紛争後社会における民主化の進捗と国家建設

東ティモールの経験に基づく考察

抄録

By examining the case of Timor-Leste, this paper explores motivations and opportunities to instigate political violence during the processes of democratization and state-building. By defining democratization as carrying out a first free and fair election, and state-building as constructing legitimized state institutions, the article attempts to identify which of these efforts contribute to new conflicts, even after brutal strife has ended.
The outcomes of democratization and state-building are outlined in bipolar approaches. One approach proposes the institutionalization of state entities before the introduction of electoral democracy to attain state stability. The other approach suggests state legitimacy is achieved through the mutual reinforcement between legal institutions and citizen satisfaction of its autonomy. In modern post-conflict contexts, democratization and state-building are concurrently introduced along with third party interventions, yet violence recurs. Timor-Leste is no exception; it received one of the most cohesive third party interventions to build a new democratic state since 1999. Despite these efforts, a collision between army and police was experienced in 2006, followed by the disintegration of security agencies which resulted in high numbers of Internally Displaced Persons-equivalent to one tenth of the population.
The Timor-Leste case shows that vertical accountability between the state and society is imperative, yet difficult to establish even during periods of high voter turnouts and vibrant political party participation. The continued violence in Timor-Leste during the 2007 parliamentary election indicates that both political parties and voters have not fully committed to their new framework for political competition.
The state-building process stimulated social conflicts which led to the 2006 disturbance. Firstly, veterans' issues arose through incoherent disarmament, demobilization and reintegration measures. Dissatisfied by the procedures to select members to new security forces, former combatants joined anti-government associations and became sources of public unrests. The east-west division also developed from the recruitment process for security institutions. While easterners who are recognized as members of the resistance were employed to the new army, westerners were to be assimilated into the police force.
Citizens, whose socioeconomic conditions remained severe, were frustrated with the low performance of their government. Their resentment was presented in an anti-governmental demonstration led by catholic churches, but in this case no violence was observed. Instead, gang groups composed of unemployed youths motivated by pecuniary and social rewards backed the 2006 disturbance. Later their main activities extended to communal violence in their neighborhoods. The third party intervention, mainly the UN largely met the goals of providing election support and maintaining security, but was limited to assist establishing long-term law and order.