In two studies (scenario study and laboratory experiment), we attempted to examine a hypothesis that reactions in bargaining were determined by the concern for identity. In scenario study, the other party, who was allowed to divide a certain amount of money between the two parties, presented participates with either unfavorably unequal, equal, or favorably unequal offers, while in experiment study s/he offered either unfavorably unequal or equal one. In the ultimatum condition, the participants were told that only when they accepted the offer, both parties could get their portions. In the dictator condition, however, they were told that independently of their reactions, the other party could get his or her portion. The finding that the participants rejected the unfavorably unequal offer more frequently than the other offers in the ultimatum conditions could be partly interpreted as that they wanted to restore fairness by making both parties' portion zero. However, it was also found that the participants did so even in the dictator condition, in which they were not able to restore fairness by rejecting the offer. These results suggest that they perceived the unfavorably unequal offer from the other party as an insult and, therefore, they attempted to project their identity by rejecting it.
