2015 年 2015 巻 179 号 p. 179_142-179_155
The governance of nuclear technology is required to address two critical natures of technology; the dual-use nature and great impact to the wellness of the society. Because of these natures, the acquisition of nuclear technology possibly changes the dynamics of international relations both in security and economy, of the state that acquires the technology. The governance of dual-use nuclear technology needs to meet two conflicting goals, namely, preventing the deterioration of international security environment through proliferation of sensitive nuclear technology and securing the equity among states in enjoying benefits of utilizing nuclear technology, which naturally causes the spread of such technology.
The governance of nuclear proliferation risks is shaped not only by international and domestic regulatory schemes, but also the dynamics of market, and the process of how technology diffuses. These factors are mutually affecting. Political dynamics over regulation of technology transfer is shaped by the number of supplier states. However, as more states become involved in technology transfer in the market, it become more difficult to form a consensus on regulatory rules. Although some states prioritize security concerns to strengthen regulations, others’ economic incentives to transfer technology may hinder the introduction of stringent regulation. Conversely, regulatory needs could distort economic rationality in social choice of technology.
The current international regulatory scheme of nuclear non-proliferation was founded with a basic deal to ensure nuclear non-proliferation without undermining the objective of promoting international cooperation for peaceful use of nuclear technology. It was possible because sensitive technology such as uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing had been owned by only a limited number of nuclear weapon states, and proliferation risk was not critical.
However, in the 1970s, as technology diffuses, political and economic environment regarding nuclear non-proliferation made drastic changes. The first oil crisis increased aspiration for national nuclear energy program in developing countries. The U.S. dominance in enrichment market was lost by European countries’ acquisition of enrichment technology. They meant the emergence of new paths of technology diffusion, and the increase in risk of nuclear proliferation. Such concern was realized in India’s nuclear test, claimed as “peaceful nuclear explosion.” Although the United States intended to tighten the control over technology transfer, loss in power in enrichment market and technology dominance prevented the United States from exerting influence over other supplier states. In the short run, the U.S. attempt to establish an international consensus to ban transfer of fuel cycle technology was failed. In the long run, however, risk of nuclear proliferation seems to shape technology transfer through regulations.
The diffusion of technology strongly depends on social context in which how the market and regulatory politics evolve. But the social regulatory scheme is also shaped by the dynamics of technological diffusion.