1) According to Titchener the cathegories of psychological description are, the last terms of analysis, the elementary processes and their attributes. But as we cannot observe all the attributes of sensations etc. at a time, the last terms of analysis must be the attributes, not sensations and the like (Yokoyama, Boring). And in order to describe the experience psychologically, it is very useful to arrange all the attributes and to construct their systems, as S. Takagi advocated it, calling the 'gegenstandtheoretical study of attributes.'
2) But even the description of greys in Dimmick's experiment of the visual movement is mostly not differentiated into more than two, the brighter and the darker, in spite of the existence of hundreds of differential thresholds in the scale of grey, which are exact as the last terms of analysis. This incompleteness of description tells us on the one hand the impossibility of describing the experience with the exact last terms of analysis, but on the other hand that it is unnecessary, for here, if desired, the greys may be described more precisely, so to speak, as ‘about no. 10 or no. 45 of Hering greys.’
3) On account of the incompleteness of the description, the understanding among psychologists is inevitably approximate. When there is much ambiguity, we must go further in analytical description, and the limit of admittance of the approximacy is to be decided by the problem of the experiment. As the meanings of the words of description must be, after all, interpreted by the behavior of discrimination, there is no essential differedce between the verbal description by man and the behavioral response by animals. It follows also from these facts, that the described experience is a construct, as the operationists insist. But it should be acknowledged, that these constructs, differ from those as ‘trace’, which have no direct experience to be understood. Koffka's implicit dependence upon 'immediate experience', criticized by Boring, comes from this.
4) The observation changes the original experience. And the good observation is, in Koffka's opinion, a ‘Durchgestaltung’, not the analysis into independent elements. But there must be distinguished two kinds of ‘Durchgestaltung ’: the differentiation of the phenomenon itself by repetition of experiments and finding the adequate words to describe the phenomenon, which may be differentiated or undifferentiated. Perhaps Koffka means the former, and Boring, emphasizing the latter, finds incompleteness in Koffka's system.
5)Titchener distinguished the process from the meaning. But from the behavioral and developmental yiewpoint, the sensations or their attributes are no less mediated and no simpler experiences than any other perceptions. On the other hand visual movements or other perceptions are no less original experiences than red, not derivable front other elementary processes; ‘a grey flash’ is never the visual movement itself but only one aspect of it.
6)‘Larger’,‘smaller’, or other relational impressions are also original experiences, which admit no further description. But there may be varieties of such impressions (e. g., ‘a little larger’,‘such smaller’), and accessory phenomena (e. g., ‘the transition experience’), which may be described. When we call our theory of the apprehension of relation ‘the theory of immediate apprehension’ or ‘the theory of originali mpression’,w e only mean that the reiationc an be apprehended without the aid of the memory images,the transitioenx periences,otrh e absolute impressions,and we never deny the mediatedness of the impression,of relationa nd the possibiiitoyf furtherd escriptioni n the sense mentioned above. on the other hand We emphasize the conditiona1b,e haviorai and deveiopmental aspect of the apprehension of relation.
