An Enquiry into the Structure of Pan-Islamism in India: The Phase of the Italo-Turkish and Balkan Wars, 1911–1913

Takashi Oishi

1. Perspectives and Problems: Pan-Islamism and the Khilafat Movement

On the eve of World War I, the Ottoman Empire experienced a preliminary crisis through Italo-Turkish War (1911–12) and the Balkan War (1912–13) (hereafter to be abbreviated as the Wars). The crisis caught the serious interest of Muslims in India, who almost immediately responded to it by expressing their sympathy for the Ottoman Empire in various forms. Numerous meetings were held to protest against the intruders from Italy and the Balkan States. Vast amounts of subscription were collected and remitted there. Even medical missions were dispatched to the remote battlefields. The relief movement in this period would turn out to be the prelude to the Khilafat Movement (1919–24), an anti-British protest under the slogan of protecting the Caliphate, the office or the rule of Caliph, which was recognized in the Sultan of...
the Ottoman Empire. This Movement was meant as a challenge against the British, their own colonial ruler in India, who was designing the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire as one of the victors of World War I.\(^1\)

Since the latter part of the nineteenth century, various movements, maneuvers and sentiments to foster the solidarity of Muslim brotherhood to counter European imperialistic aggression gradually became obvious. As a whole, these movements are known as pan-Islamism. With most of the Muslim-inhabited areas in the world subjugated to the colonial rule of European countries, these movements continued to focus around the Ottoman Empire, because it was still the major political power in the heart of "Islamic" West Asia. This pan-Islamism was to suffer the fatal recession in the mid-1920s when both the Ottoman Empire and the Calif claimed by the Sultan were declared abolished by the new Turkish government. All through this process, however, Muslims in India was one of the principal forces which supported pan-Islamism. The Khilafat Movement was one of its phase.\(^2\)

The present essay will analyse the pan-Islamic reaction among the Muslims in India during the Wars. In the history of pan-Islamism, the Wars which befell the Empire in the early 1910s had an important meaning because they heralded the last phase of the Ottoman Empire's collapse. Hence the Wars coincided with the beginning of the period where the pan-Islamic reaction among Muslims was at its height.\(^3\) Furthermore, in no area other than India was this reaction so intense and dramatic, and did the relief movement derived from it acquire such a substantial meaning. The table below, which lists the amounts of subscriptions remitted to the Red Crescent Society of the Ottoman Empire from various areas, is eloquent of such a distinguished position of India.\(^4\)

In short, the Wars marked the beginning of an incomparable collective involvement of Indian Muslims in the issue of the Ottoman Empire and pan-Islamism in general.
The importance of this collective response from Indian Muslims lies not only in the viewpoint of pan-Islamism but also in the context of the inner politics of India. Indeed, it was in the early 1910s that Muslims in India began to become detached from the firm loyalist stand, a legacy since the former century symbolized in the camp of Aligarh, and the issue of the Ottoman Empire was one of the main causes for such a change. The neutral policy which the British firmly maintained during the Wars made them sharply realize the structural change of international relations surrounding the Ottoman Empire, and it inevitably heightened the sense of crisis about the future of Islam and their mistrust of the British. It was through the active involvement in this issue that leaders like Muhammad Ali and Abul Kalam Azad, protagonists in the Khilafat Movement afterwards, set out the defiant stand against the British and rapidly gained popularity and leadership. Thus the Wars brought about not only sympathy towards Muslim brethren outside India and relief movement for them, but also a radicalism that changed the domestic politics in a drastic way.

The reaction to the Ottoman Empire issue among Muslims in India continued to have this bifurcated character until the time of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas</th>
<th>Amount (Turkish lira)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crete</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>America</td>
<td>1,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>2,038</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bukhara</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>Persia</td>
<td>2,595</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>3,255</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>Afganistan</td>
<td>3,744</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>Austria-Hungary</td>
<td>3,866</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,192</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4,676</td>
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<tr>
<td>Java</td>
<td>1,599</td>
<td>total</td>
<td>256,911</td>
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The reaction to the Ottoman Empire issue among Muslims in India continued to have this bifurcated character until the time of
the Khilafat Movement. I call such nature the duality of the Movement. I use the term duality to explain that the Movement was meant simultaneously for the quest for Islamic solidarity bridging over to the Ottoman Empire and the anti-British resistance in India. I see the beginning of this duality in their response toward the Wars. Through this period, the dual sense of crisis which overlapped the plight of the Ottoman Empire with their own decline of political and social status in India was incited, and this was to be reflected on and given clearer shape in the new leadership of the relief movement.6)

Hereafter, first an attempt will be made to examine the various factors which contributed to such large sums of relief funds. In the process of analysis, special attention is to be called to the structure and condition of Muslim society as the basis of this relief movement. Indeed, as this paper will show, the relief movement was initially not well organized but rather sporadic and spontaneous with meetings in cities springing up not always under the orders of the superior leadership. The relief movement was primarily the product of the situation surrounding Muslim society in India. After analyzing the inner structure of meetings which produced such large amounts of subscriptions, the psychological background of the above-mentioned dual sense of crisis will be explained. The latter part of this essay follows the attitudes of some leaders / organizations that, in response to the movement in society, became involved in organizing the relief movement. During the Wars, there came to be a gradual domination of the relief movement as a whole by the elitist leadership and ideology, which replaced the earlier movement originating from below in Muslim society. This does not mean, however, that the orientation of the movement was being determined solely by such elitist leadership. Even such upper leadership were still regulated by the relation with the colonial authorities, and backed by the material support from Muslim society. These constraints caused serious differences among leaders and prevented a unified approach to the Ottoman Empire’s issue.7)
2. **Structural Basis of the Reaction**

When Italy suddenly intruded into Ottoman Libya, using the excuse of the protection of the Italiansettlers there at the end of September 1911, Muslims in India quickly responded to it in the form of public gatherings in the city and meetings of local leaders. Although various organizations and leaders took the initiative to hold these meetings as is to be seen later, the form and procedure of each meeting was almost uniform. Firstly, speeches were made, in which the inconsistency of the cause of the attack by Italy was reproached, and then the plight on the side of the Ottoman Empire, the tragedy of the dead or the wounded soldiers and their families, was deplored. Secondly, some resolutions were passed to condemn the Wars, plea for an intervention by Britain, found the subscription committee, and in some cases, boycott the Italian goods. Then, money for the relief fund was collected on the spot. Lastly, after such meetings ended, those resolutions were sent to the British and Ottoman governments.

This relief movement for the Ottoman Empire continued until mid-1913 when the Balkan War came to an end, though the frequency and numbers of such meetings varied according to the situation of the Wars. The huge amount of subscription above-mentioned was the result of this fervor. It is not possible to grasp all such numerous meetings and funds, but the sources consulted, including the files of the then British Indian Government and some contemporary Muslim journals and newspapers, can give us a general idea about them. Indeed, here we can start to consider the various factors, especially the nature of Muslim society, which produced this relief movement. Below is shown a province-wise list of organizers of such collective efforts for the relief movement.8)
List: Organizers of the subscription meetings and funds for the relief of the Ottoman Empire, 1911–13.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province/Area</th>
<th>Names of organizations, leaders and journals</th>
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<tr>
<td>other areas</td>
<td>Anjuman-i Islâm (Kohat). Young Muslim Association (Peshawar) R.C.S. (Bannu).</td>
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In some cases, meetings were summoned and presided over by some local leaders such as lawyers, government officials and zamindars, and then the establishment of the committees for the relief fund, often named the Red Crescent Society, was declared on the spot. But, in most other cases, they were organized by, or held under the auspices of, the already existent organizations like the local branches of the Muslim League and the socio-political associations called anjumans. These bodies were also organizers of the local subscription movement. In addition, some notable Muslim journalists sometimes took the lead to hold the gathering to collect the subscriptions, though their main means of raising funds was through their own publications.

It is difficult to simplify the cause of these numerous meetings and the passionate reaction expressed in them. No doubt it was an intricate result of several factors, each of which will be examined below.

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<tr>
<th>Province/Area</th>
<th>Names of organizations, leaders and journals</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bombay city</td>
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* R.C.S. means Red Crescent Society. Names of journals and newspapers are in Italics, followed by the names of their editors in parentheses.
2.1. Examination of the Causes

First, we are to consider the effect of pan-Islamic propaganda and schemes which originated outside of India. It is known that the authorities of the Ottoman Empire were, facing these severe Wars, unofficially resorting to such measures. Their purposes were to gather human and material resources, and to ensure the loyalty and the moral support from Muslims in and outside the Empire. And India did receive pan-Islamic propaganda to this effect, which we can now trace in the contemporary sources on India's side. It is undeniable that they should have succeeded in inciting the sympathy toward the Ottoman Empire to a certain extent. It is difficult, however, to estimate the independent effect of this maneuver, because it should be practically effective only if it had substantial supporters in India to mediate and propagate. And in fact it had.

Thus, secondly we should examine the political leaders who became committed to the Ottoman issue and tried to organize the relief movement at the all-India level. No doubt the efforts of such Muslim leaders contributed greatly to the realization of the practical relief, bridging each meeting at the city level over to the Ottoman Empire. However, the origin of their motives, or what we can call their pan-Islamic concerns and ideologies, is problematic. The fact that they published public notices or propaganda literature of Ottoman origin in their own journals logically means that they had some means to have access to the origin or to be given access by it. And indeed, for some leaders, whose activities will be mentioned later, we have evidences to indicate the initiation of pan-Islamic ideology from outside India before 1911. For example, among the leaders of the Calcutta base, Abdullah Suhrawardy was formerly a main organizer of the Pan-Islamic Society (London), where the connection with the Sultan Abdülhamid II can be suggested. And in the radical ideology of other leaders in Calcutta, like Syed Jalaluddin and Abul Kalam Azad, the influence of some West Asian thinkers and ideologues, especially Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, can be recognized. In Azad's case in particular, it is impressive to
have featured al-Afghānī and 'Abduh in the foremost issue of his own *Al-Hilāl*. Even the less radical Ameer Ali seems to have been touched with the pan-Islamic ideology as early as the time of the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78). Thus, this radical ideology was known among a particular range of intellectuals who had enough opportunities to come in contact with foreign ideas.

And yet, this does not mean that those leaders involved in the relief movement in this period were controlled by an ideology of foreign origin, nor that their ideology was purely of foreign origin, nor that they suddenly began to commit themselves to the issue upon receiving such Ottoman propaganda in the early 1910s. Indeed, since the nineteenth century, with the collapse of their own political regimes, a tide of pan-Islamism of Indian origin had been coming in. It had been less political but more emotional and romantic, yearning for the past glory of Islam and its current realizer, the Ottoman Empire. This legacy of pan-Islamism of Indian origin must have survived until the period under present review and was shared among the intellectuals, since this explains the voice of sympathy immediately raised from such political leaders as Muhammad Ali who had not been evidenced to have received the serious influence of "foreign" pan-Islamism prior to that time.

2.2. Response from Society

But, here too, it is not possible to entirely attribute those numerous meetings to the mobilization by such political leaders. Indeed, many meetings had been held before they started the practical effort for the mobilization. And most of the existing organizations involved in the relief movement, except local branches of the Muslim League, were not affiliated with specific superior leadership. Generally local meetings chose the channel for remittance of collected money among several leaders, often changing their choice of the leader and sometimes distributing to several channels simultaneously. The relief movement was based on such rather spontaneous and sporadic response from Muslim society. Surely, as the
movement went on, the upper leadership was to gradually dominate the orientation of the whole movement, but still the response from society was indispensable for its continuation.

Therefore, lastly, we will focus on the response in society as the essential basis of the relief movement.

2.2.1. Organizational Basis: Anjuman

Reviewing the list of organizations shown above, we notice that meetings held by the previously existing organizations were mostly by the Muslim associations called anjumans. And most of them had almost similar names: Anjuman-i Islām, literally meaning the Islamic Association; Anjuman-i Mufti’dul Islām, the Islam Benefit Association; Anjuman-i Ḥimāyat-i Islām, the Islam Protection Association; and suchlike.16) There is some difficulty in discussing the nature of these anjumans in a single manner, and it is also impossible to know the details about every anjuman. And yet, they have one feature in common: they were semi-voluntary associations making various efforts to promote the socio-economic welfare of the Muslims in each city or its surrounding locality. In fact, these associations were not founded in this period under present review, nor was the support of the Ottoman Empire their main purpose.17) This fact, however, paradoxically confirms that the relief movement for the Ottoman Empire of this period was deep-rooted in society, and suggests that the structure and the idea supporting the existence of these associations should tell much about the relief movement. Moreover, some associations can be testified to have experienced similar, if on a smaller scale, involvement with the support of the Ottoman Empire before this period.18) Thus there is every reason to briefly point out some more features of these associations.

In an anjuman, some of the elite and notables of the city or its locality from various strata of the society, like zamindars, lawyers, government officials, ulama and merchants got together. Based on the money from their own pockets, public subscription and other various sources, they undertook many social welfare activities.
Some examples include: managing the maktabs or other types of schools; petitioning the local authorities for the the reform of various socio-economic administrative matters; Islamic missionary work; founding the orphanages; repairing the mosques. The geographical scope of its activities was usually within a specific city or locality, and the name of its city or locality was usually attached as part of its name, like Anjuman-i Islām, Amritsar.

It might be too hasty to generalize the nature of the organizational structure of these associations which enabled people of quite different backgrounds to be bonded in a grouping, and which brought the elite and masses together. Basically, however, such an anjuman was, as a whole, a product of the cohesiveness which was demanded by their fear of decline and backwardness caused by the socio-political change under the British colonial consolidation, details of which will be mentioned later. And inside the anjuman, on the part of the organizing elite, it worked as a place for confirming or newly forging their social authority; and the organized masses found it a medium for expressing their piety through the religiously legitimate conducts. These two were to be bridged immediately by the ulama or the mulla through the ambiguous symbolism of Islam. This ambiguous cohesion is most remarkable in the fact that the anjuman, while naming itself the Islamic Association or suchlike, had usually a secular layman, not the ulama, as their chairman, and did not make the propagation work of Islam their primary or exclusive mission. In a sense, Islam set out there was an ambiguous cause for realizing the maximum collectivity of Muslims in a specific locality.¹⁹

The inner power and structure working in the meetings at the time of the relief movement in the early 1910s was an extention of this cohesiveness represented in the anjuman. The site as a whole was overwhelmed by a sense of crisis about the fate of the Ottoman Empire, and inside it those three actors, elite, masses and the ulama, were playing their roles seen above. The local elite gave the ulama an opportunity to explain the Wars in religious terms,
through which the contribution to the Ottoman Empire was to be given the character of zakāt. Then, those elite, announcing their own contribution of large amount, took the lead in the subscription. The masses, in their turn, followed them, projecting their morally recommended deed onto the dedication to the Ottoman Empire. Thus, inside the meetings, the inner power working in the anjuman or the structure of Indian Muslim society itself was contributing to the collection of the subscription.

2.2.2. Psychological Basis: Dual Sense of Crisis

What moved the whole context of the subscription meeting was the dual sense of crisis, where the decline of Muslim community in India and the political crisis of the Ottoman Empire were overlapped and synchronously incited their fear. This was an extension of the legacy of romantic pan-Islamism since the nineteenth century, but was different in some essential points. The romantic pan-Islamism tended to be self-consciously apolitical, but the new one, backed by the dual sense of crisis, was to be coloured by mistrust of, and sometimes clear antipathy toward, the British. The process of this transformation will be followed below.

The most obvious manifestation of the dual sense of crisis emerging in this period was the numerous petitions submitted to the British authorities by the organizers of the meetings. While there might be subtle differences of expression and emphasis in the petitions, its content and rhetoric were strikingly uniform. They praised Britain both as "the greatest Mohammadan power" which held the innumerable Muslims in its colonial dominion, and as "the traditional ally of Turkey" which cooperated against Russia. And then, in asking for the intervention of Britain in these imminent Wars they admired it as "the protector of the justice and the right". What we can read in these petitions are the complimentary subjugation to the colonial authorities; the wishful fantasy that the British Empire, with an incomparably numerous Muslim population under its rule, would long be on their side; and the self-rationalization to adapt themselves to the reality of unchallengeable
colonial rule. This wishful fantasy or the self-rationalization had already been moulded since the late nineteenth century.

The Mutiny (1857) had brought about the end of the nominally surviving Mughal Empire and the consolidation of the British rule. Since then, former Muslim aristocrats and other intellectuals, losing material and mental support, had been keenly concerned about the defence of their declining position. Among various efforts to combat such plight, the mental and theoretical task of forging an Anglo-Islamic reconciliation was especially important in this context. Indeed, in this period, some noted ulama and intellectuals published their views to the effect that India, even under the rule of “infidel” British, should not always be taken as the dār al-harb (the land of the war), thus consolidating the way to inner rationalization of reality. An indispensable condition to enable the fantasy of Anglo-Islamic reconciliation, or the thesis of “Britain as the greatest Mohammadan power” in its extreme, was the actual political alliance between Britain and the Ottoman Empire, even though the alliance was, in reality, a contingent result of the Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Eastern Problem. Mingled with the nineteenth century collective romanticism for the past glory of the Islam and the Ottoman Empire still personifying it, the alliance was a psychological compensation to assist the self-rationalization.

Thus it can be said that the wishful fantasy of Anglo-Islamic reconciliation was being projected on two sites, their homeland India and the distant Ottoman Empire. This fantasy, however, once challenged by a contradictory reality, was destined to be replaced by the dual sense of crisis which would overlap the misfortunes of both sites. And indeed, it was severely challenged from late 1911 by the outbreak of the Wars and the firm neutral policy of Britain in them. Hence the dual sense of crisis was incited. In addition, this period saw the successive alarming events also inside India, such as the repeal of the partition of Bengal and the Muslim University problem. All of these events concurrently accelerated the dual sense of crisis and even aroused the mistrust of their ruler.
3. Toward Domination of Ideology and Leadership

The dual sense of crisis incited at the level of city or the locality was widespread and shared also in the upper leadership, though its expression there was more sophisticated and elaborate. In the case of Muhammad Ali, it was appealed in his journal *Comrade* as follows:

One of the ideals which the Indian Mohammadans have cherished for long is that the British Government, which rules over the largest number of Mussalman subjects, should be bound in an alliance with Mohammadan powers and kingdoms so that their own territorial loyalty and extra-territorial patriotism should work in the same direction.\(^{26}\)

And yet, the actual activities of those major political leaders were to differ from one another, and the gap among them would become wider as the situation went on. This can be attributed to the aforementioned concurrent hardships, including the neutral policy of the British, which might well have intensified their mistrust of it. Under these circumstances, some leaders began to refrain from active involvement in the issue of the Wars, while others, on the other hand, tried to step beyond the legacy of unconditional loyalty. Thus this period saw, after a long time since the inception of the Aligarh Movement, the rise of a defiant stance toward the colonial authorities. And when seen at the level of regional politics, this defiance manifested itself as the challenge of newly emerging leaders against the former firm loyalists.\(^{27}\)

The relief movement for the Ottoman Empire was on the whole initially less organized and predominantly a social response characterized by spontaneous and sporadic meetings at the city level. Through the process briefly mentioned above, however, the movement was gradually to be dominated by the ideological leadership in its orientation. Hereafter, with a minimum description of the concrete relief schemes of each leader, the main purpose of the rest of this essay will be to clarify the nature of each leadership and the
differences between them.

However, we must first turn back to the pan-Islamic response at the level of the masses and the local meetings, in order to understand what conditions or limitations it offered to the upper leaders in terms of their mobilization efforts.

3.1. Conditions of the Mobilization

The leaders, in their efforts to organize the relief movement, could not be entirely independent of the response of society. On the contrary, they were still regulated by it to some extent. This was not merely because the response there was to be the principal source of financial and moral background of their activities, but also because it presented some difficulties as an object of mobilization from above which, unless properly controlled, would be fatal to their interests.

First, the local elite and the anjumans organized by them were, in general, politically amorphous and naive in the sense that their political stands were liable to be dependent on the higher authorities and power, whether it was colonial or their own. They felt a sense of crisis but scarcely took the lead to go beyond submitting fully restrained petitions or collecting relief funds. This can be explained by the fact that their primary concern was the socio-economic uplifting of their local Muslim society, and that their official position shared much with the colonial authorities. Thus, the movement on the scale of city or the locality could not help being sensitive to the official stance of the authorities. So, quite naturally, the upper leadership on its part, if it attempted to encourage the relief movement, was compelled to clear such sensitivity, for example, by negating the worried conflict between the neutrality of their ruler and the relief movement.

However, the actual scene of subscription meetings was, once brought into full swing, filled with religious fervour, and the masses were inclined to be indifferent to the conflict. This was, to a certain extent, due to the very structure of local meetings orga-
nized by the local elite. As mentioned before, *anjumans*, as their organizers, were standing on a deliberate tie with the ulama, and the possibly largest amount of funds was expected by fanning excitement through the cause of religion. Many meetings were held around the religious institutions like mosques. Ulama led collective prayers for the Ottoman Empire. Sometimes, meetings even proclaimed it the duty for other minor mosques in the city or its neighbourhood, or each house to hold prayers on Fridays or everyday.\(^{30}\) The dramatic sequences of the Wars never failed to destabilize the feelings of the masses, and gradually such religious fervour moulded a popular notion that the Wars represented the opposition between Christianity and Islam.\(^{31}\) The rumor spread to the effect that the British were directly attacking the Ottoman Empire. The boycott of Italian goods was sometimes misunderstood as one for all European goods.\(^{32}\) The *Mahdi* (Messiah) was expected to soon come out for their salvation.\(^{33}\)

The upper political leadership was conditioned to care about this situation in the society when it tried to mobilize it. The foremost purpose of some leaders, who actively became involved in the Ottoman Empire issue, was relief of it through maximum collection of subscriptions or through the inducement of British intervention. And this appears to have been attained by fanning excitement among the masses. But, in fact, such mere encouragement of sympathy through religious terms could not solve the problems. It would lead to the uncontrollable antipathy against Europe, Christianity and, in the end, the British, which should have been avoided. Such antipathy would be too unrealistic and unfavourable for the elite, who had been pursuing the Anglo-Islamic reconciliation to protect their minority position. And this would be still more the case if they had considered the malicious criticism among some Hindu leaders. It is true that some Hindus welcomed the radical change in political attitude of these Muslim leaders, obviously finding in it a possibility of forging an anti-British radical stand under Hindu-Muslim cooperation,\(^{34}\) but others criticised
the excitement among Muslims as the product of "a false sentimentality" which induced them to "forget the interest of the land of their birth and make common cause with a people with whom they have nothing in common except religion". And Muslims in their turn received such criticism with alarm, thinking that such Hindus were "trying to make Government regard Mussalmans with suspicion".

The dual sense of crisis, or even the sheer anti-British sentiment, must have been born in wide segments of Muslim society. However, facing the complicated difficulties explained here, some Muslims seem to have sensed the impossibility of its solution and even dared to proclaim: "the Indian Muhammadans are not so senseless that the war between Italy and Turkey, whatever its reasons and circumstances may be, would provoke them against their English Government"; or "these calamities (for the brethren of Ottoman Empire) have befallen us only because of our sins and of our failure to do the bidding of the Koran."

Indeed, the issue of the Ottoman Empire was presented before the leaders as a problem of how to encourage and organize the relief movement while keeping a loyalist stance, or how many steps ahead to go beyond the existing loyalist line in manipulating this issue. It was this problem that produced the differences among the leaders.

3. 2. Shaping of the Leadership

It is a fact that Muhammad Ali and Azad, later the leaders of the Khilafat Movement, acquired their strong leadership through their active involvement in the Wars' issue. But in the period under present review, they were not the only ones concerned with this issue. Some others, at least initially, became committed. First we are to describe them.

3. 2. 1. All-India Muslim League

The All-India Muslim League (1906- ), the only political body to represent Muslims at the all-India level, was among others
most expected to show an active involvement in the issue generally concerning Muslims. But in fact, it did not meet such expectations. With not so much lapse of time after the outbreak of the Italo-Turkish War, its main members seem to have become alarmed by the difficulties which should come up with the involvement in it. In fact, as a political body in the main path of the loyalist legacy of Aligarh, it was not prepared to pay the price for such involvement.

A communique issued one week after the start of the War is eloquent of this point. In urging the necessity of subscription, it added, “The Council of League advises Mussalmans to keep a dignified attitude and place implicit confidence in the benevolence and good intentions of the Imperial Government”. Indeed, by announcing the need of mass movements, notably the boycott of Italian goods, it appeared to have exceeded the former firmly loyalist position. It was, however, more a rhetorical change. The above-cited words, carefully selected to delicately negate the nuance of defiance, must have been sobering. This will become clearer if we consider the fact that, in a week before this communique, many cities had already witnessed the meetings in excitement, where the actual collecting of funds had begun and the boycott had been announced. The communique was, in fact, just a follow in order to prevent the gap between its own stance and the preceding movement in society from becoming unbridgeable.

What the League did after this was just to search for a way of retreat from the issue of the Ottoman Empire without losing its influence. But it was, of course, difficult as the situation of the Wars became critical. The most obvious way for such a retreat can be seen in the Presidential address of Nawab Salimullah Khan (1884–1915) of Dacca at the League’s annual session of 1912. While admitting the need of departure from the “total abstention from politics” advocated by Syed Ahmad Khan, it is conspicuous in having completely ignored this issue. Another way, an elaborate one, can be found in the same Presidential address of the following year’s session. There the relief fund movement was fully
appreciated, but a rhetorical device was attached to obscure the total meaning of the address. It preached to the audience on the importance of learning the lessons of solidarity and self-help from the case of the Ottoman Empire. And it added,

External causes may compel you to quicken your onward pace; but they can never supply the place of those great forces which, springing from within your own selves, can alone impart to the national movement that vitality which is absolutely essential to the sacred cause of national regeneration.

Thus, the ultimate meaning of the address became quite ambivalent, if not actively opposing the relief movement. The last one is rather straightforward. It was an article by Aga Khan (1875–1958) first published in a newspaper in February 1913. In the midst of the crisis of the Balkan War, it suggested the abandonment of the territory in the Balkan peninsula by supposing the problem of the Ottoman Empire to be “reconstituted by the War as a powerful Asiatic State”. As a result, this all the more disclosed the serious gap between the conservative loyalists like Aga Khan and other radical leaders, and gave the latter a chance to break the dominance of early conservatives in the League.

3. 2. 2. Indian Red Crescent Society

The Indian Red Crescent Society, founded in Calcutta just after the outbreak of the Italo-Turkish War, was the first body to have tried to take the initiative of the relief movement at the all-India level. From the very start, it recognized itself as the sole central organizer, issuing a press communiqué as follows:

It behoves the Indian Mussalmans to co-operate with the Society and endeavour to collect money from even the remotest corners of the country . . . . Committees should of course be appointed all over India, in every district and in every subdivision and, if possible, in every village even, for the purpose, but we think they should all work under one central organiza-
tion and all money should be remitted to the Ottoman Government through that body. Let the Indian Red Crescent Society be the central body . . .

It failed, however, to attain such a position. Although many associations and their meetings sent a lot of money to it, its influence hardly went beyond Bengal. And, in fact, even in its base, Calcutta, several movements challenged its self-claimed "centralness", and some of them did not hesitate to cast doubt the ability of its organizing function. It saw its substantial dissolution in March 1913 when two of the main organizers since its inception, Abdullah Suhrawardy and Syed Jalaluddin, resigned.

Its failure can be attributed to several factors. First, the claim of "centralness" was too hasty and not tactical, and did not attract the full consent of Muslim society. Second, it was the outcome of an amalgamation of leaders of various social and ideological backgrounds. Surely, a certain radicalism to discontinue the unconditional loyalist posture was shared, and in this they could have been united as an organization, creating a distance from the conservative mainstream of Nawab Salimullah. But, differences within were no less serious. On the one hand, Syed Jalaluddin, a political emigré who had fled from Iran, was the organizer of a journal, Hablu'l-Matîn, which expressed outspoken antipathy against colonialism of Britain and Russia. He represented both the Iranian immigrants in Calcutta and the firmly defiant radicals against the British. On the other hand, the less radical stance with much restraint was represented by Suhrawardy and Ghulam Hussain Arif, who shared interests with the authorities through their official positions. And third, the organizers of the Society failed to come to terms with some of non-Bengali leaders in Calcutta like Muhammad Ali and Azad.

3. 2. 3. Ameer Ali

Ameer Ali (1849–1928), then the organizer of the London branch of the Muslim League, was surely in the genealogy of the
loyalist Muslims who were unconditionally expected to play the role of pacifying and controlling the excitement among Muslims over this issue. And yet, he overstepped such expected duty and shouldered the responsibility of spurring the relief movement by organizing the subscription and sending medical missions. For him the protection of the Ottoman Empire was equally as vital as the Anglo-Islamic reconciliation. As mentioned already, however, it was quite difficult to promote the relief movement without heightening the mistrust toward their ruler.

He first set out to correct the interpretation of the War since Italy was trying to manipulate the public opinion by making it known as one for the liberation of Christians from an “Islamic” Empire. This was naturally most unacceptable for Ameer Ali, because such an essentialized view, if accepted internationally, would close the way for the Anglo-Islamic reconciliation, and much more the urgent intervention of the British in the War. He attacked Italy as the offender of international law and humanity in his successive articles published in the Times of London, thus trying to negate the invented religious colour.57) Moreover those articles induced the British intervention in a different, half-threatening way. He wrote, “The masses, as in other lands, can hardly be expected to differentiate between the wrongdoer and the innocent; I pray that the hatred against the one may not extend to the other”.58) Here he suggested both the difficulty of his controlling the sentiment of the masses and the advantage of the reversal of the neutral policy on the part of the British. It was, however, not that he could not handle the movement in the society, nor that he tried to pacify the movement, but that he pretended to stand aside from “unexpectable” masses. In fact, we now know that he himself did not spare any effort to encourage the relief movement both officially and unofficially.59)

He was trying to undertake the relief movement without impairing the Anglo-Islamic reconciliation. Symbolic of this stance was the naming of his medical missions British Red Crescent Missions,
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despatched to the battlefields for the relief of the wounded. Missions were composed of doctors and male nurses of mainly British origins, and they left directly from England.\(^6\) The missions were to realize the coexistence of Islam and the British in British Empire itself. In a sense, he could not think of the future of Islam without the support of Britain, and in the next several years to come, especially with World War I, the possibility of his ideal was to be eliminated and his leadership to be undermined.

3. 2. 4. Muhammad Ali

Muhammad Ali (1878–1931), who would become the main leader of the Khilafat Movement, was just an editor of his journal Comrade until late 1911. Only after a couple of years, however, he was one of the forerunners of the radical Muslim leadership with immense popularity among the masses. What changed him in this way was the issue of the Ottoman Empire and his matchless involvement in it such as his medical mission to the Balkan and Anjuman-i Khuddān-i Ka'ba (Society of the Servants of the Ka'ba).

Like Ameer Ali, he could not help facing the same incompatibility between the relief movement and Anglo-Islamic reconciliation. And yet, in his case the former cause was absolute,\(^6\) the latter a product of compromise and something which should be tested openly. Therefore he did not hesitate to be on the same stand as that of the masses, which was a point of difference from the case of Ameer Ali, who kept his distance from them. In fact, it was the advent of a novel leadership among Indian Muslims, where mass sentiment was shared, invented and manipulated for his political interests.\(^6\) On the other hand, he did not fail to show off the minimum loyalty to the colonial authorities so as to gain maximum popularity among the people. He made the authorities notify the lawfulness of the subscription movement even under the announced neutrality, thus relieving local leaders and the masses from the fear of prosecution.\(^6\) For the same purpose, he succeeded in authorizing the Delhi Red Crescent Society by crowning it with the Viceroy as one of its patrons. Thus he was trying to control the
anti-British feeling among the Muslims. This two-edged maneuver of defiance and loyalty is also salient in his following tactical letter to the Viceroy which was written privately to express his gratitude about his patronship:

I am certain this will create the desired effect of preventing all foolish notions that may lurk here and there in some people's minds about the purpose and policy of the Government. While, on the one hand, we have to rouse the sympathy of our co-religionists here, on behalf of our brethren in Turkey, we are no less sensible of the duty, on the other hand, of preventing misconceptions about our own Government.64)

Compared with Ameer Ali, Muhammad Ali also differed in his way of representing Islam toward the British. For the former, Islam was something which should be correlated with, and given space within the sphere of the British Empire. But for the latter, Islam and Christianity, including the British, were to be juxtaposed by contrast. The Indian Red Crescent Mission or the All-Indian Medical Mission organized by him implied this stance. While both this mission and Ameer Ali's shared a mistrust of the nature of humanitarianism put on the forefront of the Red Crosses of the European countries,65) especially the Muhammad Ali's was symbolizing the unity and voluntariness of Muslims in India. This characteristic is most salient in its way of raising the cost and choosing the members, the doctors and nurses all Indians, recruited from as many provinces as possible.66)

As shown above, in this period Muhammad Ali was in a sense successful in making the subtle balance of loyalty and radical defiance, and was, due to this, also able to gain wide popularity as the basis of his activity. But, World War I, in which Britain and the Ottoman Empire clashed, was to force both him and colonial authorities to rethink the balance, and he was imprisoned.

3.2.5. Abul Kalam Azad

Before the Wars, Abul Kalam Azad (1888–1958) was known as
just a premature intellectual and editor in journalism, but through his full and passionate coverage of the Wars in his newly started *Al-Hilāl* he dramatically rose to the political scene. Of all the contemporary leaders he was distinguished by his unreserved attack against the imperialism of Western countries, including Britain. He was bold enough to ignore the limitations of the relief movement imposed by the colonial rule. In other words he was prepared to sacrifice the Anglo-Islamic reconciliation. His open definition of the Wars and the political environment around the Ottoman Empire as the opposition of Islam and Christianity, or of Asia versus Europe, was rather striking at that time. Such vehement defiance sometimes reached the suggestion of *jihād*. He said in one of his public speeches:

> It is customary in such meetings to pass resolutions but such formal things are now quite useless. Representations, resolutions, entreaties have all been tried but have proved unavailing. Justice has never been or will never be coerced by tearful entreaties but one thing, viz force which, Europe thinks, the Mussalmans have none.

This was a clear departure from the past in that, in speaking in such manner, he “brought the word *jihād* back into the Muslims’ vocabulary”. Indeed, the word *jihād* had been long sealed off by his predecessors since the late nineteenth century in the process of self-rationalization, and even if mentioned it was meant, at most, as the spiritual or inner effort for self-reform. Moreover, he is believed to have gone so far as to make a serious experiment in the underground revolutionary activities.

Though, in the actual politics in this period, his stance was too radical to be realized, the importance of his activities lies in his contribution to the spiritual reawakening by openly challenging the cause of Anglo-Islamic reconciliation, from which Muslims in India in general, including Ameer Ali and Muhammad Ali, were still inescapable.
4. Concluding Remarks

The characteristics of pan-Islamism in India will be clearer if it is compared with that of the Ottoman Empire. The latter one was primarily a policy or a scheme devised by the central authorities and its activists. And in most of the cases, it used underground channel like emissaries and unofficial propaganda for its transmission. Though there existed an ideological trend of pan-Islamism among contemporary intellectuals, and it may have hinted its political usefulness to the authorities, still such trend was not decisive in the working of pan-Islamism there.71)

In India's case pan-Islamism had the essential base in society. While gradually dominated by the direction of the upper leadership, it was still firmly backed by the movement in society in terms of both material and moral support. At the city or its locality level the relief movement consisted of meetings and funds often organized by the semi-voluntary associations called anjumans. It was here that what I call the dual sense of crisis, which overlapped their own decline with the crisis of the Ottoman Empire as the remnant glory of Islam, was collectively represented. With the incompatibility between Islam and the British vividly revealed through the Wars, some political leaders who shared the dual sense of crisis began to launch defiant stands against the colonial authorities. But their minority status and the firm colonial hegemony were not easy to overcome, and they could not be united during this period.

Thus rooted and contextualized by its own structure into the situation of society, India's pan-Islamism could not be easily dissolved, and continued to be one of the principal pan-Islamisms in the world well into the 1920s. At the same time, however, by the same reason a part of its fate and direction had to be grasped by the intention of the majority, the Hindus.

Notes

* Abbreviations are used for the references to the files of the Government of India preserved in the National Archives of India, New Delhi. A standard example will
be Foreign (Sec) E, 265–317, February 1912, indicating Department (branch) pro-
ceedings, number, date, in its order. Especially for the name of branch, Pol is used
for Political, Sec for Secret, Extl for External. Government of India will be written
as GOI.
1) Gail Minault, *The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobiliza-
tion in India*, Oxford, 1982, is an authoritative and reliable monograph on this
political process until the end of the Movement. For concrete relief schemes during
the Wars and the rise of new leadership to lead to the Khilafat Movement, see
204–12.
1990. The whole of chapter 4 is allocated to India's pan-Islamism.
3) For the various pan-Islamic schemes and their aims on the part of the Ottoman
Empire during the Wars, see *ibid.*, pp. 86–94, 134–38.
4) The Red Crescent was the Islamic counterpart of the Red Cross. The table, based
on an article in Muhammad Ali's journal *Comrade*, 24 May 1913, indicates the
money remitted to the Society from February 1912 to February 1913. Here I
grouped some areas of minor amounts under the category of "others", but this rule
was not applied to some areas, like Bukhara and China, where money must have
been raised from mainly Muslims there. The total, if calculated from each
country's amount, will be a little different, because here piastres, a subdivision of
the lira, are omitted.
5) In the Eastern Problem of the nineteenth century, the British tried to protect the
Ottoman Empire in its rivalry with Russia. But, due to a comparative decrease of
hegemony Britain had to join the alliances with European countries, thus giving
birth to the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. During the Wars the British
had to attach priority to the balance of Europe, sacrificing the protection of the
Ottoman Empire. Marian Kent, "Constantinople and Asiatic Turkey, 1905–14",
"Grey and Tripoli War, 1911–12", all in F. H. Hinsley (ed.), *British Foreign Policy
6) The "duality" of the Khilafat Movement and "the dual sense of crisis" have been a
part of the main frames of my discussion since I wrote "Hilāfato Undō no Keisei
Katei: Indo Sekishigetsu Iryōdan (1912–13) wo Chūsin ni shite (The Formative
Process of the Khilafat Movement: Focusing on the Indian Red Crescent Mission
(1912–13))". (M. A. dissertation in Japanese, University of Tokyo, 1992)
7) The frame of this overall discussion is, as a result, different from descriptions of
some previous works in that the latter constantly put the ideology and the
mobilizational efforts of some elite leaders in their centers. Comparatively they
tend to underestimate the role of the movement in Muslim society which produced
so much material and moral support, and which regulated the stand of elite leader-
ship. Francis Robinson, *op. cit.*, chap. 5–8, Mushirul Hasan, *Nationalism and Com-
munal Politics in India, 1885–1930*, New Delhi, 1991, chap. 5–6, esp. pp. 117–22,
idem, "Secular and Communitarian Representations of Indian Nationalism: Ideol-

8) Sources for this information are mainly of three types. The first one is the files of the Government of India, under the numbers of Foreign (Sec) E, 265–317, February 1912; Foreign (Extl) B, 405–515, February 1912; Foreign (Sec) E, 479–552 July 1912; Foreign (Extl) B, 42–79, September 1913. These are composed mainly of petitions of the local meetings directly telegraphed to the Government. The second is the contemporary journal and newspaper: *Comrade* and *Mussalman*, for both of their issues from October 1911 to July 1913 were consulted. (The latter was an English weekly from Calcutta edited by Mujibur Rahman.) *Times of India* from 3 October to 30 November 1911. And the third one is the information brought by the side of organizations involved in these meetings. Sayyid Shahabuddin Desnuvi, *Anjuman-i İslâm kē Sō Sāl* (The Hundred Years of Anjuman-i Islam), Bambā’ī, 1986, (in Urdu), pp. 124, 127, alleges that 37,000Rs was collected during the Balkan War by the *Anjuman-i İslâm, Bombay*. According to Ahmad Sa’īd, *Anjuman İslâmia Amritsar, 1873–1947: Taʾlîmî wa Stîyâsî Khidmāt* (Anjuman Islamia Amritsar, 1873–1947: Educational and Political Contributions), Lāhūr, 1986 (in Urdu), p. 192, this Anjuman remitted 29,531Rs by April 1913. Hereafter unless otherwise noted, the descriptions about these meetings in this paper will be based on these sources. Only names of *anjumans* and Urdu journals adopt the direct transliteration.

9) For example, in the list, the barristers were Muhammad Yanus, Hamid Ali Khan, Mir Ayub Khan, and the zamindar was Ryazuddin Muhammad.

10) For the policy of the Ottoman Empire in general, see the note 3). The examples of the evidence on India’s side are appeals from the Ottoman Red Crescent Society sent to and published in *Comrade*, 26 October 1912, under the title of “An Appeal to Indian Muslims” and Abul Kalam Azad’s Urdu weekly *Al-Hilal* (Calcutta), 22 January 1913, “Anjuman-i Hilāl-i Aḥmer Qaṣṭaṇṭaṇīyah kā Paighām: Mussalmān-i Hind kē Nām” (The Message of the Red Crescent Society in Istanbul: To Muslims in India). Both expressed gratitude for the remitted funds and appealed for more subscriptions.


According to “Memoirs of the late Rt. Hon’ble Syed Ameer Ali”, *Islamic Culture* (Hyderabad), vol. 6, October 1932, p. 505, he first became interested in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire in 1877 when he had an opportunity to see a journal “Dar-ul-Khilafat”, which had been published in Arabic in Istanbul. It was apparently a propaganda publication of the pan-Islamic colour.


It is thought that almost every town with a substantial Muslim population saw some kind of gathering to collect subscription. According to Muhammad Ali, in “every district and town” there was a fund for the relief. He commented on this as “spontaneous manifestation of sympathy”. *Comrade*, 25 Nov. 1911. Looking back about twenty years later, his biographer also wrote that in every big town (shaher) an association (anjuman) for the collection and remittance of subscription was founded. Ra’îs Ahmad Ja’îrî, *Sirat-i Muhammad ‘Ali* (The life of Muhammad Ali), Delhi, Maktabah Jāmi‘ah Mīllīā, 1932, (in Urdu), p. 228.

16) *Anjuman-i Rafiqul-Islām* can be translated as Islam Companion Association, and *Anjuman-i Hidayat-i Islām* as Islam Regeneration Association, *Anjuman-i Zia ul-Islām* as Islam Enlightenment Association. Though these *anjumans* sometimes appear as *Anjuman Islāmīa* or suchlike in the sources, I unified them as *Anjuman-i Islām*. *Anjuman-i Islām-i Aḥl-i Sunnatu’l-Jamā‘ī* was an association of the *Aḥl-i Sunnat*, a new Sunni ulama/sufi sect also called Barelwi which was then led by Ahmad Sa‘īd.


19) Only about Bengal, thanks to the work of Rafiuddin Ahmed, *op. cit.*, we have such knowledge about the total structure of Muslim society which supported the existence of these *anjumans*. So, the descriptions here cannot but be tentative about other areas. Particularly about the connection between the tendency of Islamization in Bengali masses and the their pan-Islamic commitment, see *ibid.*, pp. 83–84, 107–113.
20) Some files of the Foreign Department cited in note (8).
23) The repeal was designed as an appeasement of the anti-British sentiment in Bengal since the Swadeshi Movement, but of course it could not help causing the discouragement in Muslims especially in Eastern Bengal. Matiur Rahman, From Consultation to Confrontation: A Study of the Muslim League in British Indian Politics, 1906–1912, London 1970, pp. 231–75.
25) Reports from the each province about the political situation, Home (Pol) A, 45–55, March 1913.
28) For the key role of these local elites in the anjumans, Edward D. J. Churchill, Jr., op. cit., p. 69, Rafiuddin Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 83, 166–68.
29) According to Mussalman, 24 Nov. 1911, subscriptions temporarily stopped due to a rumour to the effect that the Government prohibited its remittance. Comrade, in its issue of 18 Nov. 1911, negated the unlawfulness of subscription. Ra‘is Ahmad Ja’fri, op. cit., p. 228 attributes the success of subscription movement to, in a sense, the virtual non-intervention on the part of the British.
30) These examples can be seen in the meetings of Calcutta (organized by the Indian Red Crescent Society, Comrade 7 Oct. 1911), Chittagong (ibid.), Hyderabad, Deccan (ibid., 21 Oct. 1911), Comilla (ibid., 11 Nov. 1911), Barisal (Mussalman, 10 Nov. 1911), Peshawar (Home (Pol) B, 82–86, November 1912).
32) These were reported from East Bengal, Home (Pol) A, 5–6, December 1911; Mussalman, 24 Nov. 1911.
33) This rumour was from Punjab, report of C.A. Barron, Chief Sec., Punjab Province, dated 17 Sept. 1912, Home (Pol) A, 45–55, March 1913; another report in Home (Pol) B, 14–18, May 1912.
34) In the initial stage, two papers, the Bengalee of Surendra Bannerjee and the Punjabee of Lala Lajpat Rai, were sympathetic to Muslims’ reaction, obviously because they found in it a germ which could lead to the radical non-loyalist stance. Home (Pol) B, 121–123, January 1912.
35) This was an opinion of “a leading Hindu paper” in Bengal. Report of Stevenson-Moore, Chief-Sec., Bengal Province, dated 10 April 1913, in Home (Pol) A, 111, May 1913.
36) A phrase of Zafar Ali Khan’s Zamindar (Lahore) dated 8 Nov. 1911, cited in Home
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38) A public notice issued by the leaders in Karachi in October 1912, in Home (Pol) B, 82–86, November 1912.


41) These were meetings by the Indian Red Crescent Society, Wilayat Hussain in Allahabad, Muhammad Ali Kizilbash in Lahore, Abdul Qadir in Madras, and some others in Dacca, Chittagong, etc.

42) Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan: All India Muslim League Documents, 1906–1947, vol. 1, New Delhi, Indian ed. 1982, pp. 231–49. In the resolutions then moved, however, the need of relief subscriptions was included, ibid, p. 255.

43) Ibid., p. 277.

44) Ibid., p. 278. The address was by Mian Muhammad Shafi, a Lahore-base politician/lawyer then the organizer of the Punjab Muslim League. He seems to have had two faces, one for the British realized in the Muslim League, the other for the Muslim public realized in his Punjab Red Crescent Society as an active organizer of the relief movement.

45) Aga Khan, “India and the War: Positions of Moslems”, first appeared in Times of India, 14 Feb. 1913. I used the same one which re-appeared in Comrade, 15 Feb. 1913. Like the former two cases, it was not that the suspension of the subscriptions was preached.

46) Muslims in Calcutta, led by Azad and A. Suhrawardy, protested against it in a public meeting, saying that it was anti-Muslim conduct and did not represent the whole Muslim opinion. Mussalman, 21 Feb. 1913. The dissent that spread among Muslims is reported in Stevenson-Moore, Chief Sec., Bengal Province to GOI, 10 April 1913., in Home (Pol) A, 111, May 1913.

47) For its self-consciousness as the first body to have formed an organization for subscription, see Qādīʿ ‘Abdu’l Latif, Tārīkh-i Jang-i Trābulus, Musawwar (History of the Italo-Turkish War, Illustrated), Kalkatah, 1912 (in Urdu, but the above English title is attached), p. 20. The Society was formed at a meeting in the office of Ḥablū’l-Matīn. This book is a contemporary detailed account of the process of the Italo-Turkish War, which was meant, as a whole, to reveal the irrationality and cruelty of Italian aggression. Its central committee consisted of Ghulam Hussain Arif as the president, Syed Jalaluddin and Abdullah Suhrawardy both as the secretary, Abdul Latif as the treasurer. Comrade, 7 Oct. 1911, and Times of India, 3 Oct. 1911.

48) “An Appeal to Our Co-religionists”, Mussalman, 10 Nov. 1911.

49) By November 1912, it collected as much as 134,238 Rs. Mussalman, 6 Dec. 1912. It is difficult to estimate its influence, for Red Crescent Societies set up in other cities could not always be taken as the branches of Calcutta’s. They might have just expressed its cooperation with the Ottoman Red Crescent Society, not with
Calcutta's. But by the Calcutta side, at least Bombay's and Rangoon's were once claimed as its branches, see *Mussalman* 10 Nov. 1911 and 26 Jan. 1912 respectively. And, for example, a meeting at Barasol promised direct cooperation with Calcutta's Society. *Comrade*, 21 Oct. 1911.

50) Muhammad Ali, then in Calcutta, who opened the Turkish Relief Fund on his paper in October 1911, was one of them. *Comrade*, 7 Oct. 1911. Also *Mussalman* of Calcutta began to receive subscriptions independently in December 1911. *Mussalman*, 2 Dec. 1911.

51) *Comrade*, 30 Dec. 1911.

52) *Mussalman*, 28 March 1913.


54) Just after the outbreak of Italo-Turkish War, *Hablu'l-Matîn* added its daily supplement in both Urdu and Bengali, thus rousing the people's interest. See also note 12).

55) Both of them were members of Bengal Legislative Assembly since 1910. Suhrawardy was, at the same time, a staff of the Faculty of Laws, Calcutta University.

56) Muhammad Ali cannot be evidenced to have attended any meetings of the Indian Red Crescent Society. Azad was expelled from it in January 1912, obviously due to the sectarian inner conflict. *Mussalman*, 19 Jan. 1912.


58) Citation is from “Italy and Turkey”, *Times*, 1 Nov. 1911 in K. K. Aziz (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 357. Similar appeals are to be seen in “Moslem and the War”, *Times*, 24 Oct. 1912, and “Additional Chapter on ‘Moslem Feeling’” (originally in Thomas Barclay, *The Turco-Italian War and Its Problems*), both in K. K. Aziz (ed.), *op. cit.*

59) His appeals sent to the *Comrade* to encourage the relief movement are seen in the issues of 26 October 1912 and 2 November 1912. For his unofficial contacts with Muhammad Ali, Zafar Ali Khan, Indian Red Crescent Society and Nawab Salimullah for the same purpose, see Home (Pol) B, 14–18, May 1912. These are now evidenced by the sources on the part of Ameer Ali and the Muslim League. See Muhammad Yusuf Abbasi, *op. cit.*, pp. 256–57, 281, etc.

60) The first dispatch of his mission for Tripoli consisted of seven members and its core was the British doctors. *Times* (London), 3 and 8 Nov. 1911.

61) One of the most vivid expressions of this sense of crisis can be seen in his letter to an unknown leader in Egypt, saying that within his generation all of Islamic civilization might be lost. This letter dated 19 January 1914 is compiled in Mushirul Hasan (ed.), *Mohamed Ali in Indian Politics: Select Writings vol. 1*, New Delhi, 1987. p. 60.

62) This stance was consciously explained by another leader of the same mass-approach style, Zafar Ali Khan, that people needed the leader who frequented mosques not social clubs, and who rejoiced at sharing his residence with people.
See Home (Pol) B, 199-202, June 1912, citing an article of his ZaminDar.

63) See note 29). This aspect of his loyalty and his frequent contacts with the authorities in this period is also pointed out in Mushirul Hasan, *Mohamed Ali: Ideology and Politics*, New Delhi, 1981, pp. 30–33.

64) Muhammad Ali to Viceroy, GOI, dated 11 Nov. 1912, in Foreign (Sec) G, 1-19, Feb. 1913.

65) "Red Crescent and Red Cross", *Comrade*, 27 July 1912. Here Muhammad Ali expressed agreement with Ameer Ali’s statement, admitting that only the Red Cross had been appreciated internationally. *Comrade*, 26 Oct. 1912, also criticized Red Cross saying it inclined to concentrate its activities on the Balkan side.

66) The subscription for this mission and its members were publicly invited to *Comrade*, 19 Oct. 1912. When the members were announced, the names of each Province where they came from were mentioned. *Comrade*, 28 Dec. 1912.

67) For example, his public speech on 6 Oct. 1912 in Calcutta, reported in Home (Pol) B, 82–86, Nov. 1912.

68) *Mussalman*, 7 Feb. 1913, reporting the meeting on 2 February 1913. His striking radicalism on this point was heard with alarm and reported in a government report, Home (Pol) A, 111, May 1913.


71) Jacob M. Landau, *op. cit.*, chap. 2–3. In the ideological trend of pan-Islamism among intellectuals, the contribution of immigrants or visitors of Caucasian and Central Asian origins can be discerned. See Masami ARAI, "Osuman Teikoku ni okeru Isuram Kaikaku Shugi no Tenkai" (Evolution of the Islamic Reform Trend in the Ottoman Empire), in *Tōyōshi Kenkyū* 45 (3), pp. 8, 11–12, 14–15. (in Japanese); Jacob M. Landau, *op. cit.*, pp. 37, 150, 156.

Acknowledgments: Ministry of Education, Japan Government, financially enabled me to stay in India for the first two years of my research there from 1992. The basic framework of this essay was formed during it, and was first presented to the faculty of Center for Historical Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University in 1993 as the synopsis of future Ph.D. thesis.