2013 Volume 78 Issue 1 Pages 81-98
On March 11, 2011, the four units of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (NPS) of Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) were severely damaged by the Great East Japan Earthquake and the subsequent tsunami. All the generators failed, cutting power to the critical pumps that must continuously circulate coolant water through the nuclear reactors, resulting in a meltdown. The diffusion of radioactive materials following the meltdown led to widespread contamination of the air, soil, freshwater, and seawater. After the accident, people became strongly aware of the risks of radiation exposure and the dangers of consuming irradiated products. The nature of radiation, which is silent, invisible, and untouchable, prevents people's clear understanding of its reality, resulting in divided opinions and attitudes toward their lives. TEPCO and the Japanese government, being responsible for the accident, lost public confidence by disclosing incorrect scientific information. Even among scientists, there is no consensus concerning the health risks and permissible doses of radiation. Therefore, serious differences in ways of thinking arose, even among family members, about self-motivated evacuation and the choice of "safe" products. Reality is always in danger of being disrupted by the world whenever actual events diverge too much from established categories, along with the institutions themselves. In the nuclear accident of March 2011, people speaking on behalf of the state and science failed to perform their expected roles of convincing the population. Institutions vanished as illusions. The conventions holding people together around a sense of reality broke down, leading people to start combining the fragments of knowledge they had at hand in order to live in an uncertain world. My field research began in a community farm located in Saitama Prefecture, about 200km from the Fukushima Daiichi NPS. At the farm, able-bodied persons work together with those with disabilities. After the accident, the farmers worked under the shadow of radioactivity. They had no way of knowing whether the vegetables they were growing would be safe for consumption, nor did they know how to deal with the contamination. At that point, one of the volunteers, Hideki Ishii, began investigating the situation. Ishii, a researcher who majored in geology during his undergraduate years, knew something about radioactivity. After studying geology, he also majored in landscape architecture and researched the therapeutic value of green spaces using the farm as his research field. On March 20, 2011, a meeting was held in the farm's office, at which Ishii described about radioactivity and gave a simple explanation about how the risk of radiation exposure could be reduced. At the meeting, his scientific explanation showed the farmers how to cope with the radiation, which had been previously perceived as "uncontrollable" pollution. From late April to early May in 2011, some researchers reported that there were hot spots around Tokyo where radiation levels were slightly high. Ishii then measured radiation levels around the farm using a Geiger counter. On the basis of the collected data, he made assumptions concerning the mechanism of pollution. Ishii then made a presentation based on those results at a monthly meeting of the farmers. Some of them refused his explanation for emotional reasons because of their growing sense of distrust toward scientific explanations after the Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident. That provoked dissension among the farmers regarding how to deal with uncertainty in the face of a nuclear hazard. After reviewing the literature about soil science published following the Chernobyl disaster, Ishii has been developing his own ideas with the cooperation of other researchers in Tokyo and farmers in Fukushima. During the fall and winter of 2011, Ishii and his research group
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