Abstract
This paper aims to present the rise and fall of the British Concession in Xiamen (the Amoy Bund) from 1852 to 1930. The paper points out similarities between bunds and traditional littoral space in Asian ports, and describes the conflicts and compromises in making a bund in minor treaty ports in China. Due to the establishment of foreigners’ land rights in modern China and the importation of western urban management in concessions and settlements, the bunds could be developed within the diverse contexts of the treaty ports. Their influence on Chinese cities was more than in determining an urban form, but also in providing contested spaces in which laissez-faire capitalism and self-government were mixed. This urban model was pursued by the Chinese government as a way to modernize cities in the early twentieth century.

Keywords: Amoy Bund; British Concession; treaty port; Xiamen; China

1. Introduction
After the First Opium War (1839–1842), many treaty ports were opened in China and their development was vital in the urban history of Chinese cities. Pictorial representations of treaty ports always focus on the bunds, featuring eclectic architecture and broadly laid boulevards. The bunds were regarded as specific to treaty ports and were interpreted as 'symbolic of the Western space created and maintained among Chinese chaos, and of the remaking of the Chinese environment by Western technology and enterprise.' (Bickers, 1999: 141) The term 'bund' is derived from Anglo-Indian vocabulary and was extensively used to describe the space between the waters (sea or river) and hinterlands; these included architecture, gardens, piers and jetties, as well as roads parallel to the waterside. (Taylor, 2002: 128–31) Embankments and landing places were key components of the bund. Its spatial feature was elongated and narrow, with a basic layout of closed buildings on one side and the other opened to the water.

Besides the well-known Shanghai Bund in the Shanghai International Settlement along the Whampoa River, some others were the Tianjin (Tientsin) Bund along the Hai River (Hai Ho), the Hankou (Hankow) Bund along the Yangtze River, and the Xiamen (Amoy) Bund along the Inner Harbour. (Fig.1.) It is worth mentioning that not all concessions and settlements had this urban form along the water. Possibly due to its residential character, Gulangyu (Kulangsu) International Settlement had no bund along its coastal line. Instead, the bunds formed in tongshang chang (trade marts opened to foreigners for residence and trade by the Chinese government) in Ningbo, Wuhu, Ichang, Jiujiang, Changsha, and elsewhere. The Canton Bund, however, was in the Chinese area, separated by a canal from the British and French Concessions on the Island of Shamian (Shameen). More importantly, many foreign bunds were absorbed into Chinese areas soon after they reverted to China. For example, the Amoy Bund was included into the urban plan of Xiamen by the Chinese government before its re-accession in 1930. Eventually, it was integrated into the new bund along the Inner Harbour.

*Contact Author: Chen Yu, Post-Doctoral Fellow, Asia Research Institute, Department of Architecture, School of Design and Environment, 4 Architecture Drive, National University of Singapore, Singapore 117566
Tel: +65-98466080; Fax: +65-67793078
E-mail: echochenyu1@hotmail.com aricy@nus.edu.sg
(Received October 5, 2007; accepted February 7, 2008)
planned and developed to symbolize the treaty port system? Was the bund a new spatial form in Asian port cities? How is one to understand the social significance of the bunds in terms of space and power? These questions cannot be answered without examining the bunds within their specific contexts, because 'the [treaty] port system was a complicated one that differed in many key respects from the way in which colonies were run.' (Taylor, 2002: 132)

This paper aims to trace the rise and fall of the British Concession in Xiamen (the Amoy Bund) from 1852 to 1930. The paper will point out similarities between bunds and traditional littoral space in Asian ports, and describes the conflicts and compromises in making a bund in minor treaty ports in China. Due to the establishment of foreigners' land rights in modern China and the importation of western urban management into concessions and settlements, the bunds could be developed within the diverse local contexts of the treaty ports. Their influence on Chinese cities was more than in determining an urban form, but also in providing contested spaces in which laissez-faire capitalism with self-government were mixed. This urban model was pursued by the Chinese government as a way to modernize cities in the early twentieth century.

The main English source for this study comes from the archives of the British Concession in Xiamen, collected in the National Archives of the United Kingdom (formerly the Public Record Office, PRO). Published Chinese archives are used to present Chinese views of British activities in Xiamen.

2. Selecting a Trouble-Free Place

As one of numerous islets along the Southeast coast of China, Xiamen did not attract the Central Government’s attention until the safety of the inland was threatened by pirates. Ming Chengzu (1360–1424) sent Zhou Dexing to reinforce maritime defenses in Fujian; he set up a military station in the southwest of the Island of Xiamen in 1387. This so-called Zhongzuo Suo (Middle Left Station) was the nucleus of the City of Xiamen, a small walled town away from the vulnerable harbours. Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong, 1624–1662) set his anti-Qing citadel at Xiamen in 1646 and extended its commercial network to Taiwan, Japan, and regions of Southeast Asia. In the second year after taking over Taiwan in 1683, Emperor Kangxi (1662–1722) declared Xiamen as the only port in Fujian for trading with Nanyang (Southeast Asia). (Ng, 1983: 52–61) Xiamen turned from a garrison into a maritime center before the First Opium War.

Despite the short history of ports such as Xiamen prior to the arrival of foreigners, they were opened to colonial powers because of their developed commercial and urban networks. Xiamen was attacked by British troops in August 1841 and became one of the first of five treaty ports in China. It was one of the leading ports in China and the most important harbour between Shanghai and Hong Kong. Consisting of the Inner Harbour and the Outer Harbour, it was the only deep water port in the area and the nearest mainland port to Taiwan. (Morrison-Knudsen Consulting Group, 1946)

A commercial area was developed along the Inner Harbour and was recorded in early gazetteers like Luijiang Zhi (Gazetteer of Egret River) in 1766 and Xiamen Zhi (Gazetteer of Xiamen) in 1832. (Xue, 1766; Zhou, 1832) According to these records, lutou (‘wharf’ in the Minnan dialect) and jieshi (‘street market’) were formed at the waterfront, which impressed foreign visitors greatly. (Fig.2.) Sir William Power described the Xiamen scene of 1845 as follows: 'there were numerous broad and convenient, but not over clean landing-places. Many two-storey houses with exterior balconies and balustrades as well as various-shaped windows were projecting over the water.' (Power, 1853: 187–8) (Fig.3.) Many of these old wharves remained on the list of the wharf survey in 1946. (Xiamen Archives: 18–1–210, 1946)

Sino-foreign interactions in Xiamen started as early as the sixteenth century and had their own character. Records of the East India Company showed the mandarins' strict control of foreign activities in the port. (Morse, 1926–1929; Hamilton, 1930) The situation did not change immediately after the First Opium War.

Fig.2. Xiamen Quantu (Map of Xiamen), 1832. (Zhou, 1832) Note the wharves along the Inner Harbour at the bottom left

Fig.3. The Anchor of Amoy, c.1845. (Power, 1853) Note the landing places and houses along the water
Opium War. Foreigners were forbidden access to local houses. Only authorized foreign officers could enter Yamen. Neighbouring villages and towns were not opened to foreigners either. (Li and Huang, 1965: 80) In the wake of a series of military defeats that began with the First Opium War, the local Chinese authorities were instructed to deal with foreigners in delicate ways, namely, not to offend and not to indulge foreigners. To avoid confrontations with foreigners, they tended to suspend or delay foreign requests as long as possible. (Anonymous, 1844: 168)

As Article 12 of the Nanjing Treaty (26 June 1843) stated, Gulangyu was to be held by British troops until the Qing government had paid the indemnity in full. (Mayers, 1877) Six months before their evacuation of Gulangyu on 22 March 1845, the British started looking for a permanent settlement in Xiamen. (PRO: FO676/313, 1929) Initially, local Chinese authorities promised to let them lease two places (Jioachang and Shuichao Tai) at Xiamen Gang; however, the British were not satisfied with this proposal, partially due to the remoteness of the two locations. (Wang and Wu, 1997: 196, 202) Meanwhile, the British acquisition of Gulangyu as a settlement was rejected by the court ‘for some undivulged reasons.’ (Anonymous, 1844: 168; Abeel, 1844: 237) In a secret decree to the Daotai on 20 May 1845, Emperor Daoguang (1821–1850) insisted on taking over Gulangyu, and approved of Rutherford Alcock’s proposal for renting an area around Jicui Temple, a wooded area outside Chinese neighborhoods. (Li and Huang, 1965: 110–1)

The British acquisition of a settlement was suspended, as the Daotai avoided the consul for a long time. Only after Harry Parkes pursued him to Xinghua in November 1851 did the Daotai agree to grant the British government a piece of foreshore between the Daomei Wharf and the Xin Wharf on 9 February 1852. (Lane-Poole, 1901: 63–6) The exchange of notes between the Daotai and the British Consul dated 9 February 1852 was the only official agreement ‘on which the British title to the Concession had rested for nearly three quarters of a century.’ (PRO: FO676/313, 1929) Called ‘Beach Ground’ in English and ‘Haihou Tan (Sea-Back Foreshore)’ in Chinese, this site was described as a ‘wuai zhiqiu’ (‘Trouble-Free Place’; it had fewer or no native houses, farm land, or graveyards therein) by the Daotai to indicate both parties’ appreciation of this barren land in front of the English hongs at that time. (Wang and Wu, 1997: 193–5)

The Agreement defined the boundary of the concession as an area with a length of fifty-five chang (approximately 189 meters) and a depth of twenty chang (approximately 69 meters) from the heads of Daomei Wharf and Xin Wharf (including Gangaizkou Wharf in between) towards the sea. The annual rental was one tael per square chang. (PRO: FO676/313, 1929) The concession was controversially expanded in the 1860s when five parcels of foreshore/land along the Inner Harbour were successively leased to the British government and merchants, which were registered as Lots No. 7 to 11 in the British Consulate at Xiamen. With the tacit consent of the local Chinese government, Lots No. 7, 10, and 11 adjoining the Beach Ground were included in the British Concession. However, Lots No. 8 and 9 were not considered part of the British Concession. (Table 1)

The process of selecting a British settlement in Xiamen showed that existing commercial and urban networks were crucial for the development of the bunds. It also reflected changing Sino-foreign relationships after the Opium Wars. The local Chinese authorities could not reject foreigners’ acquisition of a settlement in the port due to the treaties. However, they managed to find a trouble-free place to satisfy foreigners and not irritate locals. (Wang and Wu, 1997: 206–7)

3. Business-oriented Planning of the Beach Ground

The official agreement relating to the establishment of the British Concession in Xiamen was informal in many respects and did not predict any future for the Beach Ground. However, it ensured the British government’s right to develop the Beach Ground into a settlement. It was British officers and the hongs who figured out plans for the Beach Ground, largely based on their personal knowledge and experience.

Unlike foreign-owned lots scattered in Chinese neighborhoods, the Beach Ground was planned as a whole because of its single developer—the British government. However, its planning and development were different from those in colonies with full colonial institutions. By law, the British Consul supervised the development of the settlement as part of the British empire-building project; in reality, the hongs invested in land development for commercial purposes.

The initial and revised plans of the Beach Ground reflected British concerns about function and public order in their settlements. With ‘sufficient rights to the whole ground,’ the British Consul proposed a six-clause Regulation for the concession on 29 February 1852. It intended to divide the foreshore between Daomei Wharf and Gangaizkou Wharf into ‘four regular parts to a depth of 200 feet into the sea from the fronts of the Hongs.’ (PRO: FO678/14, 1852–1871) Among them, Lots No. 1, 2, and 3 were subleased to three English firms and merchants – James Tait and John Connolly, Dent & Co., and Francis Darby Syme, respectively. Lot No. 4 was reserved for the local Chinese government. However, it ensured the British government’s right to develop the Beach Ground into a settlement. It was British officers and the hongs who figured out plans for the Beach Ground, largely based on their personal knowledge and experience.

The space between Gangaizkou Wharf and Xin Wharf was halved and labeled as Lots No. 5 and 6, which were respectively subleased to James Tait and John Connolly, and Jardine Matheson & Co. (See Table 1.)

This plan was revised in 1855 in respect to land allotment and utilization. Six regular lots were changed to preserve ‘as far as possible the existing individual boundaries of the separate lots.’ (PRO: FO678/14, 1852–1871) The Original Plan of Beach Ground in
1855 reflected the site situation, including the wharves, drainage, as well as a small Chinese joss house at the corner of Lot No. 4, etc. As illustrated below, lot assignment matched the distribution of the English and Chinese hongs along the Beach Ground at that time. (Fig.4.)

The British tried to utilize existing urban networks in the revised plans, because they had to consider reclamation costs. Leases for concession lots implied priority in planning a bund—"a proper regard for the economy both of money and space and for the real utility of such public works or services, shall always be kept in view by the Britannic Majesty's Consul." (PRO: FO678/105, 1884) In fact, all construction costs, such as that of building a necessary seawall, filling and recovering foreshore, etc., were borne by the hongs instead of the British government.

Despite its leading position on the Amoy Bund, the Imperial Chinese Maritime Customs (ICMC) did not enter into its early planning; their Xiamen office was set up in 1862 and they rented Lot No. 6 on 24 August 1867. The earliest Custom house was completed in January 1870. (Xiamen Customs, 1994: 355) As the ICMC was an imperial institution dominated by high-ranking foreign staff, its lot was registered under the name of the Inspector-General, and was expanded twice. Furthermore, the ICMC was the only lessee with full facilities of individual wharf, godowns and check points. (PRO: FO678/40, 1927)

Different from the Shanghai Bund which had comprehensive functions, the tiny Beach Ground was a pure commercial center crowded with offices and shops, godowns and wharves. Even the reserved lot for the British government was subleased to the hongs, while all British consular buildings were built on Gulangyu. In fact, since the 1860s, most of the foreigners in Xiamen have resided on this small island opposite the Bund. The scene of foreigners taking sampans from their homes on Gulangyu to their offices on the Amoy Bund was a dramatic sight in the early
The business-oriented planning of the Beach Ground echoed the commercial nature of the treaty ports that would lose their very meaning without proximity to water and a Chinese commercial/urban network. Before the Beach Ground was reclaimed by the British, most of the hongs were already lined up along the foreshore and used the Chinese wharves for loading and unloading goods. It is reasonable to say that the composition and function of the bunds were not new to Xiamen and other ports in China.

The flexibility in transferring and subleasing real estate reflected the commercial nature of the bunds and the laissez-faire capitalism active in the treaty ports. The more tenants were sharing the lots, the more direct access to the causeway was required. Hence, offices and shops were lined up along the Beach Ground, and the front façade became the focus point of the Bund. However, as part of the commercial area along the Inner Harbour, the Bund was not isolated from the surrounding Chinese areas, where many other foreign properties could be found, such as those of the Butterfield & Swire Co. and Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation. (PRO: FO678/19, 1929; FO678/55, 1929; FO678/56, 1892)

Compared with settlements set up with the tacit consent of the local Chinese authorities, national concessions were protected by official agreements and developed with established regulations. In an American missionary’s words, the British Concession was ‘free from the control of the mandarins and their squeezes, the merchants can engage in their business without any fear of being interfered with.’ (MacGowan, 1897: 146–9) Eventually, the Amoy Bund became ‘the principal business quarter of the town.’ (Bowra, 1908: 814)

However, expansion of the Amoy Bund was limited due to continual disputes over foreigners’ land rights in China. Starting in the 1870s, British and American merchants tried to reclaim the foreshore on the Bund, which was inspected by local Chinese authorities who stopped once the Agreement was breached. The most influential foreshore reclamation was started in 1877 by Boyd & Co. and involved the land between Daomei Wharf and Gangzaikou Wharf; the reclamation work was soon taken over by the local Chinese authorities. To protect the interests of locals and to avoid any further intervention by foreigners, the authorities formulated a six-clause regulation on 12 March 1878, reserving the reclaimed land for the public and controlling its development. (Wang and Wu, 1997: 208–22)

As the bunds could not operate without landing places, proximity to the water was of great concern to all. The Haihok Tan Quantu (Complete Map of the Beach Ground) was made in 1885 with additional inscriptions in 1930. It highlighted the boundary of the Bund and the land reclaimed by the Chinese government. Moreover, it illustrated that the Bund was still part of the Xiamen urban network; Cijie Wharf and Gangzaikou Wharf retained their function; and Daomei Wharf was depicted as under reconstruction. Although Shixiang Wharf and Xin Wharf were disused, a new Chinese wharf—Caiqiao Wharf—was constructed in front of the reclaimed land. The ICMC had its own wharf in front of its lot. Besides a proposed hulk and flying bridge by Jardine Matheson & Co., Butterfield & Swire Co. had a flying bridge to connect their hulk and the bund, which was erected with the permission of the local Chinese authorities after negotiations through the British consul. (PRO: FO678/21, 1900; Wang and Wu, 1997: 197, 204) (Fig.5.)
After the Opium Wars, the local Chinese authorities had to recognize foreigners' privileges in the treaty ports according to the agreements and regulations. On the other hand, they learned the importance of territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction in dealing with foreigners. Due to the resistance of the locals, the British Concession in Xiamen did not expand as did those in other treaty ports. Its development was confined within a defined boundary and constrained by contests among different groups. However, this national concession allowed the British to experiment with the western urban management system in Xiamen, which ultimately made the Amoy Bund different from traditional Chinese commercial areas.

5. Western Urban Management in Developing a Bund

One of the characteristics of the bunds was their well-organized public space. Traditional Chinese cities did not lack public spaces—these could be found around wharves, temples, and varied sacred places. Actually, the public roads in the front and the rear of the Bund were required by local Chinese authorities in the Agreement. However, traditional Chinese ways of maintaining public space largely relied on philanthropic and spontaneous support from the public. The official maintenance of public work was undertaken only when necessary or urgent. During the non-professional planning of the Beach Ground in 1852, concerns had already been raised among the British about public space in a settlement. They regulated the sizes of wharves and public roads and also made detailed plans for public interests, such as setting the Bund at a uniform level through its entire length, constructing a parapet along the causeway, lighting up the wharves, and facilitating public access to the bund, and so on. (PRO: FO678/14, 1852–1871)

Based on British colonial experience in Asia, autonomous governance was set up, in which the British Consul had the power to supervise all issues relating to the concession. All Sino-Anglo negotiations had to be made through the consul, because by law he 'alone was answerable to the Chinese authorities for all charges thereon.' (PRO: FO678/14, 1852–1871) Meanwhile, a municipal council was set up in 1877 to formalize ratepayers' meetings in its early days, which were organized by the consul occasionally. The Council had five members elected from ratepayers and a small police force of one foreign inspector and two native constables. (Wang and Wu, 1997: 203, 211–2; Bowra, 1908: 814)

With funds and revenue collected from the lessees, the Council was responsible for maintaining public order. The funds were sufficient such that the surplus was used to cover all expenses to be incurred in connection with the rendition of the Concession to the Chinese government in 1930. The balance of such funds was voluntarily contributed to the Chinese police for its services in the Concession since 1925. Furthermore, rental of the concession lots accumulated a total of over eleven thousand dollars in 1930. With the consent of the ratepayers, it was proposed to 'commute the annual rentals of the Concession lots for a lump sum at ten years purchase.' (PRO: FO676/313, 1929)

The self-governing Concession was developed in line with established regulations, despite the high turnover in the foreign community and conflicting interests of different groups. Representing the ratepayers' interests, the Council managed the Concession under the supervision of the British Consul. That presented a new urban development model for the local elites, who witnessed the growth of the Bund in a systematic way that was absent in Chinese areas.

However, the development of the Bund was hindered by 'the traditional resentment of the populace against the undoubtedly high-handed proceedings of the early British settlers.' (PRO: FO676/313, 1929) In 1907, the Council stopped the erection of posts along the causeway by the Xiamen Telephone Company (a Chinese firm). Two years later, they blocked Chinese students' marches through the Bund. When the warlord battles broke out in 1918, British troops landed on the Bund that (together with the reclaimed land) was enclosed by walls and gates. These actions raised public outrage against the imperialists' intrusion into China's territorial sovereignty. The outbreak of the Tai gu Shijian (Butterfield & Swire Incident) in 1921 once again inflamed anti-British agitation in Xiamen, as British military force engaged in the clash and hurt some Chinese. These incidents led to the outbreak of the Haihou Tan Shijian (Beach Ground Incident) that was broadcast nationwide; an agreement was reached by the local Chinese authorities and the British Consul on 21 October 1922. (Li, 1990: 210–27) At that point, 'the municipal administration was reduced to the provision of street scavengers and police control had been surrendered to the Chinese authorities.' (PRO: FO676/313, 1929)

After the May 30 Incident of 1925, the British Concession in Xiamen—the oldest British Concession in China—became one of the first concessions to revert to the Republican Government. Its birth came...
from British demands for commercial privileges in Xiamen; as a minor treaty port, its ending was due to the loss of its commercial importance in Sino-foreign trade. The Amoy Bund 'had for long past ceased to have any particular value for the British.' (PRO: FO676/313, 1929) When the crown leases issued by the British government were exchanged for deeds of perpetual lease by the Republican Government, the British Concession in Xiamen reverted to China on 17 September 1930. (PRO: FO676/313, 1929)

6. Conclusion: Learning from the Making of a Bund

Western influence on modern Chinese cities has always been measured by the development of the treaty ports, and loomed large in respect to the bund and other urban landscapes alike. However, the history of the Amoy Bund shows that the urban form of the bund was not new to Chinese ports in terms of composition and function. For coastal people, proximity to water was fundamental to daily life. The wharves, street markets, and hongs had existed along the Inner Harbour before the British Concession was initiated in 1852. The traditional commercial and urban network was respected by the British in selecting and planning their concession in Xiamen.

The making of the Amoy Bund shows that the bunds in minor treaty ports such as Xiamen were created mainly for commercial purposes. Although their establishment was determined by the treaty port system, they were not cast in one single mould but varied in diverse local contexts. They survived through endless negotiations among contesting groups, none of which could claim advantage over the other. Conflicts and compromises in developing the bunds also demonstrated the vitality of Chinese tradition and the power of local forces in semi-colonial China. Chinese knowledge of territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction was modernized through continuous disputes over foreigners' privileges in the treaty ports.

Although the urban form of the bund and the idea of port utilization were not new to the Chinese, the development of the bunds displayed an efficient way of utilizing littoral space, and also showed the advantages of western urban management in maintaining public space and order. Although it is hard to demonstrate to what extent the local Chinese authorities learned from or emulated their foreign rivals in the making of a bund, large-scale municipal reform commenced in Xiamen in 1927 when the Road Construction Bureau of the Changchow-Amoy Naval Defence Commissioner's Headquarters presented a scheme for reclaiming the foreshore and constructing new roads. It incorporated the Amoy Bund into the urban planning of Xiamen and compensated the affected foreign lessees through the British Consul. (PRO: FO678/131, 1928)

The Amoy Bund was integrated into the new bund along the Inner Harbour—the foreshore was reclaimed for a thoroughfare named Lujiang Road, and the roads leading towards Daomei Wharf and Shixiang Wharf were broadened as Zhongshan Road and Datong Road. In the words of the British Consul, the urban situation of Xiamen 'improved almost out of recognition in a few years.' This new Scheme was 'nevertheless an earnest of the determination of the Chinese authorities to increase the facilities of the port.' (PRO: FO676/313, 1929) (Fig.6.)

In the early twentieth century, many Chinese cities such as Xiamen experienced large-scale municipal reforms. The local Chinese authorities were keen to make new urban policies to change traditional cities; this desire embodied their political ambitions and also indicated the enthusiasm of the locals in modernizing Chinese society. Laissez-faire capitalism, the political ambition of autonomous governments, as well as increasing nationalism led to the birth of new urban spaces in Chinese cities, which were designed to challenge the western model that had been imprinted through imperialism.

Fig.6. British Concession at Amoy, 1928. (PRO: FO228/3895, 1928)

(An early draft of this paper was presented at the 5th Conference of Modern Asian Architecture Network, 27–30 June 2005, Istanbul.)

Notes
1) The Port of Xiamen consisted of the Inner Harbour and the Outer Harbour. The former was between the Island of Xiamen and the Island of Gulangyu, and the latter was sheltered by surrounding isles and shoals.
2) The Gazetteer of Xiamen recorded ten wharves along the Inner Harbour. Five of them were used to define the boundary of the British Concession. Street markets regularly formed around the wharves for specific purposes.
3) The British Government paid the yearly rental of thirty-five and a half taels forLots No. 1 to 6, which measured fifty-five chang in length by sixteen chang in breadth. They did not pay any rental for the four-chang-wide land used as a public road.

4) Located at Liaozaihou, Lot No. 8 consisted of three parcels of land which were rented from the private Chinese owners and the Chinese government. Lot No. 9 was close to Koo Liuteou (Zhushiaijiao Wharf). It was directly leased to the British firm by the Chinese government. Neither was recorded in the Chinese map of the Beach Ground in 1885 and the English map of the British Concession at Amoy in 1928. This indicated that they were not considered part of the British Concession.

5) The 'rent-in-perpetuity system was generated from the traditional Chinese land system. Following the Land Regulations for Shanghai in 1845, the earliest title deed was issued in Shanghai in 1847. The format of title deed was standardized in the revised Shanghai Land Regulations of 1854, and was extensively used in other treaty ports.

6) Consular documents showed that the British collected and translated Chinese deeds issued by the local Chinese authorities to the Chinese who owned or rented nearby foreshore/land.

7) For example, offices in Lot No. 3 were shared by Mitsui Bussan Kaisha Ltd., Asatic Petroleum Company, China Mutual Ins. Co. Ltd., and godowns of this lot were leased to the Chinese and were used to store coal by the British Consul. See PRO: FO678/86 (1916).

8) For erecting the Flying Bridge, a five-clause regulation was made in 1898, with three clauses added in 1899. The Bridge could be taken down and removed if it was found prejudicial to the collection of lekin or other lawful revenue by the Chinese government, or was a hindrance to free public traffic.

References


7) Lane-Poole, Stanley. (1901) Sir Harry Parkes in China. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd.

8) Li, Xi. (1990) Haisan tan fandi douzheng zhi huigu [Recollection of the anti-imperialist movements in the Beach Ground]. Xiamen: Lujiang Press.


16) PRO: FO228/3895 (1928). Dossier 78 Concessions at Amoy and Kuliangyu.


18) PRO: FO676/6 (1914). Amoy: Lot No. 5B Bank of Taiwan.

19) PRO: FO676/7 (1852). Amoy: Battery and Beach Ground Letter re rental.


35) PRO: FO676/56 (1892). Amoy: Lot Nos. 32 33 34 Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank.

36) PRO: FO676/76 (1901). Amoy: Lot No. 10 Lewis, T. H.


44) PRO: FO676/141 (1907). Amoy: Lot No. 5 Tait and Co.


46) Swire collection, SOAS, sw06-145.


50) Xiamen Archives: 18-1-210. (1946) Shizhengfu sike guanyu heshi matou zhangkou de han daidian [Dispatches and telegrams regarding the wharf situation of the city, from Section No. 4 of the Municipal Government]. Construction Bureau of the Xiamen Municipal Government.

