The Discourse of *Ie* (Family) in Japan's Cultural Identity and Nationalism: A Critique

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This paper has three major objectives: (1) to give an overview of the vast literature in English on the traditional Japanese family called the "ie;" (2) to examine the relationship between the contributions of both Japanese and non-Japanese scholars to that literature; and (3) to demonstrate the significance of the ie, both past and present, for the Japanese.

A careful review of existing studies shows that the ie has often been represented as a symbol of Japan. This representation is inseparable from that of family, but it has transcended the original meaning to produce a broad "discursive" sphere in which different aspects of Japan, such as politics, economy, and psychology, are discussed in the same rubric. Regarding the ie as a discourse of Japanese culture, namely, as "a group of statements which provide a language for talking about — i.e., a way of representing — a particular kind of knowledge about a topic" (Hall 1992: 291), the paper explores how scholars, both inside and outside Japan, have conceptualized the ie. It also demonstrates that the ie lies at the heart of Japan's cultural identity and nationalism.

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1 A major problem in contemporary anthropology is the lack of dialogue between "native" anthropologists and Western anthropologists (Kuwayama 1997; 2000). To help overcome this problem, the paper gives equal weight to the literature in English and that in Japanese. It is hoped that non-Japanese readers will benefit from the author's reference to Japanese-language works, both classical and contemporary, which seldom reach the international community of scholars because of the language barrier. It is also hoped that Japanese readers will become aware of the valuable contributions made by their foreign colleagues toward a better understanding of their own society.
The *Ie* Model of Japanese Society

In Japanese studies abroad, especially in the Anglophone world, there is a tradition of research into what may be called the "*ie* model" of Japanese society. This model says that the *ie* is the basic unit in Japanese society and that it transcends the individuals who compose it. The *ie* model also holds that other large groups, such as the *dōzoku*, the company, and even the entire nation, are structural extensions of the *ie*. Examples include concepts like "corporate familism" and "*ie* society." When applied in the analysis of personality, the model emphasizes the group orientation of the Japanese, as contrasted with western individualism, underscoring the submission of the individual to the family will and the resultant suppression of personal desires for the sake of the *ie*. In this regard, the *ie* model is at the center of the "group model" in Japanese studies (Befu 1980).

Below, I will examine how it has been formulated and utilized by scholars, dividing their arguments into two major categories: village studies and company studies. How the *ie* is appropriated in the current controversy over *fūfu bessei* (two-surname family) will also be discussed to illustrate the central place of the *ie* in the discourse of Japanese culture. It should be mentioned at the outset that the following is not intended to be a comprehensive review; rather, it highlights works that are of classic importance or those that represent prevailing trends of thought at a particular time. Readers interested in a detailed analysis should refer to Kuwayama (1996).

The *Ie* in Village Studies

John Embree was probably the first American anthropologist to note the importance of the *ie* in the social structure of rural Japan. In his classic book *Suye Mura* (1939), Embree wrote:

> The primary social unit in *buraku* [village] life is the household. This household includes the small family, perhaps a retired grandfather or grandmother, and one or two servants to help in the household and farm labor. The size of a *buraku* is reckoned by the number of households, not by the number of people, and participation in *buraku* co-operative affairs such as funerals or bridge-building is per household, not per capita. People and things of the house are referred to as *uchi no* (of the house), as, for instance, mother of the house, bicycle of the house, cow of the house. (Embree 1939: 79)

The "household" mentioned above refers to the *ie*. The *ie* has often been translated into English as either "family" or "household" without a clear conceptual distinction. Since this distinction is itself a point of dispute, I have decided to respect individual authors' terminologies, although the Japanese original "*ie*" is used throughout whenever possible.
Suye Mura's influence on the subsequent research into Japan was enormous. Not only was it the only ethnography in English on life in Japan before World War II, but it was also written within the framework of structural functionalism, one of the dominant anthropological paradigms at that time. Understandably, Embree's view was followed by the next generation of scholars who visited Japan after the war.

For example, in Takashima (1954), a study of a fishing village in Okayama, Edward Norbeck followed Embree closely when he stated:

The basic social unit on Takashima is the household... In all buraku affairs the household is the unit of primary importance, and representation at most non-social gatherings is by one person only from each household, whether the household is comprised of one person or twelve persons... There is a strong feeling of unity among members of a household. A grandfather is not "my grandfather," but uchi no ojiisan, "the grandfather of our house(hold)." (Norbeck 1954: 48-49)

In Village Japan (1959), a comprehensive study of a farming village in Okayama, located near Takashima, Richard Beardsley, John Hall, and Robert Ward repeatedly argued that the ie, not the individual, is given primary consideration in community life (Beardsley, Hall, and Ward 1959: 351-352); that the individual is considered only a part of the ie (1959: 216-220); that ie solidarity demands loyalty, self-sacrifice, and suppression of individuality on the part of its members (1959: 7); that there is little room for rugged individualism in rural Japan (1959: 71-72); and that honor is achieved in the name of the ie, not in that of the individual (1959: 480). Beardsley, Hall, and Ward explicitly related the Japanese sense of self to the ie when they commented:

The household is the fundamental social unit of the community... Seldom does any man, woman, or child think of himself or another person apart from his role as a member of his house (ie). The ie looms above the individual identities of its members to a degree that is hard to over-stress. (1959: 216)

Similar views were presented by scholars who studied urban Japan. Among them was British sociologist Ronald Dore, the author of another classic City Life in Japan (1958). Dore

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2 *Ie* literally means a "house." In Iwanami’s Dictionary of *Kojien* (5th ed., 1998), three major definitions of *ie* are given: (1) a structure for residence; (2) a collectivity of people living in the same house; and (3) a kinship group with common ancestors or property handed down from generation to generation. A few words with similar meaning exist, namely, *kazoku, katei,* and *setai,* which are ordinarily translated into English as "family," "home," and "household," respectively. They are, however, defined differently in different fields of study, and within the same field, different scholars use them differently. The *ie* is analogous to another concept, *uchi,* which literally means "inside," but which can also refer to a "house," depending on the context, as Embree’s passage shows in the text. *Uchi* may also be used as a first-person pronoun. For a perceptive analysis of *uchi,* see Bachnik (1994).
maintained that under the traditional Japanese family system, the individual "is always a representative of his family" (Dore 1958: 100) and that "the family is an entity of greater importance than the individuals who temporarily compose it" (1958: 103). Although the Civil Code of 1898, which instituted the ie system, was revised after Japan's defeat in World War II, the impact of the ie system continued to be felt in the district of Tokyo studied by Dore. As he remarked, "despite the diminished importance of the transcendental family the identity of the individual can still be deeply merged in the household to which he belongs" (1958: 155).

In *Japan's New Middle Class* (1963), Ezra Vogel examined the life style of *sararî man* (salaried men), an urban middle-class that grew rapidly from the mid-1950s onward. He noted the general "decline of the ie ideal," but nevertheless contended that "the model of the ie still has an important impact on family behavior" in Japan (Vogel 1963: 165). Vogel described this model as follows:

At the heart of the system was the ie, the single unbroken family line, including both living and dead, and the concept of filial piety. The basic goal of ie members was to care properly for departed ancestors and to preserve the continuity and prosperity of their ie... Family members sacrificed personal pleasures and wants for the ie, not only to gain respect or rewards in this life, but to attain immortality, for the idea of afterlife was contingent on the continuation of the ie. (1963: 165)

It is not mere coincidence that Vogel wrote these words by referring to Nobushige Hozumi's book *Ancestor-Worship and Japanese Law*, published in English in 1912. From the Meiji restoration (1868) onwards, the ie had occupied a central place in the Japanese discourse of cultural identity and nationalism. Represented by the *minpōten ronsō* (the controversy over the Civil Code of 1898), this discourse probably influenced foreign scholars only indirectly and in limited ways, but it is unlikely that they were completely unaffected. Put another way, there was a possible convergence between Japanese and foreign scholars in the formation of the ie model. To demonstrate this, I will discuss below representative Japanese views of the ie, focusing on those put forward in the first half of the twentieth century.

Kunio Yanagita, known as the founder of Japanese folklore studies, regarded the ie as the spiritual foundation of Japan. In *Jidai to Nōsei* (Time and Agricultural Policy, 1910), Yanagita lamented the diluted sense of family continuity among urban people. In the cities, he wrote, people put their individual interests before the long-term interests of their families. He called this behavior *ie goroshi*, literally "killing of the ie," or "domicide." Yanagita further argued that a person's awareness of the relationship with his ancestors makes him recognize the importance of the ie, which Yanagita regarded as a link between the individual and the

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1 This refers to the controversy that occurred after the promulgation in 1890 of the civil code drafted by Gustave E. Boissonade. For a more detailed explanation, see the next section.
state. As he remarked, "The awareness that one's ancestors have respected and served the Imperial House for generations is the foundation of Japanese nationalism and loyalty to the master. Without the ie, it would be difficult to explain to oneself why one should be Japanese" (Yanagita 1997 [1910] : 268). This statement was followed immediately by his criticism of western individualism.

Teizo Toda, the founder of the sociology of the family in Japan, noted the deep respect there for the family genealogy. He contended that this respect springs from the "group spirit" among family members, which he described as kazoku seishin ("family spirit"). Once family spirit is generated, Toda said, it will be perpetuated, despite the constant change in family membership, just as the state has a perpetual existence. According to him, the trans-generational nature of the Japanese family makes it different from the conjugal family in the West. Toda was, however, more empirical than Yanagita. He showed, for example, that the rural families he surveyed in the 1920s usually disappeared after four or five generations. Poverty was mainly responsible for this relatively short life. Toda therefore contended that, with the exception of the nobility and the wealthy, the Japanese do not have an adequate material basis on which to develop a strong family identity (Toda 1926: 247-277).

Eitaro Suzuki, a major figure in Japanese rural sociology, drew on Pitirim Sorokin and attempted to analyze the ie as the Japanese form of "rural family." He was especially impressed with Sorokin's concept of "familism," in which "rural family collectivism" was contrasted with "urban economic individualism." Since Suzuki (1940: 116-138) referred to Sorokin in detail, and since Sorokin's description of the "psycho-social characteristics" of the rural family is strikingly similar to the Japanese personality as described in the ie model, I will quote him at length.

[The rural family's] greater integration means a greater mutual fusion of the personalities of its individual members into one collective family personality. Its members feel, think, act, and behave less individualistically and more collectivistically than those of the urban family. The family "we" occupies in their individual minds a greater place, and the individual "I" is correspondingly less developed, than in the less integrated urban family... [The] the rural family, in order to satisfy its needs and to survive, had to become more disciplined, more integrated, more orderly, and its members have had to show a deeper readiness to sacrifice and to perform their duties. (Sorokin, Zimmerman, and Galpin 1965 [1931] : 13-15, emphasis in original)

Another important aspect of rural society is, according to Sorokin, the "cult of the family and its ancestors" — a view parallel to Yanagita's concerning Japan's national identity. Suzuki, however, did not follow Sorokin uncritically. His originality lay in his conception of the ie as "seishin" (1940: 148), which is best understood as an "ethos." The German word "Geist" (as in

\footnote{All of the quotations from Japanese works that appear in this paper have been translated by the author.}
Volksgeist) is probably closer to Suzuki's *seishin* than the English word "spirit." Central to this conception is the view that the *ie* has "its own will and norms that dictate the unique world of collective experience among family members" (1940: 238).5

In one of his few publications in English, Kizaemon Ariga, best known for his study of the *dôzoku* group in Iwate, identified the *ie* as the Japanese form of family.6 Like his predecessors, Ariga emphasized the *ie* as a collectivity that transcends individuals who compose it at a particular time. As he stated:

In the Japanese family as a peculiarly idealized institution, each member finds his *raison d'être* by contributing toward the maintenance and continuance of the family... In any given period of history, all family members have been expected to contribute to the perpetuation of the family, which is held to be the highest duty of the member. (Ariga 1954: 362)

Ariga carefully noted the various changes that had occurred in the Japanese family since the end of World War II, but these changes "have not gone so far as to abolish the family system itself, in which personal freedom has little room" (1954: 368). He concluded his brief, but influential article by observing that the small-scale farm management in rural Japan contributed to the "stubborn persistence of the family as an institution" (1954: 368).

Chie Nakane's view of the *ie* was parallel to Ariga's in many respects. She strengthened her predecessors' ideas of the *ie* when she remarked as follows at the beginning of her book *Kinship and Economic Organization in Rural Japan* (1967):

**CONCEPT OF IE (HOUSEHOLD)** The primary unit of social organization in Japan is the household. In an agrarian community a household has particularly important functions as a distinct body for economic management... [I]ts sociological importance is such that a household of any kind of composition is regarded as one distinct unit in society, represented externally by its head, and internally organized under his leadership. Once established, a household is expected to remain intact in spite of changes of generations.

In a village community it is the household, not family or kin group, that forms the basis

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5 In the preface to *Suye Mura*, Embree (1939: xxii) expressed his "deep appreciation" to Yanagita and thanked Suzuki for having supplied "much valuable information and advice." He also consulted Hozumi Nobushige's *Ancestor-Worship and Japanese Law* (1912) (Embree 1939: 81).

6 Ariga's article appeared as part of the issue dealing with the "family" in 16 countries or regions in the journal *Marriage and Family Living*. His article begins as follows: "The family in Japan is called 'ie' in Japanese." This statement shows that Ariga defined the *ie* as the Japanese form of family. However, he was not consistent on this point throughout his career. For example, in the preface to *Nihon no Kazoku* (The Japanese Family, 1965), Ariga maintained, as he did previously, that the *ie* may be understood as "the Japanese family." Later, he changed his position, saying that this definition was misleading and blurred the distinction between "ie" and "kazoku." Thus, in the 1972 edition of the book, he changed the book title to *ie* and wrote, "The *ie* is a custom peculiar to Japan, and it is different from the family in the cross-cultural sense of the word."
of social organization. (Nakane 1967a: 1)

Unlike Ariga, Nakane clearly distinguished between "family" and "household," but both scholars discussed the same institution, the *ie*. This difference points to the problems involved in translation, but not to a conceptual disagreement.

At the risk of complicating the argument, some of the salient structural features of the *ie* should be pointed out here. There is general agreement that the structural core of the *ie* is the line of succession between the group's head and his successor. The *ie* continuity emphasized in the foregoing derives from this agreement. As in any other country, succession in Japan's *ie* contains two different elements, accession to the headship and inheritance of group property. The *ie* headship is ordinarily passed on from father to eldest son by the rule of primogeniture, but many alternative strategies exist to maintain the group. For example, when there is no biological son to succeed within the *ie*, a son may be adopted from outside. What distinguishes the *ie* from other family systems in Asia is that there is no strong feeling that the adopted son must be related to the head by blood. This correlates with the absence of a clear-cut distinction between kin and non-kin in traditional Japanese society. It is also reinforced by the relatively loose use of kinship terms in addressing non-kin (Befu 1971: 62-63). Indeed, Yanagita showed that the Japanese words for parents and children, *oya* and *ko*, originally referred to people of "parent-status" and of "child-status," respectively, without regard to the biological relationships involved. As for inheritance, *ie* property is passed on to one child, usually the eldest son, but in some regions, it is inherited by the eldest daughter if she is a first child or by the youngest son. Non-inheriting children receive economic support from their parents when they marry out. In the case of a merchant *ie*, which incorporates unrelated employees as its members, branch shops are often set up for them, and they maintain fictive kinship relationships with the *ie* head and participate in collective, ritual activities. These characteristics suggest that the *ie* is a corporate group, rather than a kinship group, comparable to an economic organization. As the next section shows, the analogy between the *ie* and the Japanese company has emerged from this relatively weak kinship relationship and, conversely, from the function of the *ie* as a managing body.7

At this point, and in connection with the above, I should mention a complication in the Japanese discourse of *ie* that became evident before and after World War II. For more than half a century, covering the years from the mid-Meiji period to Japan's defeat in 1945, the notion of *ie* was pivotal to Japan's *kokutai* (national polity).8 The entire Japanese nation was likened to a huge family, in which all Japanese subjects were considered *sekiishi* (babes) of the

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7 The *ie* has been likened to larger groups, even to the entire Japanese nation, as will be discussed below. Whether the *ie* is a kinship group or a pseudo-kinship group oriented toward the satisfaction of its members' economic needs, has long been debated by anthropologists of Japan. It should be remembered, however, that the *ie* analogy (i.e., the likening of the *ie* to other groups) is effective because the relatively weak blood relationship among *ie* members has made the *ie* a non-exclusive organization open to the larger, outside world. I owe this observation to Mutsuhiko Shima.
Emperor and were taught to serve the Imperial House, if necessary through the ultimate sacrifice of their own lives. In this political ideology known as kazoku kokka (family state), kô (filial piety) and chû (loyalty to the master) were considered identical. The ideology of the family state was given its quintessential expression in Kokutai no Honji (Fundamentals of Our National Polity), published by the Ministry of Education in 1937, which stated, "Our country is a great family nation, and the Imperial Household is the head family of the subjects and the nucleus of national life" (Monbushô Kyôgakukyoku 1978; Tsunoda, Theodore de Bary, and Keene 1964: 282).

Given this history, it is understandable that before the end of World War II, many Japanese intellectuals, including Yanagita, lauded Japan's junpu boku (humane customs and beautiful habits) centered around the ie, whereas there was an almost sudden reversal of attitudes after the war. This took place among so-called "progressive, postwar intellectuals" and represented an outburst of repressed feelings. Among them was the sociologist Tadashi Fukutake. Underlying many of his books was a negative outlook on his defeated nation. He argued that the idea of "doing things for the sake of the family" had been the compelling norm of family life in prewar Japan. Holding the ie system responsible for Japan's social inequality, sexual discrimination, status distinctions between honke (main family) and bunke (branch family), and so forth, Fukutake observed, "[T]he ie system was directly related to the bankruptcy of the imperial family state — itself an extension of the ie. All in all, the defects of the system balanced its virtues" (Fukutake 1982: 28).

Two of the most influential intellectuals in postwar Japan, Masao Maruyama and Takeyoshi Kawashima, made similar observations. In a lecture delivered at the University of Tokyo in 1947, Maruyama stated that the "insistence on the family system" was a "distinctive characteristic of Japanese fascist ideology" (Maruyama 1963: 37). In 1951, he further contended, "Only by destroying the tenacious family structure in Japanese society and its ideology, the very place where the old nationalism ferments, can Japan democratize society from the base up" (1963: 152). Kawashima's view was more radical. In Nihon Shakai no Kazoku-teki Kôsei (The Familial Structure of Japanese Society, 1948), he declared:

* We must remember, however, that the pro-ie discourse did not go unchallenged. For example, many novelists in modern Japan, especially those from shizen shugi (naturalism), attacked the constraints imposed on ie members. The genre called "shi-shasetsu" (the "I-novel") emerged from this tradition. Also, during the Taisho period (1912-1926), characterized by a liberal and democratic intellectual climate, there was a considerable debate about whether "ie familism" should be replaced by "conjugal individualism" which, according to some critics, was better suited to the urban, industrial lifestyle (Morioka 1993). In this context, Marxist Jun Tosaka's critique of "ie analogy" is valuable. Regarding familism as a nationalistic reaction against western individualism, Tosaka maintained that familism is a sort of fukko shugi (archaism). According to him, its primordial appearance disguises the recent origin of this ideology, which he claimed emerged only when Japan's capitalism had reached a relatively high stage of development. Tosaka argued that dento shugi (traditionalism) will eventually destroy the tradition on which it stands (Tosaka 1977 [1935] : 172-185). We may say that Tosaka adumbrated the currently fashionable theory that the ie is a tradition "invented" in modern times (e.g., Ueno 1996). Unfortunately, his critique has almost fallen into oblivion, despite his reputation as the forerunner of contemporary Cultural Studies.
Japanese society consists of families and family-like bonds. The dominant familial principle in Japan conflicts with the principle of democracy. Because they are antithetical to each other, we will never be able to democratize our family life and social life by mixing the two. The familial principle of life tenaciously prevents the democratization of our social life. No democracy would ever be possible without abolishing it... A democratic revolution would definitely require a denial of our mentality and an internal revolution of the mind. Our problems with the family system will only be solved when the pre-modern family consciousness is denied. (Kawashima 1948: 22-25)

This complication in the discourse of ie, triggered by Japan's unconditional surrender in World War II, is virtually absent in the voluminous English-language literature on the same subject.

Since the 1970s, when the impact of urbanization and industrialization began to be felt strongly throughout Japan, interest in village studies has diminished both among Japanese and foreign scholars. Yet, research has continued to this day, perhaps more so in the English-speaking community than in Japan. In the late 1970s, for example, three major re-studies were published: Ronald Dore's *Shinohata* (1978), Edward Norbeck's *Country to City* (1978), and Robert Smith’s *Kurusu* (1978). Change and continuity in the ie and the buraku were documented vividly in these books. In what follows, I will briefly discuss a few more recent studies.

Joy Hendry discussed the ie in most detail in her monograph *Marriage in Changing Japan* (1981), a study of a rural community in Fukuoka. Her central thesis is that marriage in rural Japan is not simply a contract between individuals; rather, it establishes the new couple as members of their household, whether that of honke, or a newly created bunke, that constitutes part of the wider social network in the community. Relations created by marriage are, therefore, not so much between individuals as between households and communities. Furthermore, in her widely used textbook *Understanding Japanese Society* (2nd ed., 1995), Hendry stated, "Continuity is an essential feature of the ie... It is the duty of the living members at any one time to remember their predecessors, and to ensure that the house will continue after they die" (1995: 24).

Okpyo Moon studied a village called Hanasaku in Gunma. This village was seriously affected by the decline of agriculture and depopulation. The situation began to change in the 1960s, however, when a ski resort was opened, followed by the opening of many minshuku (country inns) run by local families. According to Moon, the ideology of ie continuity helped shape the newly developed tourist industry. As she remarked, "[T]he development of a tourist industry in Hanasaku has provided those of its residents who are faced with a potential crisis in household continuity with a positive adaptive approach with which they can manipulate the changing economic situation to their advantage. The household or the ie remains the basic unit of social, political, and religious life in Hanasaku" (Moon 1998: 128). The details of Moon's research are contained in her ethnography *From Paddy Field to Ski Slope* (1989).
Brian Moeran reached the opposite conclusion. In his book *Lost Innocence* (1984), a study of a pottery-making village in Oita, Moeran described the *ie* as "the basic unit of cooperation, and each individual is first and foremost a member of his household" (1984: 50). He argued, however, that Japan's technological advances and economic improvements since the 1960s had brought about the "breakdown of community solidarity" and the "rise of individualism" in the village (1984: 120). This observation is shared with the authors of the three re-studies mentioned above, particularly Smith. Elsewhere, Moeran wrote, "Much of what has been written concerning the household (*ie*), extended household (*dōzoku*) and hamlet (*buraku*) expresses an ideal that may have been true in the past, but is no longer strictly adhered to in practice" (quoted in Moon 1998: 117). Ironically, by arguing that Japanese society used to be collective, but that it has become more individualistic, Moeran attested to the viability of the *ie* model, in which the two ideals are contrasted.

**The *Ie* in Company Studies**

As Japanese capitalism developed rapidly after the war, and the visibility of Japanese corporations increased on the international market, the focus of research utilizing the *ie* model shifted from rural communities to urban companies. Generally, scholars have emphasized the analogy between the *ie* and the company, regarding the latter as an extension of the former in two important respects: (1) The employment pattern in the modern Japanese company has a close structural and ideological relationship with the traditional *ie* management; and (2) The social role played by the *ie* in pre-modern Japan is played by the company in modern times. Robert Cole explained this analogy in his book *Japanese Blue Collar* (1971). As he stated:

Using household-kinship as a model for other social relationships in Japan, we have the following analogy: The head of the household is the father who corresponds to the head of the company, the company is the house and the worker is one of the children under the authority of the parents. In the nationalist parallel the Emperor was the father, the state the house, and the people were members of the family. In the factory, the household-kinship terminology, as legitimating ideology, reinforces the hierarchical relationship of management in a superior and the workers in an inferior status. (Cole 1971: 172)

Today, when so-called "Japanese-style management" is beginning to crumble due to the economic crisis after the collapse of the "bubble economy" in the early 1990s, coupled with the external pressures for globalization, statements like the above sound increasingly hollow. However, at the time when Japan's corporate culture was praised for having contributed to the "economic miracle of the twentieth century," many scholars argued (as some still do) that the Japanese company was committed to the entire lives of their employees, not simply to
that part related to their work. In other words, the Japanese company has been considered not so much a group of individuals bound by contractual relationships into a corporate enterprise as an all-embracing organization in which the employees' whole selves, and even those of their entire families, are immersed.

Japanese businessmen played a considerable role in spreading the idea of "corporate familism" to the western world. For example, in his widely read book Made in Japan (1988), Akio Morita, an internationally renowned businessman who, before his death, was chairman of Sony, remarked as follows in a chapter entitled "ON MANAGEMENT: It's All in the Family":

The most important mission for a Japanese manager is to develop a healthy relationship with his employees, to create a familylike feeling within the corporation, a feeling that employees and managers share the same fate... [T]here has to be mutual respect and a sense that the company is the property of the employees and not of a few top people. But those people at the top of the company have a responsibility to lead that family faithfully and be concerned about the members. We have a policy that wherever we are in the world we deal with our employees as members of the Sony family, as valued colleagues. (Morita 1988: 144-159)

As Kosaku Yoshino (1992) pointed out, Japanese businessmen were avid readers of books in the genre called nihonjinron ("theories of Japaneseess"), which was very popular from the 1960s to the 1980s. When foreigners asked about the "secret" of Japan's economic success, they were offered explanations such as the above, of a kind which strengthened the economic nationalism of postwar Japan. We should note here that the family analogy was used extensively in these explanations.

In the fields of anthropology and sociology, a major focus of research into Japan's corporate culture has been the place of the individual in the group. The relationship between the Japanese company and its employees has often been discussed utilizing the ie model. Thus, studies have emphasized that the collective welfare of a company takes precedence over the individual interests of its workers, even though this means sacrificing their family obligations. Ronald Dore's British Factory-Japanese Factory (1973) is representative. Central to his argument is the contrast between western individualism and Japanese collectivism. Noting the diffused involvement of Japanese workers in their company, Dore contended that when the workers' personal interests conflicted with those of the company, they were expected to sacrifice the former for the latter, and indeed they did so. Such devotion to the group could hardly be expected of the British. As Dore remarked:

This is not just a matter of the demands of the organization. It is partly a reflection of the fact that for all the Japanese concern with "the family" as a corporate group — its ancestry, its honour and its property — less value has been placed in Japan than in
England on the actual quality of personal relations within the family... It is not just that the Japanese system enhances enterprise consciousness; it also — the other side of the coin — does less to develop individualism. Man-embedded-in-organization has no great need to make personal moral choices; the organization's norms set guidelines; the organization's sanctions keep him to the path of virtue. (Dore 1990 [1973]: 211-215)\textsuperscript{9}

In the afterword to the 1990 edition of the book, Dore contended that non-western countries that industrialized later than Japan often lacked "the trained propensity to invest a lot of one's ego in one's membership in secondary groups outside the family and to give priority to those groups' goals over personal goals" (1990 [1973]: 452-453). According to him, this lack has contributed to the failure to establish "an energetic and cooperating working community" in those countries.

Like Dore, Thomas Rohlens argued that in the Japanese bank he studied, called Uedagin, individual interests were considered secondary to those of the company. He went one step farther when he compared the position of senpai (predecessors) in the bank to that of family ancestors. He noted that stories often appeared in the bank magazine recalling the trials and sacrifices of previous generations of workers. These stories served to remind the present generation of their debt to those who went before them. In For Harmony and Strength (1974), Rohlens wrote:

This relationship, one that stretches over time and interlocks different generations, is fundamental to the bank's sense of history, institutional continuity, and social morality. Such intergenerational ties are analogous to the traditional ideal conception of the Japanese household (ie) as a social enterprise existing in time, with each generation benefiting from its parents and ancestors and in turn having the obligation to return these benefits and increase them for their own children and their descendants. (Rohlens 1974: 48)

It is not difficult to detect here the influence of Ruth Benedict's The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1946), in which she discussed the Japanese concept of on (indebtedness; obligation). Rohlens further maintained that the Japanese bank's "organic" worldview was fundamentally different from the western "functionalist" conception of the world. As he commented, "Our 'functionalism' borrows the image of the machine. This mechanical view of organization defines relationships as essentially impersonal. Uedagin 'functionalism' utilizes the image of the 'great family,' thus implying deep personal involvement" (1974: 60).

\textsuperscript{9} At first sight, the sacrifice of family interests for the sake of the company appears to contradict the ie model, but it does not. If anything, it enhances the model's value in explaining Japanese behavior because insofar as the self is subordinated to the group to which it belongs, and dedication to causes greater than the self is praised, sacrificing family interests for the company has the same logical structure as sacrificing personal interests for the family.
Since the books of both Dore and Rohlen were written in the early 1970s, it may be thought that their views are outdated today. Their voices, however, are echoed in recent research. To illustrate this, I will discuss below three major works dealing squarely with corporate familism.

Dorinne Kondo's postmodern ethnography entitled Crafting Selves (1990) contains elegant narratives of the lives of Japanese men and women struggling to maintain the kagyou (family business). One such person Kondo described was a high school student called Masao, an only son of the owner of a small shop in downtown Tokyo. After narrating his anguish over whether he should pursue his own career interests or take over his family business, Kondo said:

The ie is not simply a kinship unit based on blood relationship, but a corporate group based on social and economic ties. Thus, the ie, the household line, and the kagyou, the family enterprise, are of critical moral, social, and emotional importance. They should ideally be carried on in perpetuity, so much so that many alternatives exist to ensure that the household will not die out. The responsibility facing young Masao was thus a daunting one. As the only son and the only child, he carried the weight of history on his shoulders... For the parents with a kagyou to pass on, subordinating one's individual desires to that of the household enterprise takes on the character of moral virtue. Pursuing one's own plans and disregarding the duties toward the household smacks of selfish immaturity. (Kondo 1990: 131)

Another person Kondo described was Mrs. Yokoyama, an attractive middle-aged woman who, one can imagine, could have had her pick of handsome boyfriends, but who married a dull man to carry on her family business of hairdressing. Kondo asked, "Why was the household enterprise so important? How could she so calculatingly sacrifice personal happiness, even for the sake of the ie and the business?" (1990: 137). Here is Kondo's answer to her own question:

[M]arriage within the ie system is above all a mechanism for ensuring the continuity of the ie. Again, considerations of the ie should be given preference over individuals' selfish desires, and where considerable ie resources are at stake (in the form of property, money, or "cultural capital") this tendency will likely be intensified. Individual preference need not be entirely ignored, but it should be a secondary consideration. The continuity and prosperity of the ie should be of utmost importance. Someone who can work well in the family enterprise and who can get along with other family members may be more valued than a person who pleases the spouse alone. If desire and obligation are in conflict, it is duty that should precede desire. (1990: 132)

Crafting Selves has been widely acclaimed in the United States, and its impact has surpassed the small circle of Japan specialists to reach the anthropological community in general.
Curiously, despite the innovative writing style inspired by the "experimental moment" (Marcus and Fischer 1986), Kondo's view of the ie replicates the traditional portrait of the Japanese that has been circulating since the times of Embree and Benedict.

Mathews Hamabata, in Crested Kimono (1990), studied a dōzoku family remotely related to Japan's imperial family, which owns a conglomerate. Like Kondo, he used narrative techniques to describe the personal lives of the family in the areas of succession, authority, marriage, and love. Hamabata showed that despite the legal demise of the ie, it loomed large in the minds of the people he studied in almost every aspect of daily life. He emphasized how individual needs and aspirations were sacrificed to preserve the honor and wealth of the ie, a point made also by Kondo. The ie was thus depicted as a source of both pride and constraint among the members of the elite business family.

Paul Noguchi studied labor-management relations at the Japanese National Railways (JNR), the largest state enterprise in Japan before it was privatized in 1987. In Delayed Departures, Overdue Arrivals (1990), Noguchi showed that JNR's ideology of "one railroad family" meant different things to different employees, depending on their positions in the overall organization. Despite the image of solidarity and harmony projected by the "one house" idiom, JNR was actually conflict-ridden, as the frequent labor strikes showed. Thus, Noguchi emphasized the importance of distinguishing the goals of an organization from the personal aims and aspirations of its employees. Such internal differences were not examined carefully in many previous studies.

The foregoing makes clear that the anthropological and sociological study of Japanese business among English-speaking scholars has commonly employed the analogy between the traditional ie and the contemporary company. What is missing, or at least submerged in the vast literature, is a clear awareness of the "politics of ie" — the fact that the ie has often been manipulated politically and represented as a national symbol in the attempt to establish Japan's cultural distinctiveness.

It is very important to note here two things. First, despite the popular assumption that Japanese-style management developed spontaneously from the values of premodern Japan, it was instituted only around World War I against a politically complex background (Hazama 1989 [1963]). Certainly, the prototype of corporate familism may be found in the kakun (family precepts) of large merchant houses in the Tokugawa period (1603-1867). However, the familism as we know it today was devised more recently as an "antidote" to the labor disputes that erupted at the start of the twentieth century and which later became associated with the

There has been some controversy, both inside and outside Japan, as to the origin of the Japanese-style management. Kunio Odaka (1984) divided the debate into two camps: "immutability" theory and "postwar evolution" theory. Represented in the United States by James Abegglen, the immutable theory traces modern Japanese management to the values of premodern Japan. By contrast, the postwar evolution theory denies this historical continuity, arguing that the Japanese-style management is an artificial system that was introduced among large corporations after World War II in order to compete internationally and to meet the persistent demand by labor unions for job security. Both theories are extreme, however, because the system could not have emerged in a social vacuum, but it could not have remained unaffected by historical changes either.
socialist movement. It was also a device to rationalize the management of large corporations in the process of Japan's capitalist development, which eventually strengthened their competitive power in the world market. Thus, Hiroshi Hazama regarded corporate familism as "invented" in modern times, contending that Japanese capitalists "reinterpret the idea of ie, which was the basis of Japanese society, to suit their purposes and made up a family-like system of management and control" (Hazama 1989 [1963] : 123-124).

Second, the idea of corporate familism developed in conjunction with that of the family state, and they reinforced each other as the ruling ideologies of modern Japan. As mentioned earlier, the legal basis of the ie system was established when the Civil Code of 1898 came into force. Its philosophical basis was expressed most clearly by Nobushige Hozumi, who stated in Ancestor-Worship and Japanese Law (1912): "The nation is considered as forming one vast family, the Imperial House standing at its head as the Principal Family, and all the subjects under it as members of houses which stand in the relation of branch families to the Imperial House" (Hozumi 1973 [1912] : 103, emphasis in original). Compare this idiom of "one vast family" with that of the "one railroad family," an idiom invented by Shinpei Goto. He was the first president of the Southern Manchuria Railway Company, founded in 1906, which played a vital role in Japan's colonial administration of northeastern China. As Goto stated:

I preach that all railroad workers should help and encourage one another as though they were members of one family. A family should follow the orders of the family head and, in doing what he expects of them, always act for the honor and benefit of the family... I attempt to foster among my 90,000 employees the idea of self-sacrificing devotion to their work. I also preach the principle of loving trust. I teach them that they should face things and other men with love and trust. (Quoted in Noguchi 1990: 83)

Corporate familism dovetailed with the family-state ideology not simply in organizational structure. Being contrasted with western individualism to emphasize the "virtue" of Japanese collectivism, it also played an essential role in Japan's cultural nationalism. The minpōten ronsō mentioned earlier revolved around the legitimacy of a civil code drafted by Gustave E. Boissonade, a French professor of law hired by the Japanese government. In 1878, he wrote a progressive civil code based on the Napoleonic Code of 1804; the Japanese code was promulgated in 1890 and was to take effect in 1893. There was, however, strong opposition by conservative critics, among whom was Yatsuka Hozumi, Nobushige's brother. He and his associates maintained that the Boissonade Code, as it was known, was founded on western individualism, which, in their view, was derived from Christianity. Thus, they denounced the Boissonade Code as detrimental to Japan's tradition centered on the worship of the ancestors (and, by implication, of the Emperor). As Yatsuka Hozumi declared in an influential article

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11 Significantly, this view was expressed two decades before the publication of The Invention of Tradition (Hobsbawm and Raniger 1983).
written in 1891, "The Boissonade Code would annihilate the Japanese virtue of loyalty and filial piety." In the end, the conservatives won the dispute, and their views were reflected strongly in the Civil Code of 1898.\textsuperscript{12}

The same reasoning was observed in the discourse of business elites who advocated corporate familism. For example, laborers' demands for better working conditions were realized in the Factory Law of 1911 only after repeated attempts by the capitalists to abort it. In 1903, the Chamber of Commerce adopted a resolution, which stated that legal constraints on corporate freedom would prevent Japan from catching up with the western powers in the industrial race; furthermore, making laws to regulate labor-management relations would destroy Japan's "beautiful tradition of paternalism" (Hazama 1989 [1963] : 104). Paternalism was conceived of as a benevolent custom incompatible with the western managerial system based on individual rights and duties. Also, the Japanese government's plan to establish a Labor Union Law was opposed by a group of capitalists, who filed a statement in 1930 containing the following arguments: (1) Japan is not a nation of individualism. The labor-management relationships in our country are characterized by mutual respect for harmony. This is why they have not been damaged by the cold, inhumane individualism of the West. (2) In Japan, there is mutual trust, love, and harmony between labor and management. Instead of struggles, we have cooperation. Instead of rights, we have paternalism. (3) The labor unions we have today are imitations of those in the West. Their extreme behavior threatens Japan's economic structure (Hazama 1989 [1963] : 132). It is safe to say that the \textit{ie} or familism was exploited by the ruling class as an ideology to legitimate their power, while masking their interests. A Labor Union Law was not put into effect until after World War II, when democratic reforms were carried out under the regime of General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP).\textsuperscript{13}

It should be noted that the discourse of nationalism is, like any other discourse, "multivocal" and contains contradictory elements. The fact that corporate familism was occasionally criticized in newspaper commentaries attests to this point. For example, in 1929, one journalist wrote, "Even though the distinctive employment relationships in our country may be considered an extension of familism, this familism cannot be maintained forever in a pristine form" (Hazama 1989 [1963] : 142). The question, then, is this: why does one voice become privileged over others, and sometimes over all the others, so as to attain hegemonic

\textsuperscript{12} Despite the conservative character, the Civil Code of 1898 contained modern elements that reflected the strong western influence in Meiji Japan. For example, before 1898, family property had been considered collective property belonging to the family itself, not to any specific individual. After 1898, however, it was registered in the family head's individual name. In order to argue that the \textit{ie} is an invented tradition (e.g., Ueno 1996), we need to examine carefully both continuity and discontinuity between the pre-Meiji \textit{ie} and the Meiji \textit{ie}. Although we tend to think of the Meiji \textit{ie} when discussing the \textit{ie}, it was not the same with the pre-Meiji \textit{ie}. In other words, the Meiji \textit{ie} was a modern version of the Japanese \textit{ie} that had existed since early feudal times. For a classic study of the legal system in Tokugawa Japan, see Kaoru Nakata (1984 [1912] ).

\textsuperscript{13} For detailed English descriptions of the controversy over the Factory Law and the Labor Union Law, see Andrew Gordon (1985).
status, and how this is accomplished?\textsuperscript{14} I would submit that codification is a major factor in making a tradition into a powerful force, whether it is "invented" or not.\textsuperscript{15}

Also, in developing countries, including prewar Japan, the discourse of nationalism tends to stress the "spirit" of the people. As Hans Kohn (1944) and others suggested,\textsuperscript{16} developing countries in modern times have often constructed a cultural nationalism that stresses their distinctiveness and even spiritual superiority over rivals that are materially more powerful. This is almost inevitable, for the nationalist discourse is that of the defeated (usually the colonized) in the modern world system, thus taking on the character of a counter-narrative that challenges the victor. Being inferior materially, they have exploited their spiritual resources, often engaging in the "invention of tradition" (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). In this process, persons or things that are believed to represent their once glorious past are selected as collective symbols, around which they rally to defend their cultural and national identity. The \textit{ie} has been one such symbol. In passing, the pitfall of cultural nationalism lies in the fact that, whereas it gives confidence and pride to the vanquished, it also helps in the suppression of minority groups among them because nationalist discourse in the developing world is ordinarily constructed by local elites. Thus, Japan's corporate familism failed to support part-time employees, to say nothing of female workers, and the family state sacrificed many of the Emperor's subjects.

After Japan's defeat in World War II, corporate familism was labeled as "feudalistic" and attacked by more than a few scholars. It was, however, not subjected to criticisms as harsh as those directed against the family-state ideology. This is probably due to the rapid recovery of Japan's economy, which elicited favorable comments from western observers concerning Japanese-style management. James Abegglen's \textit{The Japanese Factory} (1958) played a pioneering role in this reappraisal. But the most influential book was Ezra Vogel's \textit{Japan as Number One} (1980), in which the author attributed Japan's phenomenal success to its distinctive style of business management. The Japanese were so flattered that Kunio Odaka (1984) was forced to issue a warning that much of what had been said by foreigners was a "myth."

With regard to Japanese anthropologists' contributions, Kizaemon Ariga's study is classic. As mentioned previously, he regarded the \textit{ie} as a perpetual entity that transcends the

\textsuperscript{14} Stein Tønnesson and Hans Antlov (1996: 18) offered this insight: "Every nation has several possible histories... One promising route of inquiry is to look at the several possible nations which could have emerged from a given ethnic or political formation, and then ask why one of them won out."

\textsuperscript{15} Japan has many examples of the "invention of tradition," for manipulation of the past for present purposes is particularly well developed in this country. However, invented traditions that have been prescribed in the law, such as the \textit{ie} system, and those that have not been prescribed have completely different impacts on social life.

\textsuperscript{16} In \textit{The Idea of Nationalism} (1944), Hans Kohn distinguished between the "political, rational" nationalism in the West and the "cultural, mystical" nationalism in the East. This distinction was further developed by later theorists, among whom is Anthony Smith (1991), who contrasted the Western, "civic-territorial" model of the nation with the Eastern "ethnic-genealogical" model. Partha Chatterjee (1986) utilized John Plamenatz's distinction between "western" nationalism and "eastern" nationalism in his discussion of nationalist ideas in the developing world.
individuals who compose it at a particular time. From this view was derived his definition of the ie as a seikatsu shūdan, a group formed through living together (Ariga 1969: 393). As is well known, the distinctiveness of Ariga's theory lies in his assertion that the ie is not a ketsuen shūdan (group of people related by blood), but consists of people, both kin and non-kin, who live and work together to sustain themselves and, ultimately, to perpetuate the collectivity's keifu (genealogy). Ariga maintained that the status of ie members is determined by their functional roles in maintaining the group and that positions within the ie may be filled by any competent person recruited from outside. His concept of ie is analogous to the functional, economic view of "household," understood as a task-oriented residential unit that comprises both relatives and non-relatives who live together to perform common activities directed toward the satisfaction of needs (Netting, Wilk, and Arnould 1984: xx).

Seiichi Kitano took exception to Ariga's view. Drawing on Teizo Toda's theory of shōkazoku (small family), which emphasized the family bond arising from the members' trust and affection toward each other, Kitano argued that the family consists of only a small group of kinship members, centered on husband, wife, and children, who are bound by close emotional ties. He therefore excluded people like servants from the family. Kitano criticized Ariga severely, saying that the Japanese family as conceptualized by Ariga is no different from a jigyō dantai (enterprise group) (Kitano 1976: 146). This debate, known as the "Ariga-Kitano controversy," marked a crucial moment in postwar research on the ie and the Japanese family. At the heart of the disagreement was the tension between Ariga's functional approach to the ie ("household") and Kitano's emphasis on the affective relationships among kazoku ("family") members.

Significantly, it is the analogy between the ie and the "enterprise group" that was embraced in the study of corporate familism, for it is readily applicable to the analysis of companies, especially those that grew out of dōzoku networks. The dōzoku is ordinarily understood as a "federation of ie" based on the hierarchical relations between a single honke (the main ie) and its bunke (the branch ie). It is, however, important to note that the ie principle may apply well to small and medium-sized companies, but that it loses its utility once organizations exceed the optimal size. Ariga in fact maintained that there are

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17 Ariga classified ie members into two categories: (1) chokkei (persons related in the line of succession), and (2) bōkei (persons outside the line of succession). The patriarch and his successor belong to the first category and have a higher status than the successor's siblings, who are grouped together with non-kin members, such as nago (tenants) and servants, into the second category. Their differential treatment has been justified in the name of common good, namely, the collective welfare of the ie and the perpetuation of its line (genealogy).

18 In terms of composition, Toda's "small family" roughly corresponds to George Murdock's "independent nuclear family." Toda's theory was proposed in his book Kazoku Kōzō (Family Structure), published in 1937. To explain Toda's theory, Kitano used expressions like kazoku ketsugō (family bond), kanjō-teki yūgō (emotional identification), jinkaku-teki gōtsuka (fusion of personalities), nai-teki taido (internal state of the mind), etc. Clearly, Kitano stressed the psychological, affective aspects of family relationships, as opposed to Ariga's functional approach. The Ariga-Kitano controversy is said to have contributed to the subsequent bifurcation of family studies into anthropology, ethnology, and folklore studies, on the one hand, and the sociology of family, on the other.
limitations in the way the ie may be used as the basis of modern, large corporations. As he observed:

In the Meiji and Taisho periods [1868-1926], when Japan's capitalism grew, management of new enterprises had to be based on that found in the ie. All zaibatsu [conglomerates] in modern Japan developed into large business organizations through this principle. As they developed, however, they had to transcend the ie, and this means that there were limitations in the way the ie could function as the basis of large-scale enterprises. Large corporations have overcome these limitations by denying the principle of ie, but they have used the ie as their symbol, that is, as their spiritual backbone. (Ariga 1972: 31)

Ariga expressed this duality as the "negation and affirmation of the ie."

The first chapter of Chie Nakane's *Japanese Society* (1970), one of the most influential books in the study of Japan, is essentially an elaboration on Ariga's theory.19 Although seldom noted explicitly, not even by Nakane, her concept of "frame" (ba), as contrasted with "attribute" (shikaku), arises from Ariga's concept of *seikatsu shūdan*. This is obvious when we examine how Nakane analyzed Japanese organizational behavior.

Neither "attribute" nor "frame" has been defined precisely, but the former refers to the "quality" (shitsu) of a person (Nakane 1967b: 28), whether ascribed or achieved, such as being a member of a descent group or being a professor. The latter, on the other hand, refers to "a locality, an institution or a particular relationship which binds a set of individuals into one group" (Nakane 1970: 1). Thus, being a member of X village and being a professor at Z University are frames. In Nakane's mind, the ie is the archetype of "frame." Arguing that group consciousness is highly developed in Japan, she stated, "The essence of this firmly rooted, latent group consciousness in Japanese society is expressed in the traditional and ubiquitous concept of ie, the household, a concept which penetrates every nook and cranny of Japanese society" (Nakane 1970: 4). She went on to argue:

[T] he ie is a corporate residential group and, in the case of agriculture or other similar enterprises, ie is a managing body. The ie comprises household members (in most cases the family members of the household head, but others in addition to family members may be included), who thus make up the units of a distinguishable social group. In other words, the ie is a social group constructed on the basis of an established frame of residence and often of management organization. What is important here is that the

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19 This chapter corresponds to the second chapter of the Japanese original Tate *Shakai no Kosō* (The Structure of a Vertical Society). Non-Japanese readers should remember that there are many differences between the English and Japanese versions. The former is more technical and conceptually precise than the latter, which is intended for a general audience. As for the parallel between Ariga's view of the ie and Nakane's, Chapter 3 of Nozomu Kawamura (1982) is useful.
human relationships within this household group are thought of as more important than all other human relationships. (Nakane 1970: 4 - 5 )

It is not difficult to detect Ariga's influence here. First, the original Japanese phrase for the "corporate residential group" is seikatsu kyōdōtai (literally, "collaborative living group") (Nakane 1967b: 34), which Ariga used often in conjunction with seikatsu shūdan. Second, the idea of ie as a "managing body" accords with Ariga's functional, economic approach. Third, and most importantly, the view that the ie comprises non-family members was emphasized repeatedly by Ariga, as we have seen. This is, of course, not to deprecate the values of Nakane's contributions. Her ingenuity lies in having shown the international significance of Japanese anthropology by relating it to British structural functionalism.\(^2\)

Nakane's study of the ie has had a strong impact because, like Ariga's, it has wide ramifications in the study of Japanese society, especially that of corporate familism. To summarize in her own words:

To sum up, the principles of Japanese social group structure can be seen clearly portrayed in the household structure. The concept of this traditional institution, ie, still persists in the various group identities which are termed uchi, a colloquial form of ie. These facts demonstrate that the formation of social groups on the basis of fixed frames remains characteristic of Japanese social structure. (Nakane 1970: 7 )

In terms of the complication in Japanese attitudes toward the ie before and after World War II, which we discussed in the previous section, Nakane represented a major turning point in postwar intellectual history. As she suggested in the introduction to Tate Shakai no Kōzō (The Structure of a Vertical Society, 1967), on which Japanese Society is based, Nakane's thesis was originally a challenge to modernization theory and, to a lesser extent, Marxism. She remarked that Japanese scholars had customarily labeled indigenous customs that did not conform to the western pattern as "undeveloped" or "legacies of the feudal past." According to Nakane, this view was based on the premise that if Japan industrialized fully, its social structure would resemble that of the West. She flatly rejected this premise, saying, "Obviously, this view not only depends on a simplistic theory of development, but also derives from the deeply instilled sense of inferiority among modern Japanese intellectuals vis-à-vis the West. They can only think of the West as an advanced civilization higher up on the evolutionary ladder" (Nakane 1967b: 18).

From this perspective, we realize that Nakane's position was a dramatic reversal of the dominant intellectual trend in postwar Japan. Before Nakane (and a few others of her persuasion), the ie had been considered the source of social ills in Japan. Indeed, it was a

\(^{2}\) Nakane's comparison of Japan with India, on which was based the idea of tate (verticality), as opposed to yoko (horizontality), was also novel. I thank Motoi Suzuki for having pointed this out to me.
symbol of the old Japan at a time when sweeping social reform was taking place to democratize and modernize the country. After Nakane, however, the ie came to be seen as the moral fiber of Japanese corporations that helped elevate Japan's status to that of an economic power comparable to the West. Thus, the astonishing postwar recovery of the Japanese economy brought about a complete change in the people's evaluation of the ie. Tamotsu Aoki put it well when he observed that the Japanese reading public hailed Nakane's book because "it presented a theory that positively assessed the 'success' of Japan's modernization, especially the 'groupism' of Japanese corporations, in terms of the essence of 'Japanese blood'" (Aoki 1990: 90).

In this context, the influence of some leading American scholars should also be considered. For example, Robert Bellah, in his book Tokugawa Religion (1985 [1957]), regarded the Shinshū sect of Buddhism in the early eighteenth century as the closest Japanese analogue of the Protestant Ethic, suggesting that Japan's rapid modernization was owed to traditional values. Similarly, Edwin Reischauer (1965), a Harvard historian who assumed the post of ambassador to Japan in 1961, saw parallels in the evolution of Japan and Western Europe. Criticizing the Marxist approach to history, he maintained that the feudal experience in the two regions, far from hindering the modernization process, facilitated it. Like Abegglen, these scholars were instrumental in bringing about a more positive self-appraisal in Japan, beginning in the mid-1960s (Aida 1967; Aoki 1990: 76-79). Here, again, we can see the convergence between mainstream Japanese and western (especially American) scholars.

Perhaps the most ambitious attempt ever made to explain Japan's business management system, together that of the whole of Japanese society, is that of Yasusuke Murakami, Shunpei Kumon, and Seizaburo Sato, the authors of Bunmei to shite no Ie Shakai (Ie Society as Civilization, 1979). This awe-inspiring 600-page book was summarized in English by Murakami, under the title, "Ie Society as a Pattern of Civilization" (1984). The ie as conceptualized by Murakami has four major features: (1) "kin-tract-ship"; (2) stem lineality; (3) functional hierarchy; and (4) near-independence or autonomy. "Kin-tract" is a word coined from "kinship" and "contract" after Francis Hsu's important book Iemoto (1975). According to Hsu, it refers to "the fact that the criteria for recruitment to the iemoto are more flexible than to the kinship group but that once the relationship is entered into it becomes as binding as in

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21 Aoki classified the development of postwar nihonjinron into four periods. In the first period (1945-1954), Japan's tradition was totally discredited—a reflection of the negative self-esteem damaged by Japan's defeat in World War II. In the second period (1955-1963), when Japan entered the period of "high economic growth," Japan's relative merits were recognized. The third period is divided into two parts. In the first half (1964-1976), Japan's tradition began to be evaluated positively, and it was often exploited to explain Japan's cultural identity and economic success. Both Nakane's Japanese Society and Takeo Doi's The Anatomy of Dependence (1973) were published in this period. In the second half of the third period (1977-1983), the positive tone of arguments was strengthened, and Japan's status as the world's economic power was explained in terms of Japan's uniqueness. In the last period (from 1984 to 1990, when Aoki's book was published), the search for a new cultural identity began as Japan entered the age of kokusaika (internationalization).
kinship" (Hsu 1975: 237). "Stem lineality" refers to the principle of the "stem succession line," which guarantees the subsistence of ie members and their descendants. "Functional hierarchy" leads to the "vertical" organization of the ie, but unlike "status hierarchy" in the Indian caste system, it fosters solidarity and homogeneity within the group. "Near-independence or autonomy" refers to the fact that throughout the historical cycle of the ie, some ie organizations possessed the material basis for self-sufficiency (e.g., the Tokugawa daimyō) and were able to function as autonomous groups within certain limits.

Murakami considered Japan's modern management system a "variant of the ie-type organization," contending that the four features of ie are found, respectively, in lifetime employment, the perpetuation of the company, the seniority wage and promotion system, and the intra-company welfare system and company-based labor union (1984: 357). He further maintained that the ie is capable of replicating itself into larger organizations — a point made also by Ariga and Nakane. He acknowledged, however, that the ie principle may not be applied to political entities as effectively as to economic ones. As he remarked, "[T]he ie organization has its own size limitation... The society as a whole has, at every attempt, obviously been beyond the optimal size for the ie principle" (1984: 362).

Takie Sugiyama Lebra made the same observation. In her critique of Murakami's article, she pointed out the "limited capacity of the ie for sociopolitical integration" and wrote:

An ie-based polity appears destined to disintegrate, and the history of the ie cycle seems more like a concatenation of mini-cycles of organizational failures than of successes... More importantly, the ie was undermined internally by the ie principle itself. The ie organization is effective only for a relatively small group, best exemplified by the Togoku [Eastern] warrior-developer corps, but is inept at embracing a large jurisdiction. Hence as long as the ie model was adhered to, every attempt at national unification was bound to fail. (Lebra 1985: 63)

These statements point to the downside of the ie, as well as the danger of a nationalist discourse utilizing the ie as Japan's spiritual backbone. The prewar family state was highly artificial, to say the least.

The Ie in the Controversy over the Two-Surname Family

The ie system that had been laid down in the Civil Code of 1898 was formally abolished when the Code was revised shortly after World War II. Yet the ie consciousness — a set of ideas and attitudes derived from the system — is far from extinct, as is clear from many people's concern with family continuity as symbolized by the family name and the family tomb. The fact that the Imperial Code of 1947 contains major elements of the ie system, most notably, succession to the headship by the eldest son (or to the throne by the Crown Prince) clearly
attests to the lasting symbolism of the ie. Moreover, the ie that has evolved over the long course of Japanese history is not synonymous with the ie system that was codified in the nineteenth century. Contrary to the common assumption that the ie is defunct, it is very much alive both as a cultural ideal and as a social organization.

In this section, I shift attention from the ie model to Japan's cultural identity and nationalism and take up as a case study the current debate on fūfu bessei, the two-surname family. No attempt will be made, however, to give a detailed analysis, for my objective is to demonstrate the contemporary significance of the ie for the Japanese. I therefore limit myself to examining how the ie has been appropriated to establish and maintain Japan's national identity, especially in opposition to western individualism.22

Literally meaning "husband and wife assuming separate surnames," fūfu bessei was proposed to help cope with the various changes that have taken place in the Japanese family since the end of the war. Among the most notable changes are (1) the rapid increase in the number of working women that began in the mid-1960s, and (2) the spread of a sense of sexual inequality among women, especially professionals, about the custom of changing surnames after marriage. It has been claimed that this custom is against Article 24 of the Japanese Constitution, promulgated in 1946, which stipulates that the individual should be respected in family life and that husband and wife hold equal rights. As specified in Article 750 of the Civil Code of 1947, "Husband and wife assume the surname of the husband or wife in accordance with the agreement made at the time of marriage." In reality, however, women are usually required to change their surnames to those of their husbands upon marriage. Even though they may continue to use their maiden names as tsuishō (aliases), these names are not acknowledged officially. When working women constituted a small minority of the population, this posed no serious problem, but as their number increased, it became a major social concern.

To cope with this situation, and to comply with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which the Japanese government signed in 1985, an advisory committee to the Minister of Justice was set up in 1991 to investigate the issue. In February 1996, the committee submitted a final proposal recommending to the government that fūfu bessei should be legalized and written into the Civil Code. However, much of the investigation and discussion was conducted out of public view, and when the government's plan to revise the Code was made public, it invited strong opposition from conservative politicians and intellectuals. They quickly acted in concert to prevent the proposal from being presented to the Diet. The government apparently expected no such opposition and handled it ineptly. As the result, the proposal was withdrawn, and in mid-2001 it still remained pending, despite repeated attempts to put it back on the parliamentary agenda.

Besides the alleged sexual discrimination, the controversy involves many other elements, including different conceptions of the family, and, ultimately, of the individual and society. It

22 For an excellent anthropological analysis of the controversy over fūfu bessei, see Ichiro Numazaki (1997).
has thus taken on an ideological character. Significantly, the *ie* has been referred to, whether positively or negatively, by both sides of the controversy, sometimes highlighted as the major focus of contestation. Representative arguments for and against *füfu bessei* are described below.

Perhaps the best-known advocate of *füfu bessei* is Mizuho Fukushima, a lawyer and member of the Diet (the House of Councilors) since 1998. Fukushima described her book, *Kekkon to Kazoku* (Marriage and Family, 1992), as an attempt to "identify prescriptions and problems arising from the 'ie system' that lurks in the Civil Code of 1947" (1992: iii). She supports *füfu bessei* for three reasons. First, a person's name has legally been acknowledged as part of his or her "identity," and the current one-surname family system violates this rule. Second, the one-surname family is the source of many "inconveniences and disadvantages" to women, who are virtually forced to change their surnames upon marriage. Third, the one-surname family system helps promote the existing inequality between men and women, thus preserving the *ie* system that is supposed to have disappeared. Fukushima contended that the introduction of a two-surname family system will change people's views of marriage from one that carries the legacies of the *ie* system to one in which husband and wife form an association as independent individuals (1992: 141-158).

According to Fukushima, the *ie* consciousness persists because it is supported by the *koseki* (family registry) system, which utilizes the family as the unit for personal identification. In this system, a person is identified not as an individual, but as the family head's "eldest son" (who used to be the only son to inherit), "second son" (who used not to inherit), and so on. Thus, Fukushima argued that it not only reproduces the same hierarchical relationships within the family as did the *ie* system, but that it also restricts the freedom of individual action. Furthermore, by recording the profiles of all family members in a single book, the *koseki* provides the state with a means of political control. For these reasons, Fukushima proposed to abolish the *koseki*. As she stated, "In order to eliminate the *ie* system and establish individualism, the family registry should be replaced with individual registration. From the standpoint of the equality of the sexes and individual dignity, the Civil Code should be revised to install an individually based system of registration" (p. 172).

Fukushima is widely regarded as a propagandist for the *füfu bessei* movement. Her remarks such as the above have provoked many conservative critics, who have fought back fiercely. In January 1996, for example, shortly before the proposal for *füfu bessei* was to be submitted to the Diet, Masakuni Murakami took up the issue at a plenary session in the House of Councilors and expressed his concern. He maintained that *füfu bessei* would weaken family ties and eventually break up the family (*The Mainichi Newspaper*, February 8, 1996). Murakami had been a House member since 1986, and had assumed many important positions, including that of Minister of Labor.23 He described his views on *füfu bessei* in more detail in a pamphlet entitled "*Füfu Dösei wa Ai o Hagukumi, Toku o Hirogeru Nihon no Bunka*" (The Single-Surname Family is an Element of Japanese Culture that Nurtures Love and Spreads Virtue) (Murakami 1996).
Murakami stated at the beginning that the proponents of *fūfu bessei* aim to destroy the family and to spread individualism. As he wrote, "They always emphasize 'individual dignity' and the 'essential equality of the sexes.' By following these principles faithfully, they intend to create a thoroughly 'individuated society'" in Japan (Murakami 1996: 6 ). He further maintained that the proposed revision of the Civil Code was based on individualism, which stresses the individual's rights, taking the satisfaction of individual needs and desires as prior to the fulfillment of family duties. Murakami said that this attitude would destroy the family in the end. In his view, children would suffer most seriously from the broken family. He referred to the high divorce rate in the United States to illustrate how children have been victimized. He then remarked:

Recently, divorce has become common in our country. Should the system of *fūfu bessei* be introduced to satisfy the people who insist on individual dignity, the divorce rate in our country will be as high as in the West. It is obvious that the family will be destroyed and that the children will fall prey to a radical "individualism."(Murakami 1996: 9)

The West is regarded as a negative model, and its tradition of individualism is held responsible for the social problems there. This viewpoint has been repeated by other critics, as we will see.

Murakami labeled Japan's "traditional family" as part of a "culture deeply rooted in our country" and expressed his determination to defend it from western individualism. The "traditional family" he mentioned refers to the *ie*, or approximates to it, as is clear from his emphasis on the importance of the "vertical line of life" [genealogy], which he argued has been handed down from the ancestors. In his mind, a family without ancestral rituals and tombs would be no more than a "collection of individuals, which hardly deserves the name of family" (1996: 11-13). It is also a step towards the disintegration of the state. He concluded with the following peroration:

I believe that protecting the family, as a growing treasure, will contribute toward defending Japan's national history and tradition, thus transmitting it to our successors in the future... There is something immutable, despite the change in time and personnel — the "vertical flow of life" [genealogy] running through our national history, culture, and tradition. We must think about politics by situating ourselves firmly in that flow.

(Murakami 1996: 22-23)

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21 In late 2000, Murakami was involved in a political scandal and was forced to step down as a member of the Diet.
24 Murakami's views remind us of *Kokutai no Hongi* (Fundamentals of Our National Polity), issued in 1937, which denounced individualism as the source of intellectual and social disorder in the West. As mentioned earlier, Western individualism was contrasted with Japan's familism centered on Emperor worship, which in turn was defined as the "essence" of Japan's national polity.
Political statements like Murakami's have been theoretically buttressed by the writings of conservative intellectuals. Among them is Kazoku no Shiso (The Philosophy of the Family, 1998), written by Nobuyuki Kaji, president of Koshien Junior College. Referring to Samuel Huntington's idea of the "clash of civilizations," Kaji predicts that in the twenty-first century, Japan will experience an internal clash between "Confucian familism" and "Christian individualism." From this viewpoint, the controversy over fūfu bessei represents the battleground between people who honor Japan's tradition and people who espouse western values. Kaji criticizes advocates of fūfu bessei because, according to him, their "hatred of the ie system" arises from their "unqualified praise for individualism."

Many Japanese conservatives have attacked the Constitution of 1946 because they regard it as having been "imposed" by the SCAP regime during the Occupation period. With fūfu bessei, their prime target is Article 24, which stipulates individual dignity and the equality of the sexes in family life. Not surprisingly, Kaji describes the Constitution as tenka no akuhō ("the worst law ever"). He argues that the major fault with the Constitution lies in its individualistic principle, which he holds responsible for Japan's social problems today. As Kaji says, when individualism was introduced into Japan in the middle of the nineteenth century, it clashed with Japan's traditional values. But it was gradually accepted as a modern, progressive idea, whereas indigenous ideas, including familism, came to be regarded as premodern, feudalistic values to be eradicated. "Of course, individualism did not spread immediately. But the Japanese Constitution, a product of Japan's defeat in the war, idealized it. Consequently, Section 4 of the Civil Code, pertaining to 'family and kinship,' was revised completely so as to conform to the individualistic principle. The ideal of familism contained in the old Civil Code was rejected" (1998: 177). Kaji goes on to argue that an individualism divorced from the original Christian context is no more than egoism. According to him, this egoism is represented by the "unrestrained enjoyment of freedom" in American society, where people live a "beastly life."

Kaji asks, "What kind of culture did the Japanese have before westernization?" His answer is "Confucian familism." Tracing the origin of the conflict between western individualism and Japanese familism back to the minpoten ronsō (the controversy over the Civil Code of 1898), Kaji praises Yatsuka Hozumi for his insight into the fundamental differences between the Christian and Confucian worlds. As already mentioned, Hozumi declared that the Boissonade Code would annihilate the Japanese virtues of loyalty and filial piety. Kaji substitutes "Christian individualism" for the "Boissonade Code," and "Confucian familism," for "loyalty and filial piety." He summarizes his argument as follows:

In the Christian world of Europe and America, where there is a tradition of individualism, a pair consisting of a man and a woman forms a family as a contract between two individuals. By contrast, the core of Confucian culture is ancestor worship. Confucian familism defines the family/home as a "sacred" relationship/place in which the "continuity of life" inherited from one's ancestors is realized. This is what is meant by the
"philosophy of the family" in the Confucian world. (Kaji 1998: 189)

Another conservative intellectual who has fiercely attacked ふふ正派  is Yatsuhiro Nakagawa, professor of political science at the prestigious Tsukuba University and author of more than ten books. In Kuni ga Horobiru (The Fall of Our Nation, 1997), Nakagawa criticizes proponents of ふふ正派 for aiming to destroy both the marriage system and the institution of the family. Decrying the moral decay among young Japanese, Nakagawa attributes it to the disappearance of discipline and moral education in the family. In his mind, this signals the "regression" of the Japanese family, from something noble and civilized until the Civil Code was revised in 1947, to something barbaric, beastly, and uncivilized since then. As he maintains:

The family's spine is the discipline and moral education given by the father (parents) to his (their) children. A family without it could not be civilized; it is doomed to degenerate into a barbaric, animal-like family. Considering the present-day situation, it should be obvious that the Civil Code of 1898 was far more civilized than the current Code of 1947. Look at the Japanese family which is crumbling like scattered sand. See the crowd of girls who speak and behave vulgarly and those young Japanese without vigor and character. The postwar Civil Code has failed. It has proved to be harmful and wrong. On the other hand, the old Civil Code that was adopted in Meiji times was an admirable law possessed of a progressive spirit... How to rejuvenate the family is an urgent problem that Japan will face in the twenty-first century. Without the "ie," which functions as the bulwark of 介 [family life] , it would be impossible to prevent the collapse of the Japanese family. We should waste no time to modify and revise the postwar Civil Code, so that some of the excellent clauses in the prewar Civil Code may be brought back to life. (Nakagawa 1997: 127-128)

It is unclear what these "excellent clauses" refer to, but the notion of family continuity is central to Nakagawa's view. He blames advocates of ふふ正派 for having failed to address the question of afterlife, and remarks:

The idea of ふふ正派 is based on a dogmatic belief. It neither allows us to honor our "ancestors" (the past) nor considers it morally correct to take responsible action for our "descendants" (the future). The advocates are egoists who satisfy their own desires before anything else on the false assumption that the "living" can possess and consume everything in their own generation. They believe in what may be called the "absolute good of the present (the living)." (Nakagawa 1997: 100-101)

Nakagawa then declares, "The family perpetuates itself by being linked with the past. The family is the source of Japan's life. We must never let it dry up" (1997: 128). This recalls us to
Yanagita's indignation over "domicide" — the murder of the ie. Yanagita also regarded the ie as Japan's spiritual foundation.\footnote{Yanagita's view of the ie as expressed in *Jidai to Nôsei* (1910) resonates with the moral teaching, called *shûshin*, given in the prewar Japanese school. The fourth lesson in the *shûshin* textbook published in 1913 was entitled "ie," and it contained this passage: "We are descendants of our ancestors, and we will be ancestors of our own descendants. Therefore, we have obligations to both our ancestors and descendants. We should elevate our family name by disciplining ourselves and behaving correctly, not just to discharge our obligations to our ancestors, but also for the benefit of our remote descendants" (*Kôto Shôgaku Shûshin-cho*, volume 1, page 10). These bi-directional obligations lie at the basis of Yanagita's concept of the ie as a trans-generational entity. Because Nakagawa called for a revival of the Civil Code of 1898, which had instituted the ie system, it is no coincidence that his outlook resembled that of Yanagita. Significantly, the writings of conservative critics like Nakagawa laid the ground for the strong nationalistic sentiments lurking in the middle school textbooks of history and social studies prepared by a group called "Atarashii Rekishi Kyôkasho o Tsukuru-kai" (Society for Making New History Textbooks). In the spring of 2001, a heated international dispute occurred concerning the adoption of this group's textbooks.}

The above represents just a few of the views from the on-going debate on *fûfu bessei* and does not exhaust the relevant literature. It does clarify, however, the contemporary significance of the ie in the Japanese notions of nation, culture, and morality. It is, in fact, surprising that over half a century after its legal demise, there is still such strong support for the ie system and a vehement call for its revival. Also, it is worth noting that since the late nineteenth century, the attempt to search for Japan's distinctiveness has revolved around the (supposed) contrast between familism and individualism.

Interestingly, the *fûfu bessei* controversy has evolved in much the same way as the *minpô-ten ronsô* did. The debates resemble each other in the following ways. First, in both cases, the government took the initiative in introducing or revising the Civil Code. This was partly the outcome of foreign pressures.\footnote{The Civil Code of 1898 was originally a part of Japan's modernization project. A modern legal system was necessary to eliminate the unequal treaties Tokugawa Japan had concluded with the western powers in the mid-nineteenth century. The Civil Code of 1947, on the other hand, should be revised to comply with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which the Japanese government signed in 1985.} Second, the government's plans were balked because of the strong opposition from the conservative critics. They maintained that the plans were derived from a blind faith in western individualism, which, they claimed, conflicts with Japan's tradition. In neither case, however, has "individualism" been precisely conceptualized; rather, it has been dogmatically opposed to "familism." Third, both now and then, the liberals have tended to idealize the West as a model to follow, whereas the conservatives regard it negatively, attributing moral decay among the Japanese to the allegedly harmful influence of westerners. Fourth, the arguments presented on both sides of the controversy are too ideological to consider carefully the reality of the Japanese family. Thus, even basic information, such as statistics on family or household members and their relationships, have seldom been given.

The last point shows that in the past century, from the time of the *minpô-ten ronsô* to that of *fûfu bessei*, the ie has been divorced from real life and manipulated politically. Indeed, the
arguments about the *ie* are not so much about the family per se as about the Japanese nation and its state. This probably explains why the *ie* has been discussed by many people outside family studies. The *ie* has been, and still is, considered a symbol of Japan that transcends the mundane reality of life.

**Concluding Remarks**

By way of conclusion, I address an important question that has remained in the background throughout: Why has the *ie* played the vital role that it still does in Japan's modern history? Obviously, many factors are involved, and it is impossible to give here a short, satisfactory answer, but this question has to be examined in terms of the vulnerability of the Japanese family to political manipulation. It is widely known that the modern family has been exploited almost universally as a political device that strategically links the individual to society. In western societies, however, and probably elsewhere, no genuine attempt has ever been made to create a family state, at least on the scale of Japan's. This suggests that there is something about Japanese social structure that invites the state's intervention in the domain of private life.

I would submit that this is related to the high degree of permeability of external influences through the Japanese family. As Keiichi Sakuta pointed out in his influential book of 1967, ever since the Tokugawas established a powerful, centralized government in the early seventeenth century, groups positioned between individual and society, including the family, have been deprived of their autonomy to a considerable extent. Thus, these groups have been unable to protect their members from the pressures coming from neighboring people, to say nothing of rulers.\(^\text{27}\) Put another way, the Japanese family has been highly visible from the outside, and this visibility has weakened the group's defense functions. In this respect, the Japanese family differed from the German family before World War II; the Nazis attempted to break the strong shell of the family against outside intervention in order to create a totalitarian regime in which isolated individuals were put under close, governmental surveillance. As Sakuta remarked:

Japan's power elite made no effort to break up the family. On the contrary, they enthusiastically spread the ideology of familism. This fact may be attributed to the inadequate defense mechanism of the Japanese family in protecting its members from

\(^{27}\) The best-known example of mutual surveillance in the Tokugawa period is that of the *gonin-gumi* (literally, five-person group), which consisted of a group of five neighboring houses. This system was based on the rule of collective responsibility, by which all people were held responsible for any wrongdoing by their group member. The *tonari-gumi* (neighborhood group) during World War II is said to have developed from this tradition. Although the *tonari-gumi* was abolished in 1947 during the occupation period, its marks are still visible in the custom of, for example, circulating *kairanban* (a notice board) in the community.
the exercise of state control. In Japan, the family has been regarded as an important agent that nurtures conformity to external, social demands. Even today, some people advocate a revival of the old family [ie] system because they aim to create social stability by strengthening the power of the centralized state. (Sakuta 1967: 15)

Sakuta's observation was made more than three decades ago, but it is still fresh today as the opponents of fufu bessei advocate tight state control.

In this paper, I have shown that the ie does not simply refer to the family or household; rather, it stands for the entire country of Japan, being appropriated at one time as a metaphor for the organizing principle of a company, and, at another time, as a symbol of Japan's heritage to be protected. In this regard, the ie constitutes a broad "discursive" sphere in which different aspects of Japan are discussed in the same rubric. If there is any novelty and originality in this paper, it is because I have approached the ie as a discourse within Japanese culture, not as a family institution per se, as is usually the case with anthropological research.

I conclude by expressing my hope that the extensive reference to both English and Japanese literature in the foregoing has clarified the mutual relevance of Japanese studies both inside and outside Japan. Despite the apparent indifference to each other, Japanese scholars have benefited from their foreign colleagues' contributions, and vice versa. When the value of intellectual exchange across national and linguistic boundaries is recognized and dialogue takes place, the horizons of knowledge will broaden.

Acknowledgements

Professors Mutsuhiko Shima and Motoi Suzuki kindly read an earlier version of this paper and offered useful comments. Professor J. S. Eades provided me with editorial assistance. I wish to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to them.

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