External Critiques of Experimental Philosophy– *Foreword* –

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The following papers are collected for a special section “External Critiques of Experimental Philosophy”, which is based on the workshop (under the same title) held at the annual autumn meeting of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science, at the University of Tokyo, in 2012. Some of the contributors are especially invited to this issue.

Recent fashion (or revival) of the use of experimental methods in philosophy has provoked a lot of interesting meta-philosophical debates. They, however, mostly revolve around the questions about the legitimacy of the use of intuitions in philosophy. Thus such meta-philosophical debates discuss, and therefore are formulated in, the notion of intuition. For example, whether the intuitions of philosophers in evaluating philosophical arguments are reliable or not (whether they possess any relevant *expertise*), whether the use of intuition as evidence in philosophical argument is legitimate or not, or even whether intuition has in fact been used as evidence for philosophical argument as a matter of historical fact.

In this special section, Stephen Stich, a guru of experimental philosophy movement today, kindly contributed a general overview of what experimental philosophy is. Each of papers that follows, however, discusses experimental philosophy from a unique perspective. Simie Vazire from a psychological point of view, Kazuhisa Todayama from a mathematical point of view, and Eric McCready from a linguistic point of view, discuss experimental philosophy in relation to their own view of experiment.

These papers together explore the status and the nature of experimental philosophy from somewhat external points of view. Through critical examinations from such perspectives, we aim for shedding new lights on the current debates over experimental philosophy.

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