Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan
Online ISSN : 2188-8299
Print ISSN : 0453-4514
EXISTENCE OF A PURE STRATEGY EQUILIBRIUM IN MARKOV GAMES WITH STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES FOR FINITE ACTIONS AND FINITE STATES
Takahiro WatanabeHideaki Yamashita
Author information
JOURNALS FREE ACCESS

2017 Volume 60 Issue 2 Pages 201-214

Details
Abstract

We provide a sufficient condition for the existence of a Markov perfect equilibrium for pure strategies in a class of Markov games where each stage has strategic complementarities. We assume that both the sets of actions for all players and the set of states are finite and that the horizon is also finite, while the past studies examined Markov games with infinite horizons where the sets of actions and states are assumed to be infinite. We give an elementary proof of the existence and apply the result to a game of Bertrand oligopoly with investment.

Information related to the author
© 2017 The Operations Research Society of Japan
Previous article
feedback
Top