2011 Volume 131 Issue 4 Pages 918-925
In this paper, we consider a revenue-sharing and network investment problem between an Internet service provider (ISP) and a content provider (CP) by applying the dynamic agency theory. We formulate the problem as the principal-agent problem where the ISP is the principal and the CP is the agent. The principal-agent problem is transformed to a stochastic optimal control problem in which the objectives of ISP are to find an optimal revenue-sharing strategy and a network investment strategy, and to advise an incentive compatible effort level to the CP. The sufficient conditions for the existence of the optimal revenue-sharing strategy, the optimal investment strategy and the incentive compatible effort to the CP are obtained. A numerical example is solved to show the existence of such strategies. The practical implications of the results obtained in the paper will also be discussed.
The transactions of the Institute of Electrical Engineers of Japan.C
The Journal of the Institute of Electrical Engineers of Japan