拡張された帰結論証とヒューム主義的両立論

抄録

Humean compatibilists argue that determinism is compatible with leeway freedom. They refute one of the premises of the consequence argument that we have no choice about the laws of nature, and they do this by arguing that the laws of nature does not prevent us from doing otherwise by necessity since the laws of nature are just regularities. One of the humean compatibilists, Bernald Berofsky, starts off his critique of this premise by pointing out that the standard consequence argument fails to deal with the relationship between the physical and the mental. In order to overcome this deficit, he builds the expanded consequence argument, and argues that even this expanded argument has a corresponding false premise, namely that no matter what we do, the sentences representing the laws of nature are true. At the same time, he accepts two supervenience theses: (i) humean supervenience about laws and (ii) physicalism, especially the thesis that mental properties strongly supervene on physical properties. In this article, I argue that these two theses, together with the reasonable premises and inference rules, entail that no matter what we do, we cannot choose otherwise than we actually do. I conclude that Berofsky's defense of humean compatibilism fails because humean compatibilism would not succeed without abandoning either humean supervenience about laws or physicalism.