**Issues pertaining to Wallachian and Moldavian
voyvodas and their effect
on Russo-Ottoman relations (1774-1806)**

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1. Introduction

This article aims to present an aspect of Russo-Ottoman relations with regard to Wallachia and Moldavia in the period between 1774 and 1806, through an examination of issues surrounding the *voyvodas* (princes) as diplomatic issues between the two empires.

Beginning in the second half of the eighteenth century, close and complicated relations were established between Russia and the Ottoman Empire over Wallachia and Moldavia. Later, other European powers became involved as well. As a result, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, these two principalities occupied an important place in the power games of Europe and the Ottoman Empire, and issues regarding the *voyvodas* of these principalities became issues of significant interest to the European powers. Therefore, I believe that an analysis of this subject will help us to understand one aspect of the role played by these principalities in the process of the integration of Russia and the Ottoman Empire into the Western state system. Because the purpose of this article is to examine this aspect of integration, I will not consider matters pertaining to *voyvodas* in the context of domestic affairs. Rather, I will discuss this subject from the viewpoint of international relations.

After the Ottoman conquest, the historical experience of Wallachia and Moldavia, referred to as the Danubian Principalities in Western documents and important regions in present-day Romania, differed from those of other Balkan

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territories. Owing to their geographical and geopolitical position, these two principalities did not fall under the direct rule of the Porte but were under its control as autonomous vassal states, maintaining their partial independence in exchange for various obligations to the Porte, such as an annual tribute and the supply of provisions to Istanbul. Although Michael the Brave (Mihai Viteazul, 1558-1601) united Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania under a single rule for a short period of time in the end of the sixteenth century, in general, the Danubian Principalities were mostly under the control of the Porte during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Thus, attempts made by the Poles and Austrians to interfere in the affairs of these two principalities seldom met with success.

However, the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699) marked the decline of the Ottoman's dominance over Europe, and concurrently, Russia emerged as a power in the north. In the eighteenth century, as a result of this change in the political dynamics with regard to international relations, the European powers began to exercise their influence over Wallachia and Moldavia earlier than in the other territories in the Balkan Peninsula. Among the European countries, Russia was one of the first to exert its influence over these principalities. The existence of a secret alliance between Peter the Great and the Moldavian *voyvoda* Dimitrie Cantemir (1693, 1710-11) at the time of the Prut Campaign (1710-1711) bears testimony to this influence. Following the war, the Danubian Principalities became the basis for a power game mainly among three empires – Habsburg, Russia and Ottoman – and a balance of power was achieved for more than fifty years. However, the Russo-Ottoman War (1768-1774) and the Treaty of Kyuchuk Kainardja (1774) resulted in the unsettling of this balance. As a result, the Danubian Principalities became one of the regions most disputed by Russia and the Ottoman Empire, witnessing involvement from Habsburg at times and later from other European powers.

It appears that, to date, little attention has been paid to this subject, although several scholars have mentioned this topic briefly in their work. The Moldavian (Bessarabian) scholar Grosul did so in his monograph on Russian policy concerning the Danubian Principalities¹ and Stanford Shaw in his study on the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Selim III.² However, these studies only make superficial reference to the issues pertaining to *voyvodas* and do not focus on them in the context of international relations.

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Moreover, Russo-Ottoman relations in general during this period have not been the subject of many studies, while there have been an abundance of studies on Russo-Balkan relations. From a Russian perspective, in addition to the above-mentioned work by Grosul, several monographs focus not only on Russia's Balkan policy but also on Russo-Ottoman relations in general.³ From an Ottoman perspective, the only reliable study thus far is Uzunçarşılı's general history of the Ottoman Empire published by Türk Tarih Kurumu (Turkish Historical Society).⁴

Further, specific topics concerning relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Danubian Principalities during the eighteenth century – the so-called Phanariot period – have been discussed in articles by Romanian scholars. For example, *Hatt-ı şerîfs* (Imperial edicts)⁵ addressed to Wallachia and Moldavia by the Porte, after each Russo-Ottoman War, provided a legal background to the relations between the Porte and the principalities, and several articles have analyzed these edicts.⁶ In particular, the Imperial edicts of 1802, which are one of the main focuses in this article, are known to have altered relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Danubian Principalities. With regard to these edicts, Mihail Guboglu, a Romanian orientalist, edited the original text maintained in the National Archives of Romania and translated it into Russian with a brief explanation regarding its background.⁷ A personal research, conducted in the National Archives in Bucharest, revealed many minute differences between Guboglu's edition and the original text that he had based his translation upon.⁸ In addition, from the Russian perspective, G. N. Seliakh provides an outline of the edicts based on Russian diplomatic documents.⁹

Through such a review of the historiography, the lack of studies regarding not only Russo-Ottoman relations but also the relations between the Ottoman Empire and other European powers in the eighteenth century becomes evident. It would appear that the affairs which took place in the Balkans in the second half of the eighteenth century have been examined only as a part of the 'Eastern Question,' and not in the context of Ottoman-European relations.¹⁰ In other words, the role of the Porte as a political actor in international politics has been neglected, because researchers have depended solely on Western material. It must be emphasized that the Eastern Question is but one of several approaches to an understanding of affairs in the Balkans, and does not provide us with a detailed or comprehensive understanding. In Ottoman studies, from another

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perspective, the study of diplomatic history or international relations prior to the eighteenth century, is one of the weakest fields of study.¹¹ Based on these observations, we should use both Western and Turkish material to pursue the study of Ottoman diplomacy as well as the relations between the Porte and the European powers. Further, based on the results of the considerable number of studies on the Eastern Question, an attempt should be made to comprehensively reconsider the subject of the Balkans in the context of international relations wherein the Ottoman Empire is one of the most important actors.

For the purposes of this study, with regard to primary sources, issues related to the *voyvodas* and the international status of the Danubian Principalities have been examined using both Russian and Ottoman sources. As a main source from the Russian side, reference was made to a collection of diplomatic and consular reports published in Romania and the former Soviet Union.¹² From the Ottoman side, several chronicles written by Ottoman official chroniclers '*vak'a nüvîs*'¹³ were referred to. Apart from these, this study also made use of published collections of treaties, transliterated or translated Ottoman documents and several archival documents.¹⁴

2. The emergence of *voyvodas* as a political issue in Russo-Ottoman relations

2.1 The status of Wallachian and Moldavian *voyvodas* prior to the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-1774

Wallachia and Moldavia, which were both integrated into the Ottoman Empire as vassal states by the beginning of the sixteenth century, had, in theory, reserved the right to elect their own *voyvodas*,¹⁵ even though the rights of these two principalities were largely curtailed by the Sublime Porte. In principle, the *voyvodas* were elected by the boyars (nobles, *boier* in Romanian and *boyâr* in Turkish) from among a limited number of upper-class boyars known as '*osul domnesc*,' and the results of these elections were confirmed by the Ottoman authorities. However, despite the existence of this rule, beginning around the second half of the sixteenth century, the Porte directly chose the *voyvodas de facto*. At times the Porte would intervene in the election, and if the elected candidate exhibited an anti-Ottoman attitude, the election results would be rejected.¹⁶ Nevertheless, the principle that *voyvodas* should be elected from

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among local boyars was maintained until the beginning of the eighteenth century. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Poland neighboring Moldavia to the south made frequent attempts to bring the *voyvodas*, and especially the Moldavian *voyvodas*, under its influence, and at times the Habsburg Empire and Ukrainian Kazaks became involved.¹⁷ However, during this period, Western Europe was predominantly influenced by the Ottoman Empire. Hence, issues pertaining to the *voyvodas* were specific only to Polish-Ottoman relations and did not involve many other European countries or affect Ottoman-European relations.

It is widely accepted by scholars that the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699) was a major turning point in Ottoman history, particularly from a perspective of Ottoman-European power relations. As a result of this treaty, the international environment surrounding the Danubian Principalities changed considerably. The cession of Transylvania to Austria, by the Porte, resulted in their bordering the Habsburg Empire, and concurrently, in northern Europe, Russia emerged as a rival of the Ottoman Empire. In particular, Russia attempted to advance into the Balkans, appealing to the principalities as a protector of the Orthodox Church and a liberator from the 'yoke' of the Ottoman rule. In response, the Moldavian *voyvoda* Dimitrie Cantemir and the Wallachian *voyvoda* Constantin Brâncoveanu (as Wallachian *voyvoda* 1688-1714) both requested Russia's protection, and Cantemir actively collaborated with Russia in the Russo-Ottoman War (1710-1711).

Although the Russians were defeated, the Porte was forced to take new measures to prevent the principalities from gaining independence from the Ottoman suzerainty. Subsequently, the Porte abolished the indirect appointment of *voyvodas* and introduced a direct appointment system to strengthen its rule over Wallachia and Moldavia. The newly nominated *voyvodas* were appointed by the Porte from among several influential families called *Phanariots*,¹⁸ since their base was in the *Phanar* (in Turkish '*Fener*') district in Istanbul. These *voyvodas* were appointed in Istanbul and sent to Bucharest or Iași like other Ottoman *vâlîs* (governors of *eyâlet*). The *Phanariots* were a social group, most of whom were Orthodox Christians of Greek-origin, engaged in commerce, shipping and finance. They were needed by the Porte in the seventeenth century due to their financial power and their knowledge of both Europe and European languages. From the second half of the seventeenth century onward, the

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Phanariots were appointed as official translators of the imperial court (*Dîvân-ı hümâyûn tercümanları*) and played an important role particularly in the diplomatic field. From 1711 to 1821, the *voyvodas* were appointed to the Danubian Principalities from the *Phanariots*; however, they were actually only chosen from among less than ten dominant families. This was because, in principle, as a career pattern, the chief translator of the imperial court was nominated to become a *voyvoda*¹⁹ and was thus obligated to pay enormous amounts of money and give gifts to the Sultan, his family and high officials. Therefore, only people with a strong political and economic background could acquire the post. Moreover, although the official term of a *voyvoda* was three years, they were sometimes replaced earlier because of intense competition among the *Phanariot* families and the Ottoman high officials' motivation to increase their profits. Thus, in the eighteenth century, the policy adopted with regard to the appointment of *voyvodas* was inconsistent and lacked long-term perspective, and the appointed *voyvodas* collected their investment in the principalities with alacrity. Consequently, this exhausted the land and caused dissatisfaction among the boyars and peasantry,²⁰ leading to discontentment among the local boyars with regard to the Greeks who had accompanied the *voyvoda* from Istanbul and occupied high ranks in the administration. The local boyars then turned to foreign countries, particularly Russia, in an attempt to regain the privileges they had lost, making foreign intervention all that much easier. Moreover, contrary to the Porte's expectations, the *Phanariot voyvodas* were not always loyal and some of them approached France, Habsburg and Russia. Thus, the Ottoman's intention to strengthen its rule over the Danubian Principalities, through the direct appointment of *voyvodas*, did not always succeed.

2.2 The Treaty of Kyuchuk Kainardja and the status of Wallachia and Moldavia

Many scholars agree that the Treaty of Kyuchuk Kainardja (1774) changed the balance of power that had existed between the Ottoman Empire and the European powers. For the Danubian Principalities, the treaty was also significant because according to the stipulations of the treaty, the internal affairs of these principalities and Ottoman-Moldo-Wallachian suzerain-subject relations emerged as international issues for the first time since the Treaty of Karlowitz. Therefore, the Treaty of Kyuchuk Kainardja is an apt starting point for this

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article's analysis, and a more detailed examination of the process whereby the treaty was reached and of its impact are required.

The Russo-Ottoman War in 1768 was more widespread than the previous wars between the two empires. Not only did it cover the Russo-Ottoman frontiers in Europe but also spread over Caucasus and Morea (Greece) and they became battlefields as well. The militarily predominant Russian army advanced into the Danubian Principalities and occupied the capital of Moldavia, Iași, in the autumn of 1769 and then advanced into Wallachia and seized its capital Bucharest. Thus, the Ottoman defeat in the principalities was evident. Russia, emphasizing its position as the protector of the Orthodox Church, made an appeal to the people of Wallachia and Moldavia to cooperate.²¹ In response to this appeal, anti-Ottoman uprisings occurred in various places and the local boyars and the clergy sent a delegation to St. Petersburg to petition for the Empress' protection against Ottoman rule.²² Additionally, Grigore Alexandru Ghica, the Wallachian *voyvoda* (in Moldavia 1764-67, in Wallachia 1768-69), also cooperated with Russia by intentionally delaying the supply of provisions to the Ottoman troops. As a result of this behavior, Ghica was removed from his post and fled to Russia.²³

When Russian superiority over the Ottoman Empire and the Danubian Principalities' expectations with regard to Russia became clear, other European countries became involved in the war as well. The Habsburg Empire and Prussia, in particular, took an active part and under pressure resulting from the involvement of these two countries, Russia decided to enter into peace negotiations with the Porte in 1770. Negotiations were undertaken, first in Giurgiu, then in Focșani and Bucharest. However, the two parties were unable to reach an agreement, and the war raged on.

As a result of Pugachev's revolt, which had spread along the Volga and presented a serious threat to the Russian government, Russia was required to end the war in haste, and in June 1774, in Kyuchuk Kainardja, a small village near Silistra, negotiations were reopened. Approximately two weeks later, on July 10, 1774, a peace agreement comprising twenty-eight articles and two separate articles was signed by both plenipotentiaries.²⁴

In the last conference, held in Bucharest, the Russian delegation had presented the Ottoman representatives with a draft of a peace treaty that included stipulations regarding the Danubian Principalities.²⁵ This time, the Ottoman

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representatives accepted the treaty with some modifications. Article 16 of the treaty addressed the status of Wallachia and Moldavia. Therein the Porte assured the freedom of Christianity in the principalities, a tax exemption for two years, the right of the Russian diplomatic representative in Istanbul to voice his opinions concerning the affairs of the Danubian Principalities, and so on.

Although Article 16 did not address the subject of *voyvodas*, in the draft presented at the negotiations in Bucharest, Russia had demanded that the Porte reappoint the former *voyvoda* Grigore Ghica, who was in Russia at the time, as a ‘lifelong *voyvoda*’ to Moldavia ‘with a solemn pledge that the Porte would neither replace him for any reason nor insult and menace him in any way.’²⁶ Russia had protected Ghica with the intention of using him as a puppet in the future, and it is evident from this clause that it aimed to extend its influence into Moldavia through this pro-Russian *voyvoda*. It can be implied then that Moldavia had turned into a puppet state in the hands of Russia. Subsequently, this clause would play a major role in Russia’s advance into the Balkans.

However, in the negotiations held at Kyuchuk Kainardja, Russia had conceded some points and their stipulation concerning the appointment of Grigore Ghica was excluded. Nevertheless, the Porte was forced to agree to his appointment as a Moldavian *voyvoda*, and after the conclusion of this treaty, Ghica was officially nominated as a ‘lifelong *voyvoda*.’²⁷

With regard to economy and finance, the treaty did not bring many improvements to the Danubian Principalities. However, the significance of this treaty lies in the fact that clause 10 in Article 16, which stipulates Russia’s voice concerning the affairs of the principalities, paved the way for Russia to officially involve itself in issues pertaining to Wallachia and Moldavia. In other words, following this treaty, affairs of the principalities that had previously been the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire became international in scope. Some have conjectured that owing to this treaty, Russia obtained the right to protect Orthodox Christian subjects in the Ottoman Empire. This is not true. Article 7 of the treaty states that the Orthodox Christian subjects in the Ottoman Empire must be protected by the Porte, and not by Russia.²⁸ Thus, the Danubian Principalities were an exception. The Russian voice in the affairs of Wallachia and Moldavia was not as strong as the right of protection. But this did represent the beginning of Russia’s deepening involvement in the affairs concerning, first, the principalities and, later, the entire Balkan region, aided by the right to open

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consulates anywhere in the territory of the Ottoman Empire (Article 11). Moreover, although there was no clause about *voyvodas* in Article 16, Russia succeeded in placing its puppet at an important vantage point in one of the Ottoman vassal states, and eventually this would provide Russia with the opportunity to penetrate the Danubian Principalities as well.

With the granting of new rights to Russia in the treaty of 1774, the balance of power among Russia, Western Europe and the Ottoman Empire, which had brought stability to the eastern part of the European continent for more than fifty years, shifted. Consequently, the Habsburg Empire and other European powers began to take precautions against Russia's further advancement into the Balkan region and hence were obligated to take an interest in issues pertaining to that region. Thus, we can conclude that Article 16 of the Treaty of Kyuchuk Kainardja carried immense importance, not only for the Danubian Principalities and the Balkans, but also for the balance of power and the international order.

2.3 Issues regarding *voyvodas* after the Treaty of Kyuchuk Kainardja

As mentioned above, the pro-Russian Grigore Alexandru Ghica was appointed as a lifelong Moldavian *voyvoda*. Following Ghica's appointment, Alexandru Ipsilanti, who was appointed to Wallachia after the treaty, also petitioned Russia for 'lifelong' status,²⁹ which action suggests that Russia had become the other patron of the Danubian Principalities. Concurrently, in the Ottoman Empire, there was an increasing dissatisfaction among the *Phanariots* since the chance of their being appointed to the post of *voyvoda* had been reduced. As a result, there soon appeared a movement to eliminate Ghica from his post. The Ottoman government was also dissatisfied with Ghica and the Russian presence in Moldavia. One of the reasons for their dissatisfaction was that the imperial family and high officials were, consequently, no longer able to earn large sums of money and receive gifts with each nomination of a new *voyvoda*.³⁰ On learning that the Moldavian *voyvoda* and boyars intended to place their state under Russian protection, in an act of protest against the Ottoman cession of Bukovina to the Habsburg Empire,³¹ the Porte decided to eliminate Ghica. In order to achieve this, the Porte sent an agent, kapıcıbaşı Karahisârî-zâde Ahmed, to Iași who, in October 1777, succeeded in Ghica's assassination.³² With the elimination of the lifelong pro-Russian *voyvoda*, Russia's intended advance into the Danubian Principalities collapsed.

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In 1781, Russia allied itself with the Habsburg Empire, and by the end of 1782, both made representations to the Porte with regard to the following three issues: (1) the navigation of trading vessels in the Black Sea, (2) Crimea and (3) the Danubian Principalities.³³ With regard to the first issue, the Porte signed a commercial treaty with Russia in June 1783.³⁴ With regard to Crimea, Catherine II declared the annexation of the Crimean Khanate by Russia and the Porte approved it in 1784.³⁵ Finally, with regard to the Danubian Principalities, the Porte was obliged to accept the demands put forward by Russia and the Habsburg Empire, owing to diplomatic pressure, and an agreement was signed as a form of convention (*sened*) in the beginning of 1784.³⁶ In connection with the principalities, the most important point of this convention appears to have been that the tributes and other taxes sent to the Porte were fixed in order to prevent excessive exploitation. With regard to the *voyvoda*, it was stated that ‘...unless a proved violation occurs, the *voyvoda* is not to be replaced...’³⁷ The inclusion of a passage on the *voyvodas* was the first instance of a regulation concerning *voyvodas* in an official diplomatic agreement between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. As a result of this convention, the possibility that a *voyvoda* might stay in the post for a longer period of time – an outcome that Russia had coveted – was renewed.

Even after the convention had been agreed upon and despite this stipulation, *voyvodas* were often replaced. It was evident that Russia had hoped to keep pro-Russian *voyvodas* in their posts for a long period but apparently this stipulation had been ineffective. In general, *voyvodas* could gain profit legally as well as illegally; therefore, any form of violation was easily identified by both empires. Even if a *voyvoda* complied with the regulations, sometimes other *Phanariots*, aiming to succeed to the post, threatened him and forced him to resign. The Wallachian *voyvoda* Alexandru Ipsilanti’s resignation in 1782³⁸ and Mihail Suțu’s subsequent resignation in 1786³⁹ are examples of this. In fact, the Ottoman Empire appeared to regard the 1784 convention lightly. For example, in 1785, the Porte appointed Alexandru Mavrocordat II (Firaris, 1785-86). The new *voyvoda* was known to be a Russophile because, like Grigore Ghica, he had fled to Russia during the Russo-Ottoman War.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, he was appointed as a *voyvoda*. This fact clearly indicates that the Porte believed that they could remove him with little difficulty. As expected, he was replaced by Nicolae Mavrogheni (1786-90) the very next year.

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Thus, Russia's ambition to keep pro-Russian *voyvodas* in their posts for longer periods was not achieved through the convention of 1784.

The year 1787 witnessed another Russo-Ottoman War. Russian troops easily occupied Moldavia, and in keeping with an alliance between Russia and Austria, Austrian troops advanced into Wallachia. Despite this Russian and Austrian predominance, their complete victory over the Ottoman Empire was not accepted by other European powers. In 1789, Sweden declared war against Russia, and Great Britain, Prussia and the Netherlands formed an alliance. Moreover, the French Revolution had an extremely large impact on Europe; consequently, the Habsburg Empire promptly signed a peace treaty with the Porte in Svishtov, and Russia, following in Habsburg's footsteps, called for an armistice. Prior to negotiations, Russia made clear to the Porte that the Danubian Principalities would be returned, albeit with several conditions attached.⁴¹ In their negotiations, Russia focused on issues pertaining to Russian-occupied Moldavia and an agreement was reached with regard to several conditions such as a two-year tax exemption and the free movement of Moldavian subjects within their country. The Treaty of Iași, signed in January 1792, served to reconfirm the validity of past agreements regarding the Danubian Principalities but there was an absence of stipulations concerning the *voyvodas*.⁴²

However, it would appear that the Ottoman's attitude toward issues pertaining to the *voyvodas* changed during the Russo-Ottoman War (1787-1792). Following the armistice in 1790, there arose the need to nominate a new Moldavian *voyvoda*. In the grand vizierial summary (*telhîs*), presented by the official deputy of the Grand Vizier (*sadâret kaymakamı*) to the Sultan on the nomination of a new *voyvoda*, the Ottoman officials placed significant emphasis on 'who among the candidates is the most loyal to the Porte and who can exclude Russian influence from Moldavia' instead of 'who will pay the most.'⁴³ Further, the law (*kânûnnâme*) issued to Moldavia after the treaty stipulated that among the translators in the Imperial Council (*dîvân-ı hümmâyûn tercümanları*) a very loyal one to the Porte would be nominated as *voyvoda*.⁴⁴ Based on this stipulation, Alexandru Moruzi (in Wallachia 1792-96, 1799-1801, in Moldavia 1792), who was said to have relations with France, was nominated as the Moldavian *voyvoda*.

Owing to the French revolution and the existence of an anti-Russian alliance, the Ottoman Empire was able to avoid a large-scale territorial loss despite its military inferiority. However, this war, undoubtedly, had a great impact on the

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Porte. The Ottoman Empire had been forced to recognize, clearly and seriously for the first time, that their empire had grown extremely weak and that it would be unable to recover lost territory by force. This then led to a military reform known as '*Nizâm-ı cedîd*,' and they began to feel threatened with regard to the security of the Danubian Principalities. This change in the Ottoman attitude towards the nomination of *voyvodas* can be regarded as evidence of their changing consciousness with regard to the international situation as well.

3. Issues pertaining to *voyvodas* in the Imperial edicts of 1802

3.1 Internal disorder in the Balkans and the involvement of France in the affairs of the Danubian Principalities

After the French Revolution, Russia established the first diplomatic principles regarding the prevention of France's influence. Russia's Balkan policy was not an exception. In fact, in the first half of the 1790s, France actively began to advance into the Balkans, and when the Porte officially recognised the revolutionary government, it gave France permission to establish its consulate in Bucharest, hoping to diminish Russian influence over the Danubian Principalities.⁴⁵ In this context, Russia began to carefully observe France's activities in the Danubian Principalities, particularly the relations between France and the families of the *voyvodas*. Russia initially believed that Mihail Suțu, the Moldavian *voyvoda* (1792-95), would be beneficial to them. However, when it became known that his son in Istanbul shared good relations with France, Russia began to doubt him. In 1795, when the French consulate opened in Bucharest, Russia feared that the French might have influence over the *voyvoda*'s family, and the Russian Minister to the Ottoman Empire, V. P. Kochubey, complained of Mihail Suțu's illegal actions and demanded that the Porte remove him from his post. The chief translator at the Imperial council, Alexandru Callimachi, was the strongest candidate to become the next *voyvoda*, and he displayed a favorable attitude towards Russia in order to acquire the post with their help. Owing to pressure from Russia and other *Phanariots*, Suțu resigned. This incident illustrates Russia's anxiety with regard to an increase in French influence over the Danubian Principalities.

France sent agents to the area south of the Danube and succeeded in establishing relations with local notables known as '*a'yân*.' During this period,

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the *a'yâns* disregarded the central authority and fought one another to expand their own territory. Since the power of the central authority was very weak and it was unable to suppress these conflicts, the area south of the Danube was in anarchy and was divided among several powerful *a'yâns*. Of these, Osman Pazvand-oğlu of Vidin had a significant impact on Wallachia and Russo-Ottoman relations.⁴⁶

Aiming to widen his territory, Osman Pazvand-oğlu battled with his rivals for many years, causing a state of disorder and anarchy in Northern Bulgaria.⁴⁷ In order to maintain his power, he retained a large number of private soldiers (*kapı halkı*). The land beyond the Danube was a good source of riches, which he exploited to support his soldiers. He often sent his troops north of the Danube to plunder the area around Oltenia, and he repeatedly demanded money and provisions for Vidin from the Wallachian, and at times even Moldavian *voyvodas*, threatening them with further attack if they refused.⁴⁸ To suppress this disorder, the Porte dispatched troops to Vidin and besieged the fortress on three separate occasions, in 1795, 1798 and 1800. All of these expeditions ended in failure, however. Moreover, on each occasion the Porte was compelled to offer Osman honorary offices such as *kapıcıbaşlık* or *vezîrlük* to placate him.

During these expeditions, the Porte imposed a heavy burden on Wallachia and Moldavia, providing the salary and supply of provisions for the Ottoman soldiers, offering their units to Vidin and so on. The Ottoman soldiers who entered Wallachia to attack Vidin were of diverse origin and not well organized, and as a result, they plundered towns and villages on their way. Owing to these heavy burdens and miserable conditions, especially in Oltenia, a strong voice asking for Russian intervention gradually emerged from among the Wallachian boyars around 1800.⁴⁹ However, despite these requests, Russia hesitated to intervene in the affairs of the Danubian Principalities because of international relations at that time.

France defeated the Habsburg troops in Italy, acquired the Ionian Islands and the Albanian coast in accordance with the Treaty of Campo Formio in 1797, and agitated the Greek insurrection. This caused a strain in French-Ottoman relations. Then, France's invasion of Egypt in the following year compelled the Porte to end all relations with France, who had been a potential ally since the sixteenth century.⁵⁰ This situation led the Porte to forge an alliance with Great Britain and its strongest rival, Russia.⁵¹ This represented a drastic change in

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Ottoman foreign policy. As a result of this alliance, the Porte, who had until then maintained neutrality among the European states, joined the anti-Napoleonic coalition.

Given these circumstances, Russia needed to avoid strong intervention in the affairs of the Danubian Principalities. In fact, in 1798, before establishing an alliance with the Porte, Russia had offered to send an auxiliary corps of six thousand soldiers to Vidin.⁵² However, once an alliance with the Ottoman Empire was forged, Russia did not repeat their offer and only requested that the Porte take proper measures to quell the disorder in Wallachia.

3.2 The Imperial edicts addressed to Wallachia and Moldavia in 1802

In 1800, while the third siege of Vidin continued, Osman Pazvand-oğlu petitioned the Porte several times through the Wallachian *voyvoda*, but it was Russia that played the most important role as a mediator. Osman sent his agents with letters to the Russian Vice-Consul in Bucharest and the Russian Minister in Istanbul requesting that they forward his petition to the Porte. This is to say that Osman asked Russia to put pressure on the Porte, and in order to compel Russia to pressure the Porte further, Osman decided to send his soldiers to Wallachia again in 1802, sending them in groups this time.⁵³

From April 1802 onward, there was severe turbulence in Wallachia. Since Tepedelenli Ali Paşa, whom the Porte had appointed as the Governor of Rumelia (*Rumeli vâlîsi*) and the Chief Commandant of the Rumelian front (*Rumeli taraflı seraskeri*),⁵⁴ did not abandon Yanya (Ioannina), his base, Osman Pazvand-oğlu dispatched large numbers of troops to Wallachia. They seized Oltenia and advanced further, to Bucharest. As a result of this sudden attack, there was widespread panic in Bucharest, and many boyars, foreign diplomats and even the *voyvoda* himself fled to Kronstadt (Braşov). Following this incident, the boyars and ecclesiastics who had escaped sent a petition to Alexander I, a copy of which was sent to Vasily Tomara, the Russian Minister in Istanbul, requesting Russian assistance in their return to Wallachia.⁵⁵ Based on this petition, Tomara dispatched a diplomatic note to the Porte suggesting that action be taken to improve the disastrous situation in the Danubian Principalities. In the note, he introduced issues that pertained to the *voyvodas* and demanded that the Porte observe the regulations agreed to in the Russo-Ottoman Convention of 1784. In addition, he wrote: 'It is important and inevitable that the Sublime Porte and the

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signatory (Tomara – A. M.) enter into negotiations and arrive at an agreement to establish proper conditions concerning the term of both *voyvodas*.⁵⁶

Concurrently, in St. Petersburg, on receiving the petition from Kronstadt, the Russian government sent instructions to Tomara dated June 28, 1802, wherein Alexander I ordered him to inform the Porte that if the damage caused by Pazvand-oğlu reached Moldavia, Russia would dispatch its troops to the Danubian Principalities.⁵⁷ On receiving this order, Tomara delivered a second note to the Porte, wherein he made more concrete demands with regard to the principalities.⁵⁸ Aside from the exemption of taxes, the official term of the *voyvodas* was the principal subject of the note, and Tomara proposed a term of seven years or more. The instructions from St. Petersburg had not included the term of ‘seven years.’ Hence it is evident that this term was introduced by Tomara himself, based on his own judgment. However, this was not an idea that originated with Tomara, since the seven-year term was described in a request sent to him by the representative (*kapt kethüdâsı*) of the Wallachian *voyvoda* Alexandru Suțu, in Istanbul.⁵⁹ Three days later, in response to Tomara’s note, the Porte proposed ‘four years’ as the official term for *voyvodas*, but Tomara was not satisfied with this response.

Therefore, on July 21, 1802, seeing that effective measures had not been taken even after his first demarche, Tomara delivered another diplomatic note to the Porte.⁶⁰ In the note he, once again, insisted that the official term of the *voyvodas* be seven years. In the event of a dismissal prior to the completion of seven years, he suggested that the Porte inform Russia, in advance, so a joint decision could be made as to whether or not the *voyvoda* had committed an illegal action. With regard to this issue, he presented another note to the *reisülküttâb*, Mehmed Rauf Efendi the same day, wherein he demanded that the former Moldavian *voyvoda*, Constantin Ipsilanti, be nominated as the new Wallachian *voyvoda*.⁶¹ This demand was in accordance with the petition that had been made by the boyars in Kronstadt,⁶² and Tomara accepted this request because of Ipsilanti’s good relations with Russia. C. Ipsilanti was not popular among the Ottoman high officials and was only supported by *reisülküttâb* and *sadâret kethüdâsı*. At the time of his nomination as a Moldavian *voyvoda* in 1799, it is believed that Ipsilanti paid less money to the high officials than his predecessors.⁶⁴

These two diplomatic notes are a reflection of Russia’s intentions regarding

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issues pertaining to the *voyvodas*. In other words, Russia had expected that after the convention with the Porte in 1784, the frequent change of *voyvodas* – resulting in a heavy financial burden on the people of the Danubian Principalities – would cease, pro-Russian *voyvodas* would remain in their posts for longer periods and anti-Russian *voyvodas* could be replaced more easily than before by pointing out their illegal actions. However, despite these expectations, there was no visible change in the situation even after the convention because of severe competition among the *Phanariots* for the post of *voyvoda* and economic dissatisfaction on the part of the Ottoman high officials. In the 1790s, when the French influence gradually reached the Danubian Principalities, Russia sought more certain and practical means of appointing pro-Russian *voyvodas*, keeping them in their posts as long as possible and preventing the Porte from appointing and dismissing *voyvodas* at will. In order to achieve this goal, Russia fixed the official term of *voyvodas* at seven years in the first note and made it necessary for the Porte to inform it in advance in the case of a *voyvoda*'s early dismissal. In the second note, Russia insisted on the appointment of Constantin Ipsilanti, a pro-Russian, as the new Wallachian *voyvoda*.

According to Tomara's notes, the negotiations continued for a month. Before the final agreement, the Porte accepted Russia's proposal to nominate Constantin Ipsilanti, and on August 31, 1802, he was appointed as the Wallachian *voyvoda*. Concurrently, Alexandru Moruzi, the former Wallachian *voyvoda* (1792-96, 1799-1801), was appointed as the Moldavian *voyvoda*. Prior to his appointment, Ipsilanti had repeatedly asked Tomara to also nominate him as a *voyvoda*.⁶⁵ Al. Moruzi was C. Ipsilanti's uncle and served as a Moldavian *voyvoda* during almost the same period when Ipsilanti was the Wallachian *voyvoda* (1799-1801). Since it was known that Al. Moruzi had close relations with France, Tomara hesitated to accept Ipsilanti's request. However, when Al. Moruzi pledged his loyalty to Russia and Ipsilanti also assured it, he finally consented.⁶⁶

Finally, in September 1802, both sides reached an agreement and, in the second half of the month, two Imperial edicts (*fermâns*) for Wallachia and Moldavia were issued. Russia insisted that the content of the agreement be established as an act between two empires, but the Ottoman Empire claimed that it should be in the form of *fermân* since issues pertaining to Wallachia and Moldavia were its own internal affairs. Ultimately, Russia compromised.⁶⁷ With regard to the official term of the *voyvodas* and the issue of their dismissal, the

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Porte accepted Russia's proposal almost completely. A term of seven years was agreed upon, and the stipulation concerning a *voyvoda*'s dismissal was as follows: 'In case an illegal action appears during his (the *voyvoda*'s – A.M.) reign, the Russian ambassador will be informed by the Porte, and after verification by both sides, if the suspicion of the aforementioned *voyvoda* is evident and certain, only then will his dismissal be approved.'⁶⁸

Incidentally, Russia's rival France had little influence during the negotiations, although they had acquired prestige in Constantinople before 1798. Pierre Ruffin, the French chargé d'affaires to the Ottoman Empire,⁶⁹ who had been confined in the Seven Towers (Yedikule) according to the Ottoman custom, was released in 1801, but France was unable to regain its prior influence in Istanbul until a new French ambassador arrived in Istanbul in the end of 1802.

Thus, by taking advantage of the disorder in the Balkans, the change of international relations around the Ottoman Empire and the absence of French influence in Istanbul, Russia – to a large extent – obtained the right to be allowed involvement with regard to *voyvodas* and other issues concerning the Danubian Principalities. On the other hand, as a result of reluctantly made edicts, the Ottoman right to freely control the *voyvodas* was largely restrained. Their consequent dissatisfaction would eventually lead the Porte to turn towards France.

4. The *voyvodas*' dismissal in 1806 and its impact on Russo-Ottoman relations

4.1 The Ottoman Empire and its relations with Russia and France after 1802

After the peace treaty of 1802, France dispatched General Brune to Istanbul as a plenipotentiary ambassador, and as a result, diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and France were completely normalized. The new ambassador attempted to re-establish French influence over the Porte, as it had been before the Egyptian expedition, and one of his most important missions was to separate the Porte from Great Britain and Russia. He actively approached the Porte and sought cooperation from it, pointing out that the British troops were inciting the *amîrs* (commanders or governors) of Egypt to rebel against the central authority. Meanwhile, the British ambassador demanded neutrality from the Porte in the British-French war.⁷⁰

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Simultaneously, Franco-Russian relations deteriorated, and as a consequence, the principle goal of Russian foreign policy was to maintain an alliance with the Ottoman Empire and to prevent it from approaching France. Therefore, in accordance with this policy, the Russian government dealt with the affairs of the Danubian Principalities with caution, in order not to give the Porte the impression that Russia was still intervening in its affairs. For example, the Russian government prohibited the General Consul in Iași and the Vice-Consul in Bucharest from making demarches to the *voyvodas* based on their own judgment. Further, the Russian government stated that if there was a need to make a demarche, the General and Vice-Consuls were obliged to ask for prior permission from the Foreign Minister in St. Petersburg or the Russian Minister in Istanbul.⁷¹ When Pazvand-oğlu Osman Paşa⁷² once again demanded money and provisions from the Wallachian *voyvoda* early in 1803,⁷³ Constantin Ipsilanti and the Russian Vice-Consul in Bucharest requested that the government of St. Petersburg send Russian troops to Wallachia. In response, the Foreign Minister A. R. Vorontsov, clearly rejected this possibility and made it evident that Russia would not take any measures other than demarches, through the Minister, to the Ottoman Empire. Vorontsov explained that the presence of Russian troops in the Danubian Principalities for the maintenance of public order would give France the opportunity to dispatch its troops to Morea for the same reason.⁷⁴

After Russia severed its diplomatic relations with France in 1804, because Napoleon had declared himself 'Emperor,' the diplomatic activities of the European ministers in Istanbul intensified. France urged the Porte to acquiesce to the title of 'Emperor,' and Selim III was favorable towards this.⁷⁵ However, the Porte suspended the making of any official answer because there was still distrust regarding France among the Ottoman high officials.⁷⁶ Consequently, at the end of 1804, Russia proposed to the Porte that they renew their defensive alliance of 1798, which was due to expire at the end of 1805. Besides strengthening Russo-Ottoman relations, the principal aim of Russia's proposal was also to prevent France from approaching the Porte. Another motive behind Russia's proposal was that it expected to reinforce the stationary troops that were based in the Ionian Islands (Yedi Ada Cumhuriyeti) through the enactment of a new treaty.⁷⁷ Since the Porte hoped to maintain its alliance with Great Britain, it accepted Russia's proposal and entered into negotiations. The Porte did, however, refuse the following two stipulations in Russia's draft. First, given

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the possibility of a French attack in the future, Russia would dispatch ten to fifteen thousand soldiers in the Danubian Principalities and Great Britain would send five thousand soldiers to Morea. This was on the condition that the Russians and British would not interfere in internal affairs. Second, with regard to '*re'âyâ*' (or 'non-Muslim Ottoman subjects') the Porte would improve the conditions of Christian subjects in Rumelia and would give them the same rights enjoyed by Muslim subjects, with the exception of paying '*harâc*' (land tax).⁷⁸ Although the second stipulation would be fulfilled in 1839, at the time, the Ottoman Empire rejected it. In September 1805, after a long period of negotiations, both sides agreed to a renewed treaty that was valid for nine years.⁷⁹

At the time that these negotiations were carried out, the situation in Europe was not clear. Although France was comparatively dominant on the continent, Great Britain maintained its control over the Mediterranean. His triumph in the Battle of Austerlitz in December 1805, ensured the dominance of Napoleon and France on the European Continent. To the regret of the Porte, news of the French victory arrived in Istanbul just one day after the mutual ratification of the renewed Russo-Ottoman Treaty. Soon after, a French envoy was sent to officially inform the Porte of France's triumph in Austerlitz. In a confidential dialogue with the Ottoman high officials, the French envoy proposed that the Porte renounce all previous agreements with Russia regarding the Danubian Principalities, including the imperial edicts of 1802, and that France would secure and preserve Ottoman territorial integrity.⁸⁰ Although the Porte did not accept this proposal and maintained a neutral stance, its political attitude towards France gradually became more favorable.

In the beginning of 1806, the Ottoman Empire finally acknowledged Napoleon Bonaparte as Emperor of France. Then, by April 1806, the Porte declined Russia's proposal that Russian fleets should be allowed to pass through the Bosphorus Straits⁸¹ even though this proposal had been made in accordance with a newly ratified treaty. It is evident that the immediate cause for the change in the Ottoman approach towards France was the result of the French victory in Austerlitz. However, Ottoman's distrust of Russia, even though they were allies at the time, should also be taken into account when considering this change of attitude. In addition to the Imperial edicts to the Danubian Principalities in 1802, the Ottoman Empire was disturbed by several Russian activities such as the presence of Russian troops on the Ionian Islands, the annexation of Georgia in the

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Caucasus, the suspicion of incitement and support of the Serbian Revolution, and the large number of Russian troops based near the Russian-Moldavian border. As a result of all these factors, the Porte would gradually sever its ties with Russia and prepared for war against it.

In the beginning of 1806, Sultan Selim III who considered the disorder in the Balkans caused by the Serbs, Osman Pazvand-oğlu and other *a'yâns* to be the main reason for foreign intervention, decided to dispatch *Nizâm-ı cedîd askeri*, a new Western-style military corps that he had founded, to the Balkans. While the official explanation for this decision was the suppression of the Serbian Revolution, in fact, the Sultan's intention was to introduce his reform programs to the Balkans⁸² and to prepare for a future Russian attack.⁸³ In response to this series of Ottoman actions based on a change in their attitude, Russia began to make its own preparations for war while continuing its efforts to maintain the alliance with the Ottoman Empire. The Foreign Minister Budberg stated, 'I think Russia needs to maintain its foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire because a war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire would only serve to fulfil Napoleon's purpose. Hence, regardless of his designs to break Russo-Ottoman relations, we must not be hasty in severing relations with the Ottoman Empire.'⁸⁴

4.2 The change of *voyvodas* in 1806

In July 1806, the French government, determined to take decisive measures to break the Russo-Ottoman alliance, dispatched General Sebastiani to Istanbul as their new ambassador to the Ottoman Empire. Issues related to the Danubian Principalities were an ideal means by which France could separate the Porte from Russia. As soon as the new ambassador arrived in Istanbul, he requested that the Porte dismiss both the *voyvodas*, stating that they both, under the influence of Russia, had supported the Serbian uprising.⁸⁵ The Porte had also been inclined to replace these *voyvodas* whom they had unwillingly appointed in 1802, under pressure of Russia, and complaints regarding the long rule of the *voyvodas* had increased not only among the Ottoman officials but also among the *Phanariots*. The former Moldavian *voyvoda*, Alexandru Suțu, who was replaced by Moruzi in 1802 provides one example. Aiming to regain his post, Suțu lobbied the high officials to sever all ties with Russia. Subsequently, by the end of 1805, Italinsky, the Russian Minister in Istanbul, remonstrated to the

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Porte with regard to Suțu's activities.⁸⁶ Soon after, a deputy to Foreign Minister Adam Jerzy Czartoryski ordered Italinsky to make a demarche to the Porte and ensure that the *voyvodas* would not be replaced before the completion of their seven-year terms.⁸⁷ The above suggests that in Istanbul actions were being taken to remove Ipsilanti and Moruzi from their posts. After considering this issue for a week, on August 24, 1806, the Porte decided to replace the Wallachian *voyvoda*, Constantin Ipsilanti with Alexandru Suțu, and the Moldavian *voyvoda*, Alexandru Moruzi with Scarlat Callimachi, the chief translator of the Imperial Council.⁸⁸ These dismissals were executed without any advance notification to Russia although such had been stipulated in the agreement of 1802.

This incident does not imply, however, that the Ottoman Empire had decided to definitively cut ties with Russia and ally with the French. Even after the replacement of both the *voyvodas*, the Porte maintained its neutrality and made attempts to avoid a conclusive severance from Russia. It is evident that the peace treaty signed between France and Russia on July 20, 1806 in Paris affected the Porte's decision. According to the treaty, the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire were to be preserved. The Porte was informed of the contents of this treaty through a letter from Napoleon addressed to Selim.⁸⁹ The Porte did not anticipate that the dismissal of the *voyvodas* and violation of the diplomatic agreement would result in the severance of the Russo-Ottoman alliance because of this stipulation in the Peace of Paris and the military predominance of France.

Nevertheless, contrary to the Porte's anticipation, Russia took a firm stand against this incident and regarded these sudden dismissals as a final change in Ottoman diplomatic policy. The Russian Minister in Istanbul Italinsky immediately protested against this decision and demanded that the departure of the newly appointed *voyvodas* for the principalities be aborted.⁹⁰ In addition, based on instructions from St. Petersburg, he demanded that the Porte restore Constantin Ipsilanti and Alexandru Moruzi to their old posts and assure them that they could serve the remainder of their seven-year terms. At the same time, he informed the Porte that if his demands were not accepted, he would leave for Russia.⁹¹ On the other hand Sebastiani, the French ambassador in Istanbul, requested that the Porte prohibit the Russian fleets from passing through the Bosphorus Straits; in other words, he requested that the Porte annul the Russo-Ottoman alliance.⁹² As a result, the Porte was presented with a very difficult

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choice from both sides, and thus, it attempted to delay the making of a decision. However, on October 13, Italinsky delivered an ultimatum to the Porte. With the help of mediation by the British ambassador, the Porte attempted to appease the situation by restoring one of the two *voyvodas*. But, Italinsky did not change his attitude. Some officials in the Porte regarded their relationship with Great Britain as the most important, and therefore, they were apprehensive about the deterioration of British-Ottoman relations in the event the Russo-Ottoman alliance was renounced. Moreover, some officials appreciated that the Empire was not in the position to go to war against Russia, owing to a lack of preparation.⁹³ Taking all these issues into account, on October 15, 1806, the Porte finally decided to restore the dismissed *voyvodas* to their old posts.⁹⁴

Although Italinsky dispatched a courier with this news to St. Petersburg, the Russian government did not receive it until November 5, 1806.⁹⁵ By this time, Alexander I had already ordered the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, based near the border of Moldavia, to cross over into Moldavia on October 28, 1806.⁹⁶ Consequently, although the Porte had compromised with Italinsky and restored the *voyvodas*, Russian troops invaded the Danubian Principalities and commenced the Russo-Ottoman war, a war which would last until 1812.

Even if the Porte had eliminated the pro-Russian *voyvodas*, one of whom – Al. Moruzi – was not, in fact, so devoted to Russia, Russia would not have suffered any heavy losses since the activity of Russian consuls and merchants in the principalities would not have been limited and the advance of other European powers would not have been accelerated. Nevertheless, since the regulations concerning the appointment and dismissal of *voyvodas* occupied an important place in Russia's Balkan policy in the Imperial edicts of 1802 and in the international situation at that time, the replacement of the *voyvodas* in 1806 was regarded by Russia as a definitive change in Ottoman foreign policy from a pro-Russian to a pro-French stance. In this way, issues pertaining to the *voyvodas* made a large impact on Russo-Ottoman relations and became the direct cause of the Russo-Ottoman war.

5. Conclusion

This article has examined a series of issues related to the *voyvodas* of the Danubian Principalities, in the context of Russo-Ottoman relations. Previous

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studies on the Danubian Principalities and Russo-Ottoman relations in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which were mentioned in the ‘Introduction,’ revealed that Russia strengthened its influence over the Danubian Principalities in the second half of the eighteenth century. However, these studies only offered a general analysis of a variety of subjects and did not analyse any one subject deeply. In contrast, this article has focused on one concrete subject – namely *voyvodas* – making use of both Russian and Ottoman documents. Questions pertaining to the Wallachian and Moldavian *voyvodas* began with the Treaty of Kyuchuk Kainardja in 1774. Through this treaty, Russia obtained the voice and the right to intervene in the affairs of the principalities while also succeeding in the placement of a *voyvoda*, Grigore Ghica, who was a puppet of the Russian government, in Moldavia. Although the Russian advance into the principalities was foiled by the assassination of this *voyvoda*, thereafter Russia aimed to place pro-Russian persons as *voyvodas* and extend the length of their terms. Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire made attempts to hinder this Russian advance into the principalities by emasculating their diplomatic agreement with Russia. With the French influence emerging in the Balkans in the 1790s, Russia took advantage of the disorder in the Balkans caused by the *a’yâns* and by changes in international relations around the Ottoman Empire, and consequently, compelled the Porte to issue new regulations concerning the Danubian Principalities. The Imperial edicts (*fermâns*) of 1802 were diplomatic agreements that actually stipulated the seven-year term for *voyvodas* and presented Russia with the opportunity to participate, in part, in the nomination and dismissal of *voyvodas*. On issuing these edicts, the Porte was forced to nominate two Phanariots, recommended by Russia, as *voyvodas*. These edicts, with which the Ottoman Empire was discontented, presented France with the ideal opportunity to break the Russo-Ottoman alliance after French-Ottoman diplomatic relations had been normalised at the end of 1802. When the French gained predominance on the continent, the Ottoman Empire gradually leaned toward the French, and in the summer of 1806, the Porte decided to violate the agreement of 1802 by replacing the *voyvodas*, without prior notification to the Russian government. Despite the Ottoman’s expectation that, owing to France’s predominance, they could evade a war, this incident was regarded by Russia as an obvious change in the Ottoman’s diplomatic course, and consequently, it led both empires to war.

In this article, two significant points have been made clear. First, after the

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Treaty of Kyuchuk Kainardja, issues pertaining to Wallachian and Moldavian *voyvodas*, which were an internal affair of the Ottoman Empire until 1774, became a matter of international importance. Second, after 1802, issues related to *voyvodas* occupied an important place among Russia, France and the Ottoman Empire as they had even a symbolic significance in the Ottoman diplomatic course. The first point supports the predominant opinion that the Treaty of Kyuchuk Kainardja marked the turning point in relations among the Ottoman Empire, Russia and Western Europe. The second point shows that issues pertaining to the *voyvodas* that had been an internal affair of the Ottoman Empire until 1774 would become, only thirty years later, some of the most important and disputed issues among the Ottoman Empire, Russia and Western Europe. Thus, the analysis of issues pertaining to Wallachian and Moldavian *voyvodas* in this article demonstrates concretely that after the Treaty of Kyuchuk Kainardja these three 'worlds' were in even closer contact with one another with regard to issues related to the Danubian Principalities and, as a result, Russia and the Ottoman Empire were rapidly integrated into the Western state system.

Notes

1. Г. С. Гросул, *Дунайские княжества в политике России 1774-1806 гг.*, Кишинев, 1975.(hereafter cited as Гросул)
2. S. J. Shaw, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III 1789-1807*, Cambridge, 1971.
3. *Век Екатерины II: Россия и Балканы*, Москва, 1998; Александр I, *Наполеон и Балканы*, Москва, 1997.
4. İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, vol. 4, part 2, pp. 174-188. Akdes Nimet Kurat, a Turkish scholar famous for his study on Russo-Ottoman relations, has mainly focused on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, paying little attention to relations during the eighteenth century. A. N. Kurat, *Türkiye ve Rusya*, Ankara, 1970, pp. 24-40.
5. In Ottoman paleography, '*hatt-ı şerîf*' or '*hatt-ı hümayûn*' means what the Sultan writes on paper, in person, therefore, more correctly speaking, it must be called 'Imperial order (*fermân*) with Sultan's sign of approval,' but customarily it is called just '*hatt-ı şerîf*'. For further details, see Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlı Belgelerinin Dili (Diplomatik)*, İstanbul, 1998.
6. M. M. Alexandrescu-Dersca, 'Rolul hațișerifurilor de privilegii în limitarea obligațiilor către Poartă (1774-1802)', *Studii. Revistă de istorie*, 11-6(1958), pp. 101-119; Al. Vianu, 'Aplicarea tratatului de la Küciük Kainargi cu privire la Moldova și Tara Românească (1775-1783)', *Studii. Revistă de istorie*, 13-5(1960), pp. 71-104.

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7. М. Губоглу, 'Два указа (1801 г.) и священный рескрипт (1802 г.), связанные с турецко-русско-румынскими отношениями', *Восточные источники по истории народов Юго-Восточной и Центральной Европы*, т. 2, Москва, 1969, pp. 238-274.
8. Arhivele naționale istorice centrale (the Romanian National Archives), inv. 'Documente turcești,' nr. 1149. Guboglu surmises that this text is a copy from a later period, around 1811.
9. Г. Н. Селях, 'Русско-турецкое отношение 1802 г. о дунайских княжествах', *Вопросы истории*, 1961/12, pp. 195-202.
10. For example, J. A. R. Marriot, *The Eastern Question: A Historical Study in European Diplomacy*, Oxford, 1917; M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question 1774-1923*, Macmillan, 1966.
11. In 2004, the first comprehensive study on Ottoman diplomacy was published. A. Nuri Yurdusev ed., *Ottoman Diplomacy, Conventional or Unconventional?*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
12. *Documente privind istoria României: colecția Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki (seria nouă)*, vol. 1, 'Raporturi consulare ruse (1770-1796) din Arhiva politică externă a Rusiei Moscova,' București, 1962; vol. 4, 1974(hereafter cited as *Hurmuzaki*); *Внешняя политика России XIX и начала XX века*, Москва, 1960-(hereafter cited as *ВПП*).
13. Ahmed Vâsîf efendi, *Mehâsin'ül-Âsâr ve Hakâik'ül-Ahbâr*, 2 vols., İstanbul, 1219h.(1804-05), (hereafter cited as *Vâsîf 1*); Ahmed Vâsîf efendi, *Mehâsin'ül-Âsâr ve Hakâik'ül-Ahbâr*, haz. Mücteba İlgürel, Ankara, 1994 (cited as *Vâsîf 2*). The former covers the period from 1166h.(1762)-1188h.(1774) and the latter, transliterated in the modern Turkish alphabet, covers 1196h.(1782)-1201h.(1787) with the author's brief career and some information regarding manuscripts. Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Târih-i Cevdet*, tertîb-i cedîd(new edition), ikinci tab'a(the second printing), 12 vols., Der Sa'âdet, 1309h(1891-92) (hereafter cited as *Cevdet*); Ahmed 'Âsım efendi, 'Âsım târihi, 2 vols., İstanbul, f.d..
14. Gabriel effendi Noradounghian, *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman*, 4 vols., Paris, 1897-1900; de Testa, *Recueil des traités de la Porte Ottomane avec les Puissances Étrangères*, vol. 9, Paris, 1898; G. F. de Martens ed., *Recueil de traités d'Alliance, de Paix, de Trêve, de Neutralité, de commerce, de limites, d'échange etc. et de plusieurs autres actes servant à la connaissance des relations étrangères des Puissances et états de l'Europe*, 2nd ed., 8 vols., Gottingue, 1817-1835; *Mu'âhedât mecmû'ast*, 5 vols., 1295h-1298h; V. Veliman, *Relațiile româno-otomane 1711-1821: documente turcești*, București, 1984.
15. In Ottoman sources, 'voyvoda' was used most generally as a term designating the ruler of the principalities. This word of Slavic origin usually means tax collector from 'hâss,' a tenure possessed by Sultans, their families or high dignitaries in Ottoman history. We can also often find the term 'bey' in Ottoman documents. Besides these two terms, 'tekfâr,' 'hâkim,' and 'bân' are also used although they appear less often. See M. Guboglu, *Paleografia și diplomatica turco-osmană, studiu și album*, București, 1958, p. 84. In European texts,

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the terms 'duke,' 'prince,' 'hospodar' and the like are used.

16. For an example of Ottoman intervention, see V. Panaite, 'Power Relationships in the Ottoman Empire: The Sultans and the Tribute-paying Princes of Wallachia and Moldavia from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century,' *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, vol. 7(2001), pp. 33-34; M. Maxim, 'L'autonomie de la Moldavie et de la Valachie dans les actes officiels de la Porte au cours de la seconde moitié du XVI^e siècle,' *Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes*, 15-2(1977), p. 211.
17. For example, in 1568 the Polish king Zygmunt II August demanded that the Porte should never appoint the *voyvodas* of the Danubian Principalities without Polish assent, and then a Moldavian *voyvoda*, Bogdan Lăpușneanu (1568-72), also tried to enter into matrimony with a woman from a *szlachta* family and showed allegiance to the Polish king. Because of this, he was displaced by the Porte. See İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, vol. 3, part 2, p. 166; M. A. Mehmet ed., *Documente turcești privind istoria româniei*, vol. 1, București, 1976, pp. 93-94. The Wallachian *voyvoda* Radu Șerban (1602-10), the Moldavian *voyvoda* Gaspar Grațiani (1619-20) in the seventeenth century, and other *voyvodas* who fled to Poland after being displaced by the Porte because of their close relations, sometimes deteriorated Polish-Ottoman relations. (İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-175)
18. For Phanariots, see *Symposium L'époque phanariote, 21-25 octobre 1970: à la mémoire de Cleobule Tsourkas*, Thessaloniki, 1974; A. Pippidi, *Tradiția politică bizantină în țările române în secolele XVI-XVIII*, București, 1983.
19. *Cevdet*, vol. 6, p. 298.
20. We should take notice that several *voyvodas* like Constantin Mavrocordat (in Wallachia 1730, 1731-33, 1735-41, 1744-48, 1756-58, 1761-63, in Moldavia 1733-35, 1741-43, 1748-49, 1769) or Alexandru Ipsilanti (in Wallachia 1774-82, 1796-97, in Moldavia 1787-88) stayed in their post more than three years and carried out reforms. For the reforms of Constantin Mavrocordat, see F. Constantiniu, *Constantin Mavrocordat*, București, 1985.
21. *Россия и освободительная борьба молдавского народа против османского ига (1769-1812)*, Кишинев, 1984, p. 20.
22. For the text of this petition, see *ibid.*, pp. 23-31; *Hurmuzaki*, vol. 1, pp. 87-89.
23. *Cevdet*, vol. 2, p. 78.
24. The text of this treaty was prepared in three languages, Russian, Italian and Ottoman-Turkish. The Russian delegation signed on Russian and Italian texts, while the Ottoman representatives signed on Italian and Turkish texts. These original texts have yet to be discovered. The Russian text is in *Полное собрание законов российской империи*, series 1 (1649-1825), vol. 19, pp. 957-967. The Italian text is in G. F. de Martens ed., *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 286-322. The Ottoman-Turkish text is in *Mu'âhedât mecâm'ası*, vol. 3, pp. 254-273 and in *Cevdet*, vol. 1, pp. 357-370.
25. The text is in Е. И. Дружинина, *Кючук-кайнарджийский мир 1774 года (его подготовка и заключение)*, Москва, 1955, pp. 345-346.
26. In Vâsîf's chronicle it is written that on Grigore Ghica's death someone from his family

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- will succeed him in the post of *voyvoda*. Such a description, however, does not exist in the Russian draft. *Vâsîf* 1, vol. 2, p. 243.
27. A copy of the *berât* (imperial diploma) on his appointment dated September 27, 1774 (1188 receb 21) is kept in Arhivele naționale istorice centrale (the Romanian National Archives), inv. 'Documente istorice,' pachet DLXXXI/64.
 28. For this question, see Roderic H. Davison, "'Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility': The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered,' *Slavic Review*, 35-3(1976), pp. 463-483.
 29. *Hurmuzaki*, vol. 1, p. 97.
 30. The imperial decree '*kânûnnâme*' issued in 1793 to both principalities set the amount of money which a newly appointed *voyvoda* should pay to *sadr-ı a'zam*, *sadâret kethüdâst*, *reisülküttâb* and other high officials (*câize-i voyvodalık*). According to this decree, the amount exceeded one third of the tribute (*cizye*) of each principality. Considering the amount paid to the Sultan and his family, we may estimate that upon appointment, the *voyvoda* needed to pay an amount of money equivalent to more than half of the yearly tribute of that principality. See, V. Veliman, *Relațiile româno-otomane 1711-1821: documente turcești*, București, 1984, pp. 599-614; M. A. Mehmet, 'O nouă regulamentare a raporturilor Moldovei și Țării Românești față de Poartă la 1792 (O carte de lege — *Kanunname* — în limba turcă)', *Studii. Revistă de istorie*, 20-4(1967), pp. 691-708.
 31. *Россия и освободительная борьба молдавского народа против османского ига (1769-1812)*, Кишнев, 1984, p. 93.
 32. *Cevdet*, vol. 2, p. 78; Tahsin Gemil, 'Mărturii din arhivele turcești referitoare la sfârșitul tragic al domnului Moldovei Grigore Al. Ghica (1777),' *Revista arhivelor*, 1984/3, pp. 289-298.
 33. For the content, see *Cevdet*, vol. 2, pp. 352-354.
 34. For the text, see *Mu'âhedât mecmû'ası*, vol. 3, pp. 284-319; G. Noradounghian, *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman*, vol. 1, pp. 351-373.
 35. *Mu'âhedât mecmû'ası*, vol. 3, pp. 319-320; G. Noradounghian, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 377-378.
 36. For the text, see *Mu'âhedât mecmû'ası*, vol. 4, pp. 2-4; Arhivele naționale istorice centrale, inv. 'Documente istorice,' pachet DLXXXI/92. The French translation is in D. A. Sturdza și C. Colescu-Vartic ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 192-195.
 37. The original text is '...tahkîk olunmuş bir töhmet vukû' bulmakça beyler azl olunmamak'
 38. *Cevdet*, vol. 2, p. 169.
 39. *Cevdet*, vol. 3, pp. 263-264.
 40. *Vâsîf* 2, pp. 210, 380-381.
 41. *Cevdet*, vol. 5, p. 158.
 42. For the text of this treaty, see *Mu'âhedât mecmû'ası*, vol. 4, pp. 5-13; *Cevdet*, vol. 5, pp. 330-339; D. A. Sturdza și C. Colescu-Vartic ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 219-225.
 43. *Cevdet*, vol. 5, pp. 327-330.

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44. V. Veliman, *op. cit.*, p. 604.
45. For the activities of the first French consul in Bucharest, see Camariano-Cioran, 'L'activité d'Emile Claude Gaudin, premier consul de France à Bucharest,' *Revue Roumaine d'histoire*, 9(1970), pp. 251-260.
46. For a survey of his life and activity, see R. Gradeva, 'Osman Pazvantoğlu of Vidin: Between Old and New,' in Frederick F. Anscombe ed., *The Ottoman Balkans 1750-1830*, Princeton, 2006, pp. 115-161.
47. See B. Мутафчиева, *Кърджалийско време*, София, 1977; Y. Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Dağlı İsyanları*(1791-1808), Ankara, 1983.
48. *Hurmuzaki*, vol. 4, pp. 135-138, 262-263, 270-271.
49. *ibid.*, pp. 297-298, 315-317.
50. For French-Ottoman relations of this period, see E. Z. Karal, *Fransa-Mısır ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu (1797-1802)*, İstanbul, 1938; İ Soysal, *Fransız ihtilâli ve Türk-Fransız Diplomasi münasebetleri (1789-1802)*, Ankara, 1964 (reprint, 1999).
51. For the text of this Russo-Ottoman treaty of 1799, see, *Mu'âhedât mecmû'ası*, vol. 4, pp. 19-28; Gabriel effendi Noradounghian, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, Paris, 1897, pp. 24-27.
52. V. Ciobanu ed., *Europe and the Porte: New Documents on the Eastern Question*, vol. 2 (Swedish Diplomatic Reports, 1798-1799), The Centre for Romanian Studies, 2001, pp. 106-107.
53. For details of the relations between Osman Pazvand-oğlu and Russia, see A. Mayuzumi, 'Pazvand-oğlu Osman Pasha, Russia and The Danubian Principalities: from the end of the 18th century to the beginning of the 19th century,' in *Studii și cercetări de turcologie contemporană—Omagiu profesorului Mihai Maxim*, 2004, Cluj-Napoca, pp.109-115.
54. *Cevdet*, vol. 7, p. 154. The Porte often used cooperative *a'yâns* to subdue the more rebellious ones. In the case of Osman Pazvand-oğlu, the Porte supported his rival, Tirsinkli-oğlu İsmail, but to no effect. Therefore, at the beginning of 1802 the central government asked Tepedelenli Ali Paşa to suppress Osman Pazvand-oğlu by conferring the abovementioned office. The Russian Minister in Istanbul, Vasily Tomara wrote, 'If he is loyal to the central government, he will put all *a'yâns* in order as before.' *ВПР*, vol. 1, p. 195.
55. *ibid.*, p. 710.
56. *ibid.*, p. 239.
57. *ibid.*, pp. 232-233.
58. *ibid.*, pp. 241-243.
59. *Hurmuzaki*, vol. 4, pp. 393-394.
60. *ibid.*, pp. 250-254.
61. *ВПР*, vol. 1, pp. 254-255.
62. *Hurmuzaki*, vol. 4, pp. 394-395.
63. Upon his nomination as Moldavian *voyvoda* in 1799, the Emperor Pavel I ordered Tomara to give him his full support. *ВПР*, vol. 1, p. 58. But he was dismissed in the end of 1801.

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64. *ibid.*, p. 270.
65. *ibid.*, p. 302.
66. Armand Gosu, 'The Third Anti-Napoleonic Coalition and the Sublime Porte,' *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 9/1-2(2003), p. 219; V. Mischevca and P. Zavitsanos, *Principele Constantin Ypsilanti 1760-1816*, Chişinău, 1999, pp. 59-62. However, Russia always looked on Moruzi with suspicion.
67. *ВПП*, vol. 1, p. 701. However, Russia viewed these edicts as an official diplomatic agreement. On February 28, 1803 Russia sent a note to the Porte saying that it approved the new stipulations concerning the Danubian Principalities. This was actually Russia's ratification. For the text of the *fermân* addressed to Wallachia, see М. Губоглу, 'Два указа (1801 г.) и священный рескрипт (1802 г.), связанные с турецко-русско-румынским отношениями,' *Восточные источники по истории народов Юго-Восточной и Центральной Европы*, т. 2, Москва, 1969, pp. 252-272; *Cevdet*, vol. 7, pp. 352-361. There are two copies in the Romanian National Archives, Documente turceşti, nr. 1149 and 2440. For its French translation, see G. Noradounghian, *op cit.*, vol. 2, 1900, pp. 55-67. For the *fermân* addressed to Moldavia, see Arhivele naţionale istorice centrale, Microfilm Turcia, rola 1, c. 19-22 (copied from Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi, E-3999/1). Romanian orientalist Mustafa A. Mehmet translated these two edicts into Romanian. M. A. Mehmet ed., *Documente turceşti privind istoria României*, vol. III(1791-1812), Bucureşti, 1986, pp. 167-188.
68. The original text is: 'müddet-i merkûme içinde töhmeti zûhurunda cânib-i Devlet-i Aliyye'den Rusya elçisine ihbâr olunub bu vechile tarafeynden ba'de'l-tahkik voyvoda-i mûmâileyh fî nef's'il-emr müttehem olduđu zâhir ve müttehakik olur ise yalnız ol hâlde azli câ'iz ola'.
69. For his life, see H. Deherain, *La vie de Pierre Ruffin: orientalist et diplomate 1742-1824*, 2 vols., Paris, 1929-30.
70. *Cevdet*, vol. 7, p. 260.
71. *Гросул*, p. 166.
72. Osman had sent his agents and letters to the Russian vice-consul in Bucharest several times and requested Russia's mediation between the Porte and himself. He promised that he would remove all his troops from Wallachia, only if he was permitted by the Porte and could have the title of 'vezîr' restored. Expecting that disorder in Wallachia would be settled, Russia put pressure on the Porte and as a result, in August 1802, the Porte permitted Osman and returned the title of 'vezîr' to him. Thus he became Osman 'Paşa.' *Cevdet*, vol. 7, p. 161; *Hurmuzaki*, vol. 4, p. 415.
73. *Cevdet*, vol. 7, p. 256. His demand began just after a French agent visited him in Vidin in the end of the previous year. I do not have any documents with which to confirm this at present, but it is possible that the French agent told him of French support at that time. I plan to study relations between predominant *a'yâns* and European countries in the future.
74. *ВПП*, vol. 1, pp. 389-390.
75. It is well known that Selim was a Francophile as he had corresponded with the French

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- king Louis XVI when he was the crown prince. See İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, 'Selim III'ün Veliht İken Fransa Kralı Lüi XVI. ile Muhabereleleri,' *Belleten*, 2/5-6 (1938), pp. 191-246.
76. *Cevdet*, vol. 8, p. 68.
77. As the result of joint operations by the Russian and Ottoman fleets against France in the Mediterranean, in 1800 the Ionian Islands became independent as a republic under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. Even after independence, however, the Russian troops stayed there because of their geopolitical importance in the Mediterranean. Though Russia wanted a reinforcement of troops and easier access there, the treaty of 1798 limited the Russian fleets' navigations in the Bosphorus Straits only to wartime. Therefore Russia sought an opportunity to modify this stipulation. C. Tükin, *Boğazlar meselesi*, 1999, pp. 138-139. For Russian activity in the Mediterranean, see A. М. Станиславская, *Россия и Греция в конце XVIII – начале XIX века: политика России в Ионической республике 1798-1807 гг.*, Москва, 1976; *Русско-английские отношения и проблемы средиземноморья, 1798-1807*, Москва 1962. And for the Ionian Republic from the Ottoman perspective, see İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, 'Arşiv Vesikalarına Göre Yedi Ada Cumhuriyeti,' *Belleten*, 1/3-4 (1937), pp. 627-639.
78. *БПР*, vol. 2, p. 697.
79. For details regarding the background to and the negotiation of this treaty, see Armand Gosu, 'The Third Anti-Napoleonic Coalition and the Sublime Porte,' *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 9/1-2(2003), pp. 199-237. This volume was also published as K. Karpāt and R. Zens ed., *Ottoman Borderland: Issues, Personalities and Political Changes*, The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 2003. For the text of this treaty, see *Mu'âhedât mecmû'ası*, vol. 4, pp. 35-49 (in Turkish); G. Noradounghian, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 70-77 (in French); *БПР*, vol. 2, pp. 582-594 (in Russian).
80. *Cevdet*, vol. 8, p. 46.
81. According to the secret article IV of the 1805 Russo-Ottoman treaty, the Russian fleet could pass through the Bosphorus Straits in peace and in war. The Porte, however, declined the Russian proposal, insisting on the possible outbreak of war with France and the neutral position of the Ottoman Empire. *БПР*, vol. 3, p. 684; C. Tükin, *op. cit.*, pp. 144-145.
82. *Cevdet*, vol. 8, p. 61. When the Sultan's decision became clear, almost all *a'yâns* in the Balkans who had striven with each other cooperated in opposing this plan. As a result, the *Nizâm-ı cedîd* corps in Edirne had to go back to Istanbul. This is called 'the second Edirne incident (*ikinci Edirne vak'ası*).'
83. From about 1805, the Ottoman Empire began repairing the fortresses along the Dniestr and the Danube. *БПР*, vol. 3, p. 79.
84. *ibid.*, pp. 252-253. In instructions from the Minister of Foreign Affairs Budberg to the Russian Minister in Istanbul, Italinsky, dated 30 July.
85. *ibid.*, p. 263.
86. *ibid.*, p. 666.
87. *ibid.*, p. 179.

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88. *Cevdet*, vol. 8, p. 74.
89. Ahmed 'Âsim Efendi, '*Âsim târihi*', vol. 1, p. 182.
90. *BPP*, vol. 3, p. 285. At that time he did not demand the restoration of the dismissed Ipsilanti and Moruzi, because he thought these former *voyvodas* might have been killed.
91. *ibid.*, pp. 301-302; '*Âsim târihi*', vol. 1, p.182.
92. *BPP*, vol. 3, p. 319.
93. *Cevdet*, vol. 8, p. 76.
94. *ibid.*, pp. 75-76 ; M. A. Mehmet, *op. cit.*, pp. 211-212.
95. *BPP*, vol. 3, p. 347.
96. *ibid.*, p. 360. Alexander I had fixed October 13 as the day of the decision, but without news from Istanbul, he postponed his decision for two weeks.