Japanese Slavic and East European Studies Vol.20 1999

RUSSIAN POLICY TOWARD JAPAN UNDER GORBACHEV AND YELTSIN

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[Key words: Russia, Foreign Policy, Japan, Gorbachev, Yeltsin]

More than a half-century after the end of World War II, Japan and the Soviet Union/Russia have yet to conclude a peace treaty due to the unresolved issue of the Northern Territories. Where does the reason for this impasse lie?

It may be certainly not attributable to a signal cause, but must be sought in a number of factors. However, the limits of space in the present article do not allow a comprehensive approach. Instead, at the risk of presenting a somewhat oversimplified picture, I shall examine just one among the many types of factors that determine Soviet/Russian foreign policy toward Japan, namely, the top decision-makers, Mikhail S. Gorbachev and Boris N. Yeltsin. My approach has an additional theoretical justification.

Many factors determine Soviet/Russian foreign policy. Arguably, in the extreme, any factor that exerts influence on Soviet/Russian Japan policy in one way or another can be regarded as a determinant. For the sake of simplification, all of the determinants of Soviet/Russian foreign policy-making could be classified into three categories: international (external) factors, internal (domestic) factors, and individual (personal) factors.¹

Both the international and internal factors are important sources of foreign policy in any country. Yet, the foreign policy of a country cannot be a direct outcome of these two factors. Neither external nor domestic environments can directly force decision-makers to either change their foreign policy or to adopt

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a particular foreign policy behavior. Only when individual policy makers perceive the changes occurring outside and within their own country and consider them relevant enough to revalue their previous beliefs and policies, do these environmental sources have actual political significance and impact. My basic assumption in this paper thus points out the top political leader of the Soviet Union/Russia has been the source of foreign policies and of changes in foreign policy.² It draws our attention to the role that the national leadership plays in foreign policymaking, particularly in the process of learning from and adapting to the environment within and outside the country.³

I acknowledge the significant role that Gorbachev played in bringing about “the conceptual revolution” (Robert Legvold) in Soviet foreign policy.⁴ Precisely because of this acknowledgment, however, I am tempted to pose the questions: Why did Gorbachev not make any headway in Soviet relations with Japan? Did Gorbachev not make any headway in Soviet relations with Japan policy? Or was he simply unable to put his own newly gleaned knowledge into practice, due to domestic or other constraints? What has happened, my line of questioning continues further, to the next powerful leader, Boris Yeltsin? Yeltsin also brought about many revolutionary changes, including the dismantling of the Communist dictatorship and the dissolution of the USSR. However, as regards Russia’s relations with Japan especially the Northern Territories (known to the Russians as Southern Kurile Islands) issue, Yeltsin’s policy remained largely the same as that pursued by his political archrival, Gorbachev. Did shifts in individual leadership in the Kremlin bring so little meaningful change to Japanese-Soviet/Russia relations? This article attempts to provide answers to these intriguing questions.

GORBACHEV’S LOW PRIORITY OF JAPAN

What were the major features of Gorbachev’s policy toward Japan? Why did he fail to make a diplomatic breakthrough in Soviet-Japanese relationships? Putting it more bluntly, why did he not intend to, or why couldn’t he, resolve the territorial dispute with Japan?

In order to answer these questions, we should first examine Gorbachev’s list

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of priorities in his conduct of international affairs and determine Japan's place in that list. Japan was not a high-priority country in Gorbachev's foreign policy. It is true that the Gorbachev-Shevardnadze diplomatic team, unlike the Brezhnev-Gromyko team, did not show blunt contempt of Japan and was, on the contrary, even conducting "a smile diplomacy" toward Japan. However, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze did not view Japan as a country worthy of serious consideration. Particularly in the initial stage of his leadership, Gorbachev, preoccupied with other foreign policy agendas (e.g., Soviet-U.S. political-military relations, and closer to home, Europe and China border security), did not attach much importance to Japan.

At that time, the thoughts and attention of Gorbachev and his closest associates were instead concentrated on the more important and urgent issues of Soviet national security. The maintenance of a *détente* policy with the United States was a *sine qua non* for the success of *perestroika* at home. Besides, Gorbachev had much more knowledge of, and had more advisors on, the United States than any other country. Despite the departure of Andrei Gromyko, a major proponent of the "U.S.-first" foreign policy, the centrality of the United States in Soviet conduct of international affairs remained as it was before. Gromyko-type thinking, which prevailed at the Kremlin, was that once the Soviet Union's relations with the United States had improved, then its relations with Japan would improve automatically, because Japan faithfully followed the course set by the United States.

Another reason why the Gorbachev leadership initially neglected Japan had something to do with its proclivity for doing easy jobs first, leaving the more difficult tasks for later. For Gorbachev and his foreign policy team, improvements in the USSR's relations with the United States, Western Europe, China, and South Korea were not only considered more urgent but also easier than the task of improving relations with Japan. Negotiations with these countries were a non-zero-sum game. In the Soviet Union's negotiations with the United States concerning, for example, disarmament and arms control, it was relatively easy to reach an agreement. Both parties gained from such an accord, which it allowed them to enhance their security and even to devote resources to the civilian sectors of their economies. In contrast, negotiations with Japan tended to take on the

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character of a zero-sum battle involving one's territorial gain at the expense of the other, since the Northern Territories dispute revolved around sovereignty, which could be assigned to only one of the disputants. Likewise, it was not difficult for the Soviet Union to accept the so-called "three preconditions" that China had requested the Soviets to meet for the normalization of bilateral political relations: (1) the end of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, (2) the reduction of Soviet troops in Mongolia and the Sino-Soviet border areas, and (3) the end of Soviet support for the Vietnamese military occupation of Cambodia. The USSR's normalization of state relations with South Korea, which constituted a symbolic abandonment of North Korea, was, as Harry Gelman argues, "a far easier job" for Gorbachev than the full normalization of relations with Japan, which would mean abandoning the Northern Territories.⁵

Having been slightly released from its preoccupation with the United States, Western and Eastern Europe, and Chinese affairs, however, the Gorbachev leadership gradually began to pay more serious attention to Japan in the latter half of its reign, starting from around the summer of 1988. In the meantime, Gorbachev was learning that Soviet efforts in the national security sphere had not been sufficient to impress Japan. Gorbachev also realized that success in diplomatic relations with the United States and West European powers did not automatically improve the Soviet Union's economic situation; the Soviet Union's economic slump had in fact deepened since Gorbachev had assumed office. Gorbachev therefore felt it was necessary to make efforts to improve the Soviet Union's relations with Japan, the second largest economic power in the world. Gorbachev's speech in Krasnoyarsk in September 1988 clearly indicated that the Soviet Union was turning its attention to Japan. Gorbachev was also learning, albeit still insufficiently, the significance of the territorial issue in his attempts to improve relations with Tokyo. Gorbachev's initiative in carrying out personnel changes in his foreign policy team around 1988 also appeared to mark the beginning of a new period with regard to Japan. The reshuffling of Gorbachev's foreign policy team included the dismissal of old-timers such as Anatolii Dobrynin, Mikhail Kapitsa, and Ivan Kovalenko, who had prevented Gorbachev from making a bold change in Soviet policy toward Japan, and the appointment and promotion of new thinkers with regard to Japan, such as Eugenii Primakov, Aleksandr Panov, and Vasilii Saplin.

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It is clear that Gorbachev was learning. However, in international politics, learning is one thing, and translation into policy change through political institutionalization of individual learning in the central political agencies is completely another matter.⁶ “Individual learning” needs to be translated into “institutional or systemic learning,” which is not always guaranteed or realized automatically.⁷ Individual learning may be a necessary condition for foreign policy change, but being only one of many conditions, it is certainly not a sufficient condition for foreign policy change.⁸ Politics determine whether, when, how far, and in what way change occurs.⁹

Moreover, Gorbachev’s process of fundamental learning and translation into policy was impeded, or diluted, by opposition both from the right and the left in Soviet domestic power struggles.¹⁰ When the conservative nationalists blamed Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze for the loss of Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany, the Soviet Union’s *de facto* defeat in the Cold War, and all the other troubles, their real target was Gorbachev. By the summer of 1990, Gorbachev himself was being directly attacked with increasing frequency. Boris Yeltsin, a supposed leader of the democratic reformers but also an archrival of Gorbachev, also made full use of the territorial issue with Japan as a useful instrument for discrediting Gorbachev. Thus, Gorbachev had a weak power base at home, sandwiched between conservative forces on the one side and reformist critics such as Boris Yeltsin on the other. If he had been as strong in his power configuration within the USSR as he had been one or two years earlier, Gorbachev could, and perhaps would, have attempted to persuade the Soviet people that it was absolutely necessary to make diplomatic concessions to Japan on the islands issue in order to make a dramatic improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and Japan. But Gorbachev was not willing, or able, to do so. One might conclude that during the six years of his administration (1985-1991) Gorbachev changed from an innovative to a representative politician. Instead of taking bold initiatives in the foreign policy arena, as he frequently had during in his heyday, Gorbachev had become increasingly cautious and defensive, and had even been reduced to a mouthpiece for the superficial desires of the Soviet people or opposing political forces.

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TOO WEAK, TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE

Although Gorbachev began to pay more attention to Japan when he became less preoccupied with the United States and other more high-priority business, as Lisbeth Tarlow Bernstein has pointed out, Gorbachev's learning about Japan in general, and particularly the impact of the territorial question upon the Japanese leadership's willingness and ability to improve relations, was not sufficient. Bernstein writes:

Gorbachev, who had "learned" much in a short period, failed to understand the importance of tackling the territorial issue to realize a qualitative change in Soviet-Japanese relations.... He was, after all, a product of a system that despised Japan, accorded it marginal value, and paid it scant attention. Even after overcoming these perspectives, his general lack of knowledge led him to the unrealistic conclusion that normalizing relations with Japan was a relatively simple matter.¹¹

Similarly, underlining the lack of courage and the indecision of Gorbachev in failing to reconfirm even the legal validity of the 1956 Joint Declaration, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa concludes: "It was not Soviet domestic politics but rather Gorbachev's inability to accept a compromise with Japan that prevented the Soviet Union and Japan from achieving a major breakthrough in April 1991."¹² I fully agree with Hasegawa's conclusion, although we cannot ignore the fact that "politicians tend to act in ways that will promote their self-interests and will protect their own political stakes under changing political conditions, instead of seeking new knowledge primarily to achieve the 'best' outcome."¹³ As a result, Gorbachev's trip to Japan in 1991 turned out to be, in the judgment of Alexei Zagorsky, a pro-reform Japanologist at IMEMO (Institute of World Economy and International Relations), Russian Academy of Sciences, "the one real diplomatic fiasco of his career."¹⁴

What these three eminent observers of Soviet-Japanese relations suggest is that Gorbachev's learning in itself was an incomplete process. In this regard, George Breslauer's judgement about Gorbachev's learning in general may also

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be applicable to his policy toward Japan. Breslauer argues that politicians and statesmen rarely abandon their philosophical assumptions (i.e., fundamentally learn) on the job.¹⁵ Thus, Breslauer admits that there is partial validity in Henry Kissinger's general observation that policymakers do not gain in profundity with experience on the job; they must live off of the intellectual capital that they bring to office.¹⁶ While he reevaluated tactical or peripheral beliefs on the job, Gorbachev did not change his basic assumptions about the nature of international politics.¹⁷

It may be true that the translation of Gorbachev's learning into policy change was impeded, as one of his foreign policy aides, Anatolii Cherniaev, has argued, by domestic concerns and the unintended developments of events. Yet, it is still necessary to examine the content and the degree of Gorbachev's learning about Japanese affairs in the first place. Joseph Nye considers it crucial to make a distinction between "simple learning" and "complex learning." According to Nye's definition, the former involves a shift in means and behavior instigated by failure, in which neither basic goals nor values change; while the latter, being a recognition of conflicts among means and goals in causally complicated situations, leads to new priorities and an adjustment of trade-offs.¹⁸ It is very doubtful that Gorbachev's learning about Japan reached the level of "complex or strategic learning" (changes in underlying goals) calling into question his basic policy goals and objectives. Rather, Gorbachev's learning seems to have remained at the level of "simple, or instrumental, or tactical, learning" (changes in means) changing only the tactics and means used in policy toward Japan.

Cherniaev's prediction that the territorial dispute would have been resolved if Gorbachev had continued learning seems overly optimistic.¹⁹ There is no evidence in Gorbachev's writings or behavior that warrants such a prediction. In fact, Gorbachev's oral and written statements about the territorial dispute with Japan were not of particularly innovative. The basic principle in dealing with Japan that was formulated by Gorbachev near the end of his presidency, which is called by Cherniaev "his [Gorbachev's] philosophy toward the Japan problem,"²⁰ can be summarized in one sentence: "Let us, first, change the atmosphere (*atmosfera*) and create a favorable environment (*sreda*) in bilateral relations so that all problems can be solved."²¹

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It can be concluded that in the final analysis Gorbachev was advocating an “exit theory” wherein the territorial problem could be solved only if the climate or environment of bilateral relations were changed. In contrast, Tokyo was urging the reverse procedure; i.e., that the territorial question should be solved first (“entrance theory”). Although the Japanese government had become flexible enough to recognize the significant role that the creation of a congenial environment might play in bringing about a solution to the Northern Territories issue, it did not, and has not to this day, subscribed to the “exit theory” *per se*. Tokyo remains dubious that the creation of such an environment would guarantee a resolution of the territorial dispute. On the contrary, the creation of such an environment might encourage the Soviets/Russians to resort to tactics of “eat and run,” leading to permanent shelving of the territorial issue. In short, the basic question of the relationship between improvement in Soviet- Japanese relations and the territorial issue escaped Gorbachev’s serious attention. Gorbachev thus stumbled over Soviet-Japanese relations by offering Japan too little.

The above suggests how important the “time” element is in politics. A famous saying of Lenin’s was: “All things come to those who use time wisely.”²² “As location is to real estate,” James A. Baker, III says, “timing is to statecraft.”²³ Delays in decision-making and action can produce negative results. The Soviets often warned Japan of “missing the bus (*opozdat’ na autobus*).”²⁴ True, the Japanese government was late in adjusting to changes in the world and in the Soviet Union. The same can, however, be applied to the Soviet leadership as well. In fact, Soviet diplomacy resulted in needless delays and had many negative effects. For example, the Soviet Union’s military intervention in Afghanistan lasted almost ten years and involved considerable human, psychological, and economic loss. Additionally, the removal of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces, SS-20s, reconciliation with China, and the decoupling of SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) and START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) negotiations are decisions that should have been made earlier to take the pressure off the Soviet economy. The same can be said regarding Japanese-Soviet relations.

Gorbachev waited six years after his ascent to power to tackle the territorial

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problem with Tokyo. If he had gone to Tokyo earlier, the result might have been different. Gorbachev missed opportunity to pay a visit to Japan at least five times. (1) If Gorbachev had visited Japan soon after taking office, he could have paid a protocol visit to Tokyo without taking a “souvenir” in his suitcase. (2) Gorbachev lost another opportunity, due to his hesitancy, before certain affairs such as the “Toshiba Machinery case” in April 1987 caused Soviet-Japanese relations to deteriorate. (3) Gorbachev should have visited Tokyo during Nakasone’s term of office, which was a good time to make an overture toward an improved relationship. (4) The funeral of the Showa Emperor in 1989 was another opportunity for Gorbachev to have visited Japan without taking a gift in his pocket. (5) A visit to Japan should have been made before the issues of nationality, often accompanied by demands for re-demarcation of borders, blew up at home²⁵, particularly before May 29, 1990, when Gorbachev’s archrival Boris Yeltsin was elected to chairman as the RSFSR’s Supreme Soviet.

By spring 1991, Gorbachev found himself running out of time. His political opponents and the national independence movement had both gained strength, and the economy had worsened. Moreover, the delay in Gorbachev’s visit to Japan gave rise to increasing anticipation in Japan over the outcome of the summit and thus had the effect of focusing world attention on the Northern Territories issue. The timing of Gorbachev’s visit to Japan was wrong.²⁶ The Soviet president had wanted to visit Japan in the spring, when the cherry blossoms were in bloom.²⁷ It was more than symbolic that the cherry blossom season in Japan was in fact over when Gorbachev arrived in Tokyo.

YELTSIN’S WAY OF ONE-MAN’S DECISION-MAKING

Effects of international and internal environments on Soviet/Russian foreign policy-making are working in two different directions, both favorably and unfavorably to Japan. For instance, the end of the confrontation between the two nuclear superpowers and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, accompanied by the independence of the Baltic states, appear to work favorably for Japan’s request for the reversion of the disputed territory. No one finds it hard to understand this. One of the most important reasons for the Soviets’ refusal to return the disputed islands to Japan was that the loss of the territory would be a

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major security concern for the Soviet bastion strategy in the Sea of Okhotsk vis-à-vis the United States. But now this concern has gone, and only the inertia of the old thinking remains. Another reason for the Soviets' refusal was their apprehension that the return of the disputed islands to Japan would open a "Pandora's box," setting a precedent for other possible contenders of territory against the Soviet Union. But now this apprehension, or excuse, has also become groundless. The Baltic states have become independent; the Crimea has officially been given to Ukraine; and a large amount of contested territory has been ceded to China. In other words, the Soviet Union/Russia has set a precedent of giving away their territory to others.

In practice, however, the foregoing developments will not necessarily help the Japanese get back their lost territory. On the one hand, these examples may contribute to the strengthening of Japan's stance concerning the dispute. On the other hand, though, they may provide the Russians with the following excuse. Because of these recent traumatic experiences, Russia's international and internal pride has been badly wounded, and Russians have therefore been suffering from a tremendous inferiority complex. At such a moment of profound psychological crisis of identity or self-confidence, the Russians could not endure the additional blow of losing the islands to Japan; such a loss would be "the last straw" for them.

Due to their kind of *dual* nature, changes in international and internal environments are not to be viewed as a *direct* determining factor of Soviet/Russian policymaking toward Japan. Rather, they should be regarded as *indirect*, or even merely potential, determinants in the sense that they accelerate, reinforce, and amplify the direction that is determined by other variables. Probably a more direct, and hence more important, determining factor of Soviet/Russian policymaking toward Japan is in Russia's leadership.

What then can we say about the features of Russia's policy toward Japan during the Yeltsin administration? In order to answer this question, the general characteristics of Yeltsin's way of decision-making should be reviewed. After all, Yeltsin's policy toward Japan is not an exception to this general rule.

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The first characteristic stems from the fact that foreign policy decisions depend largely upon one man — President Boris Yeltsin. Andrei Kozyrev, who served as foreign minister under Yeltsin, bluntly stated in his memoirs, “The foreign policy of Russia is in fact the policy of the President.”²⁸ The 1993 Russian constitution provides the president with extremely far-reaching powers (Articles 80-93).²⁹ The Russian president, for instance, may personally appoint almost all ministers of importance, including those heading the so-called “power ministries,” i.e., defense, interior, federal intelligence service, and foreign affairs who report to the president, rather than the prime minister.³⁰ The Russian president is granted power to negotiate and sign treaties as well as accredit foreign diplomats. He also heads the Security Council. The wide-ranging, unilateral, and even hegemonic decision-making prerogatives of the current Russian president may be even greater than those of the CPSU General Secretary (or First Secretary), who after the demise of Stalin, became *primus inter pares*, ruling the USSR largely on the principle of collective leadership. In 1964, Nikita Khrushchev was removed by a majority in the Central Committee and/or its Politburo. But, it was in practice harder, perhaps even impossible, for the Russian parliament to impeach and oust Boris Yeltsin. In such a strong presidential system, Yeltsin’s way of decision-making essentially reverted, according to Lilia Shevtsova, a prominent Russian analyst of Kremlin politics at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Moscow, to “the one-person style of decision-making, discarding the mechanism of ‘collegiality’ devised under Khrushchev and Brezhnev.”³¹

Furthermore, Yeltsin’s own personal, authoritarian style of governing, his reliance upon top-down methods, and his extraordinarily skillful way of manipulating his subordinates enhanced enormously his monopoly over foreign policy decisions. Candidly admitting this, Yeltsin himself wrote in his memoirs, “To be Number One must be always my nature.”³² The principle underlying Yeltsin’s style of government was, according to Peter Rutland, simple and familiar: “*L’ état, c’est moi*.”³³ Boris Nemtsov habitually referred to Yeltsin as the “tsar-father,” apparently without irony,³⁴ and Oleg Poptsov, head of Russian Public Television (ORT), wrote a book titled *Chronicle of the Times of ‘Tsar Boris’*.³⁵ Yeltsin wanted to maintain and practice political power by himself and for himself, without sharing it with anybody else,³⁶ standing aloof over others. Even

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Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev was not allotted regularly scheduled meetings with President Yeltsin for his report on foreign affairs.³⁷

One of the salient features of Russian foreign policy-making during the Yeltsin era was the lack of any serious interests in or efforts made by the Russian leadership to elicit advice and suggestions from the intellectual community on foreign policy, such as the Academy of Sciences, the mass media, think tanks, and foundations. This stood in stark contrast to the situation that had existed in the Gorbachev era, at least in its early days, particularly when Eduard Shevardnadze was in charge of the MID.³⁸ The general secretary, self-confident in his own outstanding intellectual abilities, gathered around him a group of innovative advisors and colleagues, including Aleksandr Yakovlev, Eduard Shevardnadze, Georgii Shakhnazarov, Anatolii Cherniaev, and Vadim Medvedev. These six people, including Gorbachev himself, were, in Archie Brown's view, "the vital players in Gorbachev's foreign team."³⁹ In marked contrast, no such inner circle of advisors existed around Boris Yeltsin. As Viacheslav Kostikov, Yeltsin's former press secretary, put it: "The President [Yeltsin] did not like to have bright people around him. In this regard, he resembled an actor: He wanted all the brightness of the spotlights and all of the applause to belong only to himself."⁴⁰ Yeltsin chose to rely on a small group of close associates, whom he kept changing so as to serve his political interests at any given moment. Egor Gaidar, Anatolii Chubais, Boris Nemtsov, and Sergei Kirienko are young "kids [*mal'chiki*]⁴¹ in pink-colored shorts" (Ruslan Khasbulatov),⁴² politically immature and without any experience in government service or practical economics. Viktor Chernomyrdin, Evgenii Primakov, Igor' Ivanov, Sergei Stepashin and Vladimir Putin are simply faithful and balanced pragmatists, lacking creative ideas and courage for bold policy initiatives.

Unlike Gorbachev,⁴³ Yeltsin was not very interested in learning about Japan from "epistemic communities." Neither was he interested in the empowerment of such intellectual groups for the purpose of helping to shift the domestic balance of power in his favor. To make matters worse, the institutes on international relations and Japanese affairs formerly attached to the Academy of Sciences have given way to "a plethora of 'think tanks' that operate independently of the state, often working for banks or Russian companies."⁴⁴ Furthermore, Yeltsin

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tended to rely on a narrow circle of close aides who have direct access to him, including his tennis partner, his chief bodyguard, and his youngest daughter (e.g., Anatolii Chubais, Aleksandr Korzhakov, Tatiana Diachenko, Valentin Iumashev, and Boris Berezovsky); and he often ignored or bypassed formal decision-making channels on many issues.⁴⁵ In short, there were no “formalized institutional mechanisms”⁴⁶ through which information and policy-related suggestions by specialists on international affairs and on Japan were channeled through into the Yeltsin leadership’s policymakers. As a result, the foreign decision-making mechanism and pattern were highly irregular and secluded.

The above-mentioned characteristics of Russian foreign policy were reflected in Yeltsin’s policy toward Japan. It is Russian President Yeltsin that decides Russian policy toward Japan. This is precisely the reason why the recent two successive Japanese prime ministers, Ryutaro Hashimoto and Keizo Obuchi, tried so hard to hold a summit meeting (informal or official) with Yeltsin himself. Both of these Japanese leaders firmly believed that to build a friendly and trustful relationship with the most powerful decision-maker in Russia, Boris Yeltsin, would have helped Japan achieve its diplomatic objectives vis-à-vis Russia.

UNPREDICTABLE FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR

The second general characteristic of Russian foreign policy-making during the Yeltsin era is that no one knew for sure what the top foreign decision-maker, Yeltsin, had in his mind. Yeltsin was neither easily accessible nor available to most of his staff. Nor was he physically “visible.”⁴⁷ Boris Yeltsin proved to be one of the most enigmatic, contradictory political leaders in the contemporary world.⁴⁸ To make matters worse, during his period of recuperation and convalescence from a long string of illnesses, the ailing president became entirely distant from society and realities unfolding in the outside world, as if he were “an emperor with no clothes,” and sidelined himself from daily decisions. But precisely because of this, Yeltsin became even more obsessed with concentrating political power in his own hands.

The foreign policy-making process is often referred to as a “black box,” in which the top policy-maker constitutes one of the most important determining

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factors. According to Igor' Malashenko, the president of the NTV television network and the head of Yeltsin's media campaign for the 1996 presidential election, Yeltsin himself was nothing but a black box.⁴⁹ Malashenko explains why he thinks so: "There is not a single person in this country who can predict what goes on inside that head [of Yeltsin's]. It's like the black box in cybernetics: you can look at the inputs and the outputs, but never inside the box. Yeltsin never really shares his concerns [with anybody else]."⁵⁰ Malashenko thus concludes, "He [Yeltsin] is an extraordinarily closed person."⁵¹

These characteristics of Yeltsin's were reflected in his policy toward Japan. Nobody knew for sure what Yeltsin's basic stance on the Southern Kurile Islands issue was. As the scheduled departure date of his state visit to Tokyo drew closer in September 1992, President Yeltsin kept saying that he had in mind twelve to fourteen options with regard to the Russian side's proposal to Tokyo over the territorial issue. Even after he canceled his trip to Tokyo, Yeltsin did not disclose to anybody what those options actually were and what his final choice was. From a tactical viewpoint of negotiation, it is, of course, not a good idea to put all of one's cards on the table. Yet, these statements by Yeltsin make one wonder whether the Russian president was seriously trying to hammer out a final policy option toward Japan. Twelve to fourteen options seems to be too many from which to work out a final choice. Some Russo-Japanese observers even speculated that Yeltsin had been unable at that time to reach any definite proposal for Japan.⁵² Igor' Latyshev, for instance, concludes: "His [Yeltsin's] position concerning the territorial dispute with Japan in those days [spring of 1992] was more *amorphous* than it had been before" (emphasis added).⁵³

The third characteristic of Yeltsin's way of decision-making, which is related to the second characteristic, was his total lack of concern for consistency. Generally speaking, as a leader, Boris Yeltsin went through an incredible number of reincarnations:⁵⁴ Almost like a "political chameleon" (Lilia Shevtsova),⁵⁵ which changes its color with its environment, Yeltsin was, in turn, a Bolshevik, a populist, a democrat, and an authoritarian. In this sense we have to agree with the warning by Dmitri Glinski and Peter Reddaway that "it would be premature and foolhardy to deliver a clear-cut historical verdict on Yeltsin as a personality."⁵⁶ At any rate, the fact remains that both in his domestic politics and in foreign

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policy fields, Yeltsin did not mind at all⁵³ about suddenly changing his position and policy, sometimes even 180 degrees. In August 1998, for instance, Yeltsin stunned both Russia and the world with his attempt to nominate as prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, the same man he had sacked only five months earlier. Likewise, in foreign policy, Boris Yeltsin demonstrated often a tendency to switch overnight from one extreme to the other, with seemingly no concern about showing an about-face. He improvises policy in a quite opportunistic fashion, depending upon his instincts and mood, or under the influence of particular persons around him, or based on his calculation of political expediency at a given moment.⁵⁸ As Shevtsova put it: ‘yeltsin’s style was contradictory and inconsistent. Also like Gorbachev, Yeltsin chose policies at random, winging it, rather than operating from a well-chosen, carefully considered plan.’⁵⁹ The only consistency that we can detect in Yeltsin’s behavior was his desire to stay in power and his stubborn effort to control key political instruments in his own hands.⁶⁰ This “habitual capricious and erratic”⁶¹ leadership by Yeltsin sometimes brought about surprisingly flexible policies, accompanied by sudden concessions, which were often later withdrawn. His unpredictable way of decision-making and impulsive reactions to events made it very hard, perhaps even impossible, for Yeltsin to elaborate a clearly defined strategy and to present stable and viable policies.⁶²

In Russian policy toward Japan over the territorial dispute, too, Boris Yeltsin appeared not to be troubled very much about consistency.⁶³ The following are some statements, cited in chronological order, made by him concerning this important issue in Russia’s relations with Japan. In January 1990, Yeltsin proposed the five-stage plan for the resolution of the territorial dispute between Russia and Japan; and in September 1991, he announced that the principles of “law and justice” should be the basis for resolving the territorial dispute with Japan. In October 1998, he signed with Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa the Tokyo Declaration, which stipulated: “Both nations [Russia and Japan] agree to the early conclusion of a peace treaty through the resolution of the territorial issue on the basis of law and justice.” in November 1997, he proposed to Japanese Prime Minister Ryûtarô Hashimoto that a peace treaty be concluded by the year 2000 on the basis of the Tokyo Declaration; in November 1998, he handed Japanese Prime Minister Keizô Obuchi his reply to Hashimoto’s

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secret proposal, in which he counterproposed resolving the territorial issue not in a peace treaty to be concluded by the year 2000 but in a separate treaty.

These proposals made by Boris Yeltsin were contradictory. As pointed out by Konstantin Sarkisov and Yakov Zinberg,⁶⁴ there was a clear contradiction in Yeltsin's stance as expressed in his "five-stage proposal" and in the Tokyo Declaration. Whereas the former aims at postponing the solution of the territorial dispute to the future, the latter advocates an early (*skoreishee*) conclusion of a peace treaty through the resolution of the Northern Territories issue. The "five-stage proposal" envisions the signing of a peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union in the fourth stage, i.e., before final clarification of the disputed islands' status in the final, fifth stage. In the Tokyo Declaration, by contrast, the conclusion of a peace treaty was contingent upon resolving the issue of the status of the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai. The Russian president did not, appear to be bothered at all by these contradictions, although they are of crucial significance to Russo-Japanese relations. One may even reach the bold conclusion that Boris Yeltsin did not have any well-thought-out definite *policy* of his own with regard to the territorial dispute with Japan.⁶⁵ His basic attitude toward this issue is an opportunistic one. Yeltsin was constantly changing his stance on this issue, depending upon the circumstances. The only thing that Yeltsin seemed to be relatively consistent about is his strategy to postpone for as long as possible a resolution of the territorial dispute.

GORBAEV AND YELTSIN: THE SAME PROBLEM AND DILEMMA

It is wellknown, and hence unnecessary to elaborate in great detail here, that Boris Yeltsin is, as a political leader, quite a different type from Mikhail Gorbachev.⁶⁶ The author had an opportunity to conduct a long interview with Yeltsin on Japanese television during his unofficial visit to Japan in January 1990, when Yeltsin was still an opposition politician. At the time, he impressed me as being coarse, gruff, arrogant, and indifferent to others' opinions. I also had a chance to have a long meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev after he resigned as Soviet president. In contrast, he was amicable and attentive to what others had to say, and it was easy to understand why the world had been swept up by

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“Gorbymania.” According to one Russian observer, Galina Dudkina, Gorbachev represents the archetypical “feminine” Russian personality: indecisive, vacillating, and eager to accommodate; Yeltsin, in contrast, is the embodiment of the “masculine” Russian: coarse, rough, and inarticulate, but strong, charismatic, and prepared to take responsibility for his own words and deeds.⁶⁷

Despite their outward differences, however, these two leaders acted, in practice, very similarly in the political arena. Yeltsin, whether he likes it or not, had to continue the work begun by Gorbachev. In this regard, it would be incorrect to regard these two leaders as being absolute antipodes: both of them pursued the same task but used different methods.⁶⁸ In their conduct of foreign policy vis-à-vis Japan, particularly that concerning the Northern Territories issue, Yeltsin and Gorbachev did not differ greatly. What Yeltsin was doing is more or less the same as what his archrival Gorbachev had been doing. Why is this? Is it purely accidental, or are there convincing reasons for this similarity? And more importantly, what are the basic, concrete policies of these two leaders?

Since Gorbachev’s departure from the political scene, the international environment has greatly changed. The Cold War has ended, accompanied by a significant transformation in the global power configuration. While the Soviet Union disintegrated into fifteen states, making the Russian Federation only one of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) member states, the United States has emerged as an outstanding, almost unipolar power. Moreover, the honeymoon between Russia and the West has almost completely evaporated. Euphoria, symbolized best by Gorbachev’s catchphrase “Europe is our common home,” has disappeared. Both Russia and the West have realized that Russia’s transformation into a democratic system and a market economy cannot be achieved overnight, but instead will be a long-lasting process with ups and downs. This disillusionment caused the West to reconsider the need for financial aid through the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the World Bank to Russia and to go ahead with its plan to enlarge NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) eastward. Policies of these multilateral governmental groupings and nongovernmental organizations have had an impact on Russia’s foreign policy-making. In fact, Russia’s disenchantment with the West contributed to the shift in Yeltsin’s diplomatic orientation from “Atlanticism” to “Eurasianism.” The

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first target of Russia's Eurasian diplomacy is China. Due to Russia's deep-rooted apprehension over China's "quiet expansionism," however, there is naturally a certain limit to Russia's tilt toward China. In its efforts to balance China and to gain political leverage, Japan has become another target for the Yeltsin-Primakov team's new diplomatic orientation.

For all these developments and accompanying changes outside and inside Russia, however, one can find a few important commonalities in foreign policy conduct toward Japan between the Gorbachev and the Yeltsin periods. Almost the same *pattern* of foreign policy behavior toward Japan and exactly the same policy are observable in these two periods.

In the earliest days of their respective administrations, both leaders tended to demonstrate a good feeling toward the "Land of the Rising Sun." Japan did not appear to them to be a threat, and looked instead to be a country rich enough to provide Russia with economic assistance. At that time, they tended to underestimate the significance of the role that the Northern Territories issue plays for the improvement of bilateral relations between Japan and Russia. Besides, the territorial problem with Japan was not only the hardest one, with which no one wants to cope, but also was not urgent. Preoccupied with other diplomatic matters, foreign policymakers at the Kremlin under Gorbachev and Yeltsin tended to put the Japan problem on the back burner. Only gradually did Gorbachev and Yeltsin begin to recognize the importance of Japan for Russia. They came to realize that for the purpose of exploiting Japan to counterbalance the United States, Europe, and China and to alleviate their domestic economic difficulties, it was useful and necessary for them to turn to Japan. This realization, however, came too late for both leaders. In order to make diplomatic headway in Russo-Japanese relations by resolving the territorial dispute, it is essential for the Soviet Union/Russia to have a strong political leadership. Ironically, at precisely the times when Gorbachev and Yeltsin intended to strike a bargain with Japan over the territorial knot, both of them found themselves in a politically weak position at home. Their political opponents were eager to exploit the issue of ceding the Southern Kuriles to Japan as a convenient political instrument in Russia's domestic struggle. Under such circumstances, Gorbachev and Yeltsin were unwilling to make any potentially unpopular decisions that would have

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played into the hands of political rivals or opposition forces. Faced with this danger, both Gorbachev and Yeltsin decided to adopt a policy of preserving the status quo for their own political survival rather than making a bold initiative.

More concretely speaking, the similarities in Russian policy conduct toward Japan between the Gorbachev and Yeltsin periods are observable in terms of basic policy orientation, priority and strategy. First, both administrations tended to view Japan in the context of their global foreign policy. To put it more bluntly, Gorbachev intended to exploit Japan as a useful *instrument* to check the United States, Europe, and China. Gorbachev's learning about Japan remained, as pointed out earlier, within the level of "simple or tactical learning" (changes in means), focused on efficiently manipulating means to achieve the same goals. In other words, Gorbachev's learning did not reach the level of "complex or substantial learning" (changes in underlying goals), i.e., awakening to conflicts among means and goals in causally complicated situations, which would lead to new priorities and an adjustment or a tradeoff.⁶⁹ What Gorbachev did vis-à-vis Japan was simply an adaptation to the changing environment, and it was not necessarily even "learning" in the strict sense of its meaning.⁷⁰ Unfortunately, what was observed about Mikhail Gorbachev in this regard can be applied to an even greater extent to his successor, Boris Yeltsin. President Yeltsin also showed a proclivity to change only his tactics vis-à-vis Japan, "without altering any deeper goals in the ends – means chain."⁷¹ Almost everything that he promised to the Japanese government, such as "law and justice" and "the conclusion of a peace treaty by the year 2000," were tactical in nature. In a nutshell, Yeltsin, like his predecessor Gorbachev, failed to realize the need to doubt the basic premise of the Soviet/Russian traditional attitude and policy toward Japan, particularly with regard to the territorial dispute.

Probably because of such a relatively low *priority* they attached to Japan, both Gorbachev and Yeltsin missed the best opportunities to deal with Japan on the territorial issue, succumbing to the backlash from the nationalists and hard-liners. When Gorbachev went to Tokyo, the last capital he visited among those of the G-7 member countries, his political power base at home had become too weak to enable him to make any bold deals with Japan. The same pattern was repeated by his archrival and successor. Yeltsin should have gone to Tokyo

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immediately after his triumph against the coup plotters in August 1991. Then, no one at home would have had the courage to challenge Yeltsin's decision with the Japanese government. And yet he sent his deputy instead, Ruslan Khasbulatov, while he himself took a seventeen-day vacation in the Crimea in late September to October — a strange habit of Yeltsin's.⁷² Even if his physical condition had allowed him to visit Tokyo sometime in the spring of 2000, it seemed that Yeltsin's waning political authority and prestige at home would no longer have enabled him to make a serious deal with Japan in the face of nationalist opposition.

CONCLUSION: POSTPONING THE SOLUTION OF THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE

On the domestic front, both Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's administrations had shared the same *dilemma*: on the one hand, both leaders felt it necessary to move closer to Japan, due to domestic economic difficulties; on the other, they also found it difficult, or even impossible, to make diplomatic concessions to Japan concerning Tokyo's territorial demands, for more or less the same reasons — opposition from the nationalist and conservative forces, their own weakening position in the power struggle, and other reasons, which have already been discussed in detail.

Consequently, one can find similarities in the two leaders' basic *strategy* toward Japan. The most important commonality lies in the strategy of postponing, or trying to shelve forever, the solution of the territorial dispute with Japan. In his second book, published in 1994, Yeltsin made this strategy crystal clear by stating that "*the current generation of politicians* does not have to take responsibility for the final solution of the territorial dispute [with Japan]" (emphasis added).⁷³ At a meeting with students of Oryol University in 1997, the Russian president made a similar remark: "For many years, the Japanese have made the Kuriles a barrier to relations with us. The Japanese would say to us 'first give us the Kurile Islands, and then we will propose trade with Russia.' Of course, we cannot do this. And our society is not ready for this. *Let this be settled in the next century by future generations*" (emphasis added).⁷⁴ In fact, neither Gorbachev nor Yeltsin had clearly agreed to actually transfer even the two smaller

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islands to Japan upon the signing of a peace treaty, despite the pledge made in the 1956 Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration. This was due to their firm conviction that as long as none of the four islands were not actually transferred to Japan's hands, opposition forces at home would not make a fuss.

The Japanese government naturally has not been happy with this Russian strategy and has tended to be reluctant to provide any economic assistance to the Soviet Union/Russia. Some concessions were needed from the Soviet Union/Russia to deal with such countermeasures from the Japanese side. Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin acknowledged officially the existence of a territorial dispute between the two countries. Moreover, they also conceded that the territory whose sovereignty was to be discussed by both countries is not limited to the two smaller islands but to all four islands, including the two larger islands. (Yeltsin even agreed to list the names of the four islands in the Tokyo Declaration, starting from Etorofu Island, the furthest from the Japanese mainland.) By demonstrating their willingness to discuss the sovereignty of these four islands with Japan, both Gorbachev and Yeltsin acknowledged that these islands are no longer 100 percent, genuine Russian territory, but a disputed *special area*. This acknowledgement was confirmed when Gorbachev permitted Japanese citizens to visit the islands without obtaining a visa from the Soviet government and when Yeltsin agreed to allow Japanese fishermen to engage in fishing activities in the rich fishing grounds around the disputed islands.

Policies that will benefit a majority of the population *ex post* often do not win majority approval *ex ante*. Challenging this dilemma, only an innovative and confident leader can afford to adopt policies that are opposed in the short run by public opinion and other political pressures but may be supported by a majority in the long run. At times leaders have to get out in front, to persuade people to accept what they are not yet comfortable with. Unfortunately, however, neither Gorbachev nor Yeltsin qualified as such a leadership. Both transformed themselves from an innovative to a representative leader. In fact, both Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's choices signified a readiness to protect the *present* by sacrificing some of the *future*. This is precisely the mark of "simple (or tactical) learning."

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The theoretical *justification* that the Yeltsin leadership was employing in its attempt to legitimize its basic strategy of postponing for as long as possible the solution of the territorial dispute with Japan was based on the same *premise* that the Gorbachev leadership had resorted to. The logic of the theory goes as follows. The Southern Kurile Islands issue is very complicated and difficult. It cannot be resolved in one stroke; a step-by-step approach is required. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary, to first create a good atmosphere between Russia and Japan in which this difficult problem may be solved. In other words, the creation of a good environment between the two nations is the *sine qua non* of the solution to the problem, not *vice versa*. This was the gist of Gorbachev's basic logic and strategy, which was easily observed in his statements made during his official visit to Japan, as well as in his memoirs, as noted earlier. Yeltsin was exploiting the same explanation and strategy.⁷⁵ President Yeltsin stated, for instance, in his meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda on May 23, 1997: "If we agree *first* to expand our economic relations and *then* to discuss the islands issue, relations between Russia and Japan will definitely improve" (emphasis added).⁷⁶ Yeltsin's reply to Hashimoto's secret proposal also reportedly suggested that "the two nations aim at the resolution of the territorial dispute by *the creation of a favorable atmosphere* through joint economic activities and other means" (emphasis added).⁷⁷ Along the same line, Vasilii Saplin, former minister at the Russian embassy in Tokyo and then deputy director of the Second Asian Department at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of Japan under the Yeltsin-Primakov administration, wrote after the informal summit at Kawana ended in April 1998: "One may come closer to solving it [the territorial problem] only by the *creation of a favorable political and emotional atmosphere* in Russian-Japanese relations" (emphasis added).⁷⁸ It may be true that the Tokyo government, for its part, also considers it desirable, and even necessary, to create an atmosphere conducive to reaching a solution to the territorial problem. At the same time, however, it is also very concerned about the possibility that such "atmosphere-building" might not necessarily lead to a solution of the territorial dispute and may, instead, only end up serving Russia's strategy of deferring forever the solution of the dispute.

NOTES

1. I am indebted to Robert Legvold for this classification. See Robert Legvold, "Soviet Learn-

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- ing in the 1980s,” in George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock, eds., *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), pp.684-732.
2. Hans Adomeit, *Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp.188-193; Legvold, *op.cit.*, pp.686-87.
3. Legvold, *op.cit.*, p.712.
4. Robert Legvold, “The Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.68, No.1 (1988-89), pp.84, 96.
5. Harry Gelman, *Russo-Japanese Relations and the Future of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance* (Santa Monica, Calif:RAND, 1993), p.45.
6. Janice Gross Stein, “Political Learning by Doing: Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner,” in Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p.244.
7. Charles E. Ziegler, *Eoreign Policy and East Asia: Learning and Adaptation in the Gorbachev Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.16-17.
8. Stein, *op.cit.*, p.245
9. *Ibid.*
10. George W. Breslauer, “Ideology and Learning in Soviet Third World Today,” *World Politics*, Vol.39 (April 1987), pp.445-48.
11. Lisbeth Tarlow Bernstein, *On the Rocks: Gorbachev and the Kurile Islands* (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI, A Bell & Howell Information Company, 1997), pp.280-281.
12. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations (Vol. 2): Neither War nor Peace 1985-1995* (Berkeley: International and Area Studies, University of California at Berkeley, 1998), pp.403, 538-539.
13. John Clay Moltz, “Divergent Learning and the Failed Politics of Soviet Economic Reform,” *World Politics*, Vol. 45 (January 1993), pp.308, 324.
14. Alexei Zagorsky, “Kuriles Stumbling Block,” *Far Eastern Economic Review* (August 20, 1992), p.21.
15. George W. Breslauer, “What Have We Learned About Learning?” in Breslauer and Tetlock, *op. cit.*, p.851.
16. *Ibid.*, p.827; Breslauer and Tetlock, “Introduction,” in Breslauer and Tetlock, *op. cit.*, p.4; Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (New York: Little Brown, 1979), p.54.
17. Breslauer, “What have We learned about Learning,” p.851.
18. Quoted by Legvold, “Soviet Learning in the 1980s,” pp.687-88 and 727; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes,” *International Organization*, Vol.41, No.3 (Summer 1987), p.380.
19. In the Japanese translation of his book, *Shest' let s Gorbachevym* (Moscow: Kul'tura, 1993), Anatolii Cherniaev added one chapter devoted to Soviet-Japanese affairs. Toward the end of that chapter Cherniaev writes: “If Gorbachev had not been obliged to retire and if the USSR had not collapsed, a problem of worldwide significance [the territorial problem] would be

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- closer to its final solution.” Anatolii Cherniaev, translated by Takayuki Nakazawa, *Gorubachofu to Unmei o Tomonishita 2000 nichi* (Tokyo: Ushio-Shuppan-sha, 1994), p.445.
20. *Ibid.*, p.445; Glaubitz considers this “the familiar Soviet view.” Joachim Glaubitz, *Between Tokyo and Moscow: The History of an Uneasy Relationship, 1972 to the 1990s* (London: Hurst & Company, 1995), p.224.
21. Michail S. Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i reformy*, Vol.2, (Moscow, Novosti, 1995), p.271: After his visit to Tokyo, Gorbachev did not change this basic position in his policy toward Japan and the territorial problem. In his meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Tarô Nakayama in Moscow, October 7, 1991, the Soviet President was quoted as having said, according to his press secretary and advisor Andrei Grachev: “The Soviet Union is in favor of speeding up the work of preparation for a peace treaty. But in order to accomplish this it is necessary to create a new atmosphere (*atmosfera*) around the issue of the Kuriles.” Andrei Grachev, *Dal'she bez menia... Ukhod prezidenta* (Moscow: kul'tura, 1994), p.58.
22. Vladimir Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* (5th ed.) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1964), Vol.34, pp.49-50.
23. James A. Baker, III, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Evolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), p.195.
24. *Pravda*, August 14, 1988; A. P. Markov, *Possia-Iaponiia: v poiskakh soglasiia* (Moscow: Russkii mir, 1996), p.61.
25. Georgii Arbatov, former director of Institute of the USA and Canada, Russian Academy of Science, wrote that while Japan was dealing with its political problems, the Soviets had decided that “due to the outbreak of ethnic and other domestic problems, we can't even think of broaching the territorial issue with Japan.” “Interview with Georgii Arbatov,” *Sinjû* (an organ of the Council on National Security Problems, Tokyo), (October 1, 1989), p.5.
26. Fred Coleman, *The Decline and Eall of the Soviet Union: Forty Years that Shook the World, From Stalin to Yeltsin* (New York: St. Martin Press, 1996), p.323.
27. One suspects that Gorbachev believed that he had visited Japan during the cherry blossom season. In his meeting with the Japanese Minister of MITI Eiichi Nakao in October 1991, the former general secretary was quoted by Andrei Grachev as having said: “Impressions of my unforgettable trip to your country [Japan] are as fresh as ever. It was a brilliant idea to suggest that I visit Japan *during the flowering of the sakura* (*vo vremia tsvetenii sakury*)” (emphasis added). Grachev, *op.cit.*, p.68.
28. Andrei Kozyrev, “Russia: A Chance for Survival,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.71, No.2 (Spring 1992), p.293.
29. Jan S. Adams, “Who Will Make Russia's Foreign Policy in 1994?” *Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Eesearch Eeport*, Vol.3, No.6 (January 11, 1994), pp.36-40.
30. *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, Vol.45, No.45 (December 1993), pp.10-11.
31. Lilia F. Shevtsova, “Dilemmas of Postcommunist Society,” *Russian Social Science Review*, Vol. 39, No.3 (May-June 1998), p.14.
32. Boris El'tsin, *Zapiski prezidenta* (Moscow: «Ogonek», 1994), p.269; Yeltsin, *The Struggle*

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- for Russia* (New York: Random House, 1994), p.179.
33. Peter Rutland, "Yeltsin: the Problem, Not the Solution," *The National Interest* (Fall 1997), p.33.
34. *Ibid.*
35. Oleg Poptsov, *Ehronika vremen «Tsaria Borisa»* (Moscow: «Sovershenno Sekretno», 1995).
36. Tanya Malkina, a well-known political journalist in Moscow who has followed Yeltsin's career through nearly every one of its many tortuous turnings, was quoted by Michael Specter as having said: "Boris Yeltsin cannot stand for anyone to share power or even think about sharing power. He must have all the limelight." Michael Specter. "My Boris," *New York Times Magazine* (July 26, 1998), p.27.
37. Leonid Mlechin, "Kto tolkaet ministra Kozyreva v otstavku?", *Novoe vremia*, No. 32 (1992), p.10.
38. Alexei G. Arbatov, "Russia's Foreign Alternatives," *International Security*, Vol.18, No.2 (Fall 1993), p.22.
39. Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.213.
40. Viacheslav Kostikov, *Roman s prezidentom: Zapiski press-sekretaria* (Moscow: Vagrius, 1997), p.84.
41. Mlechin, "Kto tolkaet ministra Kozyreva v otstavku?", p.8.
42. Steven Erlander, "Reform School," *New York Times Magazine* (November 29, 1992), p.40.
43. As for Gorbachev's close ties with scholars and intellectual circles, see Sarah E. Mendelson, *Changing Course: Idea, Politics, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp.107-108.
44. Mendelson, *op. cit.*, p.130. See also Scott A. Bruckner, "Policy Research Center in Russia: Tottering toward an Uncertain Future," *NIRA Review* (Tokyo: National Institute for Research Advancement, 1996) (Summer 1996), pp.31, 130.
45. F. Stephen Larrabee and Theodore W. Karasik, *Foreign and Security Policy Decisionmaking Under Yeltsin* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1997), pp.29, 37.
46. Mendelson, *op. cit.*, p.130.
47. David Remnick, *Resurrection: The Struggle for a New Russia* (New York: Random House, 1997), p.246.
48. Lilia F. Shevtsova, "Dilemmas of Postcommunist Society," *Russian Social Science Review*, Vol. 39, No.3 (May-June 1998), p.13.
49. Cited by Remnick, *op. cit.*, p.329.
50. *Ibid.*
51. *Ibid.*
52. Yeltsin himself explains later in his memoir that he had more than ten options at that time. This fact, in itself, should be interpreted to mean that none of them was the appropriate choice. Yeltsin, *op. cit.*, p. 185.
53. Igor' Latyshev, *Kto i kak prodaet Russiiu* (Moscow: Paleia, 1994), p.78.
54. Shevtsova, "Dilemmas of Postcommunist Society," p.13.

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55. *Ibid.*, p.12.
56. Dmitri Glinski and Peter Reddaway, "The Yeltsin Era in the Light of Russian History: Reform or Reaction?" *Demokratizatsiya*, Vol.6, No.3 (Summer 1998), p.528.
57. Evgeniia Albats, a journalist and expert on Russian intelligence agencies, commented, "We have a president [Yeltsin] who could wake up one morning and change everything." *Washington Post*, February 26, 1999.
58. Poptsov, *op.cit.*, p.433; Rutland, *op.cit.*, p.32.
59. Shevtsova, "Russia's Postcommunist Politics," p.9.
60. *Ibid.*, p.13.
61. Dimitri K. Simes, *After the Collapse: Russia Seeks Its Place as a Great Power* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), pp.175, 181.
62. Shevtsova, "Russia's Postcommunist Politics," pp.10, 26.
63. Aleksei. V. Zagorskii, "Rossiisko-iaponskie otnosheniia," : B. N. Yel'tsin pered dramaticheskim vyborom," *Znakom'tes' — Iaponiia: k vizitu B. N. Yel' tsina* (Moscow: Nauka, 1992), p.20.
64. Konsutantın Sarukisofu, "Nichiro-shuno Kaidan: Roshiya-gawa no Ito," *Sekai* (Tokyo), (January 1999), p.33; Zinberg, *op.cit.*, pp.88-89.
65. M. K. Gorshkov and V. V. Zhuravlev, eds. *Kurily: ostrova v okeane problem* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1998). p.384.
66. For comparisons of these two leaders, see, for example, Vladimir Solovyev and Elena Klepikova, *Boris Yeltsin: A Political Biography* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1992), pp.14-17, 32-33, 100-103, 112-56, 204-5; John B. Dunlop, *The Rise of Eussia and the Eall of the Soviet Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp.39-40; Donald Murray, *A Democracy of Despots* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), p.5; Shevtsova, "Russia's Postcommunist Politics," pp.9-10.
67. Garina Dutkina, *Misuteri Mosukuwa: Garya no Nikki 1992* (Tokyo: Kodan-sha, 1993), pp.32, 147.
68. Shevtsova, "Dilemmas of Postcommunist Society," p.16.
69. Legvold, *op.cit.* p.687; Nye, "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes," p.380.
70. Ziegler, *op.cit.*, p.13.
71. Nye, *op. cit.*, p.380.
72. According to John Dunlop, however, Yeltsin took this long vacation on the orders of his doctor. Having experienced the dramatic confrontations against the coup plotters during the three days of the August putsch, Yeltsin was exhausted to the point of physical collapse. Dunlop. *op. cit.*, p.261.
73. Yeltsin, *Zapiski prezidenta*, p.185.
74. NHK television: 9:00 p.m. news, September 25, 1997; *British Broadcasting Corporation Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasting: Former USSR*, — hereafter cited as BBC-USSR — (September 19, 1997), p.B/2.
75. Gorshkov and Zhuravlev, *op.cit.*, p.317.

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76. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 24, 1997.

77. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, November 15, 1998.

78. V. Saplin, "Russia and. Japan Meet at Kawana," *International Attairs* (Moscow), No.4 (1998), p.17. See also *BBC-USSR*, December 24, 1998, pp.B/13-14.