行動経済学
Online ISSN : 2185-3568
ISSN-L : 2185-3568
第13回大会プロシーディングス
Rational Procrastination on Self-signaling
Masahito Yoshida
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2019 年 12 巻 Special_issue 号 p. S25-S28

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Bénabou and Tirole (2004) explain that people in the face of self-control problems could commit to rational choices with concern for self-reputation. The key of the mechanism is uncertainty of one's willpower and induced signaling effect of willpower-related actions. We suggest that this mechanism with self-reputation potentially explains a wide range of the decision making under biases. One of the example is procrastination. In a certain situation, procrastination works as a signal of low self-control power and induces precaution of doing the job early in the next time. Conversely, this strategic pretending to be low willpower might be used as an excuse for procrastination and then concern for self-reputation may induce ambivalent effects on one's welfare, contrasted with the result in Bénabou and Tirole (2004). We suggest that patience amid the craving determines the effect on one's welfare and welfare may worsen for strategic but impatient people.

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© 2019 Association of Behavioral Economics and Finance
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