In this lecture, I will limit myself to several trends in social psychology in the United States. In part, these are recent developments within the field, but in other instances, these are trends that I believe are just now getting under way. So some of my remarks are predictions about future trends rather than simply summaries of recent trends.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS

I would not be acting in keeping with my role as a social scientist if I did not comment on how certain social and economic trends have affected our field. As you probably know, the job market for new Ph.D's in social psychology has changed drastically in the last half dozen years. Because of the great increase in Ph.D granting departments a decade ago and because of a recent leveling off in the rate of growth of universities, many fewer new Ph.D's are able to find university positions. (The situation is pretty much the same in other areas of psychology and in other disciplines as well). This change in employment opportunities has had many consequences. For the progress of social psychology as a science, it seems to me the consequences have been very mixed. One consequence is that graduate faculties have tried to prepare their students for non-university positions, such as in government or industry. This has meant a shift away from training in laboratory methods and analysis of variance statistics and a shift toward training in field research methods, particularly survey research methods, and correlational statistics.

Another consequence has been, as one would expect, an enormous increase in competition for the few university positions that are available. One consequence is that graduate faculties have tried to prepare their students for non-university positions, such as in government or industry. This has meant a shift away from training in laboratory methods and analysis of variance statistics and a shift toward training in field research methods, particularly survey research methods, and correlational statistics.

The emphasis on subjective experience has a long tradition and cannot be attributed, as is sometimes claimed, to the popular appeal of dis-
sonance theory and attribution theory. It can be found throughout the history of the field,... If one looks more broadly at the intellectual context of the field, it is apparent that this concern with the subjective world of individuals has constituted social psychology's unique contribution to the social sciences. It is what is usually meant when one refers to “the social psychological point-of-view” in anthropology, economics, history, sociology, or political science. And we can be proud of the impact that social psychology has had upon these disciplines.

Having said that, Cartwright expresses misgivings—misgivings that are shared by many of us. As he says, “...surely the view that man, or woman for that matter, is merely an information processor is too narrow, even when it is broadened to include the influence of motivation.”

This focus on cognitive processes is not unique to social psychology. Undoubtedly, in part it reflects our human tendency to persist in doing what we can do best. Our ability to measure and manipulate information and cognition is far better than our ability to measure and manipulate incentives and motivation. This is why, throughout the history of psychology, the analysis of motivation has lagged so far behind the analysis of sensation and perception. For this reason, I am not optimistic about a major shift in emphasis in the near future. Yet I see many reasons to expect new developments on the motivational front.

I believe a change will come as psychologists generally give up the current view that cognition and motivation are separate systems, with, perhaps, some minor interconnections, as when motives distort cognition. This separatist view will, I think, be replaced with the recognition that the two systems are intimately related. In this recognition, cognition will be seen as having as much effect on motivation as motivation has on cognition. You will recognize the relevance here of Schachter's research on the role of perception in emotion (Schachter and Singer, 1962). Also relevant is recent research in physiological psychology on the voluntary control of autonomic functioning. In the news recently was a fascinating suggestion from research on pain, that there is an identifiable neural basis for placebo effects. In other words, we may be nearing a time when there will be known neural mechanisms by which a person's perceptions and beliefs can affect his emotions and motivational states.

THE COGNITIVE CONTROL OF MOTIVATION

If those comments seem more on the order of science fiction than of probable developments in social psychology, let me try to bring the problem closer to our field. One of Kurt Lewin's favorite examples was the Umweg problem. You'll remember how a child was located in a U-shaped barrier that stood between himself and an attractive goal object. The child would look, intently and longingly, at the object, while pacing back and forth along the barrier or trying vainly to climb over it. Only when the child perceived there to be a route to the object that went around the barrier was he able to turn his back on the goal object, look away from it, and take the round-about path (the Umweg) that enabled him finally to reach the goal object. Lewin used this example to show that a restructuring of the field (the life space) was necessary in solving many problems. We might think of restructuring as being exclusively a cognitive process, but as Lewin's redrawing of the force fields made clear, it also involves a change in the dynamic structure of the field. That is, there occurs a redirection or a transformation of the child's motives. This transformation is made possible only by some change in cognition. There must be a change in the child's perspective (an enlargement of his life space) and an attention to other things besides the goal object and the barrier.

In this example, we see the intimate interplay between cognition and motivation of which I spoke earlier. If we think about it for a moment, we realize that this type of situation can give rise to the voluntary control of motivation. Through experiences in such situations, the child can learn cognitive strategies for controlling his feelings and motives and thereby attaining his goals more proficiently. More generally, and as Walter Mischel (1973) has pointed out in his recent work on delay of gratification, “the meaning and impact of a stimulus can be modified by cognitive transformation”. These transformations are partly under voluntary control as they provide the means by which behavior is freed from control by certain salient, immediate incentives and governed by broader considerations (by a broader spatial and time perspective, in Lewin's terms).

It is along the lines suggested by Mischel's work that I believe there will develop an understanding of the close interplay between cognitive processes and motivational processes. Identifica-
tion will be made of the voluntary cognitive strategies (control over attention, thought, and memory) by which people are able to regulate their feelings and motives.

Most of the basic research on the processes involved in the self-regulation of motivation will, hopefully, be conducted by personality and physiological psychologists. However, social psychologists must play a necessary role in this enterprise by analyzing the interpersonal contexts within which such self-regulation is taught, learned, and manifested. In our recent book on Interpersonal Relations (1978), John Thibaut and I make an attempt at that task. We use outcome or payoff matrices as a means of identifying the common kinds of problems that people encounter in their interpersonal relations. That is, we derive a taxonomy of the interpersonal analogues to Umweg situations—the various types of interpersonal problems, dilemmas, and issues that one can encounter in life. Then, for this set of problems, we ask what it is that people should learn, in the way of cognitive transformations—different ways of restructuring or thinking about the problems, in order most effectively to solve them. Our analysis is essentially a logical and functionalistic examination of the origins of social motives. It reveals what it is, in view of the various problems of social interdependence, that the person should be taught and should learn, with respect both to prosocial and moral values and motives, and to egoistic and immoral tendencies. It provides a functionalistic framework within which current research on equity and altruism can be located and it suggests the links between these and the diversity of other social motives and their common origins in the realities of interdependent social life.

PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL CONTROL AND JUSTICE

In their recent review of literature on small groups, in the 1976 Annual Review of Psychology, Davis, Laughlin, and Komorita make the following statement: "...social psychologists are responsive to the needs of their times. The great needs of our times are the three E's—energy, economy, and environment—in a world of suddenly limited resources relative to increased populations. This renews research interest in the collective behavior of interacting individuals and fundamental questions about the individual's relationship to the collective. Thus, we predict that the experimental study of social interaction will increasingly address the basic questions of classical political economy: how are resources distributed, what are the process of group decision making, how do the motives and objectives of individuals relate to the collective welfare?"

There are many signs that this interesting prediction is already a visible trend in social psychology. Examples are provided by the recent interest in equity and distributive justice (Morton Deutsch's work being one instance), and a considerable amount of both laboratory and practical work on the composition of juries and the decision-making processes of juries. The theoretical work of myself and Thibaut, which I described a moment ago, is another example, inasmuch as it delves into the origins, in social interdependence, of morality and immorality. A further example of interest in the relation between individuals' goals and the common welfare is provided by recent research on the N-person Prisoner's Dilemma game. This represents an extension of the 2- and 3-person game to the N-person game in order to study problems relating to mass society, such as pollution and energy use.

In the same 1976 volume of the Annual Review of Psychology, June Tapp reviews research on "Psychology and the Law" and summarizes her own impressive studies of legal socialization. This refers to the processes whereby children develop attitudes toward the law and toward legal institutions such as the courts, lawyers, and the jury system.

As a final example of the growing interest in problems of social control and justice, I should mention the outstanding work by John Thibaut and a lawyer-colleague of his, Laurens Walker, published in their 1975 book: Procedural Justice. Thibaut and Walker were interested in what procedures employed by courts would best insure that justice will be served. Starting from the historical controversy between the adversary system (typical in the United States) and the inquisitorial system (common in most European countries), they used experimental methods to vary the amount of control over the interaction between the disputants exercised by the third party (the judge or the court). Their results favor the adversary system in which the judge exercises minimal control and the gathering and presentation of the evidence is left up to the disputants. This procedure results in greatest perceived fairness of and satisfaction with the decision, and the fewest biases in discovery and presentation of the relevant facts. While these results have been and will continue to be criticized for being based on laboratory experiments with college students (including law students), as Tapp com-
ments, “The efforts by Thibaut and Walker... generate a kind of intellectual and ideological excitement that can only further sensitize scientific and social experimentation”. In part, the excitement comes from the fact that the research becomes drawn into the continuing debate between advocates of the adversary and inquisitorial systems. But also, this research has a special interest that comes from its search for ideal procedures, this being a decided contrast to the vast amount of research in social psychology that is largely nonevaluative and not inclined to be prescriptive.

STUDIES IN GROUP DYNAMICS

Although a superficial glance through the U.S. social psychology journals might lead one to conclude that the study of the small group has disappeared from the scene, this is not true. Alvin Zander comments in a chapter prepared for the 1979 Annual Review of Psychology that small group studies have continued at a fairly steady rate of about 125 articles per year during the 1960's and 1970's. They do, of course, constitute a smaller proportion of social psychological research than they once did, but in absolute numbers, they still comprise a significant amount of our effort.

As Zander also remarks, there is a good deal of complaint about research on groups—that it hasn't come up with much that is new, that it is badly in need of integration, and so on. However, my sense is that the work continues to grow in a cumulative fashion and that there are growing signs of integrative theory building. One example of theoretical integration is provided by Ivan Steiner's 1972 book on Group Process and Productivity. From a review of the vast literature on problem-solving and work groups, Steiner constructs a theory about the potential productivity of a group and the types of process problems that cause its actual productivity to fall short of its potential. The potential productivity is determined by the nature of the task in relation to the size of the group and the distribution of abilities among its members. Steiner identifies two types of process losses that interfere with the group's realizing its full potential. The one derives from inadequate member motivation to use their abilities on behalf of the group and the other derives from inadequate coordination and integration of their respective efforts.

At least two other recent theoretical efforts in small group research have impressed me with their promise. The first is the theoretical and empirical work of James Davis (1973) on problem-solving groups. This is noteworthy for the careful development of mathematical models that enable specification of the process by which initial individual views and ideas are translated into the single group decision. The initial model, of Social Decision Schemes, enables inferences about the intervening process even when it is not observable and, therefore, has great potential value for the study of natural groups, such as juries, from which it is impossible to obtain direct evidence about the process. Subsequent versions of Davis' models are designed to incorporate process data and are, accordingly, considerably more powerful.

A second impressive line of work, by the sociologist, Peter Burke (1974), focuses specifically on the interaction process in small group discussions. Burke's research represents the present-day continuation of the early work by Freed Bales and his colleagues. As you will remember, Bales distinguished several phases of group problem-solving as well as different types of leadership.

Burke's recent work shows that interaction process is organized hierarchically with three or four distinguishable levels. His evidence makes it clear than in their statistical identification of "phases", on the basis of frequency of types of acts, Strodtbeck and Bales overlooked several intermediate levels of organization of the interaction, lying between the single act and the phase, Once these intermediate levels are identified, then some new facets of group leadership become apparent, having to do with who controls or regulates the interaction and bearing no necessary relation to who speaks the most. In other words, a kind of process leadership becomes identifiable, in the form of the person who controls which member has the "floor" and who regulates the interaction process so that the necessary coordination and consensus is achieved.

THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP

There's an enormous current popular interest in the U.S. in intimate, close relationships, particularly those involved in romantic attachments and marriage and the various alternatives to marriage. Paralleling this is an emerging research area, which bridges social and clinical psychology, having to do with the close relationship. These are interpersonal relationships characterized by close, long term affective ties. These relationships are a natural object for social psychological research for a number of reasons: (1) close relationships are available in large numbers on any college campus; (2) close relationships provide
an excellent alternative to the laboratory group as a research site for studying such general topics as commitment, interdependence, conflict, and attribution; and (3) close relationships are obviously of great practical importance for scientific investigation, inasmuch as they are the context within which important attitudes, values, and skills are acquired and within which we experience both the greatest satisfactions and the greatest frustrations of life.

One phenomena relevant to close relationships has been studied extensively in recent years, this being interpersonal attraction. However, research on interpersonal attraction has been extremely limited. It has been individualistic in its analysis rather than conceptualized in terms of dynamic interactions, and it has almost always been restricted to the initial encounters and first impressions of strangers who have no real relationships. In contrast, the study of close relationships emphasizes dyadic or triadic analysis and the processes by which relationships develop and change over long periods of time.

Empirical studies of close relationships are increasing in frequency. In this year's Annual Review of Psychology, Huston and Levinger (1978) identify 127 published studies during the period 1972 to 1976. These deal with such diverse topics as styles of heterosexual courtship, sex differences in friendship, sexual behavior in dating couples, and determinants of divorce.

Unfortunately the current research on close relationships is scattered and non-cumulative. It, of course, draws some of its theoretical ideas from the group dynamics field. However, because at present the dyad lends itself to more detailed analysis than does the larger small group, there are new theoretical developments specifically for the close relationship. One of these is my small book on Personal Relationships which is to be published next year (1979). The greatest barriers to more rapid growth of the field are methodological ones. There are special ethical and practical problems encountered in the study of long term and intimate relationships. It is here that a collaboration between clinical and social psychology will prove invaluable.

That is my brief review of what I see to be some recent trends in social psychology and what I expect to be some future lines of development. As you all know, there has been a great deal of self-criticism among U.S. social psychologists in recent years. I believe this criticism is based on highly unrealistic expectations for the field and, therefore, is not justified. As I'm sure you can tell from my remarks, I feel a great deal of satisfaction with what social psychology has accomplished in the past 30 years and am highly optimistic about its future. Social psychology is a vast field, encompassing many important problems and open to the development of many theoretical ideas. It has been for me, as I hope it will always be for you, the most exciting and satisfying field of scientific endeavour that I can imagine.

REFERENCES
Zander, A. The psychology of group processes.