**JAPAN'S PLACE IN RUSSIAN
AND SOVIET NATIONAL IDENTITY
— from Port Arthur to Khalkhin-gol —**

Yulia Mikhailova
(*Hiroshima City University*)

Changes in the world order, which resulted from the conclusion of the Cold War, especially the reshaping of state borders in Europe, have brought forth a new interest in the problem of national identity as related to the geography and natural environment with which communities identify themselves. A number of studies have demonstrated how geographical space is incorporated into the mentality of people due to the efforts of geographers, travelers, mass media or works of art. Such studies also illuminate how geographical consciousness is related to national identity and nationalism and how the latter ones influence, in their turn, geopolitical visions.¹

In Russia the construction of the relationship between the national identity and geographical space seems to be of particular interest as the geographical notion of Russia itself changed in time. It took centuries before the vast territories to the West, South and East of the “central” European area came to be seen as essential parts of the state, many of them only to reclaim their independence in the 1990s. The construction of geographical consciousness developed in the process of “conquering” nature, the inclusion of numerous ethnic groups and also through the interaction with neighbors. The resulting consciousness had a significant impact on Russian national identity, which has fluctuated from Slavic, to Western, to Eurasian. However, though there have been many studies devoted to the problem of Russia’s penetration into the East,² so far the relationship between the geographical consciousness of Russians, Russian national identity and the impact this had on Russian and Soviet images of neighboring countries including Japan, has not been sufficiently explored.

This paper aims to fill in this gap by analyzing the nationalistic propaganda

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waged by the Russians during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, “patriotic” propaganda which took place in the Soviet Union in the 1930s and the reaction of society towards it. It is suggested that propaganda’s impact on images of Japan and the Japanese held by the Russians during the periods under consideration depended not only upon achievements or failures in wars, but was also related to the place of the Far East in the geographical consciousness of the Russian people. In the case of the Russo-Japanese War, propaganda was built on ideas that were rather abstract for ordinary people, and images it spread of the Japanese did not arouse much animosity towards Japan. In contrast, Soviet propaganda was more efficient in constructing a negative image of the Japanese because hostility towards the enemy was associated with the necessity to protect “one’s own land.” This gives us an opportunity to reconsider the origins of the process of *enmification*³ in relations between the two countries. In particular, it becomes clear that when in September 1945 Stalin made a statement according to which the Soviet occupation of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands was a revenge for the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, it was endorsed by the negative image of Japan constructed by his own propaganda, rather than by the events that had taken place forty years before.

The analysis is based on visual and verbal materials taken from Russian and Soviet journals and magazines published for the general public, such as *Letopis Voyny s Yaponiei*, *Vestnik Evropy*, *Russkoye bogatstvo*, *Obrazovaniye*, *Mir Bozhiy*, *Voyna s Yaponiei*, *Niva*, *Strekoza*, *Budilnik*, *Krokodil*, special publications designed for the army (*Vestnik Russkogo Soldata*, *Krasnoarmeets I Krasnoflotets*), popular prints of the Russo-Japanese War and Russian and Soviet postcards. For the Soviet period, materials from fiction are also included.

The Holy War and the Yellow Peril

The Russo-Japanese War, which began with the Japanese attack on Port Arthur, was a surprise for the Russian military and political elite, including Tsar Nicholas II himself. They were not ready for the war and were sure that the Japanese would not dare to start it. On the eve of the war, many in Russia reassured themselves with the statement allegedly made by Nicholas II to his German cousin Kaiser Wilhelm: “There won’t be any war, because I do not want it.” Russian arrogance was based on the historically formed self-image

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according to which the might of the country was measured by the scale of its territory and military achievements of the past. During the time of Peter the First and Catherine the Second, the territory of Russia significantly increased due to successful military conquests. The Patriotic War of 1812 against Napoleon more than any other event in Russian history caused the flow of patriotic feelings and contributed to the notion that Russia was the strongest state in Europe. Though Russia disgracefully lost the Crimea War of 1853-56, the heroic defense of Sebastopol, which lasted 349 days, and the very fact that in this war Russia alone fought against France, England, Turkey and Sardinia promoted the impression of the courage, fortitude and endurance of Russian soldiers. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, successful for Russia in the military sense, contributed to the notion that Russia had defended the cause of all Slavic people against the "unfaithful" Turks and, hence, was labeled "the Holy War."⁴

The experience of this war together with age-old memories of the Tartar invasion of the 13th century, when the enemy, the same as in 1904, came from the East, contributed to the interpretation of the war with Japan as a battle for the Orthodox faith. However, this explanation did not become the main issue. The Tsar's Manifesto of 28 January 1904 (Julian style) which criticized Japan's aggressive policy and emphasized the peaceful intentions of Russia, the country blessed by God, laid the foundation for depicting Japan as a vile and treacherous state of Asiatic barbarians.

V. A. Apushkin, a journalist who reported on the war, would later write critically about the "blind reliance on providence and strange confidence of the government that anything we did had been predestined from above and no one would dare to fight against Holy Russia." He noted that Russia seemed to live captivated by the proud verses of F. Tutchchev:

Let disbelievers not believe in Holy Russia,
Let only Russia believe in itself.⁵

Many analysts of the time pointed out that the Russian government refused to understand that the Japanese had sufficient reasons to be afraid of Russia's presence in Manchuria and Korea. Instead in search of effective instruments for mobilization of people towards the war effort the nationalist press began to exploit the issue of the "yellow peril" and resorted to racism. The war was portrayed not as a mere confrontation between two countries for domination over territories, but as a war between the two races. "Japan," wrote one author,

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“is a representative of the idea of Pan-Mongolism — the unification of the people of that [yellow] stock against the white race... Russia is an obstacle for realization of the Japanese government’s plans.... Russia must stay on guard to preserve the European interests from the encroachment of the yellow race.”⁶ Another pamphlet claimed: “The yellow race found its organizers and leaders [in Japan], and Pan-Mongolism is in the process of change from dreams to pragmatic politics.”⁷ Strikingly racist was a lecture given by professor I. A. Shikorsky at Kiev University of St. Vladimir. In tune with the racist theories popular in Europe of the time, he proclaimed the “superiority of the white race,” including its ability to perform “intensive intellectual work” and demonstrate “high spiritual consciousness,” emphasizing that the latter was especially

Fig. 1 The Warning

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characteristic of the Slavs. He denigrated the yellow race for “the lack of pursuit of knowledge,” for fanaticism, insidiousness and impudence and even declared that the present war “was an important biological event” in the sense that “the Russian mission was to purge the Mongol stock.”⁸

While journal articles and lectures addressed the educated public, the brainwashing of ordinary people, many of whom were just illiterate peasants or town folks, occurred mainly through visual means. Cartoonists also quickly picked up the topic of the “yellow peril.” Many cartoons published in magazines or newspapers were designed to “warn the European powers” about the treachery of Japan, of which Russia had already been aware due to her own bitter experience. Europeans were reminded that Russia stood as a protective barrier against the “yellow peril.” One cartoon represented Japan as a witch with a yellow face, hands and hair frightening “ladies of the European community” with a potion in a pot labelled “yellow peril.” The caption said: “Beware, dear Europeans, don’t get ‘burned’ against this hot pot!” [Fig. 1]⁹ Another one, again titled “The Yellow Peril,” portrayed Japan as an ugly bloodthirsty monster with horns and fangs rushing from the Land of the Rising Sun across Russia into Europe. In yet another cartoon the frightened figure of Europe was hiding behind a tall Russian Cossack attacked by a Japanese soldier.¹⁰ However, scaring compatriots with the spectre of a “yellow peril” may not have sounded very persuasive to them, as in everyday life many Russians, especially to the east of the Volga, came into close communication with Asians through intermarriage and years of nearby co-existence. The construction of the image of the enemy exploiting the racial issue did not resonate well with the Eurasian part of Russian national identity.

On the contrary, playing on malignant attitudes to Westerners could have struck the right chord, more so that Russia felt itself betrayed by the same Western community it claimed to belong to and pretended to protect. American and English support for Japan was well known. Even several years before the war, newspapers and magazines in Japan itself published cartoons depicting England, Russia’s rival in the Far East, urging Japan to fight against its neighbour. In these pictures Japan still looked like a small and modest student or an awkward untrained soldier. This was the time when the Anglo-Japanese alliance had just been concluded (1902). However, in a wartime Russian picture on the same topic Japan was already represented as a military man with widely opened jaws

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Fig. 2 A Laundry of European Civilization

and a sabre in his hands attacking a Russian. This cartoon was published as a post-card and could thus reach a large audience. Many cartoons claimed that if it were not for the Western help, Russians would have won over Japan alone a long time earlier. The magazine *Budinik* depicted a Russian epic warrior using his sword to cut off one head of a dragon, obviously Japan, only to realize that it had three more heads – American, English and Chinese behind it.¹¹ Another cartoon in the same magazine showed a European lady caringly washing a yellow dog in a tub [Fig. 2]. The caption to the picture noted: “You cannot wash a yellow male-dog and make him into a white one.” This is an equivalent to the English proverb “the leopard cannot change its spots,” but the Russian word for the male-dog (*kobel*) has strong negative connotations. It refers to a lustful

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person who cannot hold in check his desires and points here to the aggressive nature of Japan and also to its attempts to become a civilized country. Hinting in this way at an international conspiracy against Russia, cartoonists and publishers aimed to explain Russia's failures at the front.

Another favourite topic of cartoonists was that of financial problems of Japan, which was really not far from the truth. The war, which lasted a year and a half, indeed became a heavy burden for the society and pressured the Japanese government to look for the possibilities of a peace settlement. Numerous Russian cartoons represented the Japanese begging for money from their English or American friends, Japan's "budget" bursting like a soap-bubble or Japanese at home starving from hunger. But what significance financial problems of Japan could have for ordinary Russians who themselves suffered from high prices and the lack of food.

Anti-Japanese propaganda reached its climax in *lubki* publications. These were short brochures, usually 16 to 30 pages, and broadsheet pictures, or popular prints, published on very cheap and low quality paper. When *lubki* pictures first appeared in Russia in the end of the 17th century, they represented a kind of folk art, but by the end of the 19th century *lubki* only pretended to follow the tradition. In reality they were produced by professional publishers and had to undergo censorship.¹² The Committee on the Matters of Press was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home Affairs headed by V. K. Pleve, well known for his nationalistic views. So, it may be suggested that though *lubki* publishers aimed to serve the tastes and expectations of the public itself, they also complied with official directives.

Most of the *lubki* brochures consisted of simple reprints of official dispatches. Some of them included foreign words, such as ship names or titles of foreign newspapers, written in English, German or French, which made them incomprehensible to ordinary people. Portraits of the tsar, military commanders and maps richly illustrated these books. But they also contained stories of the following kind: "... [A] group of our sailors consisting of only 26 people fearlessly made their way to the ship surrounded by a crowd of 300 Japanese. With their bare hands our sailors kicked off their attackers [...] The sailors just seized the bodies of their short-statured enemies, turned their feet up and rammed the soil with their heads; a sailor threw the first one and took another, since the Japanese were in abundance. Funny and terrible! Meanwhile 'macacos'¹³ were

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fiercely running away filling the air with piercing shrieks.”¹⁴ The above story was called Battle at Chemulpo and was allegedly retold by a senior officer of the ship Bobr, named Rychagov.

Many *lubki* pictures were satirical in nature and it is they that are most revealing in demonstrating what kind of images of the Japanese and attitudes to them were designed to be imprinted in the people’s mind. The first satirical popular print had already appeared on the fifth day of the war. It was called *The Japanese Emperor and His Sly Well-wishers*. It represented the Japanese Mikado on horseback, while an American and an Englishman tried to push him down into the sea from a rock. This was a *lubki* version of the caricatures mentioned above.

This first print laid the foundation for many others that followed in the sense that it expressed arrogant attitudes towards the Japanese and distrust towards

Fig. 3 Battle Song of Cossacks from the River Don

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the English and the Americans. It also created typical representations of foreigners – the Englishman, John Bull, and the American, Uncle Sam. This couple would appear in nearly all the satirical prints, to convey the idea that the Russians did not perceive Japan as an independent player in international relations.

Popular prints usually represented larger-than-life figures of Russian Cossacks and sailors beating, kicking, strangling or doing other physical harm to the Japanese, who were portrayed as small and ugly. Many prints depicted the injured, beaten, cringing, frail and puny bodies of Admiral Togo, Marquis Ito, or ordinary Japanese soldiers. Their bodily weakness was always emphasized; their physical strength, height, skin color and facial features were ridiculed.¹⁵ For example, the popular print *Battle Song of Cossacks from the River Don* [Fig. 3] represented a larger-than-life *muzhik* with a brutal face who picked up a Japanese soldier, put him on his knee and was beating him with a whip. The Japanese was shouting and crying, tears pouring from his eyes. Behind *muzhik* we see, of course, the frightened figures of “America” and “China” with Port Arthur victoriously towering above all of them. The picture was accompanied by a rather long caption in verse, but it is sufficient to cite here only some couplets to demonstrate its nationalistic spirit, arrogant tone and low quality:

Shame to show your yellow mugs
To the world -
What a people!

Chuck up waging war with Russia,
Pug-dog
Barks at elephant.

New York's sincere buddy,
Cossack lash
Will kill you.

Though *lubki* publishers aimed at denigrating enemies by poking fun at them and praising the prowess and power of Russians, this was done through very primitive, crude and vulgar means, be they visual or verbal. Educated and intelligent Russians of the time found *lubki* publications not only illiterate,

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ignorant and racist but also not witty at all. For example, I. P. Belokonsky published a series of articles in the journal *Obrazovaniye* (*Education*) where he analyzed many pictures in detail, heavily criticizing them. In particular he noted that all “*lubki* publications were based on praise of rude, physical force, which by itself was treated as the Alpha and Omega of happiness.” The enemy of Russia was made fun of only because he was of small height and thus could not crash cheekbones, bang on them with a cudgel, “rip out by a lash and so on. Intellect, knowledge, culture, rights of people were nothing. One must only be of huge size, have big fists and cudgels.”¹⁶ It is also interesting to note that in the popular prints the idea of a “yellow peril” was replaced by depiction of the Japanese as yellow weaklings with slanted eyes. However, this turned into mockery of Russians themselves – it was not clear why large and strong Cossacks could not in reality defeat those dwarfs. Though physical or military strength has always constituted a substantial part of Russian identity, this could also mean the downgrading of intellectual ability – hardly a vision of self-identity any people could be happy with. In this sense *lubki* were even offensive for the Russians themselves.

On the other side, the combination of bright colors, wide use of standard images and familiar jokes may have made these pictures attractive for people. Belokonsky noted that *lubki* pictures were in high demand, quickly spread around the country and reached even remote villages. This does not mean, however, that people really believed them. We do not have any direct information about the reaction of ordinary people to them, but it is reasonable to suggest that people could have believed images of the prints only if they were confirmed through other sources. Rumors, for example, usually played an important role in the life of the common folk.¹⁷ Information about the situation at the front could also be carried by the injured who returned home or could have reached the village or town taverns through the activities of political critics of the government. During this war, rumors could not tell much about the victories of the Russian army and navy. On the contrary, they narrated that General Kuropatkin brought to Manchuria wagons with candles and icons instead of guns and bullets, that general Stessel was a traitor and surrendered Port Arthur to the Japanese. They also advised that the Japanese were good and brave soldiers and worthy fighters.

Besides satirical prints there were also *lubki* which depicted battle scenes

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Fig. 4 A Repulse of Japanese Landing by Russian Troops

and were meant to glorify the Russian war effort. However, not a single one among them expressed anything close to the rejoicing and triumphant feeling that emerges as a natural result of victory at the battlefield. Not a single battle print showed a happy face [Fig. 4]. This stood in sharp contrast with the patriotic *lubki* of the Russo-Turkish war where soldiers were often depicted celebrating victories. Even those pictures of the Russo-Japanese War that aimed at presenting a story about some heroic deed were sad and pessimistic in tone. Russian soldiers, sailors and officers did not lack heroism, but their heroism usually ended in death or failure. This was the case with admiral Makarov, who was killed by a Japanese mine, with the cruiser *Variag*, whose crew preferred to sink the ship rather than let the enemy take it, and with numerous other instances when people sacrificed their lives. Thus *lubki* propaganda, which aimed at denigrating the enemy and demonstrating how easy it was to kill him, appeared to make no

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sense and by the autumn of 1904 their publication ceased. At the same time, though *lubki* failed in mobilization people towards the war effort, they certainly created several stereotypical images of the Japanese which continued to live in the national consciousness.

Beyond the Frame of Satire

Though in the beginning of the war several patriotic demonstrations expressing support for the war and loyalty to the tsar took place, within the first few months constant failures at the battle field, especially the death of Admiral Makarov on 31 March and the siege of Port Arthur which began in July, changed the mood. Various journals were full of articles, pictures and photographs completely different from the cartoons and popular prints in terms of their nature and contents. For example, a weekly-illustrated journal of military events *Voyna s Yaponiei* (*War with Japan*) and published for the ordinary public (it had a low price of 5 kopeks) gave the following picture: "With a sinking heart I followed the bursts of Japanese shells by which they attempted to detect our batteries. Thanks to God, I saw the shells were missing their marks.... Suddenly the first shell burst, followed by the second, then the third and at last all the battery disappeared from my sight covered by the smoke of numerous shells bombarded by the Japanese. I could hardly restrain myself from bursting into tears, as it seemed to me that not a single human being could stay alive there."¹⁸ The journal presented this as a description of a battle at Shaolinzy (13-14 August) given by a witness.

Other accounts conveyed the cruelty and horror of war, along with the exertion of fighting. A description of one of the attacks on Port Arthur, which took place on 13 November, contained the following words: "The Japanese were twice thrown into the moats from the parapets covered with blood. The Japanese and Russians fought with some insane stubbornness, rifles broken, bayonets twisted, people torn into pieces by bursts of grenades thrown at each other. Even those without arms and profusely bleeding continued to kill each other and the moats were filled with corpses."¹⁹ At the same time the Japanese were characterized as courageous, brave and experienced warriors. The portraits drawn by Russian artists represented the Japanese as tall, portly and even handsome. Admiral Togo standing on the deck of the ship looked like a wise oriental saint. General

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Nogi resembled Napoleon in his posture full of dignity and self-assurance. War pictures by the artists V. Mazurovsky and N. Samokish depicted the Japanese as good cavalymen, as soldiers successfully using technology and often getting the upper hand over the Russians even in bayonet attacks, something the Russians considered among their best skills. Some pictures showed clean and well-organized Japanese hospitals where physicians and nurses took care over the Russian prisoners-of-war.

To be sure, there were patriots and heroes in Russia, but most accounts of the war were full of descriptions which conveyed the depressed spirit of soldiers and officers, their fatigue and apathy, and a lack of fighting spirit. The war stories were far from being lively or cheerful. Commanders looked sluggish and soldiers languorous, suffering from hunger and dressed in ragged clothes.

However much the nationalists attempted to persuade the public that this war was "a real crusade against enemies of the Orthodox faith and the whole of Christendom," and however active *lubki* were in depicting the-easy-to-beat Japanese, neither could mobilize people for the war effort. The reality was that no one could understand the purpose of this war. Even such semi-official publications as *Chronicle of War with Japan*, published by the Headquarters of the Army, had to admit that "the course, the development and the very policy of the war remained somewhat mysterious to the public,"²⁰ and that soldiers perceived it as a war for "the rented land." One author of this *Chronicle* appealed to the army priests claiming that it was their duty to explain the holy character of war.²¹ However, recruits understood only that they were being sent away from their villages to be slaughtered by the Japanese. Officers did not lack the notion of military honor, but the war was associated in their mind with the "private" machinations of the imperial family and irresponsible adventures.

It is also important to emphasize that the war theatre was far away from central Russia. This caused difficulty not only in the transfer of troops and ammunitions supply. The problem was that the Far East was not yet incorporated into the geographical consciousness of the Russians as part of their national territory, and fighting for Manchuria made no sense at all.

Single groups of Russian Cossacks first appeared in the low reaches of the Amur river in the beginning of the 17th century, but after Russia signed the Nerchinsk Treaty with China in 1689, this vast region fell under the rule of the Manchus. So, in search of a route to Japan, Russians had to go along the northern

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coast of the Okhotsk Sea, Kamchatka and the Kuril islands. Russian interest in what is now called the Maritime and Priamur (lit. — nearby the Amur) regions resumed in the middle of the 19th century when China became weak and Western powers appeared in this part of the world barely known to them before. It was Captain Gennady Nevelskoy, supported first by the Governor-General of Siberia, N. Muraviov, and then by Tsar Nikolas II himself, who explored the Amur estuary, proved the insular character of Sakhalin and established several Russian stations there, as well as down to the south along the coast of the Sea of Japan. According to the Peking Treaty of 1860, Russia acquired the Western bank of the Amur and also the land to the east of the Ussuri river. The new port of Vladivostok was founded.

After 1860 a slow process of settlement in this region started, but it was accompanied by numerous hardships caused by sporadic clashes with the Manchus and difficulties in supplying provisions. In 1886 Russia signed a new treaty with China, which demarcated the border between the two countries, and some frontier posts were even erected in a few places.

Building the Trans-Siberian Railway, which started in 1891, became an important step for Russia's penetration into this region. The plan was put forward by S. Yu. Witte, who was the Minister of Finance and an active promoter of Russia's economic interests in the Far East. After the Sino-Japanese War, one more treaty, which enabled Russia to build a railway across Manchuria through Harbin to Port Arthur, was concluded. In 1897 Russia obtained permission from China to rent Port Arthur, built 53 forts there and turned it into a navy and military base of significance.

In 1900 Russia brought troops into Manchuria for the suppression of the Boxer rebellion. It was at this time that some supporters of Russia's penetration into the Far East, such as Prince Ukhtomsky, or a pro-government newspaper *Novoye vremya* coined the term *Zheltorossiia* (Yellow Russia) and began a campaign to install this notion into the public consciousness.²² However, Russia's military presence in Manchuria was completely inadequate for its economic role not only there, but also in the Russian Far East. During approximately fifty years of colonization of the Maritime Province and of the territories adjacent to the Amur, a huge area which amounted to more than one million square *verst*,²³ the number of soldiers and officials there reached 60,000, while the agricultural population was about 175,000, i.e. one person per more than 4 square *verst*.²⁴

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The government attempted to induce people to move there by giving them various advantages, such as the allocation of 100 *desiatina*²⁵ of land per family, exemption from taxes and army service. But people still had to be forced to go. The majority of settlers consisted of soldiers or peasants who were to be recruited into the army, as well as convicts and criminals. Cossacks, usually the first to develop new lands in Russia, were so unwilling to move to the Far East that they drew lots for whom to send. Before the railway was built, migration by land took from two to three years. People stopped on their way because of illnesses, to earn money to support themselves and other reasons. Resettlement by sea or railway was quicker, but not easier. Illnesses, bad living conditions, and insufficient food supplies caused high mortality rates. Peasants in the Far East were not quick to exhibit the spirit of activity, initiative and entrepreneurship. One critic of the time noted that "nowhere is the laziness and carelessness of the people so outstanding, nowhere are pretentious manners on the one side, misery and homelessness on the other, more obvious [than in the region adjacent to Amur]."²⁶

Indeed, it was difficult for people from the central parts of Russia to get accustomed to the living conditions and climate in the Far East. Methods of farming were unfamiliar; they required new knowledge and skills. The agricultural season lasted for only three months, while during the rest of the year people hardly had any occupation, as there were no possibilities to engage in other activity. Because Russians were afraid of tigers and Manchu bandits, they could not engage in hunting. It was also difficult to compete with Chinese traders because Russia had nothing to offer for trade, as neither agriculture nor industry was developed. The population in the Russian Far East was not self-supporting. For example, 829,000 pounds of bread were brought by sea to Vladivostok in 1895, whereas in 1900 this had already increased to 3 million. 90% of the expenses were allocated for the needs of the army and navy.²⁷ Even in 1917 the majority of agricultural products were delivered from Manchuria. Thus, an objective analysis of the situation led to the conclusion that the Far Eastern region was so underdeveloped that it was impossible for Russia to fight for Manchuria. Russian people had no attachment to this land, and no historical memory was associated with it.

The only actual Russian territory affected by the Russo-Japanese War was Sakhalin, but Russia used it as a penal colony and images of the island created

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by A. Chekhov or V. Doroshevich produced a terrible and depressing impression. Doroshevich lamented that after the splendid, blooming Ceylon, gorgeous, marvelous Singapore or picturesque shores of Japan (that was the itinerary of the boat to Sakhalin) it was a mockery to bring people to this country of snowstorms, fogs, ice, and blizzards and order them to live there.²⁸ Rarely could free peasants live in Sakhalin, not only because of the bad climatic conditions, but because the products of their work were stolen by numerous bandits. It was a true hell for the people who moved there. Their notions of the motherland were associated with central Russia or Ukraine where they had come from.

It is no surprise that when the Japanese seized Sakhalin in July of 1905, newspapers and journals reacted quite negatively to assertions of some “patriots” who insisted on continuation of the war. The liberal journal *Vestnik Evropy* wrote: “In order to offer such heroic measures as to fight for the motherland till the last drop of blood, the foe should have at least gotten into the boundaries of European Russia and threatened its center. No one hesitates about the readiness of the Russian people to fight for the defense of the motherland from the real menace. But it would be difficult to expect their readiness for this self-sacrifice for some ‘convict prison’ island of Sakhalin or even for Vladivostok.”²⁹ It is remarkable that at least some Russians expressed their assurance that Japan would turn Sakhalin into a place of prosperity.³⁰ In the year 1905, patriotism called not for the protection of some “remote and alien territories, which had nothing in common with the economic life of the country, but for mobilization of all creative forces for the fight against the backwardness of Russia.”³¹

The popular mind attributed the defeat in the war to the incapacity and incompetence of the Russian military and political elite, so that the national anger turned against them, but not against the Japanese. At this point in time the identity of Russians split into two parts – pro and anti-government. The official version of identity opted for the imperial vision, while the popular one tended to concentrate on domestic settlement and reforms.

Fostering Soviet Patriotism

Japan appeared among the enemies of Soviet Russia nearly from the very foundation of the new state. The anti-Bolshevik intervention of the Japanese

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army into Siberia began in March 1918 and ended only in 1922, i.e. it lasted two years longer than that of the other states.³² During this time several attempts to establish anti-Bolshevik governments in Siberia with the help of the Japanese were also undertaken. The very scale of this intervention, which amounted to an army of 70,000 men, covered the territory from Vladivostok to Zabaikaliye to Sakhalin, and the ferocity of fighting with the partisans left a negative imprint in the memory of each of the adversaries. What obviously made this intervention different from the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was the fact that the Japanese not only intruded into the territory of Russia, but that the main issue of confrontation went along ideological lines.³³

However, as soon as Japan withdrew its troops from Siberia and the Far East and negotiations for a treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan proceeded, information on Japan that appeared in central Soviet newspapers and magazines was presented in a way to create a rather attractive image of the country. This was achieved by means of manipulation of images, which were supposed to bring Japan closer to the realities of life or ideals of "the first state of the proletariat." For example, it was emphasized that sakura cherry blossoms and geisha, characteristic of traditional Japan, had receded into the past, while contemporary Japan was presented as a developed industrial state. The assumption behind this image was the notion that an industrial state, abundant in plants and factories, had a large number of workers, perceived as potential allies of the Soviets.³⁴ A "cheerful spirit of people" and "frugality" were emphasized as features of the Japanese national character. The first one was associated with "indifference towards religion" and matched well with the atheistic propaganda in the Soviet Union, while the life of people in Russia had to be frugal because of hard economic conditions in the country. Newspapers and magazines carried photos, for example, of a Japanese railway delegation or Japanese pilots on a visit to Moscow, which aimed to emphasize rapprochement between the two countries.³⁵ Some articles even maintained that before the advance of Western civilization into Japan, women there enjoyed equality with men, the same as their Soviet counterparts.

The conclusion in 1925 of the Basic Treaty with Japan was assessed in the Soviet mass media as an event of world historical importance, and though Japan was characterized as an imperialist power with ambitions to dominate the Far East, hopes were expressed that the treaty was a "blow against other imperialistic

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powers.” Sometimes articles on Japan were rather naïve. For example, the future “founding father” of Japanese studies in the Soviet Union, N. I. Konrad, suggested that the earthquake of 1923 could become an opportunity for the Japanese to give up what he called “the spirit of profit, characteristic of Americans, and develop other sides of the human soul well represented by Russian literary thought.”³⁶

However, at the beginning of the 1930s, this positive image underwent substantial revision as the result of changes in the domestic and international environment. In 1929 the First Five Year Plan and then the Second one were launched in the Soviet Union with the goal of turning it into a predominantly industrial power. Soviet economic planners almost obsessively concentrated on the development of heavy industry. The construction of plants, blast furnaces, electric power stations, railways and other infrastructure started. Only the so-called “giants of the Five Year Plan,” i.e. the biggest industrial sites, absorbed 45% of investment and some of them, such as the iron and steel centers of Magnitogorsk and Kuzbas, were located in Siberia. Construction of Komsomolsk-na-Amure, a new city on the Amur, with a port and a shipbuilding plant, became the symbol of conquering the Far East. The development of industry required the search for natural resources, which were discovered in rich regions of Siberia and the Far East, and hundreds of geological expeditions were sent there.

Industrialization of the country developed at the expense of agriculture and the rural population.³⁷ Thousands of families of wealthy and not so wealthy peasants were deprived of land, forbidden to continue their agricultural pursuits and resettled into Siberia or the Far East. The same regions also became sites of Gulag camps, which appeared in the course of purges, so that the population in the East increased due to prisoners and accompanying personnel. In a word, for good or for bad, the 1930s became the time of the great move to the East and these newly developed regions began to figure prominently in the plans of the Communist party and the Soviet government, in mass media, literature and cinema.

At the end of the 1920s the party and the government adopted a plan for military and patriotic education. The main organization which carried it out was Osoaviahim (Voluntary Society for the Promotion of Defense, Aviation and Chemical Construction), established in 1927 and put under the patronage

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of Komsomol.³⁸ The emphasis of its activity was placed on bringing up the young generation physically trained and knowledgeable in the use of basic military technology. The ideological ingredient consisted of the promotion of the idea of willingness and preparedness for the defense of the "sacred Soviet land." In May 1934 the party and the government passed a resolution on teaching civil history at school, which also focused on "bringing up people in the spirit of Soviet patriotism." Not only mass media, but also all spheres of arts were put under tight ideological control and were urged to represent the ideal of socialist construction and defense of the motherland.

The major target of propaganda was the young generation, so in this respect literature for youth and children or magazines for soldiers of the Red Army may be most representative of the ways in which this propaganda was carried out. The first issue of importance was demonstration of the very scale of the territory of the "first socialist country in the world." It is interesting to note that whereas the map of the Soviet Union published in 1926 in the main magazine for schoolchildren *Pioner (Pioneer)* represented only the European part of Russia and Central Asia, with the eastern boundary drawn around Tobolsk, a city on the Irtysh, another map published in the same magazine in 1939 already included Sakhalin, Kamchatka and Primoriye. The achievements in reclamation of new territories by young builders of socialism were glorified in numerous songs. Such words as "we conquer space and time, we are the owners of the land" or "we are born to turn a fairytale into reality, to overcome the spaciousness and space" were repeated with passion in many songs. The most famous among them became *Song about the Motherland*, which contained the following words "Broad my country is, with many rivers, forests and fields."³⁹ Magazines also organized competitions for the best description of one's own region. These descriptions usually included the depiction of the landscape, natural resources, local economy and activities of people. Siberia and the Far East quite often figured among them, more so after the border clashes with Japan in 1938-39.⁴⁰

Literature for children was often devoted to the topic of discovery of new lands and to this end the Far East offered good opportunities. Many stories and novels conveyed the idea of the historical bonds between the Far East and Russia, emphasizing the pioneering role of Russian travelers and explorers in the discovery of these lands. Such was, for example, the novel by A. Zonin, *The Captain of "the Diana,"*⁴¹ which was a short narrative from the famous book

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by V. M. Golovnin.⁴² In contrast to Golovnin himself who depicted the Japanese as educated and enlightened people, patient, modest, and courteous and even noted that the Japanese had sufficient reasons to be apprehensive of Russia,⁴³ the Soviet writer presented them as treacherous, vengeful, hateful, and dangerous. Moreover, Zonin completely omitted the part about Takadaya Kahei's cooperation in rescuing Russians from imprisonment, as this would have been an example of good relations between the two nations, unimaginable for the 1930s. However, he devoted much space to the description of defection and treachery of Ensign Mur, a Russian German who served on the *Diana*, to bring to the attention of readers the idea of devotion to the motherland.

The depiction of the struggle of the Bolsheviks with the "whites" and the Japanese in the Far East during the Civil War was another device for bringing it closer to the Soviet people. Songs, poems and novels aimed at emphasizing how the partisans sacrificed their lives for the victory of socialism. Such was a popular song by P. Parfyonov *Over the Valleys and Hills*.⁴⁴ The story about Sergei Lazo and other partisans allegedly burned alive in the locomotive furnace by the Japanese was known to every Soviet schoolboy or schoolgirl.⁴⁵ The scene of action of the novel *The Defeat* (1927) written by a classic of the Soviet literature A. Fadeev was the Ussuri forest and though the Japanese did not figure prominently in this novel, it was nevertheless made obvious that they were the enemies of the "proletariat cause."

In the 1930s documentary essays became a popular literary genre. Usually these essays sang glory to "peaceful constructive labor" of people, many of whom lived and worked in the outlying districts of the country, as was the case in the works of V. Kantorovich. This writer described, in particular, how the life of ethnic minorities in the Far East, North and South changed under the civilizing influence of the Soviet power. Due to his numerous trips to Sakhalin he was particularly well-informed about the life of a local ethnic group nivkhi and often compared the disastrous conditions of their life in the past with the changes brought by the Soviets, such as the spread of hygiene and education, including learning of Russian, the building of new, Russian, types of houses, etc.⁴⁶ In other essays or stories the inhuman character of Japan's colonization of Manchuria was usually contrasted to the benevolent and liberating policy of the Soviet Union, though in reality the two had much in common.⁴⁷

However, achievements of the Five Year Plans and the "heroic labor of people"

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provided the main content of news in the Soviet Union and also became the main topic for literature, cinema and other forms of art. From this time on, novels were dedicated to the description not of the individual and his or her psychological life, but of the process of building the socialist society and the collective contribution to it. Thus, *The Second Day* by I. Erenburg, *Hydrocenter* by M. Shaginyan, *Energy* by F. Gladkov, all considered later as classics of socialist realism, appeared in 1931-34. The novel *Courage* by Vera Ketlinskaya (1938) also ranked among them. It was dedicated to the first builders of Komsomolsk-na-Amure and described their enthusiasm, which helped them to overcome enormous hardships and privation in the achievement of their goal. In the middle of the 1930s *Pioner* carried, on a permanent basis, a column "Building a City in the Far East," which also sang glory to the heroic work of the builders of this city, often hiding the negative sides of this undertaking. Thus, through the construction of the historical memory and through the glorification of the contemporary achievements in industrialization of the Far East this region was gradually incorporated into the geographical and national consciousness of the Soviet people.

In reality the accomplishments of the Five Year Plans were not as glorious as advertised. The Soviet Union was able to become the industrial power only due to very hard, often physical, labour of people, at the expense of saving money for the improvement of their living conditions, consumer goods and food. To be sure, not everyone was happy with this life. Dissatisfaction and complaints of people were reflected, for example, in letters many wrote to the members of the government.⁴⁸ But it is remarkable that in the majority of cases the hardships of life were attributed to the mismanagement of local officials rather than to the policy of the Kremlin or the Soviet system itself. This means that the "cultural hegemony" of the regime (a term used by S. Davies) dominated over the mass consciousness.

The detailed examination of the ideology and the spirit of that time is beyond the scope of the present paper,⁴⁹ but it is necessary to notice that the enthusiasm and the romanticism characteristic of the young generation in the 1930s and so astonishing to us now were to a great extent genuine and sincere. Many were inspired by the dream of a future paradise of equality and brotherhood, based on belief in communism, and worked ardently and selflessly to build the mighty Soviet industry. The Soviet government and propaganda of that time appeared

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able to exploit and strengthen this belief successfully. This enthusiasm toward labour for the benefit of the “first country of the workers” helps to understand why the idea of patriotism came to have strong roots in the consciousness of people.

Constructing the Japanese Enemy

According to Stalin’s formula, the Soviet Union was surrounded by “hostile capitalist states.” So, a very effective factor that stimulated the labour effort and the unity of the people and the government became the idea of the necessity to protect the country from enemies. Thus, the construction of the “image of the enemy” became an essential part of the Soviet propaganda. Though Germany figured as the main enemy, the situation in the Far East was favourable for turning the weapon against Japan too.

The existence of a quarter of a million of “white” Russians in the northeast of China and sporadic clashes with Chinese militarists were reasons for anxiety and concern of the Soviet authorities from the end of the Civil War. At the beginning of the 1930s leaders of the Japanese state abandoned their peaceful international policy in favor of outright military action. In 1932 Japan conquered Manchuria and established the state of Manchu-kuo. Thus, the Soviet Union and Japan faced each other along the 3,000-mile border. The old geopolitical rivalry was reinforced by ideological enmity and articles of an overtly anti-Soviet character often appeared in the Japanese press. The question of war against the USSR was debated hotly among the Army General Staff and in the Cabinet. War Minister Araki Sadao pressed especially vigorously for acceptance of the *Kodoha* demand for a preventive war against the northern neighbor and Japanese journalists scared the public with the image of the Soviet threat. Araki’s views were made publicly known in the Soviet Union as a pamphlet *Japan’s Goals in the Showa Era*, allegedly written by him, was translated into Russian and published in a book by O. Tanin and Yu. Yogan.⁵⁰ Another book on the topic of war with the Soviet Union written by Hirata Shinsaku was also reprinted in Moscow. It outlined, for example, several variants of taking over Vladivostok and expressed assurance that it would capitulate, similar to Port Arthur 30 years before.⁵¹

The Soviet Union regarded creation of Manchu-kuo as a springboard for

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aggression into its territory and started in earnest to take measures for the increase of the military buildup in the Far East, improving communications and strengthening its borders. The Red Army increased from 42,000 men in 1929 to 290,000 in 1937 and was equipped with modern technology,⁵² but until 1937 the Soviet military potential in the Far East was still weaker than the Japanese. The Soviet military headquarters also worked out plans for war with Japan and, though they were called defensive, intrusion into the territory of Manchuria was not excluded.⁵³ Throughout the 1930s, border clashes between the Soviet Union and Japan occurred quite often, and the number of border violations reported by one side or the other for the period from 1932 to 1939 numbered well over 1,000.⁵⁴

In reality, in the 1930s neither Japan nor the Soviet Union wanted or could afford a full-scale war. However, when in June of 1938 G. S. Lyushkov, the head of the Far Eastern NKVD, escaped to Manchuria, the Soviets decided to enforce the border line on the hill Zaozernaya (Choko-ho) near Lake Khasan and this developed into a fierce military conflict, which lasted 14 days.⁵⁵ With great difficulty the Red Army managed to take the upper hand. But the Japanese did not seem to be much impressed by the Soviet success, so that another confrontation, much larger in scale took place the following year on the border between Mongolia and Manchuria. It came to be known as "events at the Khalkhin-Gol River" in Russian or "Nomonhan incident" in Japanese. In 1939 the Soviet victory was more substantial. It was in this situation of permanent tensions and confrontations that the image of Japan as the official enemy of the Soviet Union emerged.

The communist party and government newspapers along with speeches delivered by the Soviet authorities always condemned Japan in harshly accusatory terms. The main emphasis was usually placed on the protection of territory, though the Soviet theory attributed the aggressiveness of Japan to the capitalist nature of the state. Peoples Commissar of Defense K. Voroshilov set the tone in his speech at the 17th party congress held in 1934. He declared: "Vladivostok is remote, but it is our city, and the Maritime province, Northern Sakhalin, Kamchatka are ours as well; every inch of our Far Eastern land must be defended against the enemy attacks and we will definitely do so!" It was not necessary to explain what enemy was meant.

A book by the well-known writer P. Pavlenko published in 1937⁵⁶ was devoted

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to the description of the peaceful and enthusiastic work of the Soviet people and also imagined a future war with Japan. It claimed very clearly that the transformation of the Far East into one huge construction site had as its consequences the increase of defensive potential and that the Soviet people were ready to protect their land, stained with the blood of partisans and developed from nothing by the efforts of the people, from their Japanese enemies. It also argued that the future war, in contrast to the war of 1904-1905, lost by the tsarist government, would definitely be won by the Soviet people.

The topic of the border and its guards also figured prominently in literature and cinema. Even a cartoon for children *Fyodor-the-Hunter* told the story of a boy who managed to drive away the Japanese, after they crossed the border, with the help of animals of the forest somewhere in Siberia. Books and stories by G. Ryklin, M. Slonimsky, S. Dikovsky, and R. Fraerman,⁵⁷ to name only a few, were devoted to the topic of the Soviet frontier guards who courageously fulfilled their duty and protected the motherland against various enemies, with the Japanese ranking among the most prominent ones. One of the favorite Soviet songs of that time told how the Soviet border guards watched the frontier and protected it from the Japanese:

Gloomy clouds move along the border,
Silence governs over severe lands,
By the high shores of the Amur River
Stand the guards of our motherland.

The events at Lake Khasan became another opportunity to attempt to prove the superiority of the Soviets against the Japanese. The Soviet Union made it widely known through the mass media that it regarded the events as “the impudent aggression of Japanese militarists on the sacred Soviet land.” From 3 till 8 August 1938 the main Soviet official newspapers, *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, published information about numerous meetings held at various plants, factories or collective farms, citing extracts from resolutions accepted there. Stock phrases such as “we condemn the impertinent provocative actions of Japanese military cliques,” “hold up to shame the mean fascist bandits,” “express indignation about the bloody massacre,” etc. appeared in every newspaper. The events became instrumental in setting the Soviet propaganda machine into new motion. Glorification of the Soviet motherland, Soviet heroes, the greatness of Stalin, the “symbol of the Soviet victory,” and the Soviet Army was expressed,

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criticizing and denigrating the Japanese. From that time till the beginning of perestroika, organization of similar meetings became an essential feature of life. The government would call for them every time it needed the so-called “mass support and approval” of its policy, be it engagement of troops in Czechoslovakia or Afghanistan. Word clichés did not undergo much change, except that the Japanese were replaced by German fascists during the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945) and by American imperialists after the war. However, sincerity of people’s support has disappeared approximately in the end of N. Khrushchov’s rule.

Satirical cartoons were also published on the occasion of victory at Lake Khasan. Some of their features were similar to the cartoons and *lubki* prints of the Russo-Japanese War. Japanese were represented again as small, undersized

Fig. 5 The Height at Lake Khasan

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and weak. The same as before, Russian warriors had larger-than-life figures, though the Red Army soldiers replaced the Cossacks. Soviet cartoonists also never forgot to show the physical differences between the Russians and the Japanese, though at this time more emphasis was placed on the modern Soviet technology – the result of industrialization. The Japanese were again endowed with animal features and dehumanized; they were belittled both physically and spiritually. Many pictures and stories portrayed them constantly crying or depressed.

This victory at Khasan was viewed as revenge for the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. One of the cartoons showed an impaired Japanese soldier sitting

Fig. 6 A Soviet Gate-Way

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at a school-desk with two sheets of paper in front of him: "Lesson no. 1 - Siberia, 1922; lesson no. 2 - Lake Khasan, 1938."⁵⁸ Another showed groups of Japanese and Soviet military standing before the map, and the message ran: "Thirty five years ago: we [the Japanese] marked [on the map] Mukden, Port Arthur, Tsushima. The present: we [the Russians] mark Volochaevka, Spask,⁵⁹ Khasan."⁶⁰ The main difference from cartoons of the Russo-Japanese War lay in the representation of the territory and the border. A larger-than-life Soviet border guard with a rifle or red banner in his hands was often depicted standing on the top of the mountain, while the Japanese were attempting in vain to climb it [Fig. 5]. The mountain could be interpreted in the direct sense, as the Zaozernaya hill, or in the indirect, meaning the triumph of the Soviet Union over Japan.

In one of the postcards by famous cartoonists Kukryniksy,⁶¹ the Soviet border looked like a high iron fence with a big red lock hanging on the gates [Fig. 6]. It definitely symbolized that this border was well protected. Rifles of the Soviet soldiers pushed the Japanese, represented as ugly rats, away from under the gates. In another cartoon a Japanese military man was crushing his head against a big Soviet border-post. This was supposed to be an illustration of the speech of the Minister of Foreign affairs V. Molotov at the 18th party congress (1939): "Any aggressor will crush his copper forehead against the Soviet border-pole."

In private the Soviet leaders admitted that army operations at Lake Khasan were not well organized, that the Japanese attack took the Soviet military unaware, that commanders lacked the knowledge of locality and that too many people were killed. They also acknowledged that if it were not for the initiative and courage of ordinary soldiers, the Red Army would not have won.⁶² But the ordinary soldiers sacrificed their lives in the battle, because the officially sponsored propaganda, at some level, coincided with the love of the people for the land they became attached to through work and struggle.⁶³

It is instructive to learn that the Soviet anti-Japanese propaganda campaign of the late 1930s used the victory at Lake Khasan more actively than the one at Khalkhin-gol, which was, however, larger in scale. Moreover, the victory at Khalkhin-gol was glorified through the appeal to the memories of the heroes of Khasan, which had taken place one year before. The explanation lies, probably, in the fact that Lake Khasan was Russian territory, while Khalkhin-gol was in Mongolia. But even on the eve of the final attack there, the appeal to the Soviet

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soldiers exhorted: "Comrades! On the border of the Peoples Republic of Mongolia we defend our own land from Baikal to Vladivostok".

According to the Soviet Commissar of Defense, K. E. Voroshilov, the significance of the Soviet victory at Lake Khasan laid in the fact that it was the first case after the Civil War when the Red Army could test its ability in fighting the well-experienced regular army of a capitalist state.⁶⁴ However, this victory had a much larger consequence. This was the first case when the USSR as a state could test its identity constructed around the ideas of ideological and military superiority of socialism over capitalism. Japan was destined to become the enemy against which this test was accomplished.

Contrary to the time of the Russo-Japanese War, in the 1930s the Soviet people seemed to be supportive of their government's policy. This unity was achieved to no small extent through the idea of the necessity to protect the land which, at least in theory, belonged to the people. Land, more than anything else, can arouse national feelings. So, the geographical consciousness according to which the territory of the Far East with clearly defined borders was incorporated into the Soviet state came to be an important part of this newly constructed national identity. Images of Japan-the-enemy enhanced this identity until important changes would take place in the consciousness of the Soviet people in the 1960s and 1970s.

At the same time, the patriotic propaganda against the Japanese in the 1930s as well as the patriotic propaganda during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 also appealed to the memory of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. For this purpose the novels *Tsushima* by A. Novikov-Priboi and *Port-Arthur* by A. Stepanov were propagated and both were awarded the Stalin prize after the war. This propaganda device created a historical perspective for the anti-Japanese feelings in the Soviet Union.

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 44. See: П.Парфенов, «По долинам и по взгорьям». Как создавалась песня, (*Over the Valleys and Hills. How the Song Was Created*), *Красноармеец и краснофлотец*, 1934, № 21, с. 13.
 45. Recently a Russian historian B. Slavinsky discovered some materials which demonstrate that S. Lazo and others were burned not by the Japanese, but by the "whites". A paper made at 2001 Winter Symposium, Slavic Centre, Hokkaido University.
 46. В. Канторович, Сахалинская повесть (*A Sakhalin Novel*), Москва: Художественная литература, 1971. The book contains essays written from 1931 to 1970.
 47. On Japan's colonization of Manchuria see: Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997.
 48. Письма во власть (*Letters to Those in Power, 1928-1939*), составители А. Я. Лившин, И.В. Орлов, О.В. Хлевнюк, Москва: РОССПЕН, 2002.
 49. On new assessments of Stalin ideology and its perception by people see: *Stalinism: New Directions*, ed. By Sheila Fitzpatrick, Routledge, 2000.
 50. О.Танин, Е.Иоган, *Военно-фашистское движение в Японии* (*Military and Fascist Movement in Japan*), Москва: Партиздат, 1933, pp. 252-262.
 51. Хирата Синсаку, "Как мы будем воевать?" Япония. Сборник статей и материалов (*Japan. A Collection of Articles and Materials*), Москва-Ленинград: Партиздат, 1934, сс. 297-312.

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52. Hirai Tomoyoshi, "The Structure and the Image of the Soviet Threat in the 1930s," in *Proceedings of Symposium on Russo-Japanese Relations*, Tokyo: Sophia University, 1992, pp. 40-41.
53. *Русский архив (Russian Archive)*, т. 18, *Великая Отечественная (The great Patriotic)*, 7 (1), Москва: "Терра", 1997, pp. 74-78.
54. S.D. Goldman, *The Forgotten War: The Soviet Union and Japan, 1937-1939*, University Microfilms International, 1970, p. 41.
55. On the events at Lake Khasan see: Alvin D. Coox, *The Anatomy of a Small War*, Westport, London: Greenwood Press, 1977. The border posts which defined the border line set by the Russo-Chinese Treaty of 1886 became deteriorated by the 1930s and the Russians and the Japanese had differences in its demarcation. Soviet casualties at Lake Khasan comprised 792 men killed or lost while 2,752 were injured, see: Штамп секретности снят (*The Stamp of Secrecy Has Been Abolished. Casualties of the Military Forces of the USSR in Wars, Military Activities and Conflicts*), Moscow, 1993, p. 71-72.
56. П.А.Павленко, *На Востоке (In the East)*, Москва: Советский писатель, 1937.
57. Г.Рыклин, *Рассказы о пограничниках (Stories on Border Guards)*, Москва-Ленинград: Детгиз, 1937; Р.Фраерман, *Шпион (Spy)*, Москва, 1937; Мих. Слонимский, *Пограничники (Border Guards)*, Ленинград: Политиздат, 1937; С. Диковский, «Патриоты» (Patriots), *Новый мир*, 1937, № 11.
58. Ян Ганшин, «Рассказ о странах, армиях и лицах, чужим добром мечтавших поживиться» (A Story about Countries, Armies and People Enriching Themselves at Others Expense, *Красноармеец*, 1939, no. 3, pp. 54-55.
59. Volochaevka and Spask were famous in the Soviet Union as places where Bolshevik partisans crushed the Japanese army during the Japanese intervention of 1918-22.
60. Л. Генч, «Тридцать пять лет назад. Теперь» (Thirty Five Years Ago. Present), *Крокодил, (Crocodile)* 1939, 3, p.3.
61. Kukryniksy – a pen name for a group of Soviet graphic artists: M. V. Kupriyanov, P. N. Krylov and N. A. Sokolov.
62. *Русский архив (Russia Archive)*, т. 18, сс. 103-108.
63. Numerous reminiscences of the participants of the battle at Lake Khasan have been published. See: Д.Стонов, «Как мы били самураев» (How We Beat the Samurais), *Красноармеец*, 1938, № 2, с. 4-5; Рассказы участников отпорных боев у озера Хасан (Stories of the Participants of Defense Battles at Lake Khasan), *Красноармеец*, 1939, № 1, сс. 10-11; Т. Shlyakhov «Бой одиннадцати» (The Battle of the Eleven), *Пионер*, 1939, № 8, сс. 4-9; И.Н.Мошляк, *Вспомним мы пехоту (Let Us Remember the Infantry)*, Москва: Воениздат, 1988, pp. 27-72. Moshlyak was awarded the title of a Hero of the Soviet Union because he installed the red banner on the top of Zaozernaya hill.
64. В.Кардашов, *Ворошилов (Voroshilov)*, Москва: Молодая гвардия, 1976, с. 272.