaka (Hatthipāla, Jātaka, No. 509), there is related the incident of Gopāla, who aspired to become a disciple of the

(7) “Shih hsüan yüan-chi wu-ai fa” (Jü gen engi muge hō) in Wu-chiang chang, op. cit. J. Takakusu, The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy (1947), pp. 120–121, translates as follows: “The theory of co-relation, in which all things have co-existence and simultaneous rise,” and “The theory of variously completing ten time-periods creating one entity.” Dr. Fung Yu-lan, History of Chinese Philosophy (1953), pp. 349–355, renders these as: “The theory of simultaneous completeness” (Tung-shih chí-tsu hsiang-yin mén, Dōjī gusoku soō mon), and “The theory of the variable formation of the ten ages” (Shih-shih chieh-fa i-chang mén, Jisse kakuho ijo mon). Mr. Taitetsu Unno has recently sent me his translations of the same terms, as follows: “The theory of simultaneous, co-existent correspondence” and “the theory of disjunctive formation of elements separated in ten time-worlds.”

Buddha. But the King would not hear of this, and urged him to succeed to the crown, Gopāla answers the King: “Oh King, do not speak of tomorrow of things that can be done today. The good must be performed this very day.” Gopāla continues, reciting some verses from The Time of the Sage:

People idly pass the days, saying:
   Tomorrow I will, the next time I will.
But alas, these thoughts never come again.
   Knowing that they fail to come again,
   When good thoughts arise,
   Who among the sages would throw them away?

Shinran (1173–1262), founder of the Shin sect, when ready to take the vow of celibacy at the age of nine, was asked to postpone his initiation ceremony until the following day. He answered:

   Like cherry blossoms are the hearts
   That tomorrow think they might
   For who can tell but there might be
   A tempest in the night?

A Japanese Zen master, Shoju-Rājin, in his poetic saying, The One-Day Living of the Sage, wrote:

   Just think of present things,
   The past cannot return,
   Tomorrow is hidden from us.

Expanding this in his diary, he wrote: “The most important fact refers to the heart of the now on this very day. There is no tomorrow for him who neglects this fact. People usually think of the future and make plans, but are unaware of the exact stroke of the present (literally, ‘hit-target-now’).” Not to lose the “exact stroke of the present” means to live without being shackled to the present, possessing steadiness and equilibrium.

The Mahā-sāropama-sutta (29, M. M.), which includes the Bhaddekaratta, or Time of the Sage, explains the famous parable of the Pith of the Tree. This parable relates how man, originally seeking the pith or core (sāra)
of the tree, loses sight of his primary objective and becomes attached to the branches and leaves and becomes wrongly shackled to the bark. This is used to trace the path of the disciple who enters the Buddhist Sangha with a fervent aspiration for truth, but after practicing the disciplines and gaining some recognition, drifts into indolence, saying, “I have gained merit, I have become famous, the other disciples are not famous and their powers are insignificant.” The Buddha says:

Monks, it is like a man walking about aiming at the pith, seeking for the pith, looking about for the pith of a great, stable and pithy tree, who passes by the pith itself, passes by the softwood, passes by the bark, passes by the young shoots, and who, having cut down the branches and foliage, might go amay taking them with him and thinking they were the pith.

Even those who are not taken by worldly recognition are equally to be censured. They are proud of their observance of the precepts, saying, “I have observed the precepts. I am a good man. Those priests violated the precepts. They are bad men.” This is like mistaking the bark for the pith of the tree. It is only a little better than those who mistake the branches for the pith. The gist of this is the essence of the sutta, The Night of the Sage. It says, “Do not be taken by frivolities, but grasp the heart of the matter.”

Why is this analysis of time stressed? The Pāli scriptures teach that one must realize enlightenment in the real and immediate present by selflessness and non-attachment. In the suttas it states:

And what is the reason (for the analysis of time)? The verses of Bhaddekaratta say: there is meaning, there is truth, and these become the basis for religious practice. This leads to wisdom, to enlightenment, to Nirvāṇa.

The reason for the stress on the analysis of time is identical with the

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reason for the stress on the Middle Way theory in the first sermon of Bud-
dha, the Sutta on the Turning of the Wheel of Dharma, and the Ten
or Fourteen Indefinites (avyākata).

In a sutta in the Anguttara Nikāya there is an explanation to the effect
that the past is one extreme, the future is another extreme and the present
is the “middle” (majjhe, vemajjhe). In the Suttanipata, also, this “middle”
is applied to the present.

The present is the “middle” between the end-limit (pubbe ante) of the
past and the beginning-limit (paccha) of the future. The analysis of time
is to be free of attachments to these two extremes and yet remain free
from attachment to the present.

The two negations of the past and future comprise the analytic method
of the Middle Way. It denies the two extremes. The steadiness in the pre-
sent is the Middle Way analysis applied to itself. Thus, in the analysis of
time the spirit of the Middle Way operates. Analysis analyzes the extremes
and also itself. Analysis must be “analysis of non-analysis” to be true
analysis, and this is identical to the idea that true middle is a non-mid-
dle. The theory of the Middle applied spatially is Nirvāṇa, and applied in
terms of time is timeless time.

It is interesting to note that although Sakyamuni Buddha was said to
have been cognizant of past and future existences, he gave the following
advice to Sakuludayi, who was attached to past and future:

However, Sakuludayi, set aside thoughts of the past; set aside
thoughts of the future. I will teach you the truth: this being, that
becomes; from the arising of this, that arises; this not becoming,
that does not become; from the ceasing of this, that ceases.

Thus he stresses the importance of the standpoint of dharma based
upon conditional origination and the insight into the present. Sakyamuni
constantly taught the clear and right view of life based upon conditional
origination and the necessity of practice based upon this insight. He taught:

Dharma is a reality of the present, a timeless reality, a reality
which openly says come and see; it leads to Nirvāṇa, it is self-evi-
dent to the wise.

This same passage is repeated with reference to Nirvāṇa.

The Buddha, being identified with the Dharma and Nirvāṇa, is non-composite (asamkhata), beyond time (akāliko, timeless), transcends the aeons (kappatito vippamutto) and is not a man of aeons (akkapiyo). He is to be in time and samsāra, yet goes beyond time and samsāra.

From the hedonistic standpoint sensual pleasures are the most immediate reality, and such things as ideals and self-improvements are time-consuming. But for those who are intent upon self-improvement and whose thoughts are upon the transiency of life, the standpoint of Dharma is the immediate reality and the pursuit of sensual pleasures is the pursuit of evanescent time.

These two extremes apply to the priesthood and the layman; in the case of Sakyamuni he realized a now guiding spirit in the ideal of a Middle Way between the extremes of courtly luxury and ascetic self-mortification. In the Ágamas the priesthood is considered the second extreme and is related to the third which is the Middle Way principle, and in Mahāyāna the two extremes are negated and the new ideal of Middle Way is advocated.

These two standpoints are interestingly contrasted in a sutta in the Samyutta Nikāya. When the disciple Samiddhi had finished bathing in the hot spring of Rājagaha and was drying himself, a deva illuminated the grove of the spring with brilliant light and approached Samiddhi. He spoke in verse to him:

O bhikku, you beg for alms without enjoying life,
And while enjoying life you do not beg for alms.
O bhikku, beg for alms while enjoying life.
Do not let time pass you by.

And then Samiddhi answers:
I do not know about your time.
Time is hidden and it does not appear.
Therefore I beg for alms without enjoying life.
Time will not pass me by.

At that time the *deva* came down to earth and said;
O bhikku, you renounced the world when very young,
When possessing virility, black hair and youth filled with happiness,
You did not enjoy the pleasures in the first period of life.
O bhikku, enjoy the pleasures of life,
Do not pursue that which extends over time
By throwing away the immediate reality.

And Samiddhi answers;
O friend, I do not throw away the immediate reality and pursue that which extends over time.
O friend, I throw away that which extends over time and pursue the immediate reality.

For, O friend, “Pleasures extend over time, there is much suffering, much pain, and torments increase evermore,
But this Dharma is immediate reality, not extending over time.
It invites you to come and see; it leads to Nirvāṇa, self-evident to the wise man.”

Thus the Lord teaches.

The two standpoints in this Samiddhi-sutta are contrasted in another sutta in the *Samyutta* by the voice of *Māra*, the Tempter, enticing a bhikku on the one hand and the figure of a bhikkhu practicing asceticism on the other.

The following selections from the *Suttanipāta* all express the immediate reality which transcends time:
The “Saint” has washed away all evil, inly bred or from without; no more he’ll enter time.. like gods and men, the brood of time. (3. 6. 511)

Who outgrows time...to come
or past...by purity
and insight, with Release
from all that springs from sense. (2. 13. 373)

Grasping not, grudging not, the saint unmoved
to "high" or "low" or "equal" lays no claim;
timeless, he whirls down grooves of time no more' (4. 10. 860)

Thus it is clear that he who does not chase after the past, pursue the future,
or who is not captured by the present and yet perceives clearly the Dharma in the present, truly sees the Buddha.

To preceive the Dharma in the immediate present and to see the Buddha means to live in the Eternal Now, the Timeless Time. It is what the Zen people refer to as "the ordinary mind is the Way." In the writings of Shinshu this is expressed as: "In Buddhism there is no such thing called tomorrow. You must hurry, hurry the matters concerning the teachings of the Buddha."

Dogen (1200~1253), the founder of Soto Zen, refers to the "present now" in his Essay on Time (Uji): "Time is not merely transitory. It dwells in its own situation. Time itself does not flow. It looks as if it is over there, but it is now......This is continuity." "Working freely in a manner proper to your own situation...that is your personal time."

In conclusion I would like to say just a few words about my quite obvious omission of any discussion of the subject of eternity in this paper. In Buddhist thought the concept of eternity is closely associated with Nirvana. Moreover, the Buddha declared that silence is more appropriate to the subject of eternity than much talking. One cannot speak of eternity as being relative to time, nor can it be discussed as a subject in itself. Eternity is neither a prolongation of time nor a quantitative concept, but one

which is qualitative. It is approached through Nirvāṇa or through the doctrine of Buddha-kāya. While these are central concepts in Buddhism, they would require much more space for adequate treatment than the scope of this paper allows.

I have also omitted for some of the same reasons a discussion of time in the sense of “chronos”...historical time. History in Buddhist thought is to be conceived as a life history, and model for this kind of time is the Buddha’s own life, including his birth, enlightenment, preaching and death. These four events are commemorated in sacred monuments and by pilgrimages of Buddhists everywhere. It is in relation to the Buddha’s life history that each individual sees the importance of his own life history. In like manner, as Buddha went from his ascetic life out into the world to preach and teach, so the individual finds his own life meaningful by associating with others in ethical and religious practices. The stupas, inscriptions, sculptured images, and many historical and geographical records of pilgrimages serve to remind him of the one whom he follows and also serve as our clues to the events in the Buddha’s own life.

As for the measurement of time as...western time is based upon the units of the second, minute, hour, etc....Buddhist time has for its basic unit the kṣaṇa, which equals to one-seventy-fifth of a second, but I am glad to leave this to the scientists to explain.

** This essay was delivered at a panel discussion on the topic “Doctrines of Time and Eternity” held at the Annual Meeting of the National Association of Biblical Instructors at the Union Theological Seminary in New York on Monday, December 29, 1958, “The Hindu Viewpoint” was presented by Swami Akhilananda of The Ramakrishna Vedanta Society; “The Biblical Viewpoint” was presented by Professor Edmund Perry of Northwestern University; and “The Buddhist Viewpoint” was presented by Professor Shoson Miyamoto, visiting professor at the University of Chicago.

(12) 120 kṣaṇas = 1 tatksaṇa; 60 tatksaṇas = 1 lava; 30 lavas = 1 mhuı̂rtı̂; 30 mhuı̂rta = 1 ahorātra (day and night, 24 hours, 648,000 kṣaṇas). A kṣaṇa equals \( \frac{1}{75} \) second.