法政論叢
Online ISSN : 2432-1559
Print ISSN : 0386-5266
ISSN-L : 0386-5266
占領初期の対日食糧輸入実現をめぐる交渉過程
小田 義幸
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ジャーナル フリー

2009 年 45 巻 2 号 p. 46-57

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After the end of the Pacific War, Japan faced an unprecedented food crisis. Prewar Japan's food supply was supported by Japanese colonies (Korean and Taiwan), Manchurian and Southeast Asia. But, Japan couldn't import food from these areas by herself because the Japanese government accepted an unconditional surrender and took no actions, including the importation of food, without GHQ's permission. So, Postwar Japan had to stand on her own feet in spite of a sudden increase in the demand for food. Moreover, Japanese rice crops suffered great losses by storm and flood in September of 1945. As a result, it was expected that Japan would be short of about 3 millions tons of food in 1946, and that many Japanese people wouldn't get enough food to live. Afterwards, the Japanese Government through the Central Liaison Office entreated GHQ to import 3 millions tons of food from other countries. However, it took Japanese people more than half a year to gain them and Japan suffered from hunger in May 1946. GHQ also encountered difficulties as riots occurred throughout Japan and the occupation of Japan almost collapsed. I examined the reasons why they faced it and clarified the following matters. First, they had optimistic viewpoints about the next year's food situation in Japan and so failed to prepare against a food crisis. Second, Japan-GHQ negotiations deadlocked by December 1945 because GHQ demanded to take efforts to collect foods from Japanese farmers. Third, GHQ, especially the import-export division in the Economic Scientific Section, tried to import food from Asian countries as a business, but failed. After that, GHQ finally called on the US government for importing food to Japan in February 1946, but it was too late to prevent a riot. The above explanation makes it clear that GHQ didn't have a system for crisis management. Moreover, it clarified that GHQ was lacking in gathering correct information from around Japan and communicating with other section's members of GHQ. So, I'd like to conclude that these factors concerning GHQ promoted a straying of negotiation with the Japanese Government and the food crisis in 1946.

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© 2009 日本法政学会
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