1930年代のロンドングリーンベルト設置時における土地所有者、政府、プランナーの動向

The Actions of Landowner, Government and Planners in Establishing the London Green Belt of the 1930s

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Abstract : An area of research that has received little recent attention, is the green belt purchases of the mid-1930s. An investigation into how the green belt was implemented at this time, may help understanding of why the separation of town and country remains a feature of UK planning today. The aim of this study is to look at the resistance to the implementation of the green belt and the methods used to overcome this between 1920 and 1938. First, the historical and legislative context of the 1920s and 1930s is detailed. Then, the lead-up to the London County Council's 1935 loans scheme is investigated. Finally, a case study of the purchase of green belt land, made with such a loan is employed, and the following conclusions are drawn. The results show the important role of civil servants and landowners in allowing the green belt purchases to proceed. The significance of the various methods that are used to allow the green belt to be implemented is discussed in relation to past studies and current debates.

Keywords: *Green Belt, Inter-War, Negotiations with landowners*

キーワード: グリーンベルト, 戦間期, 土地所有者との交渉

1. Introduction

In the post-War period, several Japanese studies have attempted to identify the reason behind the successes of the UK planning system. Early studies e.g. Kimura (1948) and Yokoyama (1950), simply reported on the history and latest developments in the UK. However, since the 1970s this research has tended to focus on more specific issues. Tashiro (1976) explained the context of the post-War planning system focusing on amenity and the conservation of open space from the late 19th Century and Nishiyama (1977) looked at the history of the Royal Town Planning Institute. More recent works have concentrated on the role of famous planning pioneers such as Howard (Murakami, 1996, Azuma *et al.* 2001), Unwin and Abercrombie (Nishiyama, 1992, Ishikawa, 1994). These studies emphasise that the ideals of these famous planners were implemented to create the post-1947 planning regime.

The fact that these pioneers were successful, tells us little about why the ideals that they shared are still such a recognisable component of the UK's planning system today. One such ideal of post-War UK planning, has been the separation of town and country through the use of green belts. Though they first became effective through the powers of the 1947 TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING ACT (TCPA), an attempt was made to introduce a green belt around London in 1935. Researching the arguments and methods used in implementing the green belt, in the face of the 1930s high growth and loose control, can deepen our understanding of why a separation between town and country has been maintained in the UK until now.

Though green belts have been studied in Japan (Tashiro,

1976, Shimizu, 1977, Ishikawa, 1994) none address this issue. Similarly, UK studies mention the 1935 green belt, but do not explain any further details (Thomas, 1970, Munton, 1983, Elson, 1986). Since that time new data has become available which may help to understanding the green belt.

The present study looks at the years 1920 to 1938 to investigate the lead-up to and the implementation of the London green belt. At both stages, the aim is to show the resistance that the green belt's implementation encountered and how this resistance was overcome.

2. Methods and data sources

First, as background, and using secondary sources, we explain the relevant historical context of the 1920s and 1930s. Then, at the central government level, we look at the attempts to propose and fund the green belt scheme. Finally, we employ a local level case study of a green belt purchase. From the results, which show how resistance to the green belt was overcome, we aim to propose some reasons for why the green belt has survived. (Figure-1).

The data used were briefings, letters, memos and minutes of meetings from the Public Records Office, London. This primary data is only open to the public after thirty years, once the file has been archived⁽¹⁾. None of the files used in this study, have been referred to in the above works (Table-1).

3. Background: Historical Context 1920-1938

The following points, regarding landownership and changes in society, are relevant to the study. Because of a decline in agriculture from 1880, rising tax and death duties, and the death of heirs after the First World War, large farming es-

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tates continued to be sold and broken up during the 1920s and 30s. This increased the fragmentation of land ownership. In 1914 10% of agricultural land in England and Wales was occupied by owners. In 1927 this figure had risen to 37% (King, 1984). Also, a rising standard of living, a shorter working week and improved transport during the 1920s and 30s, fostered a demand for access to the countryside for leisure (e.g. holidays and rambling) and habitation (e.g. suburbs and sprawl) (Marsden *et al.* 1993). This demand led to the area under urban land use in England and Wales increasing from 6.7% to 8.0% between 1931 and 1939, a rate not seen before then or since. To summarise, as a 1926 report for the mid-Surrey JTPC explains, this was a time when the 'natural restraints imposed by distance and the difficulty of obtaining land are now largely swept away'⁽²⁾.

4. Towards the 1935 London County Council Scheme

(1) Overview

Before 1947, UK planning was laissez-faire. To counter this lack of control, throughout the early 1930s, counties around London had been active in buying land for preservation. The Ministry of Health had assisted this over five years, with loans to allow councils to buy 1,465 ha of land (Table-2). In 1935, the London County Council (LCC) accelerated this process by establishing a loans scheme to buy land for conservation in the green belt. In the space of 14 months, agreements had been reached to buy 4,650 ha of land - a significant contribution (19%) to implementing Unwin's green girdle scheme (Thomas, 1970).

During the inter-war period the Ministry of Health was charged with planning. The Ministry and local and county councils were able to give loans for the purchase of open space (Sheail, 1981). A large number of groups were engaged in determining the aim of the green belt. Among these, were Joint Planning Committees (JTPCs). These were described as having a 'purely advisory'⁽⁴⁾ function, taking a broader view of town planning. These JTPCs benefited planning by allowing the different local authorities to reach agreements and to exchange ideas on a wide range of issues. By joining these JTPCs, local district councils could participate in determining

the aim of the green belt and other regional open space schemes. By 1923, 16 JTPCs had been established in the whole of the UK, 4 of which were in the London area⁽⁵⁾. Three years later, there were eight such committees around London alone⁽⁶⁾. The largest and most influential of the JTPCs at the time was the Greater London Regional Planning Committee (GLRPC). This was established in 1927 and was composed of 138 local authorities, controlling an area of 2952 km² (Thomas, 1970). In addition to these, some influential amenity societies such as the Council for the Preservation of Rural England and the London Society were able to formulate the aim of the green belt. Finally, the actual purchase of green belt land was made by County Councils, local district councils and some amenity organisations such as the National Playing Fields Association (NPFA) (Table-3).

(2) Resistance to the green belt

In 1926, Neville Chamberlain, the then Minister of Health, noted to a deputation that the idea that urban growth was a problem, was not a universally shared feeling⁽⁷⁾. In the same year, the Ministry of Health had undertaken a feasibility study of the cost and the location of the green belt, in relation to the areas that were most in need of open space (Figure-2). This distribution was based on estimating the amount of open space in London (green) and simply buying extra land (red) to fairly distribute open space. 25,975 acres (10,493 ha), were thought to be necessary using this method. In a more pragmatic way, a line was drawn where the cost of land was known to be around £100/acre. Land outside this line was assumed to be cheaper and so, affordable for green belt (Figure-3).

Therefore, two types of resistance to green belt implementation can be identified: justifying it to other sections of the government and justifying its cost. The following explains what the GLRPC did to try and overcome this, and how these two types of resistance were related.

(3) Overcoming resistance

(i) Arguing for the green belt's necessity

The first green belt purchases were made as part of the founding of Letchworth Garden City in 1909, where 500 ha of agricultural land were purchased as a buffer between Hitchin

Figure-1 Study Framework

Table-1 Files used in the study and their opening years

File title	Code (HLG)	Year opened
Bath and Bristol JPC	4/3129	1959
Mid Surrey JPC	4/3353	1968
Surrey CC Acquisition	79/1074	1974
Effect of Open space on land price	51/50	1978
Open spaces	4/3242	1980
Surrey CC Bill 1931	54/175	1982
Thames Valley JTP conference	4/3764	1983
GLRPC General File	4/3239	1983
London Regional JPC	4/3241	1984
London Regional JPC 1937	4/3243	1988
NW Surrey JPC	4/3507	1989
GLRC Open spaces reservation	52/1217	1991

Table-2 Cost of loans sanctioned by the Ministry of Health and acquired land⁽³⁾

Year	Total loans sanctioned to buy land (£)	Total area of land acquired (ha)
1930-31	447,101	528
1931-32	291,311	440
1932-33	237,720	361
1933-34	167,137	136
TOTALS	1,143,269	1465

Table-3 Responsibility for the Green Belt in London 1920-1938

Responsibility for the Green belt	Proximity to Central Government →					
	Ministry of Health	Large County Councils	GLRPC	Other JTPCs and County Councils	Local District Councils	Amenity societies e.g. CPRE
FINANCIAL Lends money		(London CC from 1935)				
ADVISORY Formulates aim of green belt					(by joining a JTPC)	
EXECUTIVE Buys green belt land						(only NPFA)

Figure-2 Green belt location in relation to the need for open space (1926)⁽⁸⁾
(Text reads: "Note: The green colour indicates the area of existing public open spaces and red the proposed additional area")

and Baldock (Elson, 1986). Howard's green belt was meant to have an agricultural function to supply produce for the town. This aim was later repeated in the London Society's plan for London (London Society, 1921), which also assumed that the green belt could be paid for through agricultural rents.

In 1927, the Greater London Regional Planning Committee (GLRPC) began to question the purely agricultural function of the green belt. A more flexible use was proposed, i.e. the use of land for playing fields as well as for institutions such as mental hospitals. Nor was the green belt meant to be continuous. In some places, development could be permitted, such as that required for arterial roads⁽⁹⁾.

To argue for the necessity of having a green belt and to find a way of paying for it, the GLRPC changed the green belt's aim four times in ten years. By changing its aim to playing fields, London's residents - those most in need of open space - or the National Playing Fields Association could be asked to pay for green belt purchases. The 1927 GLRPC report above, stated that there was probably 'room for obtaining a large revenue from the provision of private open spaces for playing fields...' (10). In 1929, London was showing a 'willingness to contribute to a substantial extent to the cost of land for open spaces outside its own area' (11).

However, the aim of the green belt changed in 1934. When lobbying the Treasury its implementation became a 'national concern' (12). Following this, the GLRPC suggested that the green belt might be useful to Air and Army Ministries in time of war. Accordingly, the aim of the green belt switched to providing space for aerodromes and barracks (13). In all cases, the appeals for funding were sympathetically received but unsuccessful.

Though a 1926 London County Council study on playing fields had shown the need for open space in the city, and a speech by Chamberlain in the same year, had noted that playing fields were the best land for building, and were disappearing fastest (14), there was difficulty in justifying that it had to be in the form of a belt around London. The Treasury's, logic

Figure-3 Green belt location depending on the feasibility of purchasing it (1926)⁽⁸⁾
(Text reads: "Note: the pink edging indicates the approximate position of land of the value of £100 per acre and under")

response to a request for green belt funding, highlighted this. Not only could they not give sole priority to London, but felt that 'What is important, [compared to providing a belt] is that large areas of open land should be reserved within a reasonable distance of the thickly inhabited parts of Greater London' (15). The Air and Army Ministries on the other hand had powers to acquire land in the event of a national emergency (16).

(ii) Estimating the green belt's cost

In 1927 the Ministry of Health had tried to produce an estimate of the positive effect of open space reservation on neighbouring land and house prices. No firm conclusions could be drawn from this study (17). Despite this, the assumed effect of open space on the value of neighbouring house-prices was important in subsequent discussions.

For example, in a report for the GLRPC in the same year, Unwin discussed legally 'sterilizing' the land which involved entering into a compensation agreement to buy the future developed value of the land. He noted that it might be possible to discount the benefits of preserving the land, from this cost. As he explained, this appeared to suggest a re-distribution of rights over land. In a situation where many landowners exist, a landowner adjoining the reserved land will benefit, whereas the landowner with reserved land will suffer. In a situation where there is one landowner, the benefits and dis-benefits will cancel themselves out. "Is it possible for the same results to be achieved, and, if so, by what measures, where the land is in a number of ownerships, in order that the community may not suffer from this adventitious fact?" he asked (18). Though Unwin had the idea of pooling the benefit from preserving the land, the pre-1947 problem of interfering with land rights, remained.

Problems of accurately estimating the cost of the green belt also slowed progress. For example, in 1929, Unwin estimated that the cost of reserving an area of land of 154 square miles (246km²) would amount to around £2 million (19). A month later however, Unwin revised this estimate arguing that it

was impossible to calculate the exact cost of the green belt, because so many factors affected the land price⁽²⁰⁾.

5. Implementation of the 1935 London County Council's Scheme

(1) Overview

Despite the arguments and the attempts to estimate the green belt's cost, its implementation eluded the Greater London Regional Planning Council which broke up in 1937. Herbert Morrison, the Chairman of the London County Council from 1934, believed in the benefits of depopulation into satellite towns and the role of the green belt for this purpose⁽²¹⁾. Thus the LCC was able to take the initiative and in early 1935, proposed the loans scheme for purchasing green belt land. The conditions of this scheme were as follows⁽²²⁾:

- Loans were available for up to 50% of the cost of purchase or legally 'sterilizing' the land.
- In total, £2 million was available over three years.

Interestingly, the LCC's loans scheme contains no specification of the green belt's aim. When clarification was requested in late 1935, the LCC explained the aim in the broadest terms: if playing fields were bought, they must not be reserved for the use of local players only, otherwise the land should be designated for people to 'roam about in'⁽²³⁾.

(2) Resistance to the green belt

The LCC's scheme was widely taken up, but nonetheless encountered some opposition. This came from local authorities, in particular certain key figures who tried to block the green belt purchases. For example, in Eton Rural District Council, (1935) a Chairman of the Council saw no benefit from the conservation of land apart from a loss of rates⁽²⁴⁾. In 1936, the Clerk of Kent County Council was said to be 'particularly obstructive'. This provoked the suggestion, eventually decided against, that the Minister 'as a Kentish man' should intervene⁽²⁵⁾.

There was a difference in the opinion of these local authorities and central government on the function of open space, which can be considered as a reason for such opposition. In a 1935 letter from an official at the Ministry of Health to J. A. N. Barlow at the Treasury, the local authorities, were said to be doing "tolerably well in providing sufficient space for public health necessities (i.e. recreation grounds and playing fields) but when it comes to large areas of country which are wanted more for their 'amenity' value than for actual use, the authorities are more diffident about the expense involved. Yet from the point of view of planning, this is of first importance⁽²⁶⁾". Separating towns was important to central government. Local authorities were simply concerned about the function of open spaces.

The preservation of open space also aroused some opposition from landowners. There were some direct complaints to the Joint Town Planning Committee in Mid-Surrey for example, from a landowner who wished to extract minerals from his land. However, such complaints were described as not being representative⁽²⁷⁾. In Buckinghamshire, negotiation had to be extensively used to convince landowners to reserve the land as open space⁽²⁸⁾.

Therefore, two types of resistance can be seen to the green belt's implementation under the LCC's scheme: That of local

authorities opposing central government intervention and that of landowners who wished to make a profit from their land. The role of the landowner in relation to the green belt is interesting because they stood to lose future profits. Therefore, the following case study focuses on the landowners and their role in allowing the green belt to proceed.

(3) Overcoming resistance: a case study of Ockham Common, Surrey

(i) Background to the site

In 1930 Surrey was the richest county in the UK and in the process of undergoing profound changes as a result of urbanisation. For example, the population rose from 845,578 people in 1911 to 1,180,878 in 1931 as a result of the construction of a new railway line and a growth in the number of commuters. Surrey was also a convenient destination for London-based holidaymakers and day-trippers (Sheail, 1981, 11).

Ockham Common was private land with a combination of a location on a major road out of London (the London-Portsmouth road, currently the A3), a frontage of 1.2 km on either side of the road, and a dry soil of non-agricultural land-use, making it ideal for development in an area undergoing intense development pressure. Therefore, it was chosen for the study to expose the roles played by the local authority, land-owners and central government. The area comprised 350 acres (141 ha) of mixed woodland and gorse lying 30 km from the centre of London (Figure-4).

Figure-4 Location of Ockham Common

In 1931 Surrey had passed the Surrey Local Act in response to urban growth pressures. Sections 70 and 71 allowed the Council to enter into agreements with landowners to allow the purchase of land for preservation. If an agreement could not be reached, then the Council was permitted to use a compulsory purchase order to force the landowner to sell the land. However, to allow this, a public inquiry had to be held. If authorization was then granted by the Minister of Health, the purchase was permitted to go ahead⁽²⁹⁾.

(ii) Cost reduction through bargaining

Because of the three year limit on the London County Council loans scheme, Surrey County Council was pressed to buy Ockham Common. However, in trying to purchase this and other land for the green belt, the council required a £100,-

000⁽³⁰⁾ additional loan from the Ministry of Health. Such loans could be granted, but this was only possible after a public inquiry.

Up to that time, Surrey County Council had used a method that they termed the 'secret bargain' to purchase land cheaply from landowners. This involved secretly negotiating with the landowner to convince them to sell the land. Secrecy was necessary to ensure that the negotiation did not raise the price of other land⁽³¹⁾. Where this method could not be used, i.e. where the landowner refused to sell the land, a compulsory purchase order would be employed under Sections 70 and 71 of the 1931 Surrey Act. Table-4 shows the effect of this secret bargain on the cost of the land. Ranking all the areas bought using the Ministry's loan reveals a significant difference between Ockham Common and Nonsuch Park. Both were bought at the same time, but the latter site had been bought with a compulsory purchase order⁽³²⁾.

Such was the need for secrecy that the Deputy Clerk of Surrey Council went directly to the Ministry in December 1935 to ask for a block loan and to 'dispense with the need for a public inquiry'⁽³⁴⁾. Though a public inquiry was held in March 1936, the Ministry encouraged the Council to remain vague about the site they wished to purchase⁽³⁵⁾.

(iii) The Role of the landowner

In addition to the actions of Surrey County Council, Ockham Common's landowner and the neighbouring landowners played an important role. The owner of Ockham Common, Lady Lovelace, was offering the site for purchase at £24,000. It was widely thought to be a 'gift' at such a price⁽³⁶⁾.

In four articles published in the local newspaper during a six month period in 1935, landowners adjoining Ockham Common were encouraged to contribute to its purchase. One article sub-titled 'An Appeal to Neighbouring Owners', noted that though contributions had been received, it hoped that 'still further contributions towards the purchase price would be received'⁽³⁷⁾.

Table-5 reveals the extent of this contribution to the purchase of Ockham Common. What is remarkable is the extent to which neighbouring landowners contributed to the purchase of this open space.

In fact, one landowner is said to have contributed £2,500 to the cost⁽³⁹⁾. Though the contribution was large, this action by neighbouring landowners was not unheard of as the minutes of meetings show⁽⁴⁰⁾. Warren farm (27 ha) for example, was purchased with 10% of the cost coming from neighbouring contributions⁽⁴¹⁾.

6. Discussion and Conclusions

The results show that the implementation of the green belt met with resistance. We show that as well as planners, central and local government civil servants and landowners played a significant role in allowing the green belt purchases. This is in contrast to previous studies in Japan and the UK that emphasised the role of planners (Table-6). Though this period has been emphasised because Unwin's 'green girdle' was influential on Abercrombie's plan for London, the arguments and roles in the results of this study, share characteristics with today's UK planning.

The results show that the main objective of planners was to implement the green belt, and that its function was secondary. To an extent, the green belt's function was used as a way of responding to concerns at the time in an effort to obtain funding. Most notable among these is the appeal to the Air Ministry. Aerial bombardment had become a concern during the 1930s. This was a result of the use of bombs during the First World War when their potential for destroying cities was recognised.

This process of argumentation, i.e. the way in which the understated, fundamentally aesthetic aim of the green belt is hidden behind whatever appears most likely to justify its implementation, occurs today. The recently renamed Campaign for the Protection of Rural England for example, argue that the green belt helps urban regeneration for example (CPRE, 2001).

Civil servants tended to be flexible with regulations to allowing the preservation of land to go ahead. Central government strongly advised and directed the purchase of land, almost to the point of having the Minister coerce the council to deal with an uncooperative clerk in Kent. At the local level, the documents show that for Ockham common and other sites in Surrey, local officials used negotiations with landowners to secure good terms for buying land. Secrecy was an element in this. UK planning today, works because of its centralisation, but also because of corporatism and the negotiation associated with this.

Finally, the role of landowners was important. At the time, two kinds of landowners existed: those who had recently purchased land and provoked sprawl, and those that had held land for several generations as part of a large estate and

Table-4 Land bought in the green belt with the Ministry of Health Loan⁽³²⁾

	Area (A) (ha)	Price (P) (£)	P/A (£/ha)
Chertsey Meads	74	12000	161
Ockham Common	142	24000	169
Shabden Park, Banstead	271	67000	247
Further areas in Coulsdon	223	60000	270
Kings Wood, Coulsdon	53	15000	285
Banstead Wood	128	46000	360
Riddlesdown, Caterham	19	11000	566
Land West of Ham House	12	12000	988
Nonsuch Park, Ewell	114	121000	1060

Table-5 Contributions to the purchase of Ockham Common⁽³⁸⁾

	Contribution to Ockham common purchase	
	(£)	%
Surrey County Council	12,000	50
London County Council	6,000	25
Neighbours	4,000	16.7
Guildford Rural District Council	2,000	8.3
Total	24,000	100

Table-6 Resistance and response to the green belt: summary of results

CASE STUDY	RESISTANCE		RESPONSE	
	Type	Who	Type	Who
I: Central Government	Necessity	Other ministries e.g. Treasury	Change the green belt's function	GLRPC
	Cost	Landowners needing compensation	Include effect of neighbouring open space on land price	GLRPC/Central government
II: Local Government	Necessity	Some local districts resisting interference	Centralisation and pressure to implement	Central government
	Cost	Landowners seeking a profit	Secrecy. Flexible rules Lowering price/contributions	Central/Local Govt. Large landowners

agreed to preserve open space.

The reason that this has a strong effect on the UK's planning is a complex question and is undoubtedly linked to the idealisation of the countryside by the 19th century romantic movement. This idealisation coincided with the growth of a rural landowning class able to enjoy leisure pursuits and view the countryside differently. The green belt was not unique in benefiting from this idealistic vision. The National Trust for example had been active in buying and receiving land since 1895 (MacNaghten and Urry, 1998).

The role of land-owners has been demonstrated for other aspects of UK planning showing how they contributed to the success of the post-War planning system. Despite the erosion of the aristocrats' power during the early 20th Century, these land-owners were able to maintain sufficient power to impose their ideas on the new system (Booth, 2003). The link between aristocratic landownership and the history of the green belt, has not been previously clarified.

In addition, the neighbours' contribution to the Ockham common purchase, represents a concrete example of the transfer of an aristocratic role in preserving land, to a Not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) role. The role of NIMBYs in preventing any changes to the green belt today is well understood, though its history merits further research.

Notes:

- (1) See <www.pro.gov.uk/recordsmanagement/access/manual.rtf>, 2001.09.01 last updated, 2003.10.28 seen.
- (2) HLG 4/3353 *Mid-Surrey JTPC Report*, Adams and Thompson 1926.10.14
- (3) HLG 52/1217 *Annex to the Greater London Region - Reservation of Open spaces*, Deputation to the Minister 1934.01.30
- (4) HLG 4/3764 *Letter from Minister to participants of Thames valley regional conference*, 1922.06.12
- (5) HLG 4/3129 *Report of the Conference of the Local Authorities*, G. Pepler, 1923.10.11
- (6) HLG 4/3507 *Information distributed to participants of GLRPC*, G. Pepler, 1926.03
- (7) *ibid. Minutes of deputation to Minister of Health*, 1926.03.23
- (8) HLG 4/3242 *Provision of Open spaces*, H. G. Baxendale to I.G. Gibbon 1926.4.20
- (9) HLG 4/3241 *Preliminary issues prior to the first meeting of the GLRPC*, Unwin, 1927.09.20
- (10) *op. cit.* (9)
- (11) HLG 4/3239 *GLRPC Recommendations*, 1929.07.30
- (12) HLG 52/1217 *Statement from Secretary of the Conference of Greater London Councils and Counties to the Exchequer*, G. H. Gater 1934.01.15
- (13) *ibid. Letter to Capt. Harris from I. G. Gibbon*, 1934.02.23; *Deputation to the Minister*, R. Hardy-Sims, 1934.02.01
- (14) HLG 4/3239 *Minutes of conference between LCC and Chamberlain*, 1926.10.21
- (15) *ibid. Minutes of the deputation to the Treasury in providing for "green belt"* 1934.01.30
- (16) *ibid. Conference between GLRPC and Air Ministry*, 1934.03.06
- (17) HLG 51/50 *Dedication of land for open spaces or parks, effect on value of adjoining property*, C.F. Harwell Thomas, 1927.01.27
- (18) *op. cit.* (9)
- (19) HLG 4/3241 *Prelim. report on open spaces*, R. Unwin, 1929.4.29
- (20) HLG 4/3242 *GLRPC Open space belt, preliminary estimate of the order of cost*, R. Unwin, 1929.5.29
- (21) HLG 4/3243 *Planning London*, P. G. Saunders 1935.08.03

- (22) HLG 79/1074 *LCC Joint report of the Parks Committee and the Town Planning Committee*, 1934.12.14
- (23) *ibid. Conversation between Sir P. Henriques and W. A. Ross*, 1935.12.10; *Letter from Culpin to Pepler*, 1935.12.13
- (24) *ibid. Memorandum*, G. Pepler, 1936.03.30
- (25) *ibid. Memorandum*, P.G. Saunders, 1935.12.17
- (26) HLG 52/1217 *Letter from W. A. Robinson to J. A. N. Barlow*, 1935.04.11
- (27) HLG 4/3353 *Report on Mid-Surrey JTPC meeting*, G. M. Harris, 1928.04.26
- (28) HLG 52/1217 *Bucks County Council Report of the County Planning Advisory Committee*, 1935.11.14
- (29) HLG 54/175 *Surrey County Council Act, Sect. 70-71* 1931.
- (30) HLG 79/1074 *Meeting*, Ross and Surrey CC, 1935.12.10,
- (31) *ibid. Memo from W.A. Ross to Francis*, 1936.01.11
- (32) *ibid. Letter from Surrey CC to Legge and Annex*, 1936.12.04
- (33) *op. cit.* (31)
- (34) *op. cit.* (30)
- (35) *op. cit.* (30), *ibid. Letter from Ross to Surrey CC*. 1936.01.13
- (36) *ibid. Meeting W.A. Ross and Surrey CC*, 1935.11.29
- (37) HLG 79/1074 *Surrey Advertiser*, 1935.06.29
- (38) *op. cit.* (32)
- (39) *op. cit.* (30)
- (40) *op. cit.* (30)
- (41) *ibid. Inspector's Report*, F. G.. Hill, 1936.03.10

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摘要：1930年代におけるイギリス政府によるロンドングリーンベルトの買い上げについての議論は、これまでほとんどなされてこなかった。本研究では、1920年から1938年間のグリーンベルト設置時における、計画に関わる各主体の反対と政府による対応の実態を明らかにした。本論ではまず、1920年代から1930年代におけるグリーンベルト設置をめぐる歴史的・社会的背景を把握した。次に、1935年のロンドン議会融資計画（LCC loans scheme）が決定されるまでの経緯を概観し、最後に、同融資計画が適用された地域におけるケーススタディを行った。以上の結果より、グリーンベルト買い上げ時における、行政担当者と地権者の役割の重要性が明らかとなった。最後に、グリーンベルトを実現させた様々な計画手法を、既往研究と関連づけながら考察した。