2003 Volume 9 Issue 2 Pages 309-314
According to fallibilism, all positions are fallible. This principle is exposed to a lot of criticism. In Germany, for example, transcendental pragmatics and pancritical rationalism contributed to this discussion; on the other hand, in the English-speaking world, a pancritical rationalist W. W. Bartley, his critics J. F. Post and J. Watkins exchanged arguments over the issue. But these controversies have not yet come to a conclusion. The arguments against the principle of fallibilism tend to focus on how contradictory fallibilism is. Is this principle indeed contradictory, however? In the following discussion, I will examine some of the negative views on the principle of fallibilism and suggest that it is by no means contradictory. First, I will present two contradictions of fallibilism that transcendental pragmatist W. Kuhlmann has argued, and in the second, investigate this argument. Thirdly, I will show the paradox of pancritical rationalism that Bartley has presented, and in the fourth, examine this argument. Finally, I shall conclude that the principle of fallibilism is not contradictory.
