Article

Muslim Merchant Capital and the Relief Movement for the Ottoman Empire in India, 1876–1924

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Introduction

From the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century Muslims in South Asia showed a continuous tendency to sympathize with and even support the Ottoman Empire, the most salient example of which was the so-called Khilafat Movement (1919–1924). The aim of this paper is two-fold, firstly to point out that certain specific Muslim merchant communities, originally from Western India, made a substantial contribution to the relief movement of the Ottoman Empire from its onset, and secondly to discuss the motivation for their support. These Muslim communities in fact played an important role in the relief movement by organizing meetings and funds, and they even devised concrete measures to support, and cooperate with, the Ottoman Empire. As the present paper hopes to prove, this involvement cannot be explained solely by what may be called a religious sense of crisis caused by the critical situation of the “Islamic” Ottoman Empire, with which they shared the same religion,
nor by the political mobilization of Muslim leaders, but by various socio-economic factors affecting the Muslim communities at that time. The ultimate intention of this paper, therefore, is to discuss the socio-economic background in relation to merchant strategies in planning, and being involved in, the relief movement.

Considering these two aims, I will discuss two subjects. The first is the issue of the socio-political process, or the background, which gave rise to the Khilafat Movement. Previous studies have already clarified the process of the political and ideological evolution leading up to the Movement, but limited attention has been paid to the structure and dynamics of the contemporary Muslim society which produced the trend to support the Ottoman Empire. I previously approached this aspect of study by finding the fundamental basis of the relief movement as a whole in local meetings and the subscriptions collected there, and also pointed out the leading role played by various voluntary associations, generally named Anjuman-i Islām (Islamic Association) or the like. The analysis to be carried out in this paper is a continuation of this work, with the scope of analysis focused onto more specific social groups and particular communities.

The second subject concerns the Muslim merchant communities which originated in Western India. Some classes of these communities, such as the Khojas, the Bohras and the Memons, originally from Gujarat and adjacent areas, are known to have been active in various commercial undertakings including the Indian Ocean trade, a few of them being wealthy enough to be described as “merchant princes,” owning ten to twenty sea-going vessels. Their position, however, rapidly declined in the early to the mid-eighteenth century, when Gujarat first was detached from the hinterland due to anarchy in the Mughal heartland, and then overrun by the Marathas. As is well known, subsequently the British, taking advantage of the current of the times, transferred the commercial center from Surat to Bombay. In the wake of this period of drastic change, the wealthy Muslim merchants and the communities they belonged to virtually disappeared from the pages of history. This expression may seem exaggerated, but in using it, I contrast their long silence with the dramatic upsurge of other commercial communities like the Parsis and the Marwaris. It was not until the time of the Partition (1947) and after that the Muslim merchants finally reemerged to seize
the chance offered by the new political option, Pakistan, to revitalize their own business activities. Indeed, at present they occupy a dominant position in Pakistan’s industrial and business circles. This paper attempts also to fill the gap between the two periods by depicting the socio-economic condition of Muslim merchants from the mid-nineteenth century to the early twentieth century.

Overall this paper will illustrate that the socio-economic position of Muslim merchants, neither static nor passive, produced critical conflict and interaction with the hegemony of British rule and European capital, and forced the merchants to opt for the Ottoman Empire relief movement and to cooperate with it as their choice of action.

1. Socio-Economic Background: Ambiguity of Economic Position and Social Identity under the Colonial Rule

The western part of India was frequented by Muslims from regions outside India, including merchants, scholars and sufis hailing from Western Asia. They included missionaries preaching particular doctrines, who were responsible for the conversion to Islam of people from the lower middle class from roughly the tenth to the fourteenth centuries. The Muslim communities in the western part of India now under discussion, such as the Bohras, the Khojas and the Memons, owe their origins mainly to those missionary activities. Both the number of those Muslims and their social influence seem to have increased when Muslim political powers, including the Mughals, integrated this part of India under their rule. They lived as peasants, petty-traders and so on, but, as has already been mentioned, some were engaged in the Indian Ocean trade. Indeed, some among them were very successful and amassed large capital, and others extended their commercial activities as far as East Africa and South-East Asia. Their socio-economic position began to decline from the mid-eighteenth century, simultaneously with the greater dynamic change in the socio-economic condition of India and the whole Indian Ocean region. Unfortunately, there is no space here for a closer look at the decline of Surat, a commercial center during the Mughal period on the one hand, and the rise of Bombay on the other. It should be remembered, however, that Muslim ship-owning merchants tended to be much more negatively affected by this change than the money lending merchants and brokers who were predominantly Hindu. The main reason was that
the former could not easily coexist with the newcomers, as they were natural competitors with each other, while the latter were able to accept even the British as business partners and customers.\textsuperscript{10) Indeed, the shipping business, being one of the fiercest points of the confrontation and therefore the main theater of Muslim merchant decline, is eminently suitable to take up here for further discussion.

1.1 The Decline of the Muslim Ship-owning Merchants and the Nākhudās

Before the advent of European hegemony, the western region of the Indian Ocean had been dominated by ships owned and navigated by Muslims. In one particular case, an influential ship-owning magnate based in Surat owned more than ten ships, which were navigated and managed for him by nākhudās (originally a Persian word meaning the captain of a vessel, though in English often spelled as nakhoda). Nākhudās were usually chosen from among the ship owner’s relatives or members of other important merchant families, and were under the owner’s command regarding transactions and the sailing schedule.\textsuperscript{11) Especially in the case of India, a substantial number of such ship-owning merchants and nākhudās were produced by communities in Western Indian like the Bohras, since some of them had acquired the art and tradition of shipping. At the same time, we cannot overlook Muslim merchants of Turkish, Persian and Arab origin who had migrated to India and established themselves as affluent ship-owning merchants.\textsuperscript{12) 

It is difficult to grasp fully the complexity of shipping in this period in a quantitative manner. As a starting point for such a discussion, however, I will refer to a little studied list of ships originally recorded by the British port authorities in Bombay in the year 1795–96, and later presented to us along with a short introductory essay by an Indian scholar.\textsuperscript{13) Excluding the numerous native crafts of less than 50 tons, the list registered the arrivals and departures of 188 ships, amounting to a total tonnage of 80,441. It is not easy to know the precise origin of all the ships from the brief description comprising the ship’s name, captain’s name, and destination in that order. However, by flag (nationality) and the owner they can be categorized as follows (Table 1):
In total, only 28 were India-based ships owned by Muslims (about 15% of the total), comprising thirteen ships under the British flag, nine managed by the native powers of Cannanore and Arcot, and six owned by an individual merchant. If we consider their tonnage, their share becomes even smaller. The figures of the cumulative tonnage well explain the situation. The standard tonnage of their ships ranged from fifty to five hundred tons each, compared with ships of British origin, ranging roughly from three hundred to thirteen hundred tons. When compared with the later situation, however, this share was rather large. Of interest here is that these 28 ships also included the survivors of Muslim merchant ships. At this period the Nawab of Surat narrowly managed to maintain his sovereignty and the ships of the Chellaby family, a Turkish immigrant merchant clan, who had been influential as ship-owning merchants since the seventeenth century, remained under the flag of Surat. Moreover, there are several cases where ships owned by the British and Hindus were navigated by Muslim nakhudās, while it seems that all Muslim-owned ships were sailed by Muslim nakhudās. And yet, as a whole, it cannot be denied that at this period, when British inland he-

**Table 1** Arrivals and Departures of ships at Bombay Port during the Year 1795–96

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Number*</th>
<th>Cumulative tonnage</th>
<th>Average tonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>British and other European**</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>56,047</td>
<td>479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parsi</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6,737</td>
<td>674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muslim**</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1,841</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sub-total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>143</td>
<td>65,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6,063</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannanore</td>
<td>Bibi of the Nawab</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arcot</td>
<td>the Nawab</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2,460</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surat</td>
<td>Chellaby, a Muslim merchant based in Surat</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2,981</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,894</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>188</td>
<td>80,441</td>
<td>428</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * The number is cumulative total.
** The figures in these categories are particularly obscure and tentative.
gemony had yet to be established, British sea supremacy was already a fact, with their ships being overwhelmingly more numerous and larger.

During the course of the nineteenth century indigenous ships, including those of Muslim merchants, fell into a secondary position. It is not necessary to elaborate on the process, but here two tables (Figure 1 and Figure 2) help us understand the drastic, even revolutionary, changes in shipping. Though the accuracy of the statistics is open to question, a rough outline of the situation can still be drawn. The main features shown are the rapid increase in the number of British ships from the 1840s to the 1860s, and after that, while the number of British vessels (now a new category limited to England, excluding British India) tended still to increase, British Indian ships began to decrease after the 1880s. On the other hand, changes in tonnage (Figure 2) were even more dramatic. While in the 1900s the tonnage of British ships reached a level of

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**Figure 1** Number of Ships by Nationalities: Entering to India from Foreign Countries

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nearly five times that of the 1860s, the tonnage of British Indian ships, regardless of the fact that it must have included some ships managed by European capital, remained at an extremely low level. This means that although a substantial number of small ships, including native craft which belonged to India, remained at sea throughout the period under review, their importance in an actual commercial sense was completely over-

**Figure 2** Cumulative Tonnage of Ship by Nationalities: Entering to India from Foreign Countries

Notes for both Figure 1 and Figure 2:

1. All the crafts are devided into two major categories, i.e. “Non-Native Crafts” and “Native Crafts”.
2. Until 1865: “Total of Non-Native Crafts” = “British / British India” + “Total of Foreign”
   After 1866: “Total of Non-Native Crafts” = “British” + “British India” + “Total of Foreign”
3. “Arabic” and “Turkish” are the two categories included in the foreign non-native crafts.
shadowed. These findings support the thesis that can also be found in previous literature on the subject. In short, the Indian Ocean witnessed the gradual formation of a so-called dualism in shipping, which symbolically denotes the existence of large European steam vessels transporting large amounts of cargo, and only the remaining coastal and minor trade being left to many, albeit tiny ships (when compared with the European steamers), including native dhows.\(^{18}\)

There is no room for doubt that this situation was brought about by European technological innovation, specifically the introduction of iron, and then steel, steam vessels after the 1830s–40s, and also by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Technological hegemony was, however, not the sole reason. Various other factors also helped consolidate the situation. Here, it suffices to say that the following two interventions simultaneously worked to prevent the development of indigenous shipping: one being official intervention through the huge amount of subsidies made to selected European companies and legislative action such as maritime laws, and the other was the unofficial and sometimes secret offensive by the European shipping companies like rate wars and the Shipping Conference. The rate wars were waged as a counter measure against unwelcome newcomers in the form of extremely low freight charges, while the Conference was first held in 1877 among several dominant shipping companies for the purpose of reserving to themselves the transport of cargo, to the exclusion of others. As a result, most ventures by Indian merchant capital trying to break into Indian Ocean shipping did not last long. As Frank Broeze rightly emphasizes, their failure was not so much a consequence of so-called Social Darwinism under free and fair competition, as the expected outcome resulting from the machinery of Imperialism.\(^{19}\)

India had to await until after World War I for a shipping revival, when the legendary Scindia Steam Navigation Company (1919–), mainly under the management of Jain and Parsi capital, launched an offensive against the domination of Western capital, to grow into a national pride after Independence. The whole story, however, if completed as such, would leave an important aspect untold. It is the fate of the once dominant Muslim ship-owning merchants, the nākhudās, and the Muslim merchant communities which produced these merchants. To trace their fate greatly overlaps with the intention of this paper.
1.2 The Vitality of Economic Activity and its Limitations

The Muslim merchants were neither inert nor passive to their fate; on the contrary, they made a rather strategic response toward the socio-political changes, though this response may not have ended in so striking or dramatic a result as that of the Parsis or other business communities. As I will examine below, the main features of their tactical response can be summarized in three points. First, they did not withdraw from the newly emerging colonial economy, but consciously tried to make positive use of it. Second, they selected particular kinds of industry and commercial goods, and tried to concentrate on them. Third, they did not diminish the geographical area of their commercial activity, but expanded it by sending community members to newly emerging cities like Bombay, as well as more distant places like East Africa.

Here I will take up the story of a particular family as an example of Muslim merchants who succeeded in riding the tide of the expanding British colonial economy. This family is particularly important for my discussion, since, as will be shown below, they were to be deeply involved in the Ottoman Empire relief movement. The Chotani family, belonging to the Memon community, made their way to the Bombay area in the 1840s, when Bombay's status as a city of new commercial and administrative functions had been firmly established. It is not clear whether their ancestors had been engaged in the timber trade or not, but the first generation in Bombay successfully launched a timber business there, and the second and third generations enlarged it by arranging contracts with the authorities for railway and port construction. In the third generation, especially, when Mia Muhammad Chotani (b.1873) and his younger brother Mia Ahmed Chotani succeeded the business, the company established many new branches and agencies in various cities including Lahore, Madras, Karachi, Calicut, Belgaum, Ernakulam, San Francisco and London. The success of the family can be explained by many factors. As is seen in the case of the second generation who founded an agency in Rangoon and ventured into the teak business, they were able to take advantage of the expanding teak trade, caused by the gradual opening of the Burmese forests after the 1830s. Moreover, their business could not have been successful unless the boom in railway construction after the 1860s had not created a demand for vast amounts of timber for railway sleepers. Last but not least, the availability of ships as the means
to transport the timber must have been crucial.

The case of Chotani family should be regarded as a good example concretely testifying to a new trend among particular Muslim communities to gradually shift their economic activity from their native land to the city of Bombay and beyond. In fact, after the mid-nineteenth century they seem to have attracted British attention with their increasing presence in the city and by their newly acquired wealth. By 1901, the total population of Bohras, Khojas and Memons in Bombay city had surpassed 40,000, comprising around 25% of the total Muslim population there. A typical British observation reads: “As Surat sank into insignificance the Memons moved southwards to Bombay and immigrated in large numbers after the famine of 1813 in Gujarat and Cutch.... Their status steadily progressed as Bombay advanced in material prosperity, and at the present date the Memons indulge in every class of trade from shop-keeping, broking and peddling to furniture dealing and timber dealing and include among their number some of the richest individuals in Bombay native society.”

Their migration movement did not stop at Bombay. Again as the case of the Chotani family also suggests, they saw the whole Indian Ocean region as their trading and business stage. Certainly this kind of mobility was not a new mode of behavior for them, but in the midst of Western colonial expansion and the hegemony of European capital in the mid to late nineteenth century, it seems to have been accelerated. This can be seen, for example, in the geographical expansion of their trading network. The case of South Africa is now worth recalling. In 1860 the first group of Indian indentured laborers flowed into Natal, and, after several years, colonies of Indians began to be formed in Durban and other areas by ex-laborers, who remained there even after the expiration of their contracts. Indian merchants, at the core of which were Muslim merchant communities like the Khojas and the Memons, saw their chance and began a rapid move to the region after the mid-1870s to start their own businesses, initially supplying consumer goods to their Indian compatriots. It can be said, therefore, that they had closely observed the formation process of the new colonial economy and made a prompt response to the business opportunities it offered. This kind of positive and speedy response by Muslim merchants to the newly emerging economic order could be seen in other areas as well, like East Africa, for
example.

This vitality, however, could not always be efficiently adapted into actual business. In fact businesses faced many difficulties. Racist legislative intervention on the part of the Transvaal (South Africa) authorities, which affected their business and life, was one such difficulty.\(^{24}\) Indeed this kind of intervention on the part of the British and other European colonial authorities against native entrepreneurs, including Indian Muslim merchants, was ubiquitous wherever they were,\(^{25}\) and it never failed to cause political confrontation. As I pointed out above, the success of Muslim merchants was substantially dependent on the newly emerging colonial economy, like railway construction and new settlements of ex-indentured Indians, and as such were unavoidably involved in the structure of the colonial society. On the other hand, though, they were forced to expose themselves to limitation and discrimination imposed upon them by the authorities. Thus, merchants were caught up in an ambiguous relationship with the British and their colonial economy, situated between reliance and rivalry.

Such a contradictory position between dependence and confrontation naturally led the Muslims to incorporate various measures to change their situation, an example of which was a political association they organized as a lobby for collective action, like sending petitions and organizing demonstrations. But, it was also in this context that activities related to maintaining the Ottoman Empire, or other concrete measures of Muslim cooperation, especially under the umbrella of the Ottoman power, were espoused and included in their strategies.

Muslim merchants’ attention toward the Ottoman Empire was, however, reinforced by other factors as well. First of all it cannot be overemphasized that it was the merchants themselves who had been subjected to the combination of colonial authorities and European capital. For them it was natural to contrive the idea of some kind of cooperation movement as a counter-measure. Furthermore, as their existence and stage of activity now extended beyond India they must have been prepared to look at their situation in the wider context, such as the Indian Ocean context. In this sense, the Ottoman Empire, though in its decline, would still have been a power to rely on. Lastly we must not overlook the co-existence of various other Muslim communities in the areas surrounding Indian Ocean. The Muslim merchants from India no doubt
had social intercourse with other Muslims of different origins in the Arab area and East Africa. Furthermore India itself was frequented by many Arab and Persian merchants and merchant ships. In a sense, they all shared a more or less common fate and similar socio-economic problems.

1.3 The Pilgrimage Traffic during the Hajj

Here I will look at the business of transporting pilgrims to Mecca (Jiddah), because this is one of the businesses in which the Muslim merchants seem to have concentrated their capital and managed to compete successfully with European capital. It is also one of the areas where the Ottoman Empire cooperation movement was to be experimented by Muslim merchants in the concrete manner.

In the nineteenth century, the hajj to Mecca underwent dramatic change due to the introduction of steam vessels across the Indian Ocean. Since this new technology was in the hands of European shipping companies, the existing Muslim ship-owners engaged in transporting pilgrims had to face severe competition with these newcomers. This competition became all the more fierce when colonial authorities intervened through legislation by raising the sword of public welfare and sanitation over their heads. Indeed, we can now prove that a not negligible proportion of pilgrims was at a certain period transported from ports in India to Jiddah by European shipping companies like the British India Steam Navigation Co. and the Peninsular & Oriental Co. (P&O Co.). These companies had grown up in the mid-nineteenth century through vast amounts of official subsidy in the form of contracts for postal services. The business of pilgrim transportation, however, was to remain substantially in the hands of Muslim shipping companies like Hajji Cassum & Co., and later, the Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Co. Various reasons could be given to explain how they managed to survive such competition. For example, they converted ex-P&O ships for pilgrimage use by reorganizing the interiors with minimum facilities. Infringement of laws, like carrying more passengers than was legally allowed was, of course, another way to survive, though this incurred a fine if found out. We cannot, however, neglect the venture nature of some Muslim merchants and capitalists who shrewdly concentrated their capital on pilgrimage traffic, and no doubt made the most of their cultur-
al knowledge about pilgrims, religion, and so on. This is, more or less, true for the above-mentioned Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Co., which was founded by merchants of Persian origin in Bombay in 1877 with the hajj traffic as one of their main undertakings. 28) Lastly, their counter movement against the advance of British shipping companies seems to have been effective to some extent, particularly as here they could expect the cooperation of the Hedjaz authorities (at that time under the dual rule of Ottoman Vali as governor and the Arab Grand Shariff), as in the case of the plot to force pilgrims in Mecca and Medina to book return tickets on their contract vessels, though the authorities' aim seems, to some extent, to have been to obtain personal gain. 29)

1.4. "Islamization" or the Social Presentation of Piety

The Muslim merchant communities discussed here had a tendency to join and support social movements which would enhance their social status as Muslims. This tendency can be considered another factor that encouraged their commitment to the Ottoman Empire relief movement.

Some kind of pious and generous conduct was naturally expected of any merchants who were more or less affluent, and who were expected to be widely recognized in society. But the position of those Muslim merchants especially motivated them toward such social presentation of piety and generosity. The problem is closely related to the problem of their origins. They came to be officially categorized and labeled by the British as "converted Muslims" from Hindus in the Gazetteers and the Censuses, 30) and they had to endure such categorization however firmly they established themselves as merchants and bona fide citizens. This was the case, especially with the Khojas and the Cutchi Memons. The story dates back to 1847, when the Bombay Court handed down a judgement to the effect that these two communities (the Khojas and the Cutchi Memons), still followed Hindu law by custom in terms of succession and inheritance, and would not always be required to follow Islamic law on that point. 31) Due to this exceptional legal treatment of their custom, which was known as E. Perry's judgement, and followed as judicial precedent until 1937, they acquired a kind of preventive measure disallowing the diffusion of a family's property in the event of trouble over inheritance, for Hindu law eventually allowed the exclusion of female family members from the right of succession. Ironically, however, this
judgement made the authorities and the general public aware of the historical origin of these communities, especially the fact of their conversion from Hinduism. Indeed, as a result, the Khojas and the Cutchi Memon were forced to endure rather humiliating descriptions in the preamble of the above case, such as “the caste never seems to have emerged from obscurity,” and “Although they call themselves Mussalmans, they evidently know but little of their Prophet and of Koran.” Such phrases were surely cited repeatedly as precedent in succeeding cases.

In the actual historical process, these merchant communities produced more and more successful entrepreneurs, who rapidly increased their social influence as leaders of the Muslim community in general, especially in urban areas. It was natural that some groups from within the community came forward asking for an amendment to the jurisdiction to the effect that the communities as a whole be governed according to Islamic principle.

This social background made them ready to undertake any commitment which would benefit the Muslim community in general, and which would help them to be socially recognized as bona fide Muslims. The Ottoman Empire relief movement and aid to Muslims abroad were surely such commitments. Moreover, the Anjuman-i Islam, Bombay (Anjuman-i Islâm, Bambâ’î), established in 1876 for social and educational advancement, can be considered another example of this, and in fact it was a typical example of one of the earliest manifestations of the new leadership, which espoused Islam as the principle of social gathering.

2. Commitment to the Ottoman Empire Relief Movement

2.1 The Russo-Turkish War

The Ottoman Empire relief movement took an organized form for the first time in the late 1870s as a response to the revolt in Servia and the subsequent Russo-Turkish War. From the very beginning, the movement was accompanied by a heavy presence of Muslim merchants, including some of Arab and Persian origin. On the outbreak of revolt in Servia a large gathering of about 700 participants was held at the Calcutta Town Hall on 7th October, 1876. Resolutions passed there asked the British to maintain its stance in favor of the Ottoman Empire, and the public was called on to contribute to a subscription in aid of the Otto-
man Empire. While the meeting was chaired by Moulvi Abdul Latif (1828–1893), the notice announcing the gathering was signed by several Muslim merchants, making up a total of one third of the signatures. In addition, the central committee for the subscription it resolved to establish enlisted many Muslim merchants, some of whom can be clearly regarded as being engaged in ocean trade, having the title “nakhoda” attached to their names. Moreover, some “Arab ship-owners and Persian merchants” participated. 34)

Another group in Calcutta also held similar meetings under the guidance of Amir Ali (1849–1928) from around late 1876. The British police reported that this group was more active in the relief movement and also more suspicious about the intentions of the British. Here, however, it is more important to note that this group was also “supported by the Arab merchants and ship owners.” In addition, Indian Muslim merchants, including a Memon nakhoda Hajji Nur Muhammad, remained vitally important as organizers of the relief movement. 35)

In Bombay, on the other hand, Anjuman-i Islam, Bombay, mentioned above as a manifestation of a new leadership on the part of Muslim merchants, took a leading role. The group succeeded in organizing meetings and raising funds, and the Ottoman Government conferred orders on some of the central figures. 36)

Meetings and fund-raising on behalf of the Ottoman Empire occurred not only in these two cities but in many other towns in India. A register called Defter-i I'ane-i Hindîyye (Register of the Help by Indians) is one of the best sources for understanding the scale of the various relief funds, and also for estimating how the merchant communities from the western part of India contributed to such subscription movements. Compiled by the Ottoman Government, it recorded the names of contributors and the amount paid out by each. It seems to have been published in early 1879, with the intention of inspiring further contributions. Even keeping in mind such propaganda purposes, it is still a useful reference for the present discussion. 37)

As a tentative evaluation of this document, we can point out several characteristics about the contributions: the overwhelmingly high amount of funds raised from princely states like Rampur and Bhopal, both of which were governed by Muslim rulers; substantial contributions by some zamindars, government officials, and religious institutions and their
leaders; the activities of a certain kind of Muslim association as local mediators or fund collectors, often called *Anjuman-i İslâm* (Islamic Society), or *Muslim Komîtî* (Muslim Committee); and, lastly, the contributions of Muslim merchant communities originating from Western India. Further mention should be made of this last point. In Table 2, I have extracted those remittances which can be clearly identified as those received from those merchant communities. Here we can distinguish such communities as the Bohras and the Memons, some persons of which have the title *nâkhudā* attached to their names. There are also some cases where particular *moğallahs* (residential quarters within a city), unmistak-

*Table 2* Remittances for the Ottoman Empire according to the *Defter-i İâne-i Hindîyye*: With Special Reference to the Major Contributions of the Muslim Merchants from Western India, and of Princely States.38

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remittances and its amount</th>
<th>Muslim Merchants</th>
<th>Princely States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Rs17,900</td>
<td>Mohâllah Bankâlî Bôrah: 300~400 RS from about 50 persons. Mohâllah Chhatrî Sârang (Bombay): about 90 persons. Most of them are recognizable as Muslims belonging to merchant communities, and they include two persons mentioned as the mutawalli of a particular Mohallah where Memons resided, and five persons. “Residents of Bombay:” four persons, including one person offering Rs500. Arabs: four persons</td>
<td>Rampur: Rs50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Rs14,900</td>
<td>Bombay: 15 persons, including some Muslims recognizable as merchant community members.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Rs74,900</td>
<td>Mohâllah Nâkhudâ (Bombay): Rs400 collected from 30 persons.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Rs67,100</td>
<td>Randir (Surat): includes Rs4,500 offered by the two Bohras, one of whom is mentioned as nâkhudâ.</td>
<td>Rampur: Rs20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances and its amount</td>
<td>Muslim Merchants</td>
<td>Princely States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth Rs62,400</td>
<td>Qasbah Islâmābād (Bombay?) Rs600 from about 30 persons, three of whom are mentioned as Memons.</td>
<td>Nawab Ahsanullah of Dacca: Rs20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth Rs92,800</td>
<td>Anjuman-i Islām Gujarātīwālā (Gujarat): Rs1,000 Moḩallah (Kosā?) (Bombay): Rs1,000</td>
<td>Rampur: Rs53,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Rs52,900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth Rs52,100</td>
<td>Bombay: About Rs40,000 from more than 100 contributors, most of whom are from the merchant community. They include many persons offering Rs500 and about 15 persons offering Rs1,000.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninth Rs53,000</td>
<td>Moḩallah Kōlsā (Bombay): Rs1,000 Moḩallah Nal Bazār (Bombay): Rs50 from 8 persons.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth Rs212,50</td>
<td>Anjuman-i Tā’īd Turkī (Bombay?): Rs6,000 collected from 100 persons, belonging to merchant. Jamā’at-i Musalmān Anjā(?) (Sind?): Rs10,000 collected from 40 merchants, including some offering. Bombay: Rs1,000 collected from two merchants. Bombay: Rs1,500 collected from one merchant. Anjuman-i Islām (Bombay): Rs4,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleventh Rs205,200</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bhopal: Rs205,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twelfth Rs124,700</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bhopal: Rs100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thirteen Rs20,200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourteen Rs17,100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Rs1,069,478</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ably connected with shipping or merchant communities like Mohallah Bankāli Bōrāh, Mohallah Chhatri Sārang and Mohallah Nākhudā joined in the fund-raising.\textsuperscript{39} The contributions from these merchants might look small compared with those collected from the princely states, but they were distinguished as the contribution of a single social group or class.

2.2 From the 1910s to the Khilafat Movement

Even after the 1880s concern about the fate of the Ottoman Empire continued, but the next major upsurge in the relief movement was seen in the early 1910s at the time of Italo-Turkish and Balkan Wars. I previously concentrated my studies on this period, examining the organizers of the relief movement and the process leading to the rise of all-India level leadership. Here, I would like to repeat that the Indian Red Crescent Society at Calcutta, the first organization to try to organize the movement at an all-India level, included Muslim merchants and Persian immigrants as important members.\textsuperscript{40} In Bombay city also, the Anjuman-i Islam, whose background was already mentioned, again appeared as the main organizer of several meetings.\textsuperscript{41}

During the time of the Italo-Turkish and Balkan Wars, the relief movement as a whole was gradually brought under ideological leadership at an all-India level by Muhammad Ali (1878–1931).\textsuperscript{42} As a result, the presence of merchants in the relief movement, which thereafter culminated into the Khilafat Movement (1919–1924), appears to be comparatively weaker than before. Even at this phase, though, merchants retained their importance as they sent many members to meetings and organizing committees of the movement. Hajji Jan Muhammad Chotani, whose family background has been discussed above, was one such merchant. He was a central figure in the Bombay Khilafat Committee, which was formed in March 1919 as the first organization devoted to the khilafat issue and was soon joined by the Ali brothers (Muhammad Ali and his elder brother Shaukat Ali) and Abdul Bari. Some months later he also became the President of the All-India Khilafat Committee, which organized All-India Khilafat Day in the form of local meetings and hartal. Indeed, besides acting as such organizer, he played an especially important role as a financial supporter by furnishing vast amounts of money to the movement.\textsuperscript{43}
3. Relief Movement in the Form of Economic Cooperation

In this section I will present some instances where the Ottoman Empire relief movement took the form of attempts at economic cooperation between India and the Ottoman Empire, and analyze their background. I have already pointed out that since the nineteenth century Muslim merchants from Western India found themselves in an ambiguous position toward the colonial economy and British hegemony, and I have also suggested that they shared some socio-economic base with Arab and other foreign merchants in the region surrounding the Indian Ocean and in the Middle East. Indeed, these merchants joined, and contributed to, the relief movement and the Muslim cooperation movement not just because they supported the ideological orientation of its political leaders, including Muhammad Ali, but also because they saw the Ottoman Empire's existence and its socio-political power as an indispensable, or at least a preferable, condition for their socio-economic survival. Therefore, some of the economic projects and plans which I mention below can be thought of as the manifestation of such strategic intentions, though there is no evidence that any of them were successfully put into action with ample practical benefits or effect.

3.1 Invitation of İdâre-i Mahsûsâ's Ships

I take in the first instance, the attempt to gain a monopoly on the pilgrimage business by Muslim companies and capitalists. This attempt provides concrete evidence that Muslim merchants resorted to the ideology of Muslim cooperation for economic concerns. As I have mentioned above, the interests in transporting pilgrims between India and Hedjaz was one of the arenas where Muslim merchant capital and European capital competed fiercely with each other. It is due to this competition that a merchant named Abdullah Arab Memon, then an Ottoman subject residing in Hedjaz, devised a plan to transport pilgrims on Ottoman steamships. His plan received strong impetus when it was sanctioned by Sultan Abdul Hamid in 1888. Soon after, Abdullah himself was appointed an agent for İdâre-i Mahsûsâ (The Special Branch), the Turkish Imperial Shipping Line of Steamers directly managed by the Sultan, and was sent to India to look into the situation. In India he met merchants in several cities including Bombay, Karachi and Calcutta, and in
each city he appointed an agent for the İdâre-i Mahsûsa. During this coordination process the plan seems to have been slightly modified to establish a somewhat regular line of steamers, and to include normal cargo as well as pilgrims in the load. It was, however, not until 1894 that the plan was put into action. İdâre-i Mahsûsa did send its steamers including Abdul Qadir to India, but it seems to have faced difficulties in the new area. For example, much money had to be spent to reform equipment to suit British shipping regulations, and to make matters worse, there was a hiatus in the transport of pilgrims for nearly three years from 1897 because of plague.\(^{44}\)

It is certain that if the Sultan himself had not come forward to use his personal influence, this plan could not have been put into action. As a result, the whole story was undeniably determined by the emotionalism to satisfy his personal vanity and 'pan-Islamic' ambition. The concept, however, unmistakably originated from the plans of an Indian merchant and in some way reflected the socio-economic strategy of such merchants like him, who had been integrated into the network of the India-Arab economy managed by merchants of Indian, Arab, Turkish and Persian origin. Indeed, it is very likely that Abdullah, being already accepted into the network as a resident of Hedjaz, tried to make full use of it. Most of the merchants he met or appointed as agents of the new steamship line can be identified as those who had been engaged in the Indian Ocean trade, and moreover, some are even mentioned as Memon and Bohra.\(^{45}\) Of course, it is another matter how this scheme evolved to meet their personal expectation in terms of practical economic dealings, but it can be safely said that those merchants who supported the plan were at least anticipating some benefit for themselves in participating in the plan, even though they knew that it might have been partly a manifestation of the Sultan's personal ambition.

3.2 A Set of Plans for Economic Cooperation between India and Turkey

It seems that an idea to promote some kind of Muslim economic cooperation under the umbrella of the Ottoman Empire was in the air at this time as a method of survival and competition. An example can be seen in a proposal of some concrete measures which the Young Moslem Association of Bengal requested the Ottoman Government to consider
in 1911. The proposals were as follows:
  Indian Muslim children were to be boarded and educated for free at
  schools in Istanbul.
  Turkish wares were to be made known, and placed on, the Indian
  market.
  An Ottoman Commercial House was to be established in India.
  A special Ottoman official would be sent to India to manage the funds
  for the Hedjaz Railway.
In addition to these proposals the Association also asked the Govern-
ment to supply a list of addresses of Muslim merchants and a newspaper
published by Muslims. In response to this, the Ottoman Government
seems to have begun asking the concerned authorities to prepare the
schemes.46) As far as my present research goes, however, nothing is known
about any action taken to realize these proposals, nor is there any more
information regarding the Association. Still, judging from its particular
concern with the prospect of economic cooperation between Indian Mus-
lims and the Ottoman Empire there is reason to believe that these pro-
posals came from merchants in Bengal, probably Calcutta.

3.3 Against the Red Sea Blockade

As I mentioned above, Muslim merchants played an important role in
organizing the Ottoman Empire relief movement at the time of the Italo-
Turkish War (1911–12). The War may seem to have been too distant to
materially concern India. In reality it obstructed the commercial activi-
ties of Indian Muslim merchants considerably, because during the War
Italy advanced as far as the Red Sea and the Yemen Coast, and tempo-
rarily blockaded sea traffic. Therefore, the relief movement, though it
appears to have been motivated mainly by sympathy for the coreligionist
Ottoman Empire, was also necessitated by practical economic concern.
Indeed in January 1912 when the Italian navy reached as far as the
Yemen Coast, Indian merchants based in Aden lost the means to contin-
ue their commercial activities. For example, they lost the means to pro-
tect their vested interests in Hodeidah (a coastal port city on the Red
Sea), and there was even a case where vessels managed by Indian mer-
chants were seized by Italy. Thus, on 29th January, the merchants con-
cerned petitioned the British Resident in Aden to use his political in-
fluence to solve the situation.47)
A representation sent by the All India Muslim League to the Government of India dated 15 February 1912 was exceptionally honest in expressing this economic concern, and it most probably reflected the merchants' power behind the League. It read, “Indian traders of Bombay and Aden, not only Mussalmans, but also Hindus and Parsees too, maintain a brisk traffic with Jeddah and Yemen ports... and the number of countrymen who have settled in those places is not small.” Indeed, as the representation itself clearly stated, “Muslim apprehensions regarding the blockade are not merely sentimental, but substantial as well.”

3.4 Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka'aba

In early 1913, in the midst of the Balkan War, a society called Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka'aba (Society of the Servants of the Ka'aba) was formed, with its headquarters in Delhi. Its original idea came from Abdul Bari, a ulama/sufi of Farangi Mahallī Seminary, but it was managed in practice by the Ali brothers and their party. The Society soon became an important organization in mobilizing ordinary Muslims toward the current religio-political cause. Its chief aim was declared as the protection of the holy places of Islam, Mecca and its Ka'aba, from the aggression of non-Muslim powers, and it envisaged sending money raised from membership dues to the Ottoman Empire. The concrete schemes it proposed for the cause, however, were more economic than religious. They included purchasing ships to use for the pilgrimage to Jiddah, and, in fact, the Society’s activities were concentrated on the business of pilgrimage traffic. This commitment to the shipping business can be explained partly by the practical necessity to attract general public support and attention for the mobilization purpose. The proposed measures, if they worked well, would be beneficial to them. There is, however, every reason to believe that this involvement with the pilgrimage traffic was also a direct outcome of the relationships which the Society’s organizers kept with the Muslim merchant community in Bombay.

As I have mentioned above, indigenous merchant capital held a substantial share of the pilgrimage traffic business until the beginning of the twentieth century. Around the end of 1912 and the beginning of 1913, though, the dominant Muslim company, the Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Co. fell into the agency of a European company, Messrs. Turner, Morrison & Co., though the former survived as a shipping
company. The authorities seized this opportunity to try to solve the problem of the many pauper pilgrims who were annually stranded in Hedjaz unable to afford the return ticket to India. They quickly published a proposal to make the advanced purchase of return tickets obligatory for all, and to lay the total pilgrimage traffic business under the monopoly of Messrs. Turner, Morrison & Co.\textsuperscript{50} Muhammad Ali was firmly against this system, and asserted this in his Comrade:\textsuperscript{51}

\ldots the pilgrim’s advantage lies in competition among the shipping companies. It has happened that through open competition the pilgrims have secured passages for Rs. 15 or Rs. 20 to Jeddah. But if it was considered desirable to give a monopoly of the traffic, then the best course would have been to invite tenders from all shipping firms and to give the monopoly to the one that offered the lowest rates.

As a whole, he asserted that the scheme proposed by the Government would increase the hardships on the part of the poorer pilgrims, and his concern about the improvement of pilgrimage traffic was genuine, but at the same time he was thus speaking on behalf of the shipping companies and the merchants directly concerned with the pilgrimage business. The Anjuman’s involvement in the pilgrimage transport should be contextualized in this connection. Muslim political leaders such as Muhammad Ali and the merchant community approached each other for their mutual benefit: the former aiming at mass religio-political mobilization, and the latter protecting their vested economic interests.

3.5 \textbf{On the Table in Istanbul}

This kind of relationship between political leaders and merchants developed in a totally different quarter, on a table for discussion in Turkey. The story seems to have started abruptly, when Zafar Ali Khan, who was the editor of the journal \textit{Zamindar} (Lahore), and at that time was staying in Turkey, proposed the establishment of a Muslim Bank to the Committee of Union and Progress (C. U. P.) in early 1913. The proposal seems to have quickly attracted the attention of the C. U. P., and in April a meeting was arranged. Dr. M. A. Ansari, who had come to Turkey as the leader of the All-India Medical Mission which Muhammad Ali dispatched for the relief of wounded soldiers, was also called back from the battle field. The meeting turned out to be the first venue of the
preparatory committee for the establishment of the Muslim Bank, now called the Islamic Bank to Encourage Industry and Commerce. The committee, which included Dr. Ansari and Zafar Ali Khan, decided to found an amalgamated body of company-cum-bank under the sanction of the Government. It was decided to finance the project by selling shares in various Muslim countries. This body, which seems to have been renamed Moslem Bank and Co-operative Society, soon took on a more realistic color when it received an offer of Rs25,000 from the National Defense Association for the initial undertaking.\textsuperscript{52) Turkish Treasury Bonds, which were out on sale, might have been converted to the use of the new scheme. It is unlikely, however, that this body operated in the practical way as was planned, because after just one year the Ottoman Empire rushed into War.

Setting aside such problems of the actual success of the plan, it is interesting in terms of cooperation between Muslim merchants and political leaders. It may be that Zafar Ali Khan had been able to get in touch with some Indian merchants before going to Turkey. Furthermore, it appears that the C. U. P. and even the merchants near the Turkish authorities were prepared to put such a scheme into action at least in the initial stage, because the preparatory committee succeeded in lining up notable C. U. P. members like Sheikh Abdul Aziz Shawish (Jawish) and several Muslim merchants.\textsuperscript{53)}

4. Concluding Remarks: Consequences of Involvement

The Ottoman Empire relief movement was almost always accompanied by the presence of Muslim merchant communities, especially those originally from Western India. Summing up, this can be explained by three factors: their socio-economic strategy, their tendency toward “Islamization,” and their sense of crisis about the fate of the Ottoman Empire as a glorious “Muslim power,” including the effect of ideological mobilization by the political leaders to inspire such a feeling. As my research shows, the first factor can be thought of as the most powerful as far as the motivation which led these merchants to involve themselves in specific relief schemes for the Ottoman Empire is concerned. They opted for Muslim cooperation, particularly under the Ottoman Empire, as a means of protecting their vested interests. They found the presence, and the survival, of the Ottoman Empire preferable, or even possibly indis-
pensable for the future success of their economic activities. The second factor was shared by Muslim merchant communities in a more general way, and because of this both the relief funds and the protest meetings were widely supported by their members. The third factor was shared by almost every Muslim in India who joined the relief movement. But the latter two factors do not well explain the conspicuously concrete way of their involvement into the relief schemes and the Muslim cooperation movement.

This essay cannot prove the relief measures and the Muslim cooperation schemes so successful or long-lasting. This can be attributed mainly to the weakness of economic practicality which haunted those measures and schemes. Indeed the measures devised to overcome political and economic subjugation and recession would, by their very nature, have simply run against the rules of the economy unless properly accompanied by immense practical innovation. Of course, more research is needed to make such a judgement of their character; however, the strategic tool of "Muslim cooperation" under the umbrella of the Ottoman Empire does not appear to have been given enough innovative effort to achieve such economic practicality. In fact, the schemes needed more subtle and painstaking effort. Moreover, it is difficult to deny that those schemes tended to be unilateral with the main focus on the Ottoman Empire, and were sometimes inclined to rely excessively on the honor of the Sultan or the Ottoman Government.

Another problem with the "Muslim cooperation" schemes was that they did not always run according to social reality. A notable weakness in its strategy was probably the eventual alienation of non-Muslim people from it. In reality the vast majority of India's population was non-Muslim, and as is well-known, non-Muslim merchants and bankers, such as the Parsis and the Bhatias, had already been integrated into the network of Indian Ocean trade. No effort seems to have been made to integrate these important elements effectively into their strategy, though they certainly had no intention of alienating such Indian compatriots from their sphere.

Here, however, we may have to cease making judgement based on only the historical outcome. It should be remembered that in reality, the hegemonic machinery was too overwhelming to resist. In pointing out above what could be called the shortcomings of the schemes, I do not
mean that the schemes fell short of economic practicality or innovative effort by themselves. It was again the colonial authorities and European capital which took advantage of their competitors’ comparative weaknesses in technology and economic efficiency, and nipped them in the bud at the initial stage of their development. An example of such an Imperialist mechanism is the case of Īdār-e-i Mahsūsa’s ships. As soon as the imminent introduction of Īdār-e-i Mahsūsa’s ships to India was reported, the British authorities expressed their apprehension about the possible loss to British steamers and the crisis in the British control system over pilgrimage ships. Subsequently, the British seem to have resorted to strict enforcement of their shipping rules regarding the newcomer’s ships, and discouraged their movement. They triumphantly boasted that, “The Turkish steamer “Abdul Kadar” made but one trip, and to enable her to carry a fairly large number of pilgrims under the Indian Rules, she had to expend a considerable amount in making alterations and repairs on board.” As I mentioned above, under British rule the combination of European shipping companies was virtually allowed and some companies were even subsidized. No movement for “Muslim cooperation” under the same system was ever encouraged but rather discouraged.

In the end, World War I brought about circumstances where such problems of weak strategy or economic practicality mattered far less, because after the War the Ottoman Empire collapsed and most of the coastal area of the Arabian Peninsular came under the rule of either the British or the newly independent Arab powers which had revolted against the Ottoman Empire during the War. Due to such circumstances, merchant communities lost much the ground regarding Muslim cooperation. The top leadership of the relief movement, however, was by that time in the hands of Muslim political leaders like Muhammad Ali and Azad, and also M. K. Gandhi, and it eventually took the form of a mass movement. The orientation of the movement, therefore, was gradually moving away from the merchants. The problem remains as to how their opinions were reflected or neglected during the time of the Khilafat Movement, but I must leave that for future discussion.

Notes
1) It is not necessary here to describe either the Khilafat Movement or its preceding

2) Takashi Oishi, “An Enquiry into the Structure of Pan-Islamism in India: the Italo-Turkish and Balkan Wars, 1911–13,” *Journal of the Japanese Society for South Asian Studies*, No. 8, Oct. 1996. I would here like to supplement chapter 2 of this article. My expression there might have given the impression that such associations were the only, or exclusive, subscribers and organizers of meetings. In fact, if we count the contributions by each individual remittance by remittance, by far the most were from individuals. This was in large part because journals owned by Muslim journalist/political leaders, like the Comrade of Muhammad Ali, published the names of individual contributors however small the amount, and in so doing promoted voluntary contributions from individuals. If we look at the movement, however, at the level of local society or city, associations called Anjuman-i Islam or the like quite often played an important role as organizers. In this sense, the table given on page 63 was entitled “Organizers of the subscription meetings and funds . . .”.


4) Ashin Das Gupta, *op. cit.*, esp. 12–13 and chap. 2.

5) For a more detailed description of the decline of indigenous commercial activity based in Surat city and the new dominance of the British, see Ashin Das Gupta, *op. cit.*.


8) For each religious doctrine and its historical origin, see Aziz Ahmad, *An Intellectual


10) Ashin Das Gupta, op. cit. esp. pp. 16–17, 83–84; Lakshmi Subramanian, Indigenous Capital and Imperial Expansion: Bombay, Surat and the West Coast, Oxford, 1996, esp. pp. 31–34. Of course, in reality, there was not clear distinction by religious communities. This does not say that some ship-owner were also non-Muslims.

11) Ashin Das Gupta, op. cit., esp. p. 13. Various problems associated with the indigenous dhow and the trade on it have been closely studied by Hikoichi Yajima. See his The Arab Dhow Trade in the Indian Ocean, Tokyo, 1976; Hikoichi Yajima & Koji Kamioka, The Inter-Regional Trade in the Western Part of the Indian Ocean, Tokyo, 1979.


13) D. R. Bhandarkar, “Shipping in Bombay in 1795–6,” in Indian Historical Records Commission, Proceedings of 13th Meeting held at Patna, Calcutta, 1932. This list is based on a report by the Superintendent of Marine, Bombay, and was sent up to Fort William, Calcutta.

14) There are difficulties with distinguishing the origins of the English ships, so the result of the calculations must be treated as tentative.

15) Thanks to the monumental work of the late Professor Ashin Das Gupta, some valuable information about this family is available to us. See Ashin Das Gupta, op. cit., pp. 76–77.

16) The tables are based mainly on the combined use of the series of Statistical Abstract of British India starting from the title for the year 1840–1865 and Statement of the Trade of British India from the title 1870/71–74/75.

17) As far as I know, no quantitative analysis has been systematically made on the state of shipping during British period in India, except for a study on coastal (within British India), not foreign, trade by Andrew Pope. In a compact, but solid, essay which covers the period from the eighteenth century to the end of the Raj, Frank Broeze compares the state of shipping in 1857 with that in 1898–99, but stops his analysis there. See Andrew Pope, “British Steamshipping and the Indian Coastal Trade, 1870–1915,” in IESHR, Vol. 32, no. 1, 1995; Frank Broeze, “Underdevelopment and Dependency: Maritime India during the Raj,” in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 18, no. 3, 1984, p. 442. This present state of research might be because the data available from the statistics are not considered very accurate or consistent. Indeed, I myself find some problems with the statistics, but still, for a quantitative understanding the data can be used effectively, especially if we are well aware of the existing problems. Of course, another opportunity is needed to discuss closely the nature of the statistics themselves, but here as a preliminary and tentative introduction I confine myself to mentioning the two major problems. The first originates from the categorization of ships. Indeed, the number of native craft can be traced from 1841, the first year of the tables, but I have deliberately omitted them until
1865 (from 1866–67 and 1874–75 the data is still unavailable) because I found the gap between the number until 1865 and that after 1876 unacceptable, the former tracing a line as high as 20,000 and the latter 1,000 to 2,000. It seems that the authorities began to collect data on native craft in a somewhat systematic manner only after 1876, distributing a notice to that effect (see Department of Statistics, Government of India, The Registration and Publication of Statistics relating to the Sea-borne Trade and Navigation of British India, Calcutta, 1916, p. 127). Later in 1906 another change occurred with the reassigning of “small country craft” near Ceylon from the category of normal “British Indian (non-“native crafts”)” to that of “native crafts” (see ibid., p. 126). The effect of this is easy to see in Table 1 in the decrease of “British Indian,” “Arab” and “Turkish” non-“native craft” ships in 1906–07, and the corresponding increase of “native craft.” The second concerns the systematization of the registration of the ships’ arrivals. As a matter of fact, until as late as 1881–82 there was undoubtedly some confusion about the classification of foreign shipping and coastal shipping, and as the Government confessed, about the existing system, “the returns of foreign shipping were unduly swelled, and those of coastal vessels reduced.” So, the slight decrease of British and British Indian ships from 1881–82 to 1882–83 in Table 1 must be treated as the effect of such organization in the classification (see ibid., pp. 122–25). Needless to say, a careful study of these changes is indispensable when looking at the tables. As a whole, however, as we notice by the scale of the gap at each of the three points, the rough image drawn from the tables is valid.

19) There is no room to move further into more concrete matters concerning this machinery of Imperialism. However the later unofficial offensive was specially emphasized by F. Broeze. See, F. Broeze, op.cit., pp. 443–45, also T. S. Sanjeeva Rao, A Short History of Modern Indian Shipping, Bombay, 1965, esp. pp. 56–58. Official intervention, such as maritime law, has not been studied systematically, but later in this essay I will touch on the effect of the legislation on pilgrim ships.
21) Calculated from the data in Census of India, 1901, Vol. XIA, Bombay (Town and Island), Part VI.
24) Bala Pillay, British Indians in the Transvaal: Trade, Politics and Imperial Relations,

26) See, for example, Figure 1 of this essay about changes in numbers of Arab and Turkish ships. In the early nineteenth century, the effect of the Arab shipping revival was felt by an increase of Arab ships in India. Subramanian, *op. cit.*, p. 271–286.

27) My research on the business of transporting pilgrims is not yet completed, but the tentative result was presented at a research meeting at Tokyo University on 20th February 1999, organized by the Islamic Area Studies Project. Information about this topic, unless specially noted, is based on various government reports housed in the National Archives of India, New Delhi, and the Public Record Office, London.


29) A memorandum dated 15 May 1889, attached to a letter from Abdul Razzak, Vice-Consul, Jeddah to C. G. Wood, Consul, Jeddah, in Foreign Dept., External-A, Nov. 1889, 163–189, National Archives of India (hereafter, to be abbreviated as N. A. I.).

30) *Census of the City of Bombay, taken 21st February 1872*, pp. 24–25, for a mention of Khojas and Memons as later converts from Hindus.


35) Confidential letter from H. Reynolds, Sec. to Govt. of Bengal, dated 27th May 1877; same to A. P. Howell, dated 31st May 1877; same to H. Boileau, dated 10th June 1877, in N. A. I., Home Dept., Public-B, Feb. 1878, 215–252. Dipesh Chakrabarty has already brought to our notice that a cluster of nakhoda merchants in Calcutta was playing an important role in this connection, though the treatment of this point was not central in his study of Calcutta’s mill-hands and surrounding social problems. See his “Communal Riots and Labour: Bengal’s Jute Mill-hands in

36) Confidential Memo. by Colonel P. D. Henderson, in N. A. I., Foreign, Sec., Nov. 1881, 81–95.

37) This register is recorded in the Ottoman language, written in Arabic script. The amount must have been registered at the Ottoman Consul in Bombay, for it is in Indian Rupees. Some mention was made about this register for the first time in a recent work by a Turkish scholar, which did not, however, pay any attention to the special importance of the contribution of the Muslim merchants. See, Azmi Özcan, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 68–70. In so far as his work and my own research go, it is difficult to specify its exact publication date. It can, however, be considered to have been compiled around 1879, judging from the surrounding situation. Another problem with this register is the scale of the contributions noted here, i.e. the problem of how substantial or trivial the amount was for India and for the Ottoman Empire. It is, of course, not easy to make a definite judgment, and it is all the more so if we consider the uncertainty about the year of recording. Still, hereafter, I will try a tentative calculation. First I look at the problem from the side of the Ottoman Empire. The total amount registered in the *Defter* (Rs1,069,478) can be converted to 89,123 British pounds by using the 1878–79 exchange rate. The pound amount can then be converted into about 98,035 Turkish lira. For these calculations, I consulted Report of the Trade in British India for the Official Year 1879–80, London, 1881, p. VI; Sevket Pamuk, “Money in Ottoman Empire 1326–1914,” in Halil Inalcik & Donald Quataert (ed.), *History of the Ottoman Empire 1300–1914*, Cambridge, 1994, esp. p. 972. This amount was, if compared with the annual state revenue of the Empire, undeniably trivial, being around 0.5%. It covers, however, a substantial part of particular kinds of budgets relating to the war situation. For instance, it would equal about 2–3% of the army’s budget (which was nearly 40% of the total revenue), or would reach almost to around 5 to 10% of the “special annual extraordinary budget”. Calculation above is based on the revenue amounts available in Stanford J. Shaw & Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol. 2, Cambridge, 1977, pp. 225–226. The last mentioned budget was reserved for special use including purchasing new battleships and rifles, management of refugees, and financing the Red Crescent Society’s relief work. In fact this budget was under the direct management of Sultan Abdul Hamid, who was believed to have also been financing some special work, notably certain pan-Islamic projects such as sending out secret missions. See Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 55–56. Thus we have good reason to believe that in this case also, the subscription from India must have been registered in this special budget. And as the result of above calculation shows it should have greatly contributed to the budget. Secondly, the amount of contributions should be considered in the Indian context. In conclusion it was rather large, though its comparative scale depends on what one compares it with. Here I compare it with the fund and budget for the Aligarh College, since it was also a collective monetary management and it was raised almost in the same period. The Aligarh College started in 1877 (as a proper college) had an annual budget of approximately Rs.50,000. Even the original fund they collected by 1876 for the foundation of College was just around Rs250,000, which equals just one fourth of the contributions for the Ottoman Empire. Here I
consulted David Lelyveld, *Alicgarh’s First Generation*, Princeton, 1978, pp. 139–. The comparison can be made in a different context, like with the price of daily commodities or merchandise. We could cite some comparisons using such data as *Index Number of Indian Prices, 1861–1931*, but I here omit it due to space restraints. Anyway, we can also reach the conclusion that the collective fund-raising for the Ottoman Empire relief movement was really conspicuous. Therefore, in total, the evaluation of the scale of Indian Muslims’ contribution suggests the practical benefit of the relief movement on the part of Ottoman Empire and the inextricable involvement on the part of Muslims in India. Thus the Empire should have had sufficient reason to encourage the relief movement. On the other hand, Muslims in India, especially those in the merchant communities, should have had practical and strategic concerns regarding the relief movement. In the end, however, I would like to make some reservation about the validity of an evaluation based on the scale of contribution. As I describe in this article, the contribution was not solely caused by a strategic motivation among merchants. Other motivations included, for example, the “Islamization” tendency, which was essentially outside economic calculations. This was true also of the Ottoman Empire. The Empire, though certainly motivated by the financial gain from Indian Muslims, committed itself to the “Muslim cooperation” schemes also from other motivations, which included pan-Islamic romanticism and the Sultan’s personal ambition.

38) For the sources and the problems around it, see 37). Every amount, except the total one, has been rounded to the nearest Rs100. In the column of “Princely States”, I deliberately included Nawab Ahsanullah of Dacca, who cannot be categorized as the ruler of Princely States, since the amount is exceptionally big.

39) As well as näkhoda, sārang was also used for a ship captain. D. R. Bhandarkar, op.cit., p. 77.


45) Confidential letter from Colonel F. J. Wise, cited above.


47) A petition from merchants in Aden to the Secretary to Chamber of Commerce, Aden, dated 29th January 1912; Alfred E. Adams, Honorary Secretary, Chamber of Commerce to James A. Bell, Political Resident, Aden, dated 29th January 1912, both in N. A. I., Foreign, Sec-E, April 1912, 522–576.

48) Muhammad Aziz Mirza, Honorary Secretary to All India Muslim League to Government of India dated 15 February 1912 at Lucknow, in N. A. I., Foreign, Sec-E, April 1912, 522–576.


50) Comrade, ‘The Haj Question’ in the issues of May 31, June 7, 1913; June 14.


52) ‘The All-India Medical Mission,’ in Comrade, 17 May 1913; same, 31 May 1913.


56) Their rise to leadership was a gradual process after the early 1910s. See Oishi, op.cit., chap. 3.