I. Overview

1. The Problem of Memory Knowledge

Among the various important roles memory plays in our lives, a primary function of it is to introduce “us to knowledge in one of its forms” (Russell 93). Indeed, a good portion of our knowledge is grounded in our memory, and to that extent, epistemological inquiry must be concerned with memory.

We can distinguish two fundamental ways in which memory grounds knowledge. On the one hand, we can acquire knowledge thanks to our memory. Suppose, for instance, my presentation at a conference was miserable. Although I did not find it terrible at the conference, I later became increasingly anxious about my presentation. I recall how the audience reacted, and now I come to conclude that my presentation was a failure. In this case, I have come to know about the quality of my presentation, partly at least, because I remember how
the presentation went. On the other hand, we can simply retain knowledge by way of memory. Suppose that while giving the presentation, I already realized that my presentation was a failure. Later, while recalling how I felt then, I remember that my presentation was a failure. Of course, my knowledge is grounded in my memory in this case as well. However, thanks to memory, I do not acquire the knowledge but simply retain the knowledge I already possessed.

In this paper, we are concerned mainly with the latter type of knowledge, knowledge retained by memory. Memory, of course, retains various different things: experiences, knowledge, skills, etc. The type of memory which retains knowledge is typically expressed by a particular use of the verb, ‘remember.’ When the verb ‘remember’ takes a sentential complement as its grammatical object, it normally means retention of the corresponding knowledge. When we say, “George remembers that Togo is in West Africa,” usually we mean that George learned this geographical fact before and still has the same knowledge. Following the tradition, I call this type of memory propositional memory, and knowledge retained by propositional memory memory knowledge.

Memory knowledge, characterized in this way, confronts us with a serious challenge because of its particularly unique character. Very often, we do not remember how we originally came to acquire a piece of knowledge we believe ourselves to remember. For instance, I think I know the Pythagorean theorem, whereas I cannot tell how I originally learned the theorem. I can only conjecture that I must have learned it when I was a junior high school student; probably, I originally learned it by understanding what the math teacher taught us—a proof of the theorem, its implications, etc. However, as a matter of fact, I can recall none of the grounds of my putative knowledge which I used to possess. Moreover, I can offer no strong support for my belief in the theorem by way of reasoning. Yet I am fully confident that I once learned the theorem and still remember it. Now, do I still know the theorem? I sure do. Otherwise, we would have to face a grave skepticism as to a large portion of our knowledge. For much of what we—ordinary people—believe ourselves to know is held basically in the same manner. We usually cannot recall how we originally learned things we learned a long time ago, and on what ground we came to know them, while being fully confident that we still know them. This apparent fact seems to give us a strong reason to resist such skepticism.²

However, we are faced with an obvious question: how can I still know, or
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even be justified in believing in, the theorem? On what epistemic grounds does my memory knowledge rest? After all, I cannot offer any justification I could have advanced when I originally came to know it; I cannot prove the Pythagorean theorem now, still less recall the proof the teacher originally explained to me. Thus, the way in which we have memory knowledge is by no means similar to how we typically know things by perception or inference.

Obviously, this is a very perplexing question which deserves an independent inquiry. In the following, I will first outline several approaches to this question. Then I will delve into challenges those approaches would have to meet. My contention in this paper is essentially exegetic and evaluative; I do not propose any particular theory of memory knowledge. Instead, I hope to illuminate important conditions any successful theory of memory knowledge must satisfy in the light of those challenges.

2. Theories of Memory Knowledge
(i) Present grounds versus original grounds
Specifically in the case of memory knowledge, we may distinguish two different approaches in accordance with two apparently different types of epistemic grounds. On the one hand, it is obvious that memory knowledge somehow originates in the past. This entails that there was some epistemic factor in the past which sufficiently grounded the knowledge. We may call this factor the original grounds of memory knowledge.

On the other hand, the fact that sometimes we have memory knowledge without remembering how we originally acquired it gives us a reason to suspect that memory knowledge has different epistemic grounds. Given internalist approaches to memory knowledge, no matter what epistemically grounds our memory knowledge, we must be able to be aware of some of its grounds. However, we no longer have any conscious access to the original grounds of our memory knowledge in such cases; we forgot all of them! Hence, it seems natural for those who embrace an internalist approach to memory knowledge to base it on something presently accessible to the subject. If there is to be any such grounds, it should be legitimately called the present grounds, in contrast with the original grounds.

In the rest of this section, I will sketch out various (though not all) approaches to memory knowledge. I start with present ground theories and
proceed to original ground theories. I save detailed discussions about those theories for the next part, where I will show that both of the original and present grounds play epistemic roles.

(ii) Present ground theories
As Russell famously points out, an imagistic memory typically carries a sense of “familiarity” and “pastness” (96). Applying the same idea to propositional memory might be misleading, since the content of propositional memory is not necessarily either experienced in the past or about the past (as when someone remembers that the next Olympics will be held in London). Nonetheless, there is a legitimate sense in which propositional memory is accompanied by a sense of familiarity and pastness: when we remember that \( p \), usually it appears to us that we believe that \( p \), but do not newly come to believe it. Sometimes an experience of propositional memory seems to accompany no such impression. Yet, if we really have a propositional memory, we must be able to entertain the memory with the impression. Hereafter, I call this phenomenological aspect of propositional memory *memory impressions*.

It is well recognized that we cannot base memory knowledge on any inferential process from memory impressions. For instance, suppose I try to show that I know that \( p \) by appeal to the fact that it seems to me that I remember that \( p \). Evidently, the memory impression by itself does not entail my knowledge, for memory impressions sometimes deceive us. At best, there is a certain probabilistic relation between them. Thus, to deduce the memory knowledge from my memory impression, I need to appeal to a principle like this: when I feel just like how I am feeling now, I almost always remember, and thereby know, something. How can I justifiably appeal to this principle? Of course, we know of no self-evident truth that entails this principle, nor can we know the principle simply by remembering it. But I cannot derive the principle by induction, for, to derive it inductively, I have to appeal to different instances of my past experience ("When I felt such and such at \( t \), I actually remembered…"). On the face of it, such an appeal eventually leads me to a vicious regress.

Of course, one might wonder whether any other type of inference is possible. For instance, one might try to infer memory knowledge from memory impressions by way of abductive inference. But we have good reason to be dubious about such reasoning. For, as Owens (149) correctly points out, any successful
reasoning is most likely to contain principles or theorems, or even reiterations of a claim to which we can justifiably appeal only in virtue of propositional memory. Here we do not have to deny the possibility of a sound inference to memory knowledge from memory impressions which wouldn’t fall into a vicious regress. We can simply dismiss the possibility that our memory knowledge is grounded in an inference which is hardly known, or even unknown.

(a) Present Evidence—The previous discussion strongly suggests that no inference from memory impressions can play a role in the epistemic grounds of our memory knowledge. One might suspect that we usually do not appeal to an inference anyways, in order to justify our memory knowledge. Indeed, I have a number of beliefs, and it is likely that some of those beliefs, probably only dispositionally held, can constitute good evidence for my memory knowledge. One might claim that holding those dispositional beliefs can sufficiently ground my memory knowledge. This type of consideration may be behind the following argument proposed by Conee and Feldman:

Another defensible answer is available to internalists who think that not all evidence is conscious. If Sally is a normal contemporary adult, she is likely to have quite a bit of readily retrievable evidence supporting her belief about broccoli. The healthfulness of vegetables is widely reported and widely discussed. Furthermore, her belief about broccoli is probably not undermined by any background beliefs she is likely to have. Finally, she, like most people, probably has supporting evidence consisting in stored beliefs about the general reliability and accuracy of memory. She knows that she is generally right about this sort of thing. So Sally would have justification for her broccoli belief, though it is not her original evidence. If Sally lacks any supporting background information and also lacks any reason to trust her memory, then we doubt that her belief about the broccoli really is justified. (70)

According to this view, we can have memory knowledge, if only sufficient evidence for it is available in our mind. Thus, if the theory is correct, memory knowledge is grounded in what is in our mind presently, although it may not be what the knowledge originally rested on.

(b) Foundationalism—A different way to avoid an appeal to an inference from memory impressions is to suppose that memory knowledge can be grounded in
itself, just like other types of foundational knowledge. Some philosophers apply
the foundationalist model for perceptual knowledge, according to which
perceptual knowledge is grounded in perceptual experience itself, to memory
knowledge. The most promising candidate for such grounds is, of course,
memory impressions. Pollock and Cruz, for instance, argue:

Given that there is such a state as seeming to remember, the natural move for the
foundationalist is to treat memory as a source of knowledge parallel to sense
perception and posit the following “mnemonic” defeasible reason:

“S seems to remember P” is a defeasible reason for S to believe P." (48)

According to this type of approach, my seeming to remember that \( p \) alone can
sufficiently ground my memory belief that \( p \) (absent any defeater). Of course,
the theory avoids the regress, since no further recourse to memory is needed
for me to be entitled to the belief.

One might oppose this type of view, because he thinks that memory
knowledge requires doxastic support. Indeed, in the previous quote, Conee and
Feldman seem to mention a similar intuition, when they say, “If Sally lacks any
supporting background information and also lacks any reason to trust her
memory, then we doubt that her belief about the broccoli really is justified”
(70). But this is quite dubious. Let us think of a case in which one has no
doxastic support for memory knowledge with a strong memory impression.
Suppose I suffer from a serious memory failure, and it seems that I have lost
most of my memories, including quite basic ones. One day, it suddenly strikes
me that I remember my name: Shin. In fact, I have the same seeming
repeatedly, so that I’ve eventually become confident that I remember that my
name is Shin. Meanwhile, I have no other evidence for my belief, nor have I
any reason to believe in the general credibility of my memory. If we have the
intuition Conee and Feldman mention, we would be reluctant to say that I
actually know that my name is Shin. But that wouldn’t seem to be the case.
Indeed, nobody would tell me, “Well, since you have no further supporting
evidence, I doubt that you really know your name!” This seems to underscore
the foundationalist view, i.e., the view that a memory impression by itself can
entitle us to believe what is accompanied by the impression.
(iii) Original ground theories
Original ground theories claim that the epistemic grounds of our memory knowledge stem ultimately from what originally grounded the same knowledge when it was acquired. A challenge to original ground theories is evident. When we do not remember how we originally came to know something, the original grounds for the knowledge seem presently absent from our minds. If so, how can something unavailable to us still ground our knowledge? Any cogent original ground theories must answer this question by showing that a certain connection standing between one's memory knowledge and its original grounds is sufficient for grounding his memory knowledge.

(a) Reliabilism—A plain solution seems to be an externalist approach. Once we give up the idea that conscious access to its epistemic grounds is necessary for memory knowledge, no serious challenge seems to be left. For instance, reliabilism, a typical externalist approach, claims that a belief which results from a reliable process—a process such that “the beliefs they produce are generally true” (Goldman 345)—is well justified. Given this view, there seems to be no special problem about memory knowledge, as far as memory is generally reliable.

Of course, the primary function of memory is not to produce beliefs, but to preserve beliefs. Thus, the reliabilist approach to memory knowledge should be characterized in terms of knowledge’s preservation rather than its original production; in particular, memory knowledge must be grounded in its original grounds through the reliable preservation process of propositional memory. Characterized in this way, the subject’s present condition—reliable memory function—plays a significant role, but the epistemic status of a belief is primarily derived from what originally grounded it.10

(b) Belief Preservation—The primary function of propositional memory is not just to secure reliability of a belief but to preserve the belief itself. Owens takes special notice of this function, and claims that memory knowledge rests on its original grounds by way of preservation of the belief itself. According to him, preserving a belief that \( p \) entails preservation of a particular attitude toward the proposition that \( p \). He says, “[w]hat memory preserves is belief itself, and to believe that \( p \) is precisely to have finished inquiring into \( p \) by forming the view
that \( p \)…” (152). Thus, when we have a propositional memory, the fact that its original grounds are lost usually does not worry us. For, absent any further reason, we simply keep believing that \( p \) and find no need of additional evidence for \( p \) regardless of whether we actually possess any evidence for it.

Owens thinks that this “cognitive inertia” (154), the force keeping the epistemic status of a belief just as it was originally acquired, connects our memory knowledge to its original grounds. He says:

A well-functioning memory preserves the rationality of belief but not by preserving the evidence which prompted the acquisition of the belief. It does this rather by holding the belief in place with a force proportional to the strength of the evidence for it (a force which I call cognitive inertia). (154)

Apparently, this is an original ground theory. According to his theory, our memory knowledge rests on its original grounds, even when they are no longer available to the subject, in virtue of our ‘cognitive inertia’ with regard to the knowledge.

II. Discussions

So far, we have outlined two types of approaches to memory knowledge, and in this section, I will examine those approaches. As I said, I will propose no theory of memory knowledge here, but I will try to provide some insight into what is required for a cogent theory of memory knowledge in light of the problems those approaches must face. I will be arguing that any such theory must take the following two factors into account; (i) epistemic roles of memory impressions, and (ii) a plausible theory of the link between memory knowledge and its original grounds.11

1. Epistemic Roles of Memory Impressions

It is worth pointing out that even advocates of original ground theories well recognize that the subject’s present condition affects his memory knowledge. Goldman, for instance, discusses the following case and concludes that a reliable process through which a belief is produced/preserved alone may fail to sustain memory knowledge.
Suppose that Jones is told on fully reliable authority that a certain class of his memory beliefs are almost all mistaken. His parents fabricate a wholly false story that Jones suffered from amnesia when he was seven but later developed pseudo-memories of that period. Though Jones listens to what his parents say and has excellent reason to trust them, he persists in believing the ostensible memories from his seven-year-old past. Are these memory beliefs justified? Intuitively, they are not justified. But since these beliefs result from genuine memory and original perceptions, which are adequately reliable processes, our theory says that these beliefs are justified. (350)

This type of defeater scenario sufficiently discredits not only simple-minded reliabilist approaches but also any original ground theories disregarding the subject’s present epistemic condition. For this reason, virtually any sophisticated original ground theory will appeal to some sort of extra condition to cope with such defeater cases.

To this extent, some original ground theories agree that the subject’s present epistemic condition may affect his memory knowledge. But they do not necessarily concede to present ground theories. They might insist that the subject’s present condition does not constitute a part of the epistemic grounds of his memory knowledge, since its role is only negative. In other words, they might insist that one’s present condition may undermine his memory knowledge, but ultimately memory knowledge is grounded solely in its original grounds.

There arose a concern about such a view: the subject’s present condition seems to justify his memory knowledge. Huemer nicely articulates this concern by appeal to the famous Russellian hypothesis. It is surely possible that the world popped into existence five minutes ago with all the traces of the past. Suppose Shin* is my counterpart in such a world. He shares every element of my present intrinsic character. Now, just like I feel as if I remember that Kennedy was assassinated in 1963, he also feels as if he remembers that Kennedy was assassinated in 1963. Of course, unlike myself, Shin* does not actually remember what he feels as if he remembers, nor does he know it. (Kennedy did not even exist in his world!) Yet, it seems that he is just as much justified in believing that Kennedy was assassinated in 1963 as I actually am.

This story seems to show us an epistemic role of memory impressions. If Shin* is really justified, intuitively, it must be his memory impression that
justifies his belief. If so, isn’t it my memory impression that justifies my memory knowledge as well? For, *ex hypothesi*, his present states, including the memory impression, are intrinsically identical to my present states.

One might respond that my memory impression surely justifies my memory knowledge just as Shin*’s memory impression justifies his ostensible memory belief. However, he continues, such a justifier has no epistemic significance with regard to whether or not I have the memory knowledge. Unfortunately, we have good reason to suspect that it does.

My argument employs a defeater scenario and has recourse to how the defeater undermines memory knowledge. Thus, before laying out my argument, let me briefly elaborate ways in which defeaters work. According to Pollock and Cruz, there are basically two different types of defeaters. One type of defeater, called “rebutting” defeaters (Pollock and Cruz 196), undermines a belief truth-functionally. For instance, when $p$ and $q$ are incompatible propositions, an apparent likelihood of $q$ may work as a defeater for one’s belief that $p$. Another type of defeater undermines a belief by “undercutting” the connection between one’s belief and its grounds (Pollock and Cruz ibid.). For instance, when the epistemic grounds of one’s belief that $p$ involve his knowledge that $q$, the claim that $q$ is not a good indicator of $p$ may work as a defeater for his belief that $p$. The defeater Goldman discusses is of the latter type, i.e., if what Jones’s parents told him is true, it implies that the ostensible memory does not actually originate in what he believes to be the source of the memory. My argument appeals to a case similar to Goldman’s; both cases make use of undercutting defeaters. But the defeater in my scenario undermines a different type of epistemic ground.

Let us think of this scenario:

I learned a long time ago that the Battle of Hastings happened in 1066, but I haven’t been reminded of this historical fact for a long time. Now, somebody asks me when the Battle of Hasting happened. First I wonder, but eventually it starts seeming to me that the Battle happened in 1066, and that I remember it, although I have no further reason to believe that the Battle happened in 1066.

As I argued above, my memory impression justifies my belief that the Battle of Hastings happened in 1066. In addition, on the assumption that what occurs to my mind appropriately originates in my past knowledge, we can safely assume
that I know that the Battle of Hastings happened in 1066. Now, let us add the following defeater episode to this story:

I have a good reason to be distrustful of my seeming to remember. As far as its preservative function goes, my memory works just fine. But, ever since I had brain surgery, I very often have had memory impressions of something I've never learned nor experienced. And I know that I have been deceived by my memory impressions very often.

Given the story, it becomes less clear whether I know that the Battle of Hastings happened in 1066. This must be because the defeater undermines my memory knowledge. But how? Evidently, the defeater is not a rebutting defeater. The fact that I have been very often deceived by memory impressions does not even remotely suggest the falsity of my belief. After all, there is no intrinsic connection between memory impressions and the truth values of their propositional contents. This leaves us only the second type. If so, the defeater must defeat my memory knowledge by undercutting the connection between the knowledge and its grounds. This, of course, implies that my memory impression constitutes a part of the epistemic grounds of my memory knowledge.

If I am right, our memory knowledge can somehow rest on our memory impressions. Thus, any plausible theory of memory knowledge must offer an account of epistemic roles memory impressions can play in our memory knowledge. And in fact, this task must face many original ground theories, especially externalist theories, with a serious challenge. Think of this case. John acquired a piece of knowledge in the past, and the same thought repeatedly crosses his mind ever since. Nonetheless, the thought always occurs to him as if he is acquiring a new belief with no particular reason. In such a case, we are reluctant to say that he still knows what occurs to him—even if we know, for instance, that the belief is produced/preserved through perfectly reliable link. Intuitively, this must have something to do with the fact that no memory impressions accompany his thought. But it is not very easy to see how reliabilists, or any purely externalist theories, can explain why John appears to lack the knowledge within their frameworks.

Of course, it does not follow that no original ground theories can meet the challenge. Owens actually offers an explanation within the framework of his
original ground theory. He says:

Though memory does not usually act as a source of evidence for belief, the fact that one seems to remember that $p$ is still relevant to one’s being justified in believing $p$. If one didn’t appear to remember that $p$, if the belief in $p$ seemed to have popped into one’s head de nouveaux, one wouldn’t be entitled to defer to one’s past self, to evidence one is no longer aware of, for a justification of that belief. To seem to remember that $p$ is to be entitled so to defer, provided one has no adequate reason for doubting one’s memory. (154)

According to his account, memory impressions can play the role of a link between the subject’s reliance on his belief and its forgotten original grounds. When an occurrent thought is not accompanied by memory impressions, we might not be able to tell where the thought really originated. And if there is no way we can know the origin of the thought, in the absence of independent evidence for it, we have no good reason to count on the thought. In fact, without memory impressions, how can we be sure that a thought is actually a propositional memory? Hence, according to his account, we are reluctant to say that John knows what crosses his mind, for, without memory impressions, he is not entitled to the evidence he used to possess.

2. Original Grounds and Propositional Memory

There is a well-known challenge to present ground theories: if present grounds alone are to sufficiently ground memory knowledge, originally unjustified true beliefs may turn into knowledge. For instance, suppose a mere haphazard thought that $p$ occurs to Bill. Quite irrationally, Bill comes to be confident that $p$, and it happens to be the case that $p$. Of course, Bill doesn’t know that $p$. However, suppose simple-minded present ground theories are correct. For example, let us suppose that one’s entertaining a true retained belief with memory impressions is sufficient for that belief to constitute memory knowledge. Then Bill may come to have the memory knowledge that $p$ if he later entertains the same belief with memory impressions. This seems to be an unacceptable consequence.

One might try to avoid the trouble by appeal to a rather obvious truth: if one knows that $p$ thanks to his propositional memory, then he once knew that $p$. He might add that the fact that memory knowledge implies the corresponding past
knowledge does not entail that memory knowledge rests on the past knowledge’s grounds. I concur. But we have a reason to think that the epistemic grounds of memory knowledge partly, at least, consist of its original grounds.

Even foundationalists accept that a certain type of defeater may undermine memory knowledge by attacking its original grounds. For instance, let us think of the following scenario:

I remember what I learned when I was a high school student—e.g., that the Battle of Hastings happened in 1066. In fact, it seems to me that I remember that the Battle of Hastings happened in 1066. However, I’m not sure how I learned it. Meanwhile, though mistakenly, I have a doubt about the credibility of my high school history teacher; in particular, I believe that he often gave us wrong dates.

In this case, my memory knowledge that the Battle of Hastings happened in 1066 must be at least to some extent undermined by my doubt in the teacher’s credibility. In addition, the defeater must be an undercutting defeater, i.e., it undercuts the connection between my memory knowledge and its epistemic grounds. Hence, if our previous argument that memory knowledge rests on memory impressions is correct, by the same token, the epistemic grounds of memory knowledge must consist of its original grounds as well.

If the present argument is correct, the original grounds constitute an indispensable part of the epistemic grounds of memory knowledge. Then, for the reason I already mentioned, any cogent theory of memory knowledge must offer a plausible explanation of the link between memory knowledge and its original grounds. Toward the end of this paper, I show that how propositional memory retains memory knowledge is intricate enough to call many apparently compelling theories into question.

Consider the following case, originally suggested by Shope (309–310). Sometimes, serious amnesia patients recover from the disease. Those patients did not show any indication of believing things they used to know, when they suffered from the disease. However, they later recover the knowledge they seemed to have lost at one time. In such a case, it is natural to say that they now remember those things, and thereby have memory knowledge.

Can the original ground theories we have examined above satisfactorily explain this case? It is not clear, at best. Given the reliabilist approach, the
patient recovers the memory knowledge because there is a reliable link between the knowledge and its original grounds. But we have an obvious question: how can the link be reliable? The patient suffered from serious amnesia, which must result from serious memory dysfunction! We need further explanation, at least.\textsuperscript{20} On the other hand, Owens’s theory seems to imply that memory knowledge rests upon its original grounds because the subject has been holding the same belief ever since he acquired the knowledge. But if so, how can the theory explain the amnesia patient’s memory knowledge? After all, he once lost the belief.\textsuperscript{21}

Here, I cannot propose any solution to this problem, and indeed, I do not deny the possibility that it can be dealt with within the frameworks of those theories. My point here is not just to challenge those theories, but to emphasize that any cogent theory of memory knowledge must be underpinned by a compelling theory of propositional memory. And, to that extent, our inquiry into memory knowledge ultimately requires an explication of propositional memory.

(Endnotes)

1. Many philosophers believe that to remember that $p$ is simply to retain the knowledge that $p$. See, for instance, Squires\textsuperscript{185}; Annis\textsuperscript{324}. I defend this thesis elsewhere (Sakuragi\textsuperscript{238–239}). But we do not have to commit ourselves to this thesis here. Even those who argue against this view admit that propositional memory usually implies the corresponding knowledge and that no other type of memory preserves propositional knowledge.

2. For a devastating implication of such skepticism, see BonJour\textsuperscript{170–171}, for instance.

3. Here, I simply assume a typical characterization of internalism which requires any internalists to grant the subject’s (possible) conscious access to some of the epistemic grounds of memory knowledge.

4. About the sense of familiarity and pastness, see, for instance, Malcolm\textsuperscript{88–89}; Pollock and Cruz\textsuperscript{48}; Plantinga\textsuperscript{59}.

5. It is worth noting that many philosophers try to raise a counterexample to the view that propositional memory is retained knowledge by appeal to cases in which one doesn’t feel as if he remembers something while actually remembering it. See, for instance, Martin and Deutscher\textsuperscript{167–168, 192}; Lehrer and Richard\textsuperscript{121–122}. A further discussion about such cases is in Bernecker\textsuperscript{149–151}.

6. This might be rather an unfair characterization of their approach. Audi, for in-
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7. See also Pollock 193. Criticisms of Pollock’s approach are found in Senor. One of Senor’s main complaints is that memory knowledge may be justified in the absence of memory impressions (459–460). One might try to avoid this problem, by appeal to the disposition/occurrence distinction. Ginet, for instance, says that “[a] memory-impression (weak or strong) is an enduring sort of dispositional state of its subject that may be (and usually is) present when it is not being manifested in any mental or behavioral act. … But, of course, whether or not a person has a certain memory-impression is tied to whether or not he would manifest it if the circumstances were of the right sort” (157).

8. I do not mean that Conee and Feldman themselves endorse this view. In fact, they also suggest that the foundationalist approach is a possible solution to the problem (70).

9. Of course, if what enters my mind is inconsistent with what I generally believe, we might feel more suspicious. However, even if we think that I don’t know what I seemingly remember, that is not because my belief appears to be groundless, but rather because the belief is defeated or because we are not sure whether I hold the belief strongly enough.

10. It is worth noting that sound functions of memory play a crucial role in other externalist approaches. For instance, Plantinga characterizes his proper functionalist approach in this way: “…what counts for warrant is whether memory beliefs typically result from the proper function of our cognitive faculties in an appropriate environment, whether the function of memory is to give us true belief about the past, and whether the design plan in this area is a good one” (64).

11. Hence, it follows that any plausible theory of memory knowledge is to some extent dualistic. In this regard, I agree with Huemer’s dualistic approach (351–352).


13. Huemer says, “How, then, can the dualistic theory avoid the objection from the five-minute hypothesis… Simply by this posit: coming to believe something by seeming to remember it (in the absence of defeaters that one is aware of) is an epistemically rational way of acquiring the belief” (351).

14. The same idea can be found in Pollock 42–43.

15. Here, I do not imply that memory impressions constitute a necessary condition for memory knowledge. Of course, John may start wondering, and eventually reach the conclusion that he actually remembers what repeatedly occurs to him. One might be tempted to say that John has the memory knowledge in such a case (although my intuition is unclear). However, notice that in this particular scenario, John doesn’t even recognize that the same belief keeps occurring to him in the same manner. Given this particular condition, we are more inclined to say that he
lacks the memory knowledge. Indeed, as I suggested in note 5, in many counterexamples to the claim that remembering that \( p \) implies knowing that \( p \), a subject is supposed to lack a piece of knowledge because he doesn't know that he actually remembers what occurs to him.

16. See, for instance, Annis 325-326; Hume 348.
17. See, for instance, Pollock 193.
18. See Pollock ibid.; Pollock and Cruz 51.
19. A similar intuition seems to play a role, when Naylor criticizes Ginet and asks, “If for defeasibility purposes we have to look to S’s original justification anyway, why shouldn’t it be that what supports the confidence of S’s memory knowledge that \( p \) is not his present memory-justification for \( p \) at all, but instead … his original justification for \( p \) (or some subset thereof)?” (282).
20. It is worth pointing out that proper functionalism would face the same difficulty. We cannot simply stipulate that memory knowledge is grounded in properly functioning memory.
21. The solution proposed by Shope, for instance, is to claim that propositional memory may be grounded in retention of a certain cognitive capacity. See Shope 312.

References

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