西洋古典学研究
Online ISSN : 2424-1520
Print ISSN : 0447-9114
ISSN-L : 0447-9114
有益性と美 : 『ヒッピアス(大)』における美の定義の破綻の意味について
一色 裕
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ジャーナル フリー

1999 年 47 巻 p. 41-51

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Although there is some controversy about the authenticity of Hippias Major, the majority now take it to be Plato's own work. But the assessment of 'philosophy' involved in it has just begun with the commentary of P. Woodruff. But most scholars including Woodruff who think the fine to be open to definition regard the aporia of search as representing the failure of Socratic argument depicted by Plato. But in my view, this is a grave fault of interpreters. As a result, the definitions of the fine by the beneficial and the beneficial pleasure, which are the key points of the dialogue, have not yet been given proper and successful interpretation. My task in this paper is to give a new interpretation of this dialogue, focusing on the concept of the beneficial. Hippias, Socrates' interlocutor in this dialogue, displays the fine practices desirable in youth through a fictional discourse based on Homer. Conversely, he teaches fine things without himself knowing the fine. The problem of the beauty of virtue lies hidden in the initial situation of the dialogue. Examining Hippias' ideas of the fine, Socrates shows the fine to be an incomplete predicate during the refutation of Hippias. To refute Hippias' first proposal (fine girl) and his third one (happy life), Socrates refers to the existence of gods. But Hippias' second proposal (gold) is refuted by the notion of appropriateness he himself applied. The appropriateness is at first introduced as a visual one, but is immediately transformed to a moral one, i. e. the appropriateness to ends. The visual appropriateness per se has not yet been examined. In Socrates' self-refutation, his proposal for the definitions of the fine is concerned with human motivation, whose archetype was presented in Grg. 474de. Motivations which are introduced into the argument through visual appropriateness have two series. 1. utility : the useful-the beneficial. 2. pleasure : pleasure through sight and hearing-beneficial pleasure. In each series, the last definition makes explicit the relation of the fine and the good through the notion of beneficial, which leads to aporia. But among fine things, there are some which cannot be perceived as fine. These are the beauty of law and practice Plato esteems highly. The visual appropriateness is concerned with perception, not with being. Then, the appropriateness to ends, that is, utility comes in. But usefulness for doing bad things cannot receive approbation. If good things are substituted for bad things, can the definition of the fine be formed successfully? But, if the good is made consequent of the productive agent (doing or making) and the fine is made antecedent of it, this results in the non-identity of the fine with the good. The beneficial does not explain the fine. The fine cannot be composed of objective good things. With this result, Socrates turns to the examination of the second series of motivations : pleasure. Does pleasure through sight and hearing, i. e. pleasure (s+h), explain the fine? The problems with which Plato is faced in this definition are the following. 1. Is the beauty of law and practice explicable by pleasure (s+h)? 2. Does pleasure (s+h) explain the fine? But the definiens, pleasure (s+h), which takes the form of a conjunction, cannot denote a single thing. (The same is true with disjunction.)Problem 1 can be answered only after problem 2 is settled definitely. But because the definition of the fine by pleasure (s+h) failed, problem 1 remains open. Why is the term 'fine' applied to pleasure (s+h)? The ground for predicating 'fine' about pleasure (s+h) is asked here. Is there any explanation convertible with and inherent in the fine? To this question Socrates answers that pleasure (s+h) is the most harmless and the best. When one asks with reflection the ground of predicating 'fine', the other name of the term

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