医学哲学 医学倫理
Online ISSN : 2433-1821
Print ISSN : 0289-6427
ドン・マーキスの反妊娠中絶論とその批判
江口 聡
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ジャーナル フリー

28 巻 (2010) p. 19-28

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After briefly reviewing the philosophical controversy on abortion, I will introduce Don Marquis' "future-like-ours" argument and its various critiques. Marquis insists that (1) it is seriously immoral to kill us because killing deprives us of our valuable futures, and (2) a human fetus has a future like ours, therefore (3) it is seriously immoral to kill a human fetus. His argument is very simple but plausible, and not easy to rebut. Possible objections to his argument are (1) an objection from negligence of the women's viewpoint, (2) a ruductio ad absurdum objection from contraception, (3) an objection from metaethical analysis of "loss" and "deprivation", (4) an objection from personal identity and non-similarity of a fetus and us, and (5) a metaethical objection from relation of value and desire. I argue that objection (5), which relies on the desire account of value, is most powerful, if we are to account for modifications and qualifications of "desire", such that desire should be interpreted as "dispositional desire" and desires should be "rational and well-informed". But these objections also have a significant burden of philosophical justification.

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