2020 年 47 巻 2 号 p. 81-96
This paper discusses John McDowell's disjunctivism. Through the Argument from Illusion, many philosophers have accepted that subjectively indistinguishable perceptual experiences share an underlying mental state (a highest common factor). McDowell, by contrast, thinks of this conception of experience as problematic, developing disjunctivism, which claims that a veridical experience and a corresponding delusive one need not be taken as having a common state-even if they are indistinguishable from one another. However, his writings are difficult to read, so that his thought on disjunctivism, it seems, is still not properly understood or evaluated. Given that the validity of disjunctivism is an important topic in the philosophy of perception, and given that McDowell is one of the standard-bearers of the position, such a situation would be quite unsatisfactory. Therefore, in this paper I work on two things: namely, I try first to give an interpretation of his relevant thought, and then to reveal its significance.