Local Governance and the Central City Redevelopment in a Provincial City: A Case Study of Matsumoto City, Nagano Prefecture

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Abstract In many Japanese cities, the central city has declined considerably and redevelopment has become a major policy issue. The objective of this study is to describe the process of central city redevelopment in Matsumoto City, Nagano Prefecture, focusing on the strategy of store proprietors. Redevelopment of central Matsumoto City initially aimed to strengthen the retail sector, based on an informal relationship between the local government and the commercial sector. In the 1990s the local government took over redevelopment, and the focus shifted from retail development to urban growth. This article discusses the reason for these changes and shows how redevelopment has been implemented from the perspective of the diversification of store proprietors' strategies classified into three types: leaving, remaining in, or moving into the central city area.

Key words: central city redevelopment, store proprietor, strategy, local governance, Matsumoto City

1 Introduction

Today in many Japanese cities, the central city has declined considerably, and redevelopment has become a major policy issue. By 2002 the number of small stores in Japan had fallen by more than 540,000 since peaking in 1982 (Census of Commerce 2002). The decline is especially prominent in provincial cities. In response, government-led redevelopment spread nationwide, with large-scale infrastructure development at the core. The number of Land Readjustment Projects (LRP) in provincial cities in excess of 10 billion yen has risen steadily (Figure 1).

Researchers and practitioners have criticized projects such as these (referred to as Hakomonoism in Japanese), which emphasize facilities and infrastructure. They have suggested that smaller projects that involve more citizen participation and partnership between the public and private sectors would be better.

Central city redevelopment has been analyzed from the perspective of fiscal policy and urban politics. Following periods of rapid economic growth, large public transfers from urban to local areas have supported urban development in provincial cities (Ohmura and Arita 2001). As in the United Kingdom in the 1980s, public investment was relied upon, because private support was not forthcoming, despite deregulation based on neoconservative policies (Barnekov et al. 1989).

Public investment was sustained by the urban middle class, such as store proprietors, a major support base of the conservative party (Kamo 1988). The Central City Invigoration Law, which came into effect in 1998 with a 1 trillion yen budget, indicates that the urban middle class still had strong political influence.

The Chicago School has analyzed urban development based on community power structures. Molotch (1976) shows that urban capitals, such as financier, retailer and realtor, which benefit from
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Figure 1 Number of central city land readjustment projects by investment
Source: Annual report of the land readjustment (2000)

Graph showing the number of central city land readjustment projects by investment over different years (1970-1999), categorized by private sector and public sector investments. The graph indicates a trend of increasing projects over time, with most investments falling in the range of less than 1 billion yen.

The central city redevelopment occupied a dominant position in urban politics through cooperation with local government. He describes these local relationships as a "growth coalition".

Little analysis of community power structures in urban development had been conducted in Japan, where the influence of the central government is strong. Study of community power structures became common in the 1970s, with the establishment of progressive local governments. This line of research argues that budgets for urban development were planned through an informal decision-making process that reflects the influence of the local potentate. The leadership of the mayor and the policymaking capabilities of local officials were consolidated after the establishment of progressive local governments, and urban development became their responsibility. Meanwhile, various local communities, such as commerce and industry associations, cooperated with local government, establishing the system known as cooperation (Sato 1997).

The process of redevelopment has to be studied from viewpoints other than fiscal policy and urban politics. Stakeholders with different interests participate in redevelopment projects; they include the mayor, city councilors, local government, the chamber of commerce and industry, store proprietors, and residents. These local actors behave autonomously and interact with one another in circumstances shaped by fiscal policy and urban politics. The process of redevelopment is greatly influenced by their autonomous behaviors and interactions.

This article analyzes actions by local stakeholders in order to understand how they behave. It describes the process of central city redevelopment in a provincial city, based on data obtained through interviews with store proprietors. It also examines the institutional circumstances and politi-
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2 Study Area and Methods

The study area is Matsumoto City, Nagano Prefecture, which is 150 kilometers (90 miles) from the Tokyo metropolitan area. Matsumoto City, with a population of 200,000 and a market area of 500,000 consumers, is a castle town in the center of Nagano Prefecture. It was an old mercantile city.

Eighteen shopping areas were established in the district south of Matsumoto Castle, 0.7 kilometers northeast of the JR Matsumoto Station (Figure 2). These shopping areas experienced a sharp decline in sales and the number of shoppers, a phenomenon also experienced by other provincial cities (Arai and Hashimoto 1997). In Matsumoto large retail stores accounted for 49.1% of total retail floor space in 1998, up from 37.5% in 1991. This fact shows severe situation facing small retailers in these shopping areas.

In response to this situation, various redevelopment projects were planned and implemented in Matsumoto 4). This study focuses on the Chuo-nishi LRP, which started in 1987 in the traditional shopping areas. The project, which cost 29.3 billion yen and covers 12 hectares, is a large redevelopment project for a provincial city 5).

Interview survey was conducted with 38 actors involved in the redevelopment process, including 21 store proprietors, 13 administrative officials, and 4 others that were not categorized. The data obtained was confirmed by other sources, including city council minutes, newspaper articles, political documents, and documents possessed by merchants associations.

3 Formulation and Stagnation of the Redevelopment Plan

Redevelopment around the Train Station and the Crisis of Existing Shopping Areas

The redevelopment of central Matsumoto City began in the 1960s, when the plan for the train station was developed. Land use around the station was highly mixed, in an intricate network of streets.

The mayor at the time, Tokuya Furuhata, quickly initiated redevelopment around the station. His urban policy was supported by conservatives and facilitated by the increase in tax revenues associated with rapid economic growth. The project and similar projects based on redevelopment in the vicinity of train stations—known as Station and Town Development Projects—were launched throughout Japan in the early 1970s, prompted by the massive issuance of national construction bonds in local regions. The cost of the Matsumoto Station LRP was 99 billion yen, of which 6.4 billion yen was paid out of national funds.

By 1980, 18.0 of the planned 21.3 hectares had been developed around the station. The project encouraged large retail stores—such as the Mat-
Many Japanese provincial cities were originally castle towns or posting stations with multiple shopping areas. After World War II, the train station, which was located some distance from the central city, became the new urban core, and traditional shopping areas declined (Tanabe 1959).

Matsumoto was a typical example of this. An increasing number of large retail stores around Matsumoto station caused the center of commerce to move from traditional shopping areas located to the south of Matsumoto Castle to the vicinity of the station. These large stores attracted more customers than expected. A foot traffic survey revealed that this resulted in a dramatic decrease in the number of pedestrians in the traditional shopping areas (Figures 2 and 3).

Encircled numbers in figure 2 correlate with survey points shown in figure 3.
Store proprietors in traditional shopping areas realized that a crisis was underway. They had preserved the identity of a mercantile city since before World War II. Soon after the war, they established the Union of Matsumoto Merchants Associations (UMMA), which helped them maintain their political influence. The UMMA established the Council for Central Shopping Area Promotion as a special unit in 1978 and started to discuss ways to promote the shopping areas. While privately financed initiatives for redevelopment were considered in some shopping areas, the Council principally pursued grant-aided redevelopment, making many presentations to the local government.

*Relationship between the Union of Matsumoto Merchants Associations and the Local Government*

The local government immediately responded to the petition. In December 1979 it compiled the Basic Concepts of the Matsumoto Urban Redevelopment for 200 hectares of the central city. To promote the plan, in December 1980 it established the Headquarters for the Promotion of Redevelopment of the Central City, whose board consisted of the chairman of the chamber of commerce and industry and the UMMA and three section chiefs of the local government. By the time redevelopment around the station was completed, it did not seem reasonable to plan further redevelopment.

Such rapid planning was supported by the relationship between the local government and the UMMA. Since 1971, when the former chief of commerce and industry department of the local government became the executive director of the chamber of commerce and industry, the chamber had strengthened its relationship with the local government through the commerce and industry department. Merchants had a strong influence over the chamber of commerce and industry; the UMMA, which represented the merchants’ interests, cooperated with it. An informal association between the UMMA and the local government was built through the mediation of the chamber of commerce and industry.
The Basic Concepts of Matsumoto Urban Redevelopment was harder to justify than redevelopment around the station, which improved the gateway to the city. Some city councilors checked commercial sector-led policymaking by criticizing the plan in the city council. Repeated criticism focused on the fact that the plan had been created behind closed doors by the local government, the chamber of commerce and industry, and the UMMA. The master plan became more and more of a political issue. Meanwhile, the local government continued to cooperate with the UMMA.

In addition to this informal association between the UMMA and the local government, following the establishment of progressive local governments, the shift from informal decision-making to the planned administration occurred, as previously described. This shift enabled mayors and local officials to proactively participate in making urban policies. While policymaking regarding redevelopment around the station was influenced by local capital and the conservative class, the Basic Concept of Matsumoto Urban Redevelopment was the first plan in which the local government played a leading role. This is an example of the government’s effort to introduce a proactive urban policy. In addition, Mayor Shoji Wago, who took office in 1976, showed a willingness to promote the redevelopment of the central city area while improving the city’s finances, which had deteriorated in 1969-76, the period of progressive local government.

In this way redevelopment began. It was not until the early 1990s, however, that it accelerated. The following is a structural account of the stagnation of redevelopment in the 1980s, called the “lost decade” by many store proprietors.

The Second Provisional Commission for Administrative Reform established as the central government panel in 1981 recommended cutbacks on transfer payments to local governments to eliminate the accumulated government deficits caused by aggressive investments for public works during the period of rapid economic growth. In response, the central government severely restrained spending on public works and grant projects and required local governments to finance unsubsidized projects as an economic stimulus. Particularly from 1985 to 1988, the reduction of projects with a high level of grants placed a financial burden on local governments. These shifts in intergovernmental financial relations significantly changed the direction of redevelopment in Matsumoto. Mayor Wago, who had actively pursued fiscal reform, urged officials in the urban development department to make efforts to gain government subsidies. It is conceivable that such habitual reliance on subsidies could not be altered in response to reforms of intergovernmental financial relations.

These facts suggest that financial factors inhibited swift implementation of redevelopment. Meanwhile, store proprietors had not always promoted redevelopment. The following section presents reasons for the growing lack of interest in redevelopment by store proprietors during the time that the Chuo-nishi project was being promoted as the core project for the central city.

*Store Proprietors’ Status Quo Strategy*

Since 1978, when the Council for Central Shopping Area Promotion was established, each merchants association outwardly promoted redevelopment around the UMMA. However, perception toward redevelopment were not necessarily the same for each of them. The UMMA consists of 17 local merchants associations and 21 independent stores. There has been a hierarchy and rivalry among merchants associations since the 18th century. Each merchants association is more coherent than the UMMA, which is just a political synthesis.
Attitudes toward redevelopment differed subtly across associations. For the Hon-machi merchants association, which played a central role in the UMMA, the sense of crisis over the agglomeration of large retail store in the vicinity of the station was not very strong. Members of this association took pride in being located on the main street, which received 10,000 passersby a day on weekends—fewer than it once did, but still a substantial number.

In contrast, among associations of merchants located on side streets, the agglomeration of large retail store near the station was recognized as a threaten to their very survival. Merchants in the Ise-machi shopping area, located on a side street near the station, had a particularly strong sense of crisis. A city development meeting was organized that consisted of the Ise-machi merchants association and representatives of the 11 neighborhood associations within the area. An effort was undertaken to educate landowners about redevelopment efforts. This movement was related to the Chuo-nishi Urban Development Master Plan, which was organized in 1981 and contributed to the Basic Concepts of Matsumoto Urban Redevelopment effort.

In 1983 the Council for Land Readjustment Promotion, a network of government officials and store proprietors, was established. The Chuo-nishi LRP was officially selected as the core redevelopment project in March 1983. The Chuo-nishi LRP was modeled on the Matsumoto Station LRP in scale and content, with the hope of drawing on lessons learned from the Matsumoto Station LRP.

Not all Ise-machi store proprietors backed the Chuo-nishi LRP. They shared the sense of crisis but did not necessarily promote the project.

The Ise-machi shopping area has a long history. It has been improved by store proprietors' self-help efforts since the early 20th century. In 1966 an arcade project was implemented, as a part of the Ise-machi modernization project. Unlike other shopping areas that developed arcades with subsidies, the merchants association financed this project. The project set up an arcade as store proprietors' common property, with the land donated by them. It instilled Ise-machi store proprietors with a sense of community.

Store proprietors with a relatively strong interest in the project were in their late 30s and early 40s. They set up unofficial meetings, called Kiyori, in which the vision of the Ise-machi shopping area was discussed. Such meetings played an important role in building consensus among store proprietors.

Some store proprietors wanted to close their stores and build homes in the suburbs, because they lacked successors, faced financial difficulties, or had lost the motivation to continue managing their enterprises. They wanted to use the gain on the sale of their properties in Ise-machi to build new homes elsewhere. Had they left Ise-machi, the LRP would have progressed more smoothly, because the fewer actors involved in the project, the more swiftly individual interests relating to the land substitution would have been reconciled. In the event, in consideration of the community of store proprietors, they adopted a status quo strategy while refusing to participate in the project. The strong sense of community fostered by the arcade project kept them in the Ise-machi shopping area and prevented new projects from progressing.

At the same time, store proprietors interested in the project, who should have played a leading role in building consensus for it, gradually became passive. They shifted the job of building consensus to the local government in the 1980s, when the regulations of the Large Retail Stores Act were tightened. In the 1970s large retailers could not open store without going through difficult negotiations with small retailers. The floor space of the large retail store that were approved to open was
substantially reduced. Despite this, sales at the stores exceeded expectations, and the number of pedestrians in the traditional shopping areas decreased dramatically. In response, small retailers requested a freeze on the opening of new large retail store. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry had gradually tightened the regulations for opening large retail store since 1978; in Matsumoto the opening of large store was all but frozen in the 1980s. The strategy to promote redevelopment was gradually weakened through the period of tighter regulations of the Large Retail Stores Act. This suggests that small retailers failed to recognize the cause of decline of their shopping area and felt safe by freezing the opening of large store.

A minority of stakeholders in Ise-machi, including store proprietors and some residents, considered the shopping area as a place to live. They chose the status quo strategy from the start of the project. They supported such a strategy because they did not have high expectations of receiving income from managing their stores, which they also used as homes, or because their families supported the household through nonretail business. They did not expect any further income from retail business as compensation for fixed costs such as property tax and electricity charges. Hence, they did not support the project, even though the local government had offered them compensation for the cost of building new stores and houses.

4 Progress of the Redevelopment: The Diversification of Strategy

The redevelopment of Matsumoto enjoyed significant progress in the 1990s. In the Ise-machi shopping area, reploting associated with the Chuo-nishi LRP progressed rapidly, and new projects, such as the construction of multistory parking garages, started (Figure 4). In traditional shop-

![Figure 4](changes-in-the-designation-of-replotting-the-chuo-nishi-land-readjustment-project)

*Figure 4 Changes in the designation of reploting, the Chuo-nishi land readjustment project*

*Source: The internal data from Ise-machi merchants association*
ping areas, redevelopment through grants and bonds started and continued without interruption.

The neoconservative policy symbolized by the mobilization of private resources and the deregulation of the 1980s triggered the turnaround. In April 1986 the Study Group for the Adjustment of Economic Structure, the private advisory body of Prime Minister Nakasone, submitted the so-called Maekawa Report, which presented the view that expansion of domestic demand and market liberalization were necessary for good partnership with the United States. A series of deregulation policies was specified. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry showed the direction of the substantial deregulation of the Large Retail Stores Act. It was the Japan-U.S. Structural Impediments Initiative (SII), adopted in September 1989, that determined the direction of change. SII endorsed three-stage deregulation, consisting of adequate operation, revision, and partial elimination of the Large Retail Stores Act. This led to the re-amendment of the Large Retail Store Act in 1992 and the Large Retail Store Location Act in 2000.

Deregulation allowed outside capital to flow rapidly into local regions in which small-scale capital plays a major role and for which a protective tendency is dominant under the Large Retail Store Act, and this seriously influenced the regional economy (Hashimoto 1998). In Matsumoto the freeze on the opening of new large retail store was removed as the first stage of the deregulation program.

Meanwhile, a new problem surfaced: from 1987 to 1990 one shopping center after another opened up in neighboring towns and villages, attracting customers away from the central city shopping areas. Upon the requests of regional and extraregional stakeholders, the 10-year freeze on store opening was removed in 1990. Notifications to open or extend the permits of six large retail stores, with more than 120,000 square meters of floor space, were received in the Matsumoto suburbs (Figure 5).

The situation was reported nationwide.

![Figure 5](image-url)
According to the *Nikkei Marketing Journal* (September 20, 1990):

"The period of freezing large-scale store opening in Matsumoto was just too long," said an official of Kanto Bureau of Economy, Trade and Industry. "The last decade was only 'the time of brain freeze' not only for the distributors but also for the local and central government and the chamber of commerce and industry which should present a grand design for urban planning. Now, as its payback, historic shopping areas have disappeared and large-scale stores have opened one after another."

**Developmentalism and the Growth Coalition**

The policies of the local government, city council, and mayor were significantly affected by the rush of large retail store opening in the suburbs. Within the local government, awareness gradually increased that the burgeoning of large retail store would accelerate the decline of existing shopping areas and ruin the framework of the Basic Concept for Matsumoto Urban Redevelopment. Therefore, the In-house Conference on Large Retail Store Issue was established in May 1990. Reflecting the growth of such awareness, 18 departments other than commerce and industry, such as urban planning and construction, cooperated in a cross-sectional manner as the first bureau-wide implementation team.

As the decline of existing shopping areas continued, members of the city council—including some council members who had criticized the Basic Concept when it was formulated—expressed their support for redevelopment from the viewpoint of social policy. The fact that no significant opposition had appeared since 1990 at the Special Committee on Land Readjustment Project in City Area, where city councilors could exert the greatest influence, demonstrates the change in tone of the entire city council.

In the mayoral election of March 1992, Tadashi Aruga won by supporting "developmentalism" policies. These policies set the tone for the promotion of redevelopment in the local government and city council. Mayor Aruga, who defeated incumbent Shoji Wago by a very narrow margin, adopted a very aggressive fiscal policy centering on large-scale public works, including the Chuo-nishi LRP, which had been on hold since 1987. These policies reflected his idea of city development, which included both the opening of large store in the suburbs and the promotion of public investment in the central city area.

The result of the new mayor's aggressive fiscal policy can also be seen in the rapid increase in urban development expenditures since 1992 (Figure 6). The breakdown of urban development expenses in the 1970s differs greatly from that in the 1990s, when they accounted for a large share of total municipal spending. Urban development expenditures in the 1970s were financed mainly by subsidies. In contrast, expenditures in the 1990s were financed by independent sources of revenue, including general revenues and municipal bonds (Figure 7).

To justify focusing public investment on central city areas, abstract expressions, such as "interurban competition" and "urban dynamism," were often used in statements by the city council and urban policies. The notion that Matsumoto cannot grow without revitalizing the central city area was included in each strategy of the local government, city council, and mayor. Referring to Molotch's growth coalition theory, Machimura (1999, 2000) notes that a vague slogan such as "interurban competition" could justify heavy investment and mobilize the masses. He observes that not only influential local business groups but also the progressive party, labor unions, and universities, which had kept their distance from developmentalism, participated in the growth coalition.
It is undeniable that a growth coalition was formed in Matsumoto. Members of the In-house Conference on the Large Retail Store Issue worked closely with the chamber of commerce and industry, holding periodic meetings. In 1992, after Mayor Aruga was elected, the Panel on the Revitalization of Shopping Areas, which mobilized the UMMA, the Lions Club, and other regional organizations, was established. The panel was later reorganized into the Central District Revitalization Council by adding members and becoming a more institutionalized promotional...
organization.

The Diversity of Store Proprietors’ Strategies

Store proprietors were also incorporated into the structure of developmentalism and the growth coalition. However, their strategies did not always adapt to this structure. In the four mayoral elections since 1992, store proprietors did not systematically support Mayor Aruga, who had implemented developmental policies that greatly benefited them. They made no presentations to the local government since the 1990s. This suggests that a mechanism other than developmentalism was at work.

Changes in store ownership in the Ise-machi shopping area around the Chuo-nishi LRP show that the project caused more than half of the tenants to leave and many new tenants to move into Ise-machi (table 1). Some landowners left Ise-machi, others continued to operate retail businesses, and others leased their properties after renovating their buildings. Each of these three groups had an almost equal number of members.

It is conceivable that the increase in the number of vacant stores with the rise in floor-space ratio and the number of leases influenced new store proprietors, including hair salon and bar owners, to move into Ise-machi. The following subsections examine the reasons for these changes and describe proprietors’ strategies, which fall into three types: leaving, remaining in, and moving into Ise-machi.

Leaving Ise-machi: Store proprietors began leaving the area because of the deterioration in business conditions. First, merchants associations started to weaken. One of the most important purposes of these associations was to organize periodic promotional events. The growing importance of large-scale events organized by the government and the UMMA steadily marginalized merchants associations.

Second, about 25 years had passed since the arcade project; solidarity toward the Ise-machi shopping area had weakened with the aging of store proprietors. In 1978 the sense of crisis toward the large retail stores opening around the station drove redevelopment. In contrast, in 1990 the large retail stores opening in the suburbs was greeted with a sense of resignation.

Third, the deterioration of business conditions was accelerated with the aging of store proprietors, who had been plagued by stagnant sales associated with the inability to make new investments and select goods to meet consumer demand. Their motivation to continue business operations progressively declined.

Replotting in the Chuo-nishi LRP increased

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<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Changes in store ownership in the Ise-machi shopping area</th>
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<tr>
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Source: Author’s field survey and the internal data from Ise-machi merchants association.
rapidly in the 1990s; in 1995 about 70% of the planned area had been completed. This increase was triggered by the plan to open a large store in Ise-machi in 1996. The incident caused the demolition of arcades and the move of landowners to the suburbs; the leaving strategy spread all over Ise-machi. The opening of the large store enabled store proprietors who had adopted the status quo strategy only out of consideration for the community of store proprietors to leave Ise-machi. Some store proprietors who had promoted redevelopment in 1980 also left, because of the deterioration of business conditions.

The increase in the number of store proprietors leaving the area accelerated the pace of replotting. The second peak, which occurred after 1998, involved store proprietors who had considered the shopping areas as places to live. For them the deterioration of business conditions and the opening of the large store in Ise-machi did not affect their decision to remain. For them the deciding factor was the rise in the fixed property tax in the late 1990s.

Remaining in Ise-machi: 51 store proprietors, including landowners and tenants, remained in Ise-machi after the project, using bank loans to build new store or move into existing one. Most of the landowners who remained had relocated their residence before the start of the project in 1987 (table 1). This suggests that the acquisition of a residence outside Ise-machi before the project began was one of the financial conditions for remaining.

Store proprietors who remained did so for a variety of reasons, including many irrational reasons such as pride and attachment to Ise-machi. However, it requires additional insight to conclude that remaining strategy is caused by irrational thoughts. Almost all remaining store proprietors admitted in interviews that their strategy had been a failure. Their financial condition was extremely weak; some had given up management in order to lease their business or leave Ise-machi.

Three factors explain their shift in strategy. First, the rise in property taxes squeezed profits, particularly for owners who chose to build. Second, slumping demand for store space, which had started in the late 1990s, weighed on the lease business. Third, the LRP did not lead to large enough increases in sales to allow store proprietors to recoup their investments. Many of the remaining proprietors had invested more than 100 million yen in their buildings, with the expectation of increases in sales.

It was difficult for remaining proprietors to consider these factors in advance, because the increased tax burden and slumping demand for store space were influenced by other factors, such as the collapse of the economy and tax reform. Store proprietors remained in Ise-machi based on their successful experiences and economic conditions at the time. Some owners strategically shifted to the lease business in expectation of the entrance of new tenants attracted by the large retail store in Ise-machi. In these situations, the more remaining proprietors wrote off their strategies, the more they disguised rational thoughts and emphasized irrational strategies such as mercantile pride.

Moving into Ise-machi: 39 new tenants moved into the Ise-machi shopping area with the LRP, attracted by the large retail store. New tenants agglomerated around the large store and depended on it to draw 40–70% of their customers. New tenants, such as apparel stores and hair salons, consisted mainly of nationwide chain stores and independent stores managed by individuals who had managed retail store in other places. Tenant managers were mainly in their 30 and 40s and highly competitive. However, high rent prices, reflecting the higher property tax burden, caused new tenants to face unfavorable business conditions.
Existing store proprietors favored the entrance of new tenants. Although concerned that many tenant managers were not attached to Ise-machi and tended to keep their distance from events there, existing proprietors recognized that tenants attracted by the large retail store had become an integral part of the area.

5 Conclusion

This article describes the process of central city redevelopment in Matsumoto, focusing on the strategy of store proprietors. Although the process is partly explained by the concept of developmentalism and growth coalition, the strategy of store proprietors, which was adopted in the context of relationships with others and the history and culture of Matsumoto, appears to have been crucial. The diversity of strategies—leaving, remaining in, or moving into the area—facilitated redevelopment.

The diversity of strategies transformed the purpose of redevelopment. Retail development had seemed to be the common purpose of the actors involved in redevelopment until the 1970s; the relationship between the local government and the commercial sector had been established with such a purpose in mind. However, merchants associations were unable to maintain an interdependent relationship with the local government once store proprietors began to pursue different strategies. This made it difficult to focus redevelopment on retail development. In response, the local government mobilized new actors and began promoting government-led redevelopment aiming at the city's growth rather than retail development. This process shows how redevelopment project which emphasize facilities and infrastructure was implemented.

The results of this study suggest that it is necessary to establish local governance in provincial cities. The development process was influenced by the local potentate or the informal relationship between the local government and the commercial sector. Many recent projects have been initiated by the local government. It is likely that various actors, such as Non-Profit Organization and volunteers, will participate in the development process, connected by the logic of "cooperation." Cooperation means that the status that the private sector builds interdependent relationship with the public by providing resources such as information, manpower and technology, and not that they depend on the public unilaterally. In such a relationship, store proprietors are no longer members of a traditional hierarchical organization but independent citizens as well as NPO and volunteers.

The period of uniform government-led infrastructure development in Japanese cities is over. In the future it will be important to advance projects by harnessing the intellectual and human resources of the community. The contents of these projects should be linked not only to urban development but also to various other policies, such as those concerning social welfare and the environment. In Matsumoto, for example, some development projects friendly to the elderly and the environment give preference to bicycles and pedestrians over vehicles. It is important that these projects establish governance by using local resources and coordinating divergent interests. Continuous examination is required to evaluate these trends.

Notes

1) This study defines a local city as a city located outside of a metropolitan area with a population of at least 100,000. In 2000, 85 Japanese cities fit this definition. This study covers the LRP within densely inhabited districts—census enumeration districts with densities of at least 4,000 people per square kilometer.
2) These kinds of discussions are related to locality studies in the fields of geography and sociology. Cox and Mair (1988, 1991) note that local coalitions have been formed in the restructuring of the U.S. economy since the 1970s. Pahl (1970) shows that the urban spatial structure directly reflects the political process of urban planning and proposes the concept of "urban managerialism," noting the role of the gatekeeper, such as local governments and developers, which manage the allocation of housing and urban facilities.

3) The role of store managers in city development, including redevelopment, has been studied mainly in commercial science. Hama (2003) focuses on changes in the role of store managers in shopping area events. Watanabe (2003) describes the principles guiding store managers' behavior from the perspective of organization theory.

4) Musha (2004) outlines the LRP in Matsumoto and describes the mechanism of development in the suburbs of Matsumoto.

5) In 2000 the average cost of an LRP project in a densely inhabited district in a local city was 62 million yen.

6) Based on an interview with the project manager of the Chuo-nishi LRP in December 2001.

7) Based on an interview with the assistant manager of the Chuo-nishi LRP in November 2001.

8) Based on an interview with the auditor of the Ise-machi merchants association in July 2004.

9) Based on an interview with the store managers of the Ise-machi shopping area in July 2004.

References


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地 方 都 市 に お け る ロ ー カ ル ・ ガ バ ナ ナ ス と 中 心 市 街 地 再 開 発
—長野県松本市の事例—

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要 旨
本研究は、長野県松本市の中央西地区再整理事業を事例に、地方都市における中心市街地再開発のメカニズムについて、商店経営者の戦略を中心に分析したものである。

衰退者である中心市街地の再開発は、今や地方都市に共通の政策課題となっているが、一方で、これらの再開発はハード事业に偏重し、ソフト面での活性化には結びつかない「ハコモノ主義」であるとの批判も継続的になされてきた。来、商店街を活性化させるはずの再開発が、なぜハコモノ主義として批判されるようになったのか、この問いに答えるため、本研究では再開発の主たるアサーである商店経営者に着目し、インタビュー調査をベースに、再開発に対する彼らの「戦略」が転換していく様を描き出すことを通じて、中心市街地再開発のメカニズムを明らかにした。

松本市では、1970年代に進められた松本駅周辺の再開発によって、商業重視が既存商店街から駅周辺地区へとシフトした。これに危機感を抱いた商店経営者らは、行政とインフォーマルな関係を構築することで既存商店街の再開発計画を推進したが、1980年代を通じて計画は停滞した。この停滞は、構造的には地方移転支出の削減という財政的要因によって説明されるが、それとは異なる文脈として、商店街の規模や大店法強化などを背景に、現状維持的な戦略を志向した商店経営者の影響を指摘することができる。

1990年代に入ると、大型店の延長を機に、松本市の再開発計画は大きな展開をみせ、大型店問題に対応する形で行政内部に推進体制が整備されたことに加え、開発主義を標榜する市長の誕生によって、個別財源や地方債にもとづく再開発への積極的な投資がなされた。また、都市間競争などをスローガンに中心市街地への投資が正当化され、地域市街地の活動を図られた。しかし、商店経営者の戦略はこうした枠組みにとどまらず、連動していなかった。商店街組織や個人の経営体を弱体化した既存商店街では、固定資産税の増加などを契機に撤退戦略が波及する一方、かつての成功体験や商店街への愛着などの要因が複合的に作用して、商店街に残存する戦略がみられた。残存した地権者は、経営継続とテナント賃貸業への転換という戦略に分かれたが、これによるテナントの供給増や若年層向け大型店の新規立地に対応して、新たに商店街へ進出する戦略もみられた。これに個々の商店経営者の戦略が多様化したことは、区画が再整理事業の展開や事業後の経営環境の維持にプラスに作用した。一方、戦略の多様化によって商店街と行政との相互依存の関係が維持されなくなったことは、中心市街地再開発の目的を商店街振興から都市成長へとシフトさせ、行政主導の再開発を加速させるという結果をもたらしたのである。

以上のようメカニズムの理解を踏まえて、今後、新しい都市空間を創造していくためには、ローカル・ガバナンスを構築することが不可欠である。すなわち、かつてのような行政と組織化された商業セクターのインフォーマルな関係ではなく、「協働」の論理に結びついた多様なアクターによって開発が進められるべきである。こうした関係の中では、もはや商店経営者は従来のようなモデル一型構造の一員ではなく、NPOやボランティアなどと同様、主体性を持った一市民としてまちづくりに参加することが求められている。日本の地方都市における今後の都市空間形成は、このような地域に潜在している知的・人的資源を活用しながら、地域性を考慮した事業を展開していくことが重要になる。そうした事業は、いわゆる都市開発だけではなく、環境や福祉、観光、交通など、様々な政策分野と関連性を持った内容となるだろう。

キーワード：中心市街地再開発，商店経営者，戦略，ローカル・ガバナンス，松本市

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