Voting Behavior and Electoral Engineering in Taiwan

抄録

Many studies on Taiwanese voting behavior have addressed the topic of the electorate's voting choice. Unfortunately, few have paid attention to the implications of different electoral systems on voting behavior. This paper examines voting behavior in single-member districts and multi-member districts and argues that inter-party strategic voting exists in presidential elections. In regards to the presidential election, partially overlapping social bases of political parties provide the framework for inter-party strategic voting. In the legislative election, which uses a single-nontransferable voting system (SNTV), party lines are mostly respected. Party-line voting, however, would be replaced by inter-party strategic voting once SNTV transforms into a single-majority voting system. To test our hypothese, we examine the 2000 presidential election, in which there were three sets of major candidates. We also examine the 2001 and 2004 legislative elections as examples of the SNTV system. Our conclusion is that Taiwanese voters respond to change in the electoral system and that there will be vote switching when the number of parties is reduced.