Wakefield on Colonial Government and Patronage

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In the United Province of Canada in 1841, the Executive Council was transformed into a provincial cabinet of ministers occupying seats in the government. Under the first coalition, Louis Hypolite Lafontaine (1807-64), a French Canadian leader, demanded patronage be distributed on the advice of the Executive Council, which led to a confrontation with Governor Charles Theophilis Metcalfe (1785-1846). Canada was shaken by an outburst of a political crisis. In November 1843, the first Canadian cabinet resigned. This crisis did not fail to draw Edward Gibbon Wakefield’s (1796-1863) attention. Indeed, he published two articles in 1844; ‘A View of Sir Charles Metcalfe’s Government of Canada’ (Wakefield [1968b]) and ‘Sir Charles Metcalfe in Canada’. ([1926])

While there was a tariff reform in Britain, other European countries and the United States did not cease their protectionism. Instead he singled out British colonies as qualified free trade partners. As we already know, he was to propose that it was mutually advantageous to produce different crops in Great Britain and colonies and that some reformative measure should be taken for desirable Imperial unity, thereby establishing the Imperial free trade. Precisely for this purpose he joined the Durham mission in 1838. (Kondo [1994; 1995; 1996])

In the present paper, the author examines his colonial thinking through an examination of these articles, as well as England and America (1834; [1967]) and A View of the Art of Colonization (1849; [1968c]), to complement a neglected part of the studies of British Imperial history. Attempts would be made to distinguish his revisionism on the British Colonial Empire as compared with the historically celebrated Durham Report (1839) after the death of Lord Durham (1792-1840).

1. Wakefield’s View on Government.

Wakefield’s economic expectations towards colonial trade are derived from his life-time concern for the ‘Condition-of-England question’. (Wakefield [1968c] p.795) In addition, he was fully aware of the British status quo at the Orleans Revolution. In the face of the social unrest prevalent on the Continent, however, there appeared some reformers holding firm confidence in the Revolutionary Settlement, which the notable Colonial reformers shared. While observing ‘[t]he physical discovery of the Parisian led to this great political discovery in England; that the nation had outgrown its laws’ in England and America, Wakefield praised that British power structure was ‘the envy and admiration of surrounding countries,’ because it
provided' better than any other government of Europe for the security of property and persons.' (Wakefield [1967] pp.109-10, 93)

Employing this insight, he gave a political diagnosis that the cause of the Canadian revolts in the 1830s was in ‘giving representation to the people and withholding from their representatives all control over the executive Government.’ This problem was not essentially settled, in his view, after the provinces united. For ‘this Ministry differed from that of “the Old Country” in a very material point. Here the Administration consists of the leading men of the party which happens to be most numerous in the House of Commons; of men who, on that account alone, are appointed to office by the Sovereign’ (Wakefield [1968b] p.730).

The bill introduced in September 1841 by Robert Baldwin (1804-58), an anglophone reformer and the then Opposition leader, was ‘somewhat different’ from the British Constitution. For Baldwin’s resolution ‘nowhere declares the responsibility of Ministers, but secures it by a tacit understanding between the Crown and the House of Commons,’ and ‘they leave wholly untouched that other part of the machinery of Parliamentary government which consists of the relations between a Ministry and the Crown’ (Wakefield [1968b] p.730, 732; his emphasis.).

Wakefield was very concerned with Metcalfe’s practices. In October 1843, he wrote from Kingston to one of his friends in Great Britain.

[T]he long habit of exercising a paternal despotism makes it difficult for him [Metcalfe] to comprehend the nature and consequence of the representative system. If this notion of mine should be correct, of course he is in great danger. But I feel certain, if they should occur, the present ‘Ministers,’ so to speak, will choose to rely rather on the country than on the temporary Governor; and that, if he should force them to retire on a question of this sort, he will be unable to replace them without getting into violent collision with the representative body, ...... (Wakefield [1968b] pp.734-5)

Evidently he was afraid that this paternal despotism would cause the colonial complaint, thereby leading to their independence.

Shortly after the Union, moreover, Wakefield discovered an estrangement of French population from the executive office and lack of cooperation between former two sister provinces (See Wakefield [1968b] p.729, 732). Then based on what kind of confidence in the British Constitution did he propose his solution to the colonial constitutional anomaly?

2. Wakefield on Colonial Constitution.

In his second article in 1844, Wakefield made a theoretical statement: ‘[t]he really essential features of the British Constitution, ......, are two in number’, that is ‘the system of ministerial responsibility’ and the ‘practical ascendancy of the House of Commons’ (Wakefield [1926] pp.183-90). He gave the following explanation of the system of ministerial responsibility.

From that last revolution [of 1688], dates the wiser practice which has since prevailed, the system now never for a moment departed from, of ascribing ev-
ery public act of the Sovereign, without exception, to the agency or advice of certain of his servants, functionaries of the State named by him and holding office during his pleasure, but who stand before the country as the Responsible Ministers of the Crown for the time being, must defend all its acts in Parliament so long as they are in office, and must yield their places to other men the instant they are no longer able to do so with success. (Wakefield [1926] pp.186-7)

It followed from these observations that although they were ‘the Responsible Ministers of the Crown’, they must be responsible not to the ‘Crown’ but to the ‘Parliament’ for defending the acts. Thus, it was quite natural for him to regard the ‘practical ascendancy of the House of Commons’ as another feature of the British Constitution. He observed that at present ‘[t]o all practical intents, the House of Commons, though in theory but the third estate of the realm, has become the representative embodiment of the nation as a whole’. ([1926] pp. 187-8)

Once these ‘two cardinal principles of the Constitution’ are conceded, he concluded ‘the rest is matter of necessary inference’. He argued that the ‘system of ministerial responsibility’ involved an institutional possibility of a constitutional change of ministry.

Nor does this safety of the Prerogative rest merely on the interests which the Ins, with their majority, have in maintaining for themselves the powers they need for the due administration of the Government. The Outs have the same interest in it; as their leaders may soon in turn occupy the Treasury Benches, and the prerogatives of the Crown be wanted to shield and strengthen them. In like manner, the ministers of to-day may be the Opposition of to-morrow and must have an eye to the chances of future popularity, independent of the mere possession of executive power. The system is thus a constant check on the otherwise inevitable tendency of party to rush into extremes. By contrast of all, the highest prize, the Crown, is placed hopelessly out of reach. (Wakefield [1926] pp.190-1)

He presented the tension between the party in power and the opposition as a contribution to the security of colonial politics and put an emphasis on this being a useful means to create popular government. Furthermore, the influence of the Crown lost its constitutional influence. ‘And the Government must always be a real and effective one; since, whatever the other checks interposed by the Constitution, it must always rest upon, and be the impersonation of, the working majority’. (Wakefield [1926] p.191) Thus, Wakefield seemed to think that the severely opposed groups, which might lead to the division of Canada, could be transformed into the tension between the provincial parties and contribute to the political security of the colonies.

Looking at the political reality in colonies, he pointed to the fact that there was no popularity there. ‘In fact, from first to last, unpopularity is the characteristics of the entire system. The office-holder party, in
all its political doctrines no less than in its official habits, is absolutely alien to the prevailing opinions and feelings of the country'. (Wakefield [1926] p.220) To fill the lack, he urged that it was necessary to make it popular through these ‘two cardinal principles’ and the organization of the ‘office-holders’ be reformed.

First, he stated vis-a-vis the basic concept of it.

Cannot each have a House of Assembly, occupying within its limits a position of qualified ascendancy analogous to that of the Assembly of Commons? Cannot such House of Assembly be allowed to regard the Representative of the Crown in the same light as that in which the House of Commons regards the Sovereign; to fasten upon those Provincial Office-Holders through whose Ministerial aid he carries on the Government, the same kind of responsibility to itself, which the House of Commons attaches to the Ministers of the Crown at home? And is not the recognition of these principles just as much the true keystone of the system in a Colony, as in Great Britain? (Wakefield [1926] p. 206)

He argued that the principle working at home should be transplanted to the province; that the Crown, ‘the Sovereign’, should carry on the government on the advice and assistance of the ‘Cabinet’, and that the Cabinet be responsible for the advice and assistance to the ‘House of Commons’. In the province, the ‘Governor-General’ in an identical manner, should carry on the provincial government with ‘Ministerial aid’ and the ‘Provincial Office-Holders’ should be responsible to the ‘House of Assembly’, to which Wakefield referred as essential ‘keystone’. But the difficulty in the Colonial system was that the Governor was pressed with routine administrative chores. (Wakefield [1926] p.221) Due to the complete lack of the departmental machinery of performing the administrative business, the Governor inevitably attended to the colonial administration and was not able to spare time to do his proper function, and this led to the ‘Constituted Anarchy’. (Wakefield [1926] pp.224, 243) He regarded this as the greatest cause of colonial complaint and therefore pressed for the necessity of establishment in colonies of the administrative machinery of the colonists.

How should the colonial ‘House of Assembly’ be constructed? He thought:

Not less unavailing for every useful purpose is the newer half-and-half recipe of Colonial-Office jealousy,—the plan of giving Colonies a semi-popular Constitution, with no House of Commons in it, but a mongrel legislative body, neither Commons nor Lords—part chosen by People, and part by the Executive. Suppose the Executive chooses to the satisfaction of the people; we have much such a House as they would have chosen themselves, and may rely on its taking much the same course as a bona fide House of Assembly would have taken. (Wakefield [1926] p.237)

Even if the Executive chooses ‘to the satisfaction of the people’, he observed, the so chosen Assembly would take ‘much the same course’ as the Assembly chosen by metropolitan
authority. Conversely, the colonists, he feared, would feel discontented with the unpopularly elected assembly itself. And his greater concern was that the administrators nominated by the Home Government would be 'under more temptation to an abuse of its powers' in colonies. (Wakefield [1926] p. 237; see Kondo [1995] p. 106) What the Colonies did want of Parliament was 'to be let well alone, to have no one, not even Parliament, standing in the sunshine. On those large questions of general policy, on which the Imperial Government and parliament must decide, they desire to have their own views known, and their interests thought of. Make their Governors, then, represent them. A Ministry can always secure the favourable attention of Parliament to its plans; and a Governor, as a thing of course, commands always the fair, not to say favourable, hearing of the Ministers whose servant he is. The Cabinet is gained, all is gained.' (Wakefield [1926] pp. 255-6)

This was his notion of the provincial Cabinet government.

And therefore, the provincial Governors were both required to understand distinctly 'it is their business to govern popularly', and they had to be given each 'his House of Commons'. What was required, in Wakefield's view, was to 'make all parties, Governors, Commons, and public servants, clearly aware that the chief officials of the Province, instead of being suffered to keep their tenure of office, as heretofore, secure by sheltering themselves behind the orders they put into the Governor's mouth for their own guidance, are to be treated as answerable to the Province for all his public acts.' (Wakefield [1926] p. 255-6)

Such was a whole idea of Wakefield's responsible government. He added that it was 'a mere extension to our Colonies of an old rule or two of Government long ago reduced to every-day practice by ourselves at home.' (Wakefield [1926] p. 256)

What sort of relationship should these colonies with such responsible government as Wakefield recommended have with the home country? Some argued that once the colonial constitution were transformed to cabinet government of its own, the essential distinction would disappear between colonial dependence and independent country. To counter the argument, he pointed to the dual role of the Governorship, noting that governor was 'not the mere representative of the Crown but its servant also.' (Wakefield [1926] p. 267) Wakefield was convinced that this was 'an essential distinction between what is the British and what must be the Colonial usage'. He implied both that they had to be regarded as a 'Sovereign' to the colonial Assembly and that as Imperial servants they had to perform colonial administration for the interest of the Imperial Sovereign. Therefore, as he suggested, when the patronage should be surrendered to the colonies, 'accountability to Imperial authority' on the shoulders of the popularly elected 'Provincial Ministers' was not heavy, but on the Governor 'its weight falls quite otherwise.'

His orders come to him [Governor] direct from home; he must explain or defend all he does to the ministers of the Crown at home, whenever they require it, and his acts may be disavowed, and he censured or recalled, if they
should think his reasons insufficient. Unable to devolve this responsibility on any Provincial advisers, or even to share it with them, his position calls on him to take a far more active part in public affairs than the Sovereign is under any necessity of taking. (Wakefield [1926] p. 268)

Wakefield maintained that the ‘governor’ should reign and govern in the colonies as ‘Representative of the Crown’ and Imperial agent on condition that the patronage of the ‘Provincial advisers’ be freed from the rule of the Home authority. ‘The true guardian for each Colony, of Imperial interests, is the Governor.’ (Wakefield [1926] p. 344)

In short, when Anglo-Canadian collisions thus far dealt with in colonial councils and assemblies, are now settled through the Governors, the home authority was able to maintain conventional Imperial tie with colonies.

But having said that, he did not necessarily intend to maintain the conventional relationship.

I do not mean by this, that Colonies should be favoured, right and left, with protecting duties at the cost of the British consumer, to build up new pet Colonial class-monopolies. The policy I advocate is perfectly compatible even with the cautious abolition of those that are already in existence. Create every facility for a steady well-ordered emigration, of the right kind, at once to swell their population and argument their capital and industrial resources generally. (Wakefield [1926] p. 345; his emphasis)

Wakefield never meant to give the ‘Colonial class’ the benefit of monopoly. Far from this, according to his argument, the policy he recommended was ‘compatible even with the cautious abolition’ of Imperial preference. His true intention can be understood from his statement that these Colonies should be developed by the larger emigration and augmented ‘capital and industrial resources generally,’ made mature enough to relieve the burden of ‘protecting duties’ from the ‘British consumer’, and, ultimately, should evolve into Great Britain’s free trade partners. And this completes his original project of Empire as the ‘extension of Britain’.

Thus, what was the difference between his colonial constitution and that of the Durham Report? What was the purpose of his publishing his articles? We must make inquiry into the related passages in this Report.


The recommendation of ‘the true principle of representative government’ in the Durham Report is one of the most familiar descriptions. (Durham [1970] p. 77)

Since the Revolution of 1688, the stability of the English constitution has been secured by that wise principle of our Government which has vested the direction of the national policy, and the distribution of patronage, in the leaders of the Parliamentary majority. However partial the Monarch might be to particular ministers, or however he might have personally committed himself to their policy, he has invariably been
constrained to abandon both, as soon as the opinion of the people has been irrevocably pronounced against them through the medium of the House of Commons. The practice of carrying on a representative government on a different principle, seems to be the rock on which the continental imitations of the British Constitution have invariably split; and the French Revolution of 1830 was the necessary result of an attempt to uphold a ministry with which no Parliament could be got to act in concert. It is difficult to understand how any English statesmen could have imagined that representative and irresponsible government could be successfully combined. (Durham [1970] p.79)

But should it be noted that the Report recommended a straightforward transplantation of the British Constitution in the colonies and this technically contained a grave contradiction in the selection of executive body, a vitally important post in colonial constitution. The Report suggested that it was hardly conceivable that 'any people, or any considerable portion of a people, will view with dissatisfaction a change which would amount simply to this, that the Crown would henceforth consult the wishes of the people in the choice of its servants'. ([1970] p. 285) Here, it was unmistakably stated that the British 'Crown' would intervene in the choice of colonial servants. Moreover, it argued '[a]n elective executive council would not only be utterly inconsistent with monarchical government, but really, under the nominal authority of the Crown, deprive the community of one of the great advantages of an hereditary monarchy'. ([1970] p.279) Because the Revolutionary Settlement as reforming model in the Report was the system of parliamentary government through the medium of the Crown, characterized as "King in Parliament", it was quite possible for the Imperial Parliament to meddle with the selection of colonial ministers. ⁸

In short, the Durham Report reserved the colonial patronage to Imperial control. And it did not make any clear statement as to what should be done with the relationship between the Assembly and Executive in colonies. The Report failed to provide a satisfactory remedy to the malpractice of colonial constitution and the concept of responsible government, the most important element which earned its great historical significance.⁹ In fact, the Union Act of 1840 did not provide any reference for this issue. (See Buckner [1985] p.257)

The purpose of Wakefield's articles was to delineate the theoretical concept of constitutional responsibility in colonies, and despite his overt intention it was to revise the recommendation of the Report and surrender patronage to colonists. In practice, however, Lord John Russell (1792-1878), the Colonial Secretary, issued a despatch in October 1839, giving Lord Sydenham (1799-1841), the first United Canadian Governor, as much patronage as possible to form colonial executive government. For such permission would bring to the governor the greatest political support in policy-making.¹⁰ From Wakefield's description that Sydenham's system of administration rather 'resembled that of the present King of the French than
that of the British Sovereign at all times,' (Wakefield [1968b] p.730) we know that he attributed the Provincial complaint to this Imperial exclusive control of colonial patronage.

Wakefield characterized the Revolutionary Settlement, in effect, as parliamentary government under constitutional monarchy, and at the same time he urged reform of the system of colonial departmental organization. He delineated the colonial constitutional responsibility which was missing in the Report, and urged the extension to the colonies of a cabinet system where ministries change when they lose the confidence of the colonial assembly. To export the same form of Settlement as that of Great Britain, he suggested that the patronage should be surrendered to colonies and that authorities should govern colonies through governorship. His responsible government was, in a sense, a fundamentally revised recommendation and was to give colonies freer constitutions than those recommended in the Report. Another ammunition for the present discussion could be deployed from his suggestion that the Great Britain should give to colonies ‘ungrudgingly ... an approach to the privilege of free trade with foreign countries’, (Wakefield [1926] p.346) which was reserved to Imperial control in the Report. Wakefield’s suggestions were an attempt to solve British imperial problems by granting greater autonomy than those in the Report.

4. Wakefield in Politics and Significance of His Proposals.

Later on, in the Art of Colonization, Wakefield even reflected ‘[i]s the subordination of the colony to the mother-country, as respects government, an essential condition of colonization? I should say not. ... To my view, the United States of America, formed by emigration from this country, and still receiving a large annual increase of people by emigration from this country, are still colonies of England.’ ([1968c] p. 767; see Kondo [1995]) It was necessary to reform the colonial constitution in the British North America and to introduce parliamentary government, because not only was there a flood of emigrants pouring in from Great Britain, where liberal reform was in full flow, but also the province had to be politically as attractive to immigrants as USA, especially to those capitalists enfranchised in the home country. Donald Winch remarks that his view of society as ‘not so much “aristocratic” as bourgeois.’ ([1965]p.153) Bernard Semmell labels it Wakefield’s project for the ‘middle-class empire.’ ([1970]ch.5) Wakefield was eager to surrender patronage because he regarded colonists as both agricultural exporters and consumers for Britain, an integral part in his project of building the British Colonial Empire. I suppose what he advocated was, in part, to give the French population satisfaction through their engagement in the colonial constitution and economic development. Thus, he was by far a freer constitutionalist than the rest of the Durham mission.

But the metropolitan authorities had to prevent the rise to full power of the French and suppress the sentiment of colonial independence. For this purpose, the colonial ministers had to be responsible not to the colonial but to Imperial Parliament. A
colonial 'system of ministerial responsibility' was entirely unacceptable to Imperial authority.

Second. His theoretical recommendation of making governors govern as colonial Crown was contradictory. As is previously observed, the Crown lost, at least in theory as far as his argument goes, its constitutional influence in the Revolutionary Settlement. In case of conflict of colonial assembly with Governors’ Imperial interests, Wakefield’s advocacy would allow the dual authority in colonies.

Third. It was definitely impossible for British Government under corn laws to grant free trade to colonies.

Fourth. Was Wakefield influential in the contemporary politics? He was not officially permitted to join the Durham mission, and went to Canada in capacity of private assistant of Lord Durham. In 1833, Lord Howick (1802–94), a parliamentary secretary at Colonial Office, commented ‘[t]he principle on which this proposal was founded and which was first explained in the pamphlets of Mr. Gibbon Wakefield has been actually tried with the most complete success in the Australian colonies’. (Howick to Glenelg, May 2 1838; cited in Manning [1965] p.95) Wakefield himself, however, complained bitterly in the Art of Colonization that what Howick had done with his theory ‘has been to pick out bits of it here and there, turn them into crotches of his own, and then call them mine’. ([1968c] p.770) Howick’s policy of taxation on wild land was not the direct result of Wakefield’s influence. To the South Australia Association in 1834 were appointed Robert Torrens (1780–1864), a vocal advocate for it, and Charles Buller (1806–48), but not Wakefield. He was mortified at this and criticized that it was ‘[a] dilettante Commission, an amateur Commission, a sort of fancy Commission.’ (cited in Bloomfield [1961] p.137) Admittedly, Wakefield had to contend with James Stephen, Jr (1789–1859), a permanent undersecretary at the Colonial Office. Under such circumstances it was evidently and entirely impossible for him to make any substantial contribution to constructing Australian colonies, either directly or through influence on the policy-makers. This was also true of him in Canadian affairs precisely in the same decade. Also in Canada, Governor Charles Bagot (1781–1843) called him ‘Cacodaemon,’ evil genius. (Bloomfield [1961] pp.260-1)

His proposals stemmed from his critical appraisal of the Empire: that the cause of the United Canadian political crisis, as well as Upper and Lower Canadian revolts in the previous decade, was the unsatisfactory administration of colonial system. This we learn from the fact that he began ‘Sir Charles Metcalfe in Canada’ with a cry, ‘Save me from my friend!’; ‘When will one cease to have occasion to repeat the saying of the wise Spaniard, who first told men that he ever dreaded a foe’s wisdom less than a friend’s folly?’ (Wakefield [1926] p.171) Reluctance of the British authorities to reform and their desire to retain the conventional colonial constitution, which could be seen from the case of patronage, convinced Wakefield that the metropolitans had committed a ‘folly’ which would lead to disunity of the Colonial Empire from within.
NOTES

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1) This was a constitutional departure from the dominance of the ‘Family Compact,’ about the existence of which some cast doubt. (Morison [1930] p. 260) Whatever its existence and form, the colonial reformers levelled criticism at the colonial political system.

2) British markets in the European countries and USA were dwindling. (Imlah [1969] p. 129; Davis [1979] p. 21; Cain and Hopkins [1993] pp. 87-8)

3) We can obtain a vivid description of unease and poverty in the then Great Britain from his writings, such as Notes II and III of England and America. One of the major aims of his proposal for colonization was to settle the domestic crisis. ‘Indeed his reforms were to be a policy for population first, a kind of “imperialism” only second’. (Bloomfield [1961] p. 23) Bernard Semmell argues that Wakefield appears to have been ‘less troubled about surplus population or surplus capital than with the necessity of constructing an extensive trading system,’ ([1970] p. 83) with which the present author disagrees.

4) Indeed, there were many ‘temporary Governors,’ for out of fifteen governors between 1791 and 1844, about half held their office in only fourteen years since 1830s. Before appointed to Canada, Metcalf served in India (1827-36). Ged Martin regards him as ‘closest to Durham’s model.’ ([1990] p. 48) Phillip Buckner argues that Wakefield had ‘publicly defended Metcalfe’s refusal to surrender all patronage to the Canadian reformers’ ([1985] p. 295). Whatever he did in public, Wakefield felt unsatisfied with Metcalfe’s policy.

5) In 1836, Baldwin wrote that the remedy ‘consists in nothing more than having the provincial government, as far as regards the internal affairs of the province, conducted by the Lieutenant-Governor (as representative of the paramount authority of the mother country) with the advice and assistance of the Executive Council, acting as a provincial Cabinet, and composed of men possessed of the public confidence, whose opinions and policy would be in harmony with the opinions and policy of the representatives of the people’ (Baldwin to Glenelg, 13 July 1836; cited in Morison [1930] p. 270).

6) ‘If the government of the dominant country substantially governing the dependency, the representative body cannot substantially govern it; and conversely, if the dependency be substantially governed by the representative body, it cannot be substantially governed by the Government of the dominant country. A self-governing dependency (supposing the dependency not to be virtually independent) is a contradiction in terms.’ (G. C. Lewis, An Essay on the Government of Dependencies, 1841; cited in Ajzenstat [1988] p. 115) See also Russell’s letter to Sydenham, cited in Bloomfield [1961] p. 238.

7) As is well known, to extend the Constitution to colonies, the Report distinguished between the internal affairs of colonies and matters of Imperial concern. (Durham [1970] p. 282) In addition, it recommended reserving the voting of supplies to Imperial authority. (p. 287)

8) While Martin mounts scathing criticism to the Report that the author(s) ‘hardly seem[s] to have been aware of the crucial nature of the problem [of dual authority],’ ([1972] p. 54) the Report seems to try to avoid the
crucialness in a clandestine manner by the introduction of 'Crown' and 'monarchy' in the selective process.

9) To Buckner, however, '[t]he general principles which Durham recommended were clear, even if the details were not.' ([1985] p.258) I am not alone in arguing that it is ambiguous over selection and composition of the provincial cabinet and relationship between executive and legislative. Defending the principle of responsible government, J.M.S. Careless observed that Durham's was not clear in the Report whether it was a full cabinet system as Baldwin understood it or not. ([1978] p.208) 'To Durham then, and to most of his contemporaries, the term [responsible government] had no specific reference to parliamentary forms of government. It simply meant the opposite of arbitrary government.' (Patterson [1977] p.11; see also Durham [1970] p.79n.1)

10) Helen T. Manning and Careless presented an orthodoxy that the exclusive patronage of the Governor would make possible the introduction of the 'cabinet government' at the moment when he wishes to, with which Buckner must be of the same opinion. (Manning [1965] p.102; Careless [1978] p.212; Buckner [1985] p.282n.17) However, as Martin argues, once this happens there will be two independent parliaments within the single Empire. Graeme Patterson regards the orthodoxy as 'gloss'. ([1977] p.12)

11) Among those few who made any passing comment on his constitutional reform is Janet Ajzenstat. She regards as different the notion of responsible government of Durham and that of Wakefield, arguing that while the former found the best security in balanced or 'mixed' government, the latter used it to signify a form of government in which assemblies were dominant and the executives subordinate. ([1988] p.63)

12) In the administrative history of Great Britain, the Reform and Municipal Corporation Acts are correlative, in that the latter 'gave town councils the right to tax (but not to collect) the county rate, and enfranchised rate-payers (or householders), contributing directly to local revenue, to select the members to town councils'. (Fujita [1996] p.15; my translation)

13) Ajzenstat's evaluation of Durham that 'partnership like that of Baldwin and LaFontaine were what he hoped to see come about' ([1988] p.17) would undoubtedly be valid when applied to Wakefield. She never mentions the fact that the French population did not receive any sympathetic hearing in the Report, in contrast with English population. Also see Kondo [1996].

14) Manning and Martin, who produced diametrically opposite assessments on the Report, both refuse to admit Wakefield's influence on government policy. Despite their denial, however, he exerted some intellectual influence, among others, on John Stuart Mill's thinking of combination of labour and colonies as an extension of Old Country in particular. (For the former, see Winch [1965])

15) For the continued imperial unity, it was simply impossible, both in theory and practice, to transplant the British Constitutional structure of Crown, Cabinet, and the Houses of Lords and Commons, to colonies as that of Governors, the Executive and Legislative Councils and Assembly, while Peter Burrells assumes it possible. ([1984])

16) Howick even declined to meet Wakefield in person. (Howick to Wakefield, Sep.7 1831; cited in Manning [1965] p.96) Wakefield sighed 'Lord Howick zealously opposed our New Zealand scheme.' (Wakefield [1968c] p.772) This suggests that he felt his plan was frustrated by Howick in Canada, Australia and New Zealand. See also Semmell [1970] p.123
17) As Torrens was not in perfect agreement with him on colonial matters, (see Winch [1965] p.88) the Association was not necessarily under decisive influence of Wakefield.

18) For detail, see Bloomfield [1961] p.125. Manning argued that it was Wakefield’s criticism levelled at the Colonial Office (especially to Stephen) that was responsible for the ‘Colonial Office legend’, which assumed that the Office alone was the author of the colonial policy. ([1965] p.88)

19) The Union of Canadas was a policy to contain the French population, otherwise numerically superior.

REFERENCES
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Edward Gibbon Wakefield, known as a British Colonial Imperialist, was a free constitutionalist in the first half of the nineteenth century. In 1844, in order to promote imperial unity and to encourage prosperity both at home and in the colonies, he argued for constitutional reform in the British North American colonies. In the face of the Canadian political crisis, Wakefield argued for greater freedom for the Provincial government to promote own legislation, thereby increasing the autonomy of the colony. He thought that the surrendering patronage to the Canadian Province would be effective as a remedy to the crisis, so that the provincial cabinet was responsible solely to the colonial legislature. Wakefield intended in part to revise the recommendation in the Durham Report, and to make the British colonies an extension of Great Britain so they would attract enfranchised emigrants from the Isles. The paper concludes that despite Wakefield’s argument, the Revolutionary Settlement as a reforming model could not be transplanted to the colonies either in theory and practice.