日本・キューバ貿易と米国の対日政策

―一九六〇年代、キューバ糖貿易をめぐる三カ国の外交姿勢とナショナリズム―

抄録

After World War II, Japan was the largest importer of Cuban sugar outside of the Soviet bloc. This continued well after the Cuban Revolution of 1959, making Japan one of Cuba’s largest trade partners in the 1960s. As is often suggested, Japanese foreign policy is based upon two main principles: Japan’s collaboration with the United States, its closest ally outside of Asia, and the high priority given to trade promotion and economic growth.
Trade between Japan and Cuba began to trouble the U.S. government to such a degree that the U.S. undertook direct intervention against it. Efforts were even made to have other Latin American countries boycott trade with Japan. As a result, the Japanese government was faced with the dilemma of which of the two foreign policy principles should take priority. Meanwhile,the U.S. government was particularly concerned with the export of Critical Commodities (CC) from Japan to Cuba and the Japanese use of the Export and Import Bank of Japan (their official financial loan firm) when trading with Cuba.
President J.F.Kennedy himself asked the Philippine Government to divert its sugar export from the U.S. to Japan, Secretary of State D.D.Rusk urged Latin American countries to scale down their trade with Japan, and the U.S.government pursued a policy of not purchasing goods and services from those private foreign commercial firms engaged in trade with Cuba.
On the other hand, Ambassador E.O. Reischauer and Minister J.K. Emmerson, both diplomats in Tokyo highly respected for their Japan expertise,worked hard to keep the Cuban Sugar trade issue low profile for fear that Japanese nationalist sentiment would react strongly against this direct U.S. intervention.
Two primary reasons help to explain why Japan continued to trade with Cuba. One is based on an agreement within the Commercial Treaty of 1961,in which Japan promised to import 450,000 tons of Cuban sugar per year. In this de fact barter trade agreement, Japan imported sugar with its competitive or low price and good quality, while Cuba obtained Japanese manufactured goods such as ships, machinery, tools, and buses. The other reason why Japan refused to scale down its trade with Cuba was that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) was inept and powerless compared to the Ministries of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and of Finance (MF), both of which maintained strong influence over the domestic private sector.
The U.S. government was highly concerned with these commercial activities, fearing that important materials from Japan would be obtained, and that further trade activities would contradict its hostile policy toward Cuba.
While MOFA was highly susceptible to U.S. pressure, Japanese politicians and those in MITI, MF, and the private sector were reluctant to obey any such request. This article reveals (as a case study) that Japan’s trade agreement with Cuba actually helped to harmonize future collaboration with the U.S. on foreign trade with other socialist countries. The primary sources used to support this argument are from the National Archives (NARA) in Washington D.C., the Archivo Nacional de Cuba, and the MOFA Archives in Tokyo.