心理学研究
Online ISSN : 1884-1082
Print ISSN : 0021-5236
ISSN-L : 0021-5236
原著
集団内における互恵性の適応基盤
堀田 結孝山岸 俊男
著者情報
ジャーナル フリー

2010 年 81 巻 2 号 p. 114-122

詳細
抄録

A one-shot sequential prisoner's dilemma game with an in-group and an out-group member was conducted to test the group heuristic hypothesis for the in-group bias in minimal groups. Eighty-nine participants played the role of a second player and faced a fully cooperative first player. The results showed that in-group bias occurred only in the common knowledge condition in which the first player and the second player mutually knew each other's group membership, but not in the private knowledge condition in which the first player did not know the second player's group membership. These results provide support for the group heuristic hypothesis that in-group bias is an adaptive strategy in an assumed generalized exchange system to avoid a bad reputation as a defector.

著者関連情報
© 2010 公益社団法人 日本心理学会
前の記事 次の記事
feedback
Top