「自体的存在」としてのカテゴリー : 『形而上学』Δ巻第7章における存在への視点

抄録

In Metaphysics Δ7(1017a22-23)Aristotle asserts that both substance and non-substantial categories are "per se beings". But H. Maier maintains that this assertion is misleading, because according to Aristotle's usual ontology non-substantial categories are not per se beings but accidental beings. The alleged inconsistency relates to the conceptual frame in terms of which Aristotle's account of per se beings and accidental beings is couched. My aim in this paper is to investigate a way of reading the Al passage which I hope will show that Aristotle is consistent in dealing with all categories, substance or non-substance, as per se beings. The problem is this : how does Aristotle take accidental beings in Al to be? We should consider the second chapter of Met. E, whose central topic is accidental beings. Accidental beings discussed there are said to be material things(1027a13-14)and not any object of science at all(1026b3-4, 1027a19-20), therefore, not the object of the science of being qua being. But is this true of Al, as J. Owens supposed? Ζ4 will give us the clue we need to this question. Aristotle establishes the close relation not only between accidental beings and "compounds from the other categories" (1029b23) , but also between per se beings and "things said to be per se"(1029b14, 29). And he says, "what a thing is belongs without qualification to a substance, but in a way to other things as well."(1030a22 -23), and "there will be a definition even of a pale man"(1030b12-13). So it turns out that he is treating substance and non-substantial categories, or even compounds from the other categories in the same way because of their definability. Something's being "one" not by the continuity but in the respect of what it is or definition, I think, enables him to do that(1030b8-11). Aristotle enumerates three meanings of 'one'(Met. Δ6) : (1) one by the continuity; (2) one by the substratum; (3) one by "the formula saying what it is to be". It is to the third meaning that Ζ4 refers. Since 'being' and 'one' signify the same thing by following each other(Met. 12, 1054a13 ; Γ2, 1003a22-25), 'per se being' in ΔA7 can be also taken to mean 'one' by the formula saying what it is to be. If so, why is it that accidental beings in Ε2 are not regarded as objects of the science of being qua being, while in Ζ4 they are practically studied as such? Notice that matter is the cause of the accidental combination of substance and the other categories(Ε2, 1027a13-14). Accidental beings in Ε2 are material compounds or individuals. But in Ζ4 Aristotle never mentions the concept of matter in discussing essence and definition, for the definition of a thing just states what it is by disregarding its matter. It follows that accidental beings in Ζ4 are not material but essential compounds, and that things said to be per se are without matter. So are per se beings in AT. The idea that being what it is without matter is common to all categories seems to have led Aristotle to the assertion at issue.