Regional Arrangements as Signals to Induce UN Peacekeepers

Abstract

Since the late 1990s, the United Nations (UN) has begun to mount peacekeeping operations in the conflict zones where regional organizations had already deployed their peacekeepers. This paper employs a game-theoretic model to examine the reasons for the UN’s decision to intervene in such conflicts rather than choosing disengagement or devolution, and its reasons for allowing regional organizations to intervene first. The results suggest that regional organizations intervene in regional conflicts to signal their inability to resolve the conflicts single-handedly. By showing the ineffectiveness of regional arrangements, they try to elicit cooperation from the UN, a more resourceful organization. However, I also find that when the cost of intervention is high, the UN is not likely to intervene in the conflict even after a regional organization dispatches peacekeepers. Knowing this, disputants are more likely to violate a cease-fire agreement and increase the burden of regional countries. Finally, when a regional organization anticipates that the UN is likely to pass the buck, it would refrain from dispatching peacekeepers and wait until the UN is embroiled in the conflict. I illustrate these findings through an example of the conflicts in Africa.