Statistical

Studies on the range of voice of school children were made by such scholars as Koch (1874),Vierordt(1920), Froeschels, Paulsen, Flatau, Gutzmann and Weinberg, and their results agree to a considerable degree. In Japan, few studies based on survey and measurement are found except Dr. Iida’s S’%漉6εo〃魏θ1~σ%g66ゾ17∂此6げノゆαπθεθP6ρρ16. As our voice plays a very important part in our daily life, studies on the voice range of school children, who are in the fundamental stage of forming humanity, were made on the basis of the individual examination and measurement of over 1,400 school children in Toyama Prefecture. Concerning the method of survey and research, no literature was available and the writer,s own method was used. The writer believes that these studies made by the writer are signi丘cant enough, from medical point of view, to enrich children’s Iife using voice and to help educators study children from their point of view. It must be added, however, that these studies were made entirely from physical point of view. The main results reached as the conclusion of the studies are as follows. 1,The stages of the progress of the voice range following the ages of children are nearly similar to those studied by Gutzmann and other scholars, but the range of voice was a little wider than that made clear by their stud1es. The lowest limit of the voice range was found lower than that shown by their studies. 2.It was made statistica11y clear that the voice range of the children of Oto-rhino-laryngological disease was narrower than that of healthy children. 3.Concerning the relation between the width of the voice range and the sensitiveness of the sense of pitch and that between the w三dth of the voice range and the condition of voice production, the coe缶cients of correlation were:the former O.5 and the latter O.7-0.9.


Preface
This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses the Ghana Statistical Development Project (GSDP), which was approved by the World Bank on December 31, 2010, and financed through a multi-donor trust fund (MDTF), including the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom (DFID) and the European Commission. The total project cost was estimated at US$7.37 million. The actual cost was US$5.9 million. The original closing date of the project was December 31, 2012, but it was extended by six months to June 30, 2013, to advance the implementation of project activities. IEG is grateful for the excellent cooperation of all of the stakeholders and the support of the World Bank country office in Accra.
Following standard IEG procedures, a copy of the draft report was sent to the relevant government officials and agencies for their review and feedback. Their comments were taken into account and are enclosed in Appendix C. .

Summary
Following the declaration of the Marrakech Action Plan for Statistics in November 2004, and with a growing global consensus on the need to build and broaden the statistical capacity of developing countries, the Government of Ghana began a process of analytical reviews and needs assessments. Late in 2008, with the support of the World Bank, the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DIFD), and other external partners, the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) launched the Ghana Statistical Development Program (GSDP). It was an ambitious and far-reaching plan designed to align and dovetail the work program with the needs of the general public and the government, including the requirements for planning, policy making, and monitoring and evaluation.
This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) focuses on the results of the World Bank's Ghana Statistical Development Project (P118585), which was approved in December 2010 and closed in June 2013. It was the first in a series of two World Bank operations dedicated to supporting the government's broader initiative with the same title-Ghana Statistical Development Program. The objective of this operation was "to prepare GSS for institutional reform and to ensure timely and extensive analysis and dissemination of census data 1 ." For the second operation, the objective was "to strengthen the National Statistical System in the production and dissemination of timely and robust statistics relevant for evidence-based policy making and other uses." This PPAR also discusses, but does not review, the second operation.
Initially, the assistance from the World Bank was meant to be substantial and give a major boost to the government's statistical development-similar to the second project in this series. During project preparation in 2009, however, it was decided that a smaller project that might be prepared quickly could give a head start to the corporate reform program and help finance the 2010 population and housing census. This smaller operation was expected to precede the main project by about 18 months. But there was a delay of almost one year in bringing the first project to the approval stage, while the main operation proceeded on schedule. As it turned out, the first project was approved only nine months ahead of the second 2 .
As far as the first project is concerned, the objectives were well aligned with national priorities and assistance strategies of the World Bank-both at the time of appraisal and completion. However, the clarity of objectives suffered from the absence of rationale and direction of reforms. The project appraisal document (PAD) did not present the scope and extent of corporate actions to be undertaken to "prepare the GSS for institutional reforms.". Although additional information is available in the project components and results framework, the difference between the reform package of the project and that of the government's corporate blueprint for GSS was not discussed. The relevance of objectives is rated Modest.
The causal chains underlying the project as presented in the PAD showed many deficiencies. First, the statement of objectives was unclear, providing no measurable targets or outcomes to be achieved. Second, the institutional reforms as defined by the project overlooked a crucial part of the government's strategic blueprint-the redeployment and retrenchment of staff according to established rules. 3 . The agenda was thus fragmented and introduced uncertainties, including possible delays, in the funding of reforms. Third, the project team failed to revise and restructure the design of the project when circumstances changed with the one-year delay (from late 2009 to late 2010) in getting the first project to the approval stage. The project design should have been amended-to reduce the scope to cover only the census work or extend the duration to three or four years-to alleviate congestion of the institutional reform agenda and the 2010 census work, which by 2011 had become a matter of urgency. Fourth, adequate arrangements were not made to limit the loss of specialized and skilled staff. The results framework therefore offered little chance of achieving its goal. The relevance of design is rated Modest.
The first objective-to prepare GSS for institutional reforms-was partially achieved at the time the project closed-a significant shortcoming being that the statistics bill which was essential to preparing the GSS for institutional reforms was not presented to (let alone approved by) parliament. By April 2016, when this report was under preparation, all of the milestones set out in the PAD were met, but the statistics bill remained to be approved by the cabinet and parliament. The achievement of the first objective is rated Modest.
The second objective-to ensure timely and extensive analysis and dissemination of census data-was fully achieved at project completion. The final results of the census were released in May 2012, followed-within 10 months-by a series of 13 analytical papers including a national analytical report and 10 regional analytical reports, as well as a demographic, social, economic, and housing characteristics (DSEH) report. In addition, a variety of outputs not specifically targeted in the PAD, including the statistical compendium (manual of definitions, concepts, and methods), one-stop user service center and an international peer review process, were also delivered. The achievement of the second objective is rated Substantial.
Efficiency. Neither the PAD nor implementation completion report (ICR) presented an economic and financial analysis. There were no issues on the compliance with World Bank fiduciary and financial management policies. But a preponderance of evidence points to inefficient use of resources, as illustrated by a loss of four years in getting cabinet approval for the statistics bill and a delay of almost one year before the project was approved. Following approval, the project suffered multiple operational setbacks, among them the inability to secure technical advisors in a timely basis, a delay of more than three years to complete the reforms of human resources, and the need to extend the closing date by six months for a two-year project. On balance, efficiency is rated Modest.
Overall, the outcome is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory.
Risk to development outcomes. Among the key risks to sustainability are: i) GSS's funding uncertainty due to unpredictable budgetary allocations and ii) loss of qualified staff. Each of these risks could directly undermine Ghana's statistical capacity and the results achieved. The project did not mitigate or provide safeguards for these threats. As such, the risk to development outcomes is rated Significant.

World Bank performance
(i) Quality at entry. The quality at entry was Unsatisfactory. The first objective was not adequately defined. Project planning was poor, with unmanageable bunching of the census work and institutional reforms. The results framework was weak, with a fragmented reform agenda that lacked crucial measures (redeployment and retrenchment of staff). The monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system was notable mainly for its lack of contents. Quality at entry is rated Unsatisfactory.
(ii) Quality of supervision. Project supervision was mechanical, relying on routine administrative and financial data, rather than progress towards the results envisaged. Specialized areas were not adequately covered, including legal reforms and legislative processes. More importantly, the supervision team failed to secure the funding for the completion of corporate reforms which was embedded in GSDP II and left the reform agenda unfinished for another three years. The quality of project supervision is rated Unsatisfactory.
Overall, World Bank performance is rated Unsatisfactory.

Borrower performance
(i) Government performance. The government provided strong and consistent ownership of the project. It supported politically sensitive reforms and ensured an enabling environment for the GSS, including technical support as well as the personnel and office space of the project management unit. It could, however, have been more vigilant and more proactive in its deliberation of the statistics bill, which by all accounts involves no sensitive issues and yet has not been approved in nearly four years. Government performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory.
(ii) Implementing agency performance. Equally strong was the commitment of the GSS and its Board of Directors. Together, they gave the World Bank team extensive and reliable support. They also independently resolved many difficult implementation challenges, ranging from difficult measures in the workplace to poor design of the project and the absence of monitoring system. The Program Development and Management Group (PDMG) showed particularly strong performance in coordinating all activities efficiently and promptly tackling implementation issues as they arose. Monthly reviews were consistently carried out and progress reports issued as scheduled. Nonetheless, GSS could have made a difference on the statistics bill by monitoring its status more closely and submitting periodic inquiries to the cabinet. Implementing agency performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory.
Overall, borrower performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory.
Monitoring and evaluation system. No functional M&E system was developed and used in this project-no outcomes and no tracking indicators. Project supervision relied on routine administrative data and final outputs of the activities supported. There was no way of obtaining interim results, other than asking individual task teams. If an activity made no progress, it would not trigger any alarms or activate any corrective actions. The quality of the M&E system is rated Negligible.

Lessons.
Among the lessons derived from this review are:  To provide the public with relevant and reliable statistics, the national statistical office needs a responsive governing body to give strategic direction. Of particular importance is the presence of directors who represent the interest of data usersresearchers, development partners, academicians, students and policy makers.
Ghana once had such a mechanism; it was called the National Advisory Committee of Producers and Users of Statistics (NACPUS).  In supporting corporate or institutional reform agendas, it is essential to ensure orderly, efficient, and effective implementation to minimize the impact on staff. It requires meticulous design, thorough consultations, adequate funding, and the supervision of specialists. By failing to include the funding for redeployment and retrenchment, the project held up the completion of corporate reforms for years.  It helps to ensure that all the technical assistance services are in place before the project is presented to the Board. This was not the case with this project. After it became effective in February 2011, GSS was unable to get an expert to assist on the World Bank's procurement simply because it did not know how to use the World Bank's procurement system to hire that expert.  Despite the large role that the World Bank has played in mobilizing international support for statistical development, the capacity of the World Bank team to deliver results in this area should not be taken for granted. Even though the World Bank team appeared to be well qualified and the task team seemed to possess the right skills mix, project results were modest.  The check-list approach to monitoring and evaluation, as applied in this project, does not work. The results framework relied exclusively on administrative data (disbursements) and outputs (reports) of various activities to indicate the extent of progress made. No interim variables were chosen or developed to track progress.

Nick York Director Human Development and Economic Management
Independent Evaluation Group

Background and Context
1.1 At the dawn of the 21st century, the global development community became acutely aware of the need to upgrade and significantly increase the supply of relevant statistics. Quality data was sought in the quest to improve policy making, enhance governance and monitor progress. The World Bank played a central role in raising the awareness, convening stakeholders and mobilizing resources to advance this agenda. In 1999, Partnership in Statistics for Development in the 21 st Century (PARIS21) was founded in the context of the United Nation's Conference on Development to develop a culture of evidence-based policy making. Soon thereafter, the Trust Fund for Statistical Capacity Building (TFSCB) was established as a World Bank-administered, multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) to provide grants to developing countries to improve their capacity to compile and use statistics. In 2004, the Marrakech Action Plan for Statistics (MAPS) emerged from the Second Round Table for Managing for Development Results as a global plan to improve development statistics based on an informal partnership involving developing countries, donors, and statistical agencies worldwide.

1.2
This key initiative was not lost on Ghana. In fact, within the government, and especially at the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) where external support had been actively sought, it resonated profoundly. To seize the moment, the government of Ghana requested the assistance of the World Bank, as well as many external partners notably UK DFID, for both technical advice and funding to develop a far reaching program of statistical capacity building to modernize the role of GSS. With the consent of partners, extensive consultations and needs assessments were carried out.

1.3
The results were not surprising: major shortcomings were found across the board, including structural (legal and organizational), managerial and professional (skills), and financial deficiencies. Of particular concern was the weak capacity of staff at the GSS, inconsistencies in official statistics, use of different concepts and definitions by data producers and delays in the release of statistical data. The assessments recommended the development of a strategic framework, including a legislative foundation, to address the weaknesses. The challenges of the GSS were to be addressed first to make it more efficient in coordinating the National Statistical System.

1.4
In November 2008, with the help of development partners, GSS launched the Ghana Statistical Development Program (GSDP), which included a Corporate Plan to serve as the blueprint for institutional reforms of the GSS. The GSDP is a system-wide approach intended to revamp the entire national statistical system (NSS), including the GSS and ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) responsible for data collection and dissemination. The vision of GSDP has been to align activities of the NSS with the requirements of the government in planning, decision-making, and monitoring and evaluation. GSDP also envisages making statistics more relevant, reliable, and easily accessible to the public, including the private sector, social networks, cultural communities, civil societies, researchers, students, and development partners. The cost of the program was estimated to be $157 million, including major surveys, such as the 2010 population and housing census, to be implemented over five years.

1.5
This PPAR focuses on the results of the Ghana Statistical Development Project (P118585) of the World Bank, which was approved in December 2010 and closed in June 2013. It was the first in a series of two World Bank operations dedicated to supporting the government's broader initiative with the same title -Ghana Statistical Development Program. The objective of this operation was "to prepare GSS for institutional reform and to ensure timely and extensive analysis and dissemination of census data." For the second operation, the objective was "to strengthen the National Statistical System in the production and dissemination of timely and robust statistics relevant for evidence-based policy making and other uses." This PPAR also discusses, but does not review, the second operation (Table 1.1).

GSDP I (MDTF) GSDP II (SRF-CF) Objective
To prepare GSS for institutional reform and to ensure timely and extensive analysis and dissemination of census data 4 To strengthen the National Statistical System in the production and dissemination of timely and robust statistics relevant for evidence-based policy making and other uses 5 Initially, the assistance from the World Bank was meant to be substantial and give a major boost to the government's statistical development programsomething like the second in this series. During project preparation in 2009, however, it was decided that a smaller project that might be prepared quickly could give a head start to the corporate reform program and help finance the 2010 population and housing census. This smaller operation was expected to precede the main project by about 18 months. But there was a delay of almost a year before the first project was approved while the second proceeded as scheduled. Ultimately, the first project was approved only 9 months ahead of the second.

2.1
According to Schedule 1 of the World Bank's Multi-Donor Trust Fund Grant Agreement of February 7, 2011, the objective of the (Ghana Statistical Development) Project is to prepare GSS for institutional reforms and to ensure timely and extensive analysis and dissemination of census data. The statement of objectives given in the PAD is identical. The overall objective of the government's larger program is "to modernize and streamline the Ghana National Statistical System to ensure that it is sufficiently resourced in terms of human resources, essential tools and infrastructure to produce and disseminate reliable and timely statistics in a cost effective manner, in accordance with international standards and in response to user needs" (World Bank, 2011, Project Appraisal Document for the Ghana Statistical Development Project, p. 9).

Project design
The Results Framework

2.2
The summary results framework as presented on page 29, of the PAD is presented in Table 2.1.

2.3
In addition, the PAD also stipulated that, as an intermediate result, the Statistics Law would be approved by the cabinet and the parliament by the end of 2012 (Appendix 3, p. 31).

2.4
The project had five componentslegal and institutional reform; GSS capacity building; improving the quality and dissemination of statistical products; supporting the 2010 Census post enumeration; and project management. Components 1, 2 and 3 support the first objectiveto prepare GSS for institutional reforms. Component 4 supports the second objectiveto ensure timely and extensive analysis and dissemination of census data. Component 5 covers project management activities.

Component 1: Legal and institutional reform (Appraisal, US$0.38 million)
(i) Amendments of the existing legal and regulatory instruments governing GSS; and (ii) Reorganization of the institutional structure of GSS and reform of its human resource management framework through: a. Development of job specifications for managers and staff; b. Introduction of a management information system; and c. Preparation of a redeployment and retrenchment plan after the 2010 Population and Housing Census.

Component 2: GSS capacity building (Appraisal, US$1.36 million)
(i) Preparation of a needs assessment, developing and implementing a training program for GSS management and staff; (ii) Upgrading of information technology equipment to improve communication and internet connection between the' GSS and other entities, and (iii) Enhancement of Ghana's geographical information system by assessing its practices and policies and implementing needed reforms and providing the hardware and software for the geographical information system.

Component 3: Improving the quality and dissemination of statistical products (Appraisal, US$ 0.90 million)
(i) To improve the production and dissemination of statistical products across the Ghana Statistical Service, including among others, reviewing the quality and scope of statistical products and services, aligning them with international best practices; making quality products publicly available and supporting the preparation of a manual on statistical standards and methods on selected areas.  (2007 -2010), which dovetailed the government's GPRS II, pledged its support for the national statistical system. The objective of this project directly supported the goal of evidence-based decision making and the objective of good governance of the Joint Assistance Strategy. The Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report (CASPR) of the World Bank, which was effective from March 2010 through July 2013, when the project closed, noted specifically that "a program of support for the Ghana Statistics Development Plan is planned to advance a results based approach to public policy formulation in Ghana."

2.6
However, the objective as stated in the project documents does not clarify the rationale or direction of the institutional reform being supported. No indications are given that the support provided under the project would pave the way towards a national statistical system capable of producing relevant, reliable, and timely statistics, as envisaged by the government. Nor did the PAD present the scope and extent of corporate actions to be undertaken to "prepare the GSS for institutional reforms". While additional information is available in the project components and results framework, the difference between the reform package of the project and that of the government's corporate blueprint for GSS was not discussed.

2.7
By comparison, the statement of objectives given in the government's broader statistical development program is perfectly clear. It shows why the reforms are being sought as well as the quality of statistics to be delivered. Since the statement of objectives serves as the basis on which the achievements of the project are to be measured, the inadequate clarity diminishes its relevance. The relevance of objectives is rated Modest.

2.8
In principle, the design of the project should have been clear and straight-forward. But, as it is designed and presented in the PAD, many complex issues arise. Among them:  First, the objectives are not clearly stated, with inadequate specificity and large areas of ambiguity. For example, "to prepare for institutional reforms" is a vague goal that could be met by a variety of actions, including one brief meeting to discuss a concept note. In addition, no specific targets or types or direction of reforms are givena reshuffling of existing staff and managers would qualify under the stated objective.
 Second, the institutional reform package supported by the project is fragmented, incomplete and difficult to implement. It deviates from the blueprint of the government's GSS Corporate Plan in a critical way. The government's blueprint calls for a reclassification of jobs, skill requirements and redeployment of staff, including retrenchment, retraining and buyouts (severance payments) in a comprehensive and coherent package. The project removes the redeployment and retrenchment actions from the reform package and leaves this key element of the program to be implemented under a future operation. This fragmentation of personnel actions subjects the reforms to uncertainties, including delays in the arrival of a future operationa risk that actually materialized in this case.  It should be noted that these personnel actions cannot be unilaterally decided and imposed top-down by GSS management. It needs to be a two-way street in which individual staff is consulted to determine the preference, needs and circumstances. Some staff might volunteer to be redeployed with no incentives offered, while others would not transfer at any cost or would rather receive retraining in order to remain with GSS. The reform package fails to take this crucial consultation process into account. It envisages a reorganization to be imposed with no voice of the staff, since GSS is unable to make any offers to retain the staff or give them incentives to be redeployed or retrenched. If implemented as envisaged, the partial reforms target staff for separation without immediate benefit of retraining, compensation or new posting in a different organization.  Third, the project design does not address significant changes that affect the causal chains and sequencing of events. Due to external events, the approval of the project was delayed by about one year, from December 2009 to December 2010. The loss of time created an urgency for the completion and release of the 2010 census. It would have been prudent to restructure the project, possibly by focusing exclusively on the census work and removing the institutional reforms component. Alternatively, the duration could be extended from two to four years to accommodate the workload arising from the 2010 census. But no such amendments were made prior to approval. The design remained unchanged and contributed to foreseeable bottlenecks and delays, which materialized as the project was being implemented.  Fourth, adequate arrangements were not made to limit the loss of specialized and skilled staff.

2.9
As such, the weak design offers little assurance of the likelihood for success. The relevance of design is rated Modest.

3.1
At appraisal, the total cost of the project was estimated to be US$7.37 million which would be financed by a multi-donor trust fund (MDTF), including GBP 3 million from the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom (UK DFID) and EUR 1.9 million from the European Commission. Of the total funds available, US$ 6.2 million was to cover the estimated project cost at appraisal and the balance of about US$ 1 million was to mitigate exchange rate fluctuations. 3.2 During implementation, many reallocations of project funds took place. Some planned activities were dropped, including the installation of an accounting package and administrative management information system. They were dropped because the government was committed to install common financial information and administrative information systems across the public sector. The Financial Management (FM) consultant which was expected to build the capacity of the GSS Finance Unit was not hired. An FM assessment by the World Bank soon after effectiveness indicated there was no need for such a consultant. Some activities were added including additional work to engage stakeholders, prepare integration guidelines under the Institutional Reform Component and support the re-basing of the Consumer Price Index (CPI).

3.3
The original closing date of the project was December 31, 2012. At the request of the government, the closing date was extended by six months to June 30, 2013, in order to advance in the implementation of project activities. The PDO and the performance indicators remained unchanged.

3.4
The operating environment for the GSDP was full of challenges, both foreseeable and unexpected. In addition, the implementation was further hampered by weak quality at entry. Among the key factors affecting implementation are:

3.5
Poor planning. An oversight committed at the outset hamstrung this project throughout its life. In the planning stage, both the World Bank and the government failed to recognize that the census enumeration work would be in full swing at the time that a comprehensive, and difficult, reorganization campaign would be launched and conducted. Each of these exercises would entail a workload that fully occupied the entire staff and management.

3.6
Poor design. The bunching of large and unrelated workloads was further exacerbated by weak technical design with funding gaps and issues related to the sequencing of events. As discussed above, the results framework did not lead to the main results and the wrong funding instrument was used. No assistance was provided to help the implementing agency procure technical assistance to learn about World Bank procurement. As discussed below (Section on M&E System), no meaningful monitoring devices were developed and employed to track progress, other than the deliverables of each activity.

3.7
Lack of working experience with the World Bank. Unlike many MDAs in Ghana, GSS was never exposed to the administrative and fiduciary requirements of the World Bank. This proved to be a distinct disadvantageat least in the initial stage. It relied heavily on the experience and expertise of the World Bank staff in drawing up an adequate design and operational blueprinta reliance that in hindsight turned out to be misplaced. The loss of the GSS head of the procurement unit during the first year of implementation also compounded the problem.

3.8
Civil service constraints. While GSS is in principle an autonomous agency that reports directly to the Office of the President, in practice it relies on the Ministry of Finance and other MDAs for technical support. In addition, it is part of the public service that depends on the budgetary allocations of the government and is subject to the compensation, recruitment and job placement restrictions of the public sector. Each of these rules has an implication for the implementation of this project. For example, budgetary allocations proved to be unpredictable making it difficult to sustain a medium term work program, as required by the project. The staff with requisite expertise and training is often recruited by private firms with more attractive job offers. Furthermore, replacing lost staff has not been possible in recent years as a hiring freeze has been imposed across the public service.

3.9
National election of December 2012. The follow-on project -GSDP II or SRF-CFwas held up for three years. The reasons were: i) it was an IDA credit which requires parliamentary approval; ii) it contained funding for staff retrenchment, which was politically sensitive; iii) the incumbent administration did not wish to engage in a public debate of such a delicate issue in an election year. As a result, the project was shelved until after the election in December 2012. (For further details, see Box 3.1 below.) Thereafter, a new Minister of Finance was appointed. He requested additional time to study the project before giving clearance to the cabinet. Finally, the project was approved by parliament in 2014. The delay in the follow-on project was detrimental to the project under review (GSDP I or MDTF). As discussed above, a critical element of institutional reforms under this project was left unfunded in anticipation of the follow-on project.

Box 3.1. Why GSDP II Was in Limbo for Three Years
The second Ghana Statistical Development Project (GSDP II or SRF-CF Project) was approved on August 25, 2011, but it did not become effective until April 28, 2014, two years and eight months later. The delay in its approval is relevant to the evaluation of the first project.
A substantive reason for the delay that the project involved redeployment and retrenchment of staff at GSS. Part of the project funds were earmarked to pay for severance benefits (buyouts) of affected staff. In addition, some of the staff was expected to be transferred to other municipalities, ministries, departments and agencies. These are politically sensitive issues, which could trigger protracted debates in parliament when the project was presented for approval. 6 Officials familiar with the project, however, explained that much of the delay could have been prevented. A crucial error was made when the task team and the implementing agency were not able to ensure timely cabinet approval of the project agreement within the calendar year 2011 or within 4 months of project approval by the World Bank Board (August 2011). If the project had been presented to parliament before the election year of 2012, it would not have received the extra scrutiny that it would be subjected to in an election year. It could have been quickly approved.
In the event, the cabinet did not get to review the project until the 2012 when political campaigns had begun. Following the death of incumbent President (John Atta Mills), the ruling party postponed the presentation of the project to parliament until after the election (December, 2012). More delays followed the appointment of a new Minister of Finance in 2013 who requested additional time to review the project and did not present it to parliament until February, 2014. Thereafter, the credit agreement was quickly endorsed and the project became effective in April.

Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance a. Safeguard Compliance
3.10 Activities supported by the project involved only institutional reforms and capacity building. According to the project appraisal document, no safeguard policies were triggered. The project was rated Category C.

3.11
The initial assessment of financial management and procurement capacity at GSS indicated major weaknesses. To mitigate these risks, a Project Implementation Manual and a Manual of Procedures were prepared and cleared by the World Bank prior to project effectiveness. Training was provided by procurement staff in the first year of the project, but the hiring of a procurement advisor to assist GSS staff, which was planned, was deemed unnecessary by a procurement specialist on the task team.
3.12 According to the task team, the project and the borrower complied fully with the World Bank's fiduciary policies. Internal management control was carried out by GSS. External audits were conducted each year by a firm approved by the government Auditor General. Regular joint supervision missions were carried out by the World Bank's Project team, the government and the Donors contributing to the MDTF. Overall, fiduciary compliance was deemed adequate.

4.1
As indicated above, the objectives of the project were narrow compared to the objectives of the government's underlying program that the project was supporting. Many results were achieved that had not been explicitly stated as parts of the objectives.

Objective 1: To prepare GSS for institutional reforms Inputs
The project supported this objective through:  Technical assistance and advice on the development of a new legal and regulatory framework governing the roles and responsibilities of the National Statistical System, including GSS at the center. The new legal framework was to redefine the mandates of individual agencies in the National Statistical System, their reporting structures and methods of collaboration across agency boundaries. It was envisaged that the new law would be approved by parliament by the time the project closed.
 Technical assistance and advice on reforms of institutional structure and human resource management framework, including the information system. With the support, GSS was to develop new job specifications for staff, staff performance management system and preparation of redeployment and retrenchment plan, including a review of the terms and conditions of service.

Outputs
With the support of the project, the following outputs were reported:  The Statistics Bill 2013 was prepared and completed. Before the project closed, the Bill was presented to the cabinet but the expected parliamentary approval was not achieved. Three years later, in May 2016, the Bill remained under cabinet review. Reasons for the delay are discussed in Box 5.1: A Baffling Case of Statistics Bill.
 A strategy for restructuring the GSS was prepared and approved by the GSS Board.
 A new organogram was approved by GSS Board and by the Public Service Commission.
 A plan for reposting of staff was completed, but no funding was available under the project for implementation.

4.2
All of the milestones set out in the PAD were met by April 2016, with the notable exception of the Statistics Bill, which remained to be approved by the cabinet and parliament. These achievements are not directly attributable to the project.  (2015), although it is the system used by all MDAs and differs from that originally envisaged. 9 4.3 Thus, the first objective was partially achieved, with a major shortcoming in the failure to get parliamentary approval for the Statistics Bill. The achievement of this objective is rated Modest.

Objective 2: Timely analysis and dissemination of census data Inputs
The project supported the following activities:  Post census enumeration activities, including:  Analysis of census data, report writing and dissemination of the preliminary and final results;  Production and distribution of analytical and thematic reports beyond census data including national and regional reports;  Specialized training workshops geared towards improving the capacity for GSS staff to analyze census data;  Post-census enumeration survey. This survey was to be conducted immediately after the census to reconcile and validate the results. Among the activities are:  Training of field staff for the survey;  Printing survey manuals and questionnaires;  Data collection at the district and regional levels;  Data matching and editing;  Reconciliation and quality control.

Outputs
With the support of the project, the following outputs were reported:  Post Enumeration Survey (PES) Report 11 , completed in-house by GSS staff with editorial assistance of an external consultant. The PES report was published (and posted on the web) in June 2013 at the closing of the project, along with GSS's National Analytical Report. The PES is a method for evaluating the results of the 2010 census. As census results are used for more policy and planning purposes, it is essential to review the quality and limitations of the data and to understand the inaccuracies that may occur. While no data is currently available on the users of this specific report, users of the PES are generally those who use census data (see below). However, the PES is of greater value to those who depend on population characteristics for their businesses and careers. Politicians, for example, need reliable ethnic and socio-economic data of households in particular electoral districts. Demographers need refined distinctions of age and education attainment of residents in particular Regions.  A series of analytical results were produced and disseminated, including:  National and Regional Analytical Reports 12 ;  Demographic, Social, Economic and Housing Characteristics (DSEH) 13 .

4.4
These analytical reports enhance and broaden the usefulness of the basis census data by providing maps (at national, regional and district levels) and disaggregation of the data, for example, by age, income and housing groups. More sophisticated policy makers and researchers, especially international users, benefit from the availability of these statistics. Since a more recent year is a better reflection of the consumers' current purchases, a new and more recent base year is more relevant to both consumers and policymakers.
 According to GSS, the following training activities were carried out:  50 GSS and MDA staff trained on the use of STATA at the University of Cape Coast between July and August, 2012;  40 staff on Integrated Management Information System in December 2012;  10 staff trained on archiving and documentation.

Thus the achievement of the second objective is rated Substantial.
12 For a copy of the National Analytical Report, click on URL: http://www.statsghana.gov.gh/docfiles/2010phc/National_Analytical_Report.pdf

Box 4.1. How Statistics Change People's Lives
Many communities in rural Ghana are far removed from public services and infrastructure. Few residents are literate or have access to official records, such as a home address or marriage certificate. Most children are born without legal identity. To the rest of the world, they simply do not exist. With the help of the Ghana Statistical Development Project (GSDP) and the staff of Births and Deaths Registry (BDR), however, some of these communities are now more visible.
One such community is Gizaa in Kumbungu District of the Northern Region. Residents of Gizaa participated in an outreach drive called the Community Population Registration Program (CPRP), which was made possible by the use of Mobile Registration Vans (MRVs) financed by the GSDP. A BDR team visited Gizaa and met with the village chief, elders and representatives of the local authority to explain the concept and benefits of a nationwide Community Population Register. (It is a system of data collection in which residents' names, gender, date of birth, education, marital and health status are recorded and regularly updated.) Volunteers with requisite levels of literacy were selected and trained to complete registration forms and maintain the Register. At specified intervals, the volunteers would submit the completed forms to the nearest registration office within the District. The BDR duty officials would then issue actual birth certificates for the families.
Today, Gizaa is on the map. With the proof of residency and birth certificates in the community, the Kumbungu District Assembly was able to provide assistance with electricity and basic water harvesting schemes including bore holes. With the arrival of power supply and water, family members are freed of daily time-consuming chores. More economic opportunities have become available. Girls have a chance to attend school --once schools and teachers arrive in the community, that is.

4.6
Many key results fundamental to the achievements of the government's statistical development objectives are listed here. The project contributed directly to these achievements. Nonetheless, they are not mentioned or indirectly covered in the statement of objectives of the project. (An assessment of the relevance of objectives is made in Section 2 above.)

Outputs
Among the more significant outputs are:

4.7
Although no specific and observable outcomes were stipulated in the PAD, a few indications of positive outcomes resulting from the production of data are available:  Enhanced GIS data has been widely used and cited by international researchers, including for example, BiomedCentral, a British publisher has supported research on the application of GIS to control the spread of ulcer in Ghana 20 ;  The peer review mechanism on GSS data has been studied and published by the African Development Bank. (See footnote 3)  A survey conducted by GSS shows that more than 4,000 organizations and individuals have made use of data and publications released by GSS including the Statistical Compendium 21 .

4.8
In addition, it would be reasonable to expect some improvement in the capacity among staff at GSS and the quality of data delivered as a result of the project. A followup User Satisfaction Survey is scheduled to be conducted this year (2016). The result of this survey, together with the 2012 baseline, would give indications of an important outcome.

5.1
Neither the PAD nor the ICR offers traditional cost-benefit analysis or rate of return calculations. With good reasons, these project documents argue that the results of the project are primarily public goods that enhance social welfare and contribute to the quality of governance by generating more reliable evidence. There is also little or no scope for revenue generation or cost recovery associated with the outputs or outcomes of this operation.

5.2
However, the project experienced protracted delays and loss of opportunities, as summarized in Table 5.1. Among them:  Four years of lost time in advancing the Statistics Bill to parliament;  Considerable delays (more than three years) in completing the institutional reforms due to the lack of funding for staff redeployment at GSS;  Delays in getting started, including getting procurement advisors at GSS;  A last-minute restructuring of the project budget and procurement plan was needed prior to project approval due to a mis-procurement at GSS (not involving Bank resources). This revision delayed the effectiveness of the project by almost one year;  The closing date was extended by six months (or 25% of project's life) as implementation took longer than expected;  A large number of activities were dropped (including an advisor on financial management and an audit of the electrical system) and others unplanned activities were added, resulting in significant reallocations of project expenditures.

5.3
Nonetheless, there were no reported issues of fiduciary compliance or irregularities in financial management during implementation. On balance, efficiency is rated Modest. Outputs and outcomes were delivered later than planned 6. Outcomes

6.1
The objectives of the project were aligned with the priorities of both the country and the World Bank. However, the relevance of these objectives was modest due to inadequate clarity on the outcomes and targets envisaged. The design of the project was also modestly relevant due to gaps in the causal chains that jeopardized the achievements of objectives. The first objective of preparing GSS for institutional reform was only partially achieved. The main shortcoming at the time of the PPAR (April 2016) was the status of the Statistics Bill which remained to be approved by parliament. The second objective of timely analysis and dissemination of the 2010 census was achieved before the project closed. Efficiency was Modest due to significant delays in most of the activities. Overall, the outcome is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory.

7.1
Among the key risks to sustainability are: i) funding uncertainty; ii) loss of qualified staff at GSS; iii) staff reassignments and shifts of priorities among participating MDAs. Each of these risks could directly undermine Ghana's statistical capacity and the results achieved.  Table 7.1). Government allocations represent the largest source of revenue, although the amount of funding has been variable from year to year and inadequate to cover GSS's work program. On average, funding from the government accounts for less than 60 percent of the requirements, with more funding available during the election year (2012) and tapering off thereafter. Heavy reliance on donor funding has become the norm. But donor's contributions have been even more uncertain than that of the government. No provisions have been made under this project or the follow-on operation (SRF-CF) to limit the variability of funding for the statistical program. GSS activities remain subject to delays and interruptions, depending on the availability of money.

7.3
Loss of competent staff. Retention of well trained and skilled personnel has proved a difficult task at GSS. Better compensations and job qualities are often available in the private sector. "Poaching", as GSS representatives put it, has often occurred to the best and brightest of the organization. Furthermore, under the IMF's current Extended Credit Facility, a freeze on new hiring is now in effect. Once a statistician has left the Service, it is difficult and time consuming to find a replacement.

Box 7.1. A Baffling Case of the Statistics Bill
The first Ghana Statistical Development Project (also known as GSDP I or MDTF), which was approved in December, 2010, was scheduled to close in December 2012. One of the key outcome envisaged was parliamentary approval and enactment of the Statistics Bill, along with the necessary regulatory instruments, which would govern the national statistical system and define the roles and responsibilities of the participating ministries, departments and agencies. This outcome was to be achieved before the project closed in December 2012. However, by April, 2016, nearly four years after the expected delivery, the Statistics Bill remains in limbonot having been presented to parliament or even approved by cabinet.
Without the law, the national statistical system (NSS) remains fragmented and governed by the inadequate decrees that predated Ghana's return to democracy. The close collaboration across agency boundaries that has occurred under the SRF project (GSDP II) is unlikely to be sustained beyond the life of the project. The new skills and capacity would soon be dissipated under civil service reassignments and recruitments by private businesses. Of particular concern, however, is the loss of the National Advisory Council on Producers and Users of Statistics (NACPUS), which would be established under the new law to give strategic direction to the NSS and help ensure the production of relevant and reliable statistics.
The delay is also surprising because there are no substantive or politically sensitive issues involved. According to GSS (the implementing agency), an issue that has come up was the title of the chief executive officer of the NSS. The draft Statistics Bill used the title of "Statistician General", which may have required the legal underpinning from a constitutional amendment being reviewed by a constitutional commission. Thus, a legal sub-committee of the cabinet recommended the revising the title to "Government Statistician"-a change to which the governing body of the GSS had no objection.
Years have passed and little progress has been made. It would appear that more proactive efforts-and vigilanceperhaps through monitoring and dialogue, would have produced the result much earlier.
Source: Interviews with staff of GSS and Ministry of Finance 7.4 MDA staff rotations and priority changes. Statistical staff at sector ministries are subject to transfers and reassignments under civil service priorities. The requirements of the statistical program, including skills and experience of staff, may or may not correspond to those of the parent ministries. Continuity of the work program is always a risk among MDAs. IEG has learned during the April 2016 mission that even staff trained under the GSDP II operation or otherwise familiar with the program has largely been redeployed, leaving a large capacity gap for the scheduled activities. A restructuring of the operation has now become necessary and is in fact scheduled for June 2016.

7.5
Overall, the risk to development outcomes is Significant. It is not considered High because, while budgetary allocations tend to be inadequate, they have not been cut drastically.

World Bank and Borrower Performance
World Bank Performance Quality at entry

8.1
The project was well chosen and of considerable strategic relevance both to the World Bank and to the GOG. However, there was large scope for improvements in the quality of design, implementation arrangements, design of the M&E system and the sequencing of project supported activities.

8.2
The results framework was not fully worked out, with major gaps in the causal chains. The institutional reform agenda was fragmented, with critical actions left outside the scope of the project. The activities in components 2 and 3, which accounted for a third of project resources, did not support any stated objectives the project.

8.3
Implementation arrangements were not adequate to ensure the results. In particular, the funding for key components of institutional reforms, including retrenchment buy-outs (severance packages), was not provided under the project, leading to a hiatus in implementation from 2012 to early 2014.

8.4
No meaningful M&E system was developed for the purpose of tracking results. No monitoring of outcomes or outputs took place. The task team relied primarily on inputs used through routine administrative reports. Outputs were noted as a task was finished. There was no way of detecting when a task was left unfinished.

8.5
The sequencing of major events was also problematic. The reorganization of GSS staff and structure was to take place during the time when the GSS workload was at its maximum, with the production and dissemination of the 2010 census in full swing. The severe bunching was disruptive to the regular census enumeration activities.

8.6
Overall, the goals of the project were laudable, but they were difficult to achieve with the design and preparation that took place. The quality at entry is rated Unsatisfactory.

8.7
Project supervision was mechanical, consisting mainly of reviews of administrative and financial reports, rather than an examination of results and progress made toward desired outcomes. This shortcoming is reflected in the M&E system which shows no tracking indicators or outcomes to be achieved. The frequency of supervision visits was also low, with three missions conducted over the 29 months of project life, averaging 9 months per visit. The normal frequency for the Africa Region is 6 months. No comprehensive mid-term review was carried out, contrary to the intent as stated in the project appraisal document (PAD). Specialized areas, including personnel management and legislative process, were not adequately covered. For example, while three different legal counsels served as members of the task team, nobody covered the draft Statistics Bill and the necessary legislative procedures needed for presentation to the parliament.

8.8
A significant oversight occurred in the second half of 2011 when the supervision team failed to secure the funding needed to complete the corporate reform agenda. As discussed above, the funding for staff redeployment and retrenchment was attached to the follow-on project -GSDP II or SRF-CF, which was approved on August 25, 2011, when corporate reforms were being actively implemented. The supervision team could have provided rapid implementation support to expedite the effectiveness of GSDP II and release the necessary funding for the key personnel actions. No such prompt interventions were made, however. Soon the political campaigns of 2012 were in full swing and it became exceeding difficult to win parliamentary approval. (See further discussion in Box 3.1.) Meanwhile, the corporate reform agenda was left unfinished for nearly three years. The quality of supervision is rated Unsatisfactory.

8.9
Overall, Bank Performance is rated Unsatisfactory Borrower's performance Government performance 8.10 The Government of Ghana, as represented mainly by the Ministry of Finance, showed strong and consistent support for the project. Following the request for Bank assistance, the government participated fully in the design and implementation of the project. It approved the reorganization of the GSS and the institutional reforms which included politically sensitive measures, such as staff redeployment and retrenchment. As a contribution to project financing, the government paid for the staff, office space and facilities of the project management unit (Program Development and Management Group -PDMG). In addition to the Ministry of Finance, the Comptroller and Accountant General also assisted the implementing agency by promptly reviewing and approving the withdrawal applications submitted. The Public Procurement Agency and the Ministerial Tender Board also provided technical assistance to GSS during project implementation. The government, however, could have been more vigilant and more proactive in its deliberation of the Statistics Bill, which by all accounts involves no sensitive issues and yet has not been approved in nearly four years. Government performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory.

Box 8.1. The Restructuring of GSDP II (SRF-CF)
As soon as the project became effective (in April 2014about three years late), the first task confronting the project team was to restructure or re-build the project.
Significant changes made the original design obsolete. First, many stakeholders left the project, including staff of participating MDAs, under civil service reassignments, job change or retirement. Second, many of the capacity building programs envisaged at appraisal were no longer considered appropriate by the new stakeholders. Third, new statistical agencies were created at municipal and regional authorities which helped absorbed some of the GSS employees who were previously earmarked for retrenchment. The program of buy-outs became much smaller than originally estimated.
Upon effectiveness, new team leaders arrived both on the World Bank project team and at many of the participating MDAs, although the project management unit remained largely intact. It was agreed that while project objectives would remain the same the activities would be substantially revised, with many of the training programs to be replaced by data producing and learning by doing activities. Funding for severance packages was reduced and reallocated to data production and dissemination. In addition, the closing date of the project which was originally set for August 2016 was extended to June 2018.
A project paper indicating the rationale and restructuring measures went to the World Bank Board on March 22, 2016. An implementation support mission to launch the restructuring is scheduled for late May and early June 2016.
Source: IEG and project task team.
Implementing agency performance 8.11 Equally strong was the commitment of GSS, especially the Board of Directors, which paid close attention to the project. The GSS played an active role from the design stage by supporting the World Bank team in the consultations with local stakeholders and the needs assessments of the MDAs. A key contribution of the GSS was to establish the PDMG and staff it with a cadre of qualified and dedicated professionals. The Program Development and Management Group (PDMG) in turn contributed to the preparation of the PAD and the Project Implementation Manual. During project implementation, the PDMG served as the project secretariat, coordinating the activities of all the participants, both in the government and from the World Bank.
8.12 The PDMG discharged its responsibilities with distinction. It facilitated all activities and ensured compliance with project covenants and broader World Bank policies. It introduced monthly meetings, chaired by the agency head (government statistician), to review progress and address implementation issues. The progress reports, including procurement and financial management representations, were produced monthly within one week following month end. The standards of delivery far exceeded the expectations set out in the PAD, which called for quarterly reports to be produced six weeks after end of quarter. In addition, the PDMG provided support for the World Bank's supervision with services before the arrival, during the visit and after the missions.
8.13 Senior management of GSS, including the government statistician and two deputies, provided the staff with adequate oversight and support. They held monthly reviews of the progress made and met with all supervision missions from the World Bank. They attended to the development of institutional reforms strategy and the Statistics Bill. They oversaw the implementation of staffing reforms, including a difficult period of staff redeployment and buy-outs, and the introduction of a new approach to personnel management. They also sought the approval of the Public Service Commission for the new institutional structure and scheme of service at GSS. Nonetheless, GSS could have made a difference on the Statistics Bill by monitoring its status more closely and submitting periodic inquiries to the cabinet. The performance of the Implementing Agency is rated Moderately Satisfactory.
8.14 Overall, borrower performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory.

Monitoring and Evaluation System
9.1 Quality of design. No functional M&E system was developed for this project. Observable outcomes, such as user satisfaction or an increase in relevant statistics from an established baseline, made no appearance in the results framework. Instead, all the results were stated in terms of outputs to be delivered by project supported activities. In fact, the M&E system shows little more than a check list of what was delivered under the project.

9.2
Data collection was event driven, such as completion of a task or report, with no periodic monitoring of specific variables to indicate progress made. Administrative data and financial management reports, which primarily indicate inputs, were used by the supervision missions to measure implementation. No distinction was made between final and intermediate outcome indicatorsall indicators presented in the PAD are called "intermediate indictors". In the case of the Statistics Lawthe cornerstone of this operationno interim results were stipulated or tracked. The only indication of progress was to be the proclamation of the law. Thus, no monitoring took place and the lack of progress (including the Statistics Bill) went unnoticed for four years.

9.3
Implementation. Since there were no indicators to track, no data was to be collected other than routine administrative and financial reports. No meaningful implementation of the M&E system took place.

9.4
Utilization. Only routine administrative data and financial reports were utilized.

9.5
Overall, the quality of the M&E system is rated Negligible.

Lessons
10.1 Among the lessons derived from this review are:  To provide the public with relevant and reliable statistics, the national statistical office needs a responsive governing body to give strategic direction. Of particular importance is the presence of directors who represent the interest of data usersresearchers, development partners, academicians, students and policy makers.
Ghana once had such a guiding hand; it was called the National Advisory Council for Producers and Users of Statistics (NACPUS). With the help of this project and its successor, an active Board is now at work at GSS. Gradually, capacity at GSS is being built. In addition, a governing body like NACPUS is expected to be established, once the Statistics Bill, which has been dormant for four years, is approved by parliament.
 In supporting corporate or institutional reform agenda, it is essential to ensure orderly, efficient and effective implementation to minimize the impact on staff. It requires meticulous design, thorough consultations, adequate funding and the supervision of specialists. In particular, by failing to include the funding for redeployment and retrenchment, the project held up the completion of corporate reforms for years.
 It helps to ensure that all the technical assistance services are in place before the project is presented to the Board. This was not the case with this project. After it became effective in February, 2011, GSS was unable to get an expert to advise on the World Bank's procurement simply because it did not know how to use the World Bank's procurement to hire that expert. To address this issue, the World Bank has offered the use of Project Preparation Facility (PPF), which can be drawn on before the project becomes effective. But the World Bank Unit of the Ministry of Finance in Ghana noted that the PPF is seldom, if ever, used in the country. The reason, according to Ghanaian officials familiar with the PPF, getting approval for the PPF is as complex and time consuming as getting the underlying project through the Board.
 Despite the large role that the World Bank has played in mobilizing international support for statistical development, the capacity of the World Bank team to deliver results in this area should not be taken for granted. Under this statistical capacity development project, much was made of the limitations of counterpart agencies in Ghana, based on multiple needs assessments sponsored by the World Bank. Even though the World Bank team appeared to be well qualified and to possess the right skill mix, project results were modest. As discussed throughout this report, the quality of project design, preparation, implementation and supervision all fell short of the norms for Bank operations.
 The check-list approach to monitoring and evaluation, as applied in this project, does not work. The results framework relied exclusively on administrative data (disbursements) and outputs (reports) of various activities to indicate the extent of progress made. No interim variables were chosen or developed to track progress.