Disproportionality under the Mixed-member System in Taiwan’s Legislative Election of 2008

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Abstract: Upon the evaluation of an electoral reform, two often cited concerns are governability and proportionality. A new electoral system, whatever it is, should respond to the two concerns as best as possible. In Taiwan’s changing from SNTV-MMD to MMM, however, reformers invariably accentuated the new system’s attributes of enhancing stability of governance while ignoring the possible outcomes of disproportionality. Hence, as expected, the result of election in 2008 produces high governability and low proportionality. This article measures the degree of disproportionality by Loosemore-Hanby index from 1992 to 2008 and explains how disproportionality occurred.

Introduction

In modern society, electoral system has played an institutionalized role of translating citizen’s votes into seats on the one hand and forming a government on the other hand. More importantly, electoral system channelizes conflicting public interests without jeopardizing the functioning of democratic system. As Taagepera and Shugart indicate, a main function of electoral system is to preserve political stability in the face of potentially disruptive or paralyzing disagreements on issues (1989: 63). Nonetheless, it is also widely recognized that different electoral systems bring about different political consequences. Hence, the issue of choosing an electoral system has been a core concern among politicians and researchers. Especially since 1980, the importance of this issue is further strengthened when some advanced democracies as New Zealand, Italy and Japan adopt a mixed-member system to elect their parliamentary members. The wave of electoral reforms since the 1980s, has continued to influence other countries to review their own electoral system. It also motivates deeper scholarly discussions on the characteristics and implications of different electoral systems.

Upon the issue of choosing an electoral system, two often cited concerns are governability and proportionality. The former implies that electoral arrangements affect the stability and management of state apparatus as an institutional order; the latter refers to the political equality and representation of viewpoints which are fundamental to democracy regarding all social groups are placed on an equal footing in stand for members of parliament (Dunleavy and Margetts, 1995: 13-15). In theory, an electoral system is designed to meet these two concerns as best as possible. In reality, different type of electoral system performs differently, however.

Traditional literature has specified three varieties in the families of electoral systems: plurality systems, proportional representation systems (PR) and mixed-member systems. Among these three types, plurality systems are regarded as more likely to produce a majority government and thus enhance the degree of governability. The main cost of plurality systems is their failure
to maintain a proportional electoral result. By contrast, PR systems are more faithfully responsive to social compositions and will produce a more proportional electoral result in the parliament. The PR systems are also flawed by their inability to form a clear majority government after election. Comparatively, mixed-member system is regarded as a hybrid entailing a mixture of the competing plurality and proportional principles. In other words, Mixed-member system intends to compromise the elements of the two electoral formulas. To a certain extent, mixed-member system is expected to maintain the equilibrium of governability and proportionality. It is also due to this consideration that the mixed-member system becomes the preferred option by many countries in the wave of electoral reform.

As a member of the third wave democratization (Huntington, 1991), Taiwan has engaged in a series of constitutional amendment since 1990s. As a part of these constitutional revisions, the original electoral system for legislators, single non-transferable vote with multi-member system, is replaced by mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001: 13). During the process of electoral reform, institutional designers are also faced how to reach a balance between political equality and governable ability. The goal of electoral reform is to combine the governability strengths of plurality rule in single-member constituencies with the offsetting proportional qualities of national list. The degree of compromise between governability and proportionality definitely exercises significant impacts on the Taiwan’s political development. The main purpose of this paper is to focus on the problem of proportionality under the new MMM system in Taiwan. It firstly defines the meanings of proportionality or disproportionality, which both are two sides of a coin. It secondly measures the degree of disproportionality by Loosemore-Hanby index from 1992 to 2008. It is followed by the explanations for the existences and changes disproportionality. Finally, a concluding remark is provided in the last section.

Electoral Disproportionality

Electoral system can be simplified as a system of translating electorate’s votes into parliamentary seats. An untold but crucial concept in the process of vote/seat translation is proportionality. An ideal type of electoral system is a system faithfully translates electorate’s vote into parliamentary seat. That is, if there are 30% of electorate votes for a party in election, then the party should receive 30% of parliamentary seats. There exists a sensitive and close association between votes and seats. This ideal type of electoral system brings in perfect proportionality. Any deviation from the vote/seat association is a violation of proportionality. Of course, the ideal type of electoral system exists only in theory but not in reality, so is the perfect proportionality. All electoral systems differ in terms of proportionality. Some are more proportional than others. Or, put it another way, all electoral systems are inherently disproportional to some extend. One thing, and perhaps the only thing, electoral reformers can to is not to find the ideal electoral system that produces perfect proportionality but to choose an electoral system that produce proportionality as best as it can.

Why does proportionality matter? An essential cause is political equality among the electorate. Democracy prescribes an equal treatment to every citizen’s electoral preference. Electoral system is thus required to respond every citizen’s preference and transform the preference into policy agenda without bias. So, if there is certain
amount of voter support for a political party, then the political party should have corresponding strength in the parliament. Additionally, proportionality ensures the survival of smaller political parties. The more proportionality is, the greater is the chance for small parties to be represented. It also suggests that the voice of voters in parliament cannot be monopolized by two dominant parties in a pluralist society. When the expected proportionality increased, the nature of country’s diversity can be more possible to be mirrored. Furthermore, from the perspective of representation, the higher degree of proportionality is, the fewer votes are wasted because they are fully translated into seats. The problem of proportionality is thus an essential factor in the choosing of electoral systems. It is certainly not less important, if not more important, than the criteria of governability in the issue of electoral reform.

Definition of disproportionality

First of all, the question is how proportionality is defined. Generally, conventional wisdom treats the term based on the electoral performance of political parties, namely, the extent to the political parties receive seats in proportion to their votes in the electorate. As Arend Lijphart indicates, disproportionality means “the deviation of parties’ seat shares from their vote shares” (Lijphart, 1994: 57). The focus is party’s share of votes in relation to its share of seats. It also anchors electoral system is a mechanism deciding the allocation of parliamentary seats according the distribution of popular votes. The parliamentary seats a party receives thus depends on the votes it wins in elections. Moreover, disproportionality is essential a state of closeness to or distance from perfect proportionality. It is an issue of degree of disproportionality instead of an issue of having or having not disproportionality.

Of course, there are otherwise perspectives of disproportionality. For example, Riedwyl and Steiner take a different angle by looking at the perspective of the voters, i.e. how many voters stand behind each seat and whether a large group of voters always wins over a smaller one (1995: 358). Proportionality refers not only the relations between popular votes and parliamentary seats a political party has, rather, it means even more the political equality of each electorate in election. Both authors indicated that Lijphart’s idea of disproportionality is too focused on the percentage of the seats whether virtually corresponded to the percentage of the votes or not at the cost of ignoring the problem of “unequal values of each vote” resulting from protecting minority.

Riedwyl and Steiner’s offer disproportionality a broader meaning that closely connect the whole essence of political equality. However, this meaning also suffers from bringing too many campaign-irrelevant factors into analyses. For example, if applying Riedwyl and Steiner’s viewpoint to Taiwan’s case, the problem of apportionment (Balinski and Young, 1982: 1), which is also called malapportionment, still exists under the new electoral system. The malapportionment issue did exist in Taiwan’s legislative election in 2008. There are obviously unequal distributions of population in each district after the new redistricting. It is found that there are 475928 voters behind one seat in Hsinchu County, as compared to 79884 and 9786 voters behind one seat in Kimen County and Lienchiang County respectively. Apparently, people in Kimen County and Lienchiang County have greater voice than in Hsinchu. As a result, the ideal of equal representation, or the principle of one man one vote, is failed to be realizes.

As a matter of fact, there is no perfect proportionality either from the perspective of political
parties or from the perspective of voters. It is impossible to make a precise allocation of seats to parties. The problem of apportionment (or malapportionment) will keep emerging while redistricting occurred. Both perspectives are necessary for a complete discussion of proportionality. Nevertheless, redistricting issue has closely related to institutional design and gerrymandering. It takes a long coverage to discuss the redistricting issues (Yu, 2007). Relatively, electoral proportionality addresses to a specific election and its outcomes. It is easier to make a longitudinal analysis in Taiwan’s elections. Following this line of argument, we are able to find the partisan bias from different electoral formula and discuss the relevant issues of under-representation or over-representation of In this essay, therefore, we put our focus on how proportionality before and after the new electoral system is implemented in Taiwan. The definition of proportionality based on party competition, as Lijphart suggests, will used in the following analyses.

Measures of disproportionality

As discussed above, there is a relatively consensus in the literature on the definition of proportionality. Yet, there are also disagreements on the indices to measure proportionality. Basically, the question of how best to measure disproportionality has been much more difficult than the question of how to measure it. Hsieh indicated that it is necessary to match up with the purpose and subject in choosing of the indices of disproportionality. In addition, he further classified the indices according to different subjects (1996: 42-63): (1) the number of parties by Rae index; (2) two largest parties in each election by Lijphart index; (3) the maximum ratio between a party’s seats and its votes in all parties by d’Hondt index; (4) overall disproportionality produced by an election by Loosemore-Hanby index, or Least Squares index, or Sainte-Lague index.

The earliest and best known is that devised by Rae, which consists of adding the vote-seat differences of each party winning more than 0.5 per cent of the votes, and then divides the number of all parties. However, a major concern with Rae index is that it is overly sensitive to the presence of very small parties (Lijphart, 1994: 58) as it is applied to calculate the degree of disproportionality of each party not each election. In contrast with Rae’s index, Lijphart’s index assumes the distortion of seat-vote of two largest parties would reflect all situations of deviation. Needless to say, it is too assertive to conclude the disproportionality of each election. As to d’Hondt index, Gallagher stated the method does not work by trying to minimize some overall measure of disproportionality (Gallagher, 1991: 42). Moreover, just as Lijphart’s index has suffered, the method of d’Hondt that uses the maximum ratio of the largest party draws conclusions from a part as well.

This essay is going to measure the overall disproportionality per election (Taiwan’s 2008 legislative election) not per party like Rae index. Thus, only the index of Loosemore-Hanby, Least Squares, and Sainte-Lague fit in with the purpose. Among these three methods, the index of Least Squares and Sainte-Lague tend to exaggerate the result of disproportionality because of their emphases on weighting the deviations by vote-seat share differences for each party (Hsieh, 1996: 49-51). In other words, these indices make the larger deviations account for a great deal more in the summary index than small deviations. It is also understandable that these indices are less common in the mainstream literature. For these reasons, this essay chooses the index constructed by Loosemore and Hanby

\[ D = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} |S_i - V_i| \]

Unlike Rae’s index, Loosemore and Hanby replace the total number of political parties by 2 because what is gained by one party must be lost by others in elections. The difference between the vote and seat percentages of all of the overrepresented parties will be the same as the total difference between the vote and seat shares of the underrepresented parties. Therefore, it is not necessary to include both the extent of overrepresentation and underrepresentation together in the index (Riedwyl and Steiner, 1995: 358). Besides, in order to make sense of the values, adding all vote-seat share difference \((S_i - V_i)\) with absolute values and sum them up; then we can obtain D index after divided 2. If all seat shares are the same as vote shares for the given party, we have \(D = 0\), which properly reflects the lack of deviation from perfect PR. This is the minimum possible deviation. The maximum conceivable deviation would occur when some parties with 0 percent of the votes obtain 100 percent of the seats, with the remaining parties obtaining 100 percent votes but no seats. Calculating D for such a situation results in \(D = 100\) (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989: 105).

Undoubtedly, every index has weaknesses. As Gallagher mentioned, D index is always minimized by the largest remainders method (1991: 39). We consider the solution to the problem is regarding the allocation rules. Hsieh proposed an easy way to solve the question: (1) increase the number of seats; (2) change the electoral formula (Hsieh, 1996: 43). To go a step further, in our points of view, the aim of increasing the number of district magnitude is to reduce the electoral quota which means how many votes are needed to elect any one candidate. In this way, more seats would be distributed at the first step, so that, it would decrease the controversy of allocation base on the remainders at the second step. Furthermore, it is also possible to alter the electoral formula to the Droop Quota under the largest remainder system, i.e. Quota Methods. Because Droop method divides the total number of votes by the number of seats plus one, the divisors will get greater, and the quotients will get smaller. This means that fewer seats remain to be distributed, the same logic as.

After excluding the possibility of problem from the electoral formula itself, D index is not only simple and straightforward but also the most popular and widely used to measure the disproportionality of election. Thus, by using D index, this paper is going to examine the degree of disproportionality in Taiwan’s legislative elections before and after the electoral reform.

**The case on Taiwan 2008 election**

**Performance of SNTV-MMD**

Taiwan had implemented SNTV-MMD in its legislative elections before 2008. Scholars have paid much attention to the study of SNTV-MMD for many years and its weaknesses are widely discussed. Many discussions mentioned the problem of intraparty competition due to the design of multiple seats. Any party that seeks to win a majority of the seats must therefore run more than one candidate in most districts. Here comes a problem: these candidates from the same party do not only compete against candidates from other parties but also from the same parties. Moreover, parties must correctly nominate the number of candidate in each district. Same party candidates exist in the same district. Furthermore, under the plural formula, each candidate needs only a relative portion of vote to get a seat.
Thus, intraparty competition for votes will be as important as, and possibly more important than, interparty competition (Cox and Rosenbluth, 1993: 579). As a result of competing in the same battle ground, candidates always portrait themselves as unique as possible and propose extreme or fringe policy to please a certain voters. Consequently, as the past experiences, radical party competition continued in every legislative election.

However, there are also strengths of SNTV-MMD. In reality, SNTV has not only straightforward plurality formula but also more proportional result. As mentioned earlier, candidate just needs few portion of vote to be elected. For this reason, small parties are more likely to win a seat in districts. It is advised by Lijphart that small parties are able to survive under SNTV-MMD. He used the conception of threshold of exclusion to demonstrate that the optimal limited vote for small parties is a system in which the number of votes of each voter is as small as possible; that is, one, SNTV (Lijphart, et al. 1986: 158). On the other hand, under SNTV, large parties have to suffer two serious problems. First, those larger parties can reasonably expect to win more seats, and hence that over-nomination occurs under the exceeding number of candidates. Moreover, larger parties have to instruct its supporters to distribute their votes as equally as possible among its candidates; otherwise, the votes received by a candidate above the number necessary for victory are wasted. In order to avoid such a problem, parties always nominate fewer candidates than they might have been able to elect, namely, under-nomination occurs whenever the number of candidates that a party nominates falls short of maximum of seats (Lijphart, et al. 1986: 157-162; Cox and Niou, 1999: 356-357). Comparatively, only if small parties nominate one or moderate candidate, under the premise, it will be surely to guarantee to get their first seat without wasting votes. This is why SNTV-MMD is credited to be beneficial to survival of small parties. As explained above, SNTV tends to protect the representation of minority and produce a proportional electoral result somehow.

Thus, indeed, it is necessary to pay attention to the drawbacks of SNTV on the one hand, and we should also give weight to the advantage of semi-proportionality of SNTV on the other hand. Based on the 2005 constitutional amendment, under the new MMM system, the total number of seats is cut into half from 225 to 113. Among them, 73 seats are elected based on the SMD in local constituencies, while 34 seats based on the PR in a nationwide district. In addition, there are still 6 seats for the aboriginals based on SNTV constituencies. In the 2008 legislative election, the Kuomintang (KMT) got 71.7% of the total 113 seats; moreover, pan-blue camp will be three-fourth of the total seats including one seat of the People First Party (PFP) and three seats of the Non-Partisan Solidarity Union (NPSU). Comparatively, the election results fell far short from the expectation of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), only got 23.9% of 113 seats. Obviously, the pan-blue camp received an overwhelming victory under MMM in 2008. The emergence of absolute majority means it is much easier to have a stable government that can carry out policies without the obstruction of the opposition. Therefore, now that the goal of governability is likely to achieve after foreseeable years, on the other hand, the performance of proportionality should be examined under the new system. Then, as followed, we measure the degree of disproportionality by D index from district level (nominal tier) and national level (list tier) respectively.
Proportionality of the new electoral system

This section begins with an attempt to measure the degree of disproportionality between 2004 and 2008 election at the district level in order to make a comparative study with two different electoral systems. The aim is to examine the hypothesis which refers to “For small parties, plurality with SMD tends to produce higher degree of disproportionality than MMD.” Furthermore, it measures the degree of disproportionality of PR tier and aboriginal tier respectively by weighting proportion of each tier (64.6%, 30.1%, and 5.3%), so as to generate an index of overall disproportionality produced by 2008 election. In other words, discussing whether the D index of district level is affected by national and aborigine level or not. Finally, measuring the degree of disproportionality of per election from 1992 to 2008 and tries to explain how disproportionality occurred.

As Figure 1 demonstrates, the result of election reflects that the degree of disproportionality under the new electoral system is higher than the SNTV-MMD in 2004 across most of the cities and counties. Besides, it is also worth noting that, after adopting the MMM system, many cities and counties yielded “manufactured majorities” (Rae, 1971: 74-77), namely, parties that receive less than a majority of the votes but to which the electoral system awards a majority of the seats. In this respect, it is the main reason resulting in the high degree of disproportionality. For instance, the dominant parties in many areas received only slightly higher than the half of votes but awarded nearly 80 percent of seats. Still, a few areas like Changhua County, Chiayi City, and Lienchiang County, obtained even lower than half of popular votes, so the degree of disproportionality got even higher to 50 percent. These results confirm the theory about the plurality with SMD brings higher disproportionality than the MMD.

In theory, when a proportional representation formula is used, the larger the magnitude is, the more proportional the system will be (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989: 112). In the former SNTV-MMD system, exceptional for few cases, Taiwan’s district magnitude is a mid-size constituency ranged from 1 to 10. Because of the higher number of district magnitude, each party does not necessary to win a seat by the highest votes. From the perspective of political parties, it is beneficial to representation of parties, especially small parties. However, under the new system in 2008, since the district magnitude sharply shrank to 1, not only is the percentage of waste votes high, but also that the degree of proportionality is up apparently.

Figure 1  Disproportionality between 2004 and 2008 by Administrative Areas

Source: Calculated from Central Election Commission data. http://210.69.23.140/cec/cechead.asp#
words, to be a winner needs to win the highest votes, or he/she will turn to be a loser. Thus, small parties always suffer from strong under-representation while the result of election is decided by the winner-take-all formula. Additionally, according to Duverger’s viewpoint, the electorate will realize that their votes are wasted if they continue to support for the third party; whence their natural tendency to transfer their vote to the less evil of its two adversaries in order to prevent the success of the greater evil (Duverger, 1966: 226). Under such a psychological effect, it will further squeeze the room of small parties at local constituencies. Figure 2 displays the trend of disproportionality of each election at district level. Compared with the indices of every election before 2008, the degree of disproportionality under the new electoral system is significantly increased up to 24.62. The result corresponds with the existing literatures about the plurality system produces lower proportionality than SNTV.

To analyze the disproportionality of overall election, it is important to note that Taiwan’s mixed member system consists of three parallel tiers. Besides SMD of 73 seats and PR of 34 seats, there is SNTV of 6 seats from aboriginal district yet, in other words, the overall disproportionality is determined by three different d (see figure 3). Therefore, it is necessary to calculate the index of disproportionality of SMD, PR, and SNTV tiers at the first step, and then, according to the proportion of tiers (64.6%, 30.1%, and 5.3%), weighting the three different D index respectively at the next step. Then, we can obtain the overall disproportionality by adding up the results of the second step.

Equally important, somehow, the old SNTV is also regarded as a mixed system based on two tiers - regional level and aborigine level. Hence, given the consistency of comparison, we use the same method while calculating the disproportionality under the old SNTV system. For instance, in 2004 election, the result goes as followed:

In general, PR tiers in mixed system have their ex-
expected effects: producing lower levels of disproportionality than their corresponding SMD tier (Moser and Scheiner, 2004: 586). In other words, the function of PR tier is to provide some proportionality to systems that would otherwise discriminate against smaller parties. Moreover, D index of PR tier also revise and harmonize the SMD tier, so that the overall disproportionality will be lower than SMD. Nonetheless, since the proportion of SMD tier (64.6%) is much higher than PR tier (30.1%); we can imagine that the efficacy of harmonization won’t be striking enough as theory.

As Table 2 displays, the disproportionality in 2008 is 20.09. After corrected by PR and SNTV tier, as we expect, the index only drop 4 percent in the long run. Compared with the result of SNTV of figure 4, it still presents significantly high degree of disproportionality. Obviously, even though the purpose of the mixed system is to compromise the features of plurality and PR system, however, according to the result, it failed to look after the both sides- governability and proportionality.

In addition to district magnitude and electoral tiers, another crucial factor which resulted in the high degree of disproportionality is the design of threshold. Threshold is the most direct and explicit way of affecting the degree of proportionality. As an entry barrier, this discrimination against small parties and their supporters is usually justified in terms of preventing excessive fragmentation and thereby making it easier to form stable government (Gallagher and Mitchell, 2005: 13). In Taiwan, notwithstanding there was a threshold (5 percent of votes) under the old SNTV, small parties obtained representation somehow because of the semi-proportional characteristic of the SNTV system. After switching to the MMM system, the same threshold still exists, that is, the only parties that qualify for any list seats are those that win 5 percent of the list votes.

If we further compare the Table 2 with the Figure 4, the degree of disproportionality of PR tier is 11.86, even higher than the degree of disproportionality under the SNTV before shifting the electoral system. Apparently, this kind of result didn’t correspond to the theoretical expectation about PR systems generate more proportionality than SNTV. Understandably, the existence of threshold may be one of the key points producing limitations on proportionality. According to the result of 2008 election, the two dominant parties (KMT and DPP) received the 88.24 percent of total number of votes; by contrast, New Party (NP) and Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) obtained only closed to 4 percent of votes. Since small parties were unable to reach the threshold, it goes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year 2004</th>
<th>KMT</th>
<th>DPP</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural &amp; Party List</td>
<td>V%</td>
<td>32.71</td>
<td>36.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bonus</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>6.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aborigine</td>
<td>V%</td>
<td>40.64</td>
<td>9.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bonus</td>
<td>9.36</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>12.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 Degree of Disproportionality in 2004 Election

| Source: Calculated from Central Election Commission data. |
without saying that they failed to earn any seats at all. Ironically, even though the main purpose of mixed-member system is to moderate the disproportionality of SMD tier by PR tier that facilitates seat acquisition by small parties, the design of the threshold becomes a major barrier to impede the small parties to get seats. No parties other than the two major parties, the KMT and the DPP, have seats in Legislative Yuan after 2008 election. The new electoral system completely fulfills the missions of increasing the degree of governability, yet, at the cost of decreasing the degree of proportionality.

Conclusion

In order to reach the goal of “the best system of both worlds”, many new and advanced democracies adopt the mixed-member systems which possess the features of balancing the two main dimensions between governability and proportionality/disproportionality. Taiwan is also in the wave of electoral reforms and maintains that the new electoral system would bring a better combination of both governability and proportionality. This essay takes the Taiwan’s legislative election in 2008 as a case of examining the changes of proportionality before and after the new electoral system is implemented.

As to result of Taiwan 2008 legislative election, the biggest party, the KMT, has won more than 70 percent of legislative seats. The new electoral system does bring a stable majority in Taiwan and the purpose of governability has accomplished. Yet, by Loosemore-Hanby index, we discover the degree of disproportionality under the MMM is sharply increased to 20.15. Obviously, even if the function of the PR tier may correct the disproportionality from the SMD tier, the transition of the elements of electoral system, just like district magnitude, levels of seat allocation, and the high threshold, are harmful to proportionality or discriminate against the representation of small parties. In sum, the outcomes of the new MMM experience got an unbalance between governability and proportionality. Albeit, the mixed-member systems provide such an opportunity that compromises the features of plurality and PR system, however, in practice, all electoral reforms are advantageous to large parties.

Moreover, there is no reason to assume that the first election under a new system represents the final equilibrium (Reed, 2005: 387). One result of election should not be exaggerated as a long and constant consequence. Although this problem may be a limitation on this article, we can still keep a first eye on the existing and ensuing problems from the new system under the only one experience. Last, but not the least important, although mixed-member systems combine some features of both plurality and PR, there is still no perfect electoral system in the world. However, by making good use of flexibility of mixed-member systems, we might have an “ide-

Figure 4  The Trend of Overall Disproportionality, 1992-2008

Source: Calculated from Central Election Commission data.
al” system which can be regularly updated to suit changing needs and political conditions. On the case of 2008 legislative, Taiwan should choose to revise the electoral formula appropriately in the future rather than switch the electoral system drastically once again. In particular, the allocation of SMD seats and PR seats should be more balanced and the threshold for PR seats also needs to be reduced. These suggestions are still to be seen in the future because they have addressed to the issue of constitutional revision which entails great uncertainties.

Reference
Rae, Dogulas (1971), Thresholds of Representation and Threshold of Exclusion, New Haven: Yale University Press.