金融危機後の改革と政治

―ユーロ圏におけるドイツ―

抄録

By comparing policy preferences of Germany and policy outcomes in the two post-financial crisis reforms—Basel III and the European Banking Union—the paper analyzes the context and factors impacting Germany’s positions and the extent to which Germany made concessions to other countries. Germany had a stronger bargaining position in the case of the European Banking Union than it did in the case of Basel III due to its relative economic and political strength in the region. However, Germany was forced to make significant compromises in the negotiation of the European Banking Union in exchange for its demand for regulatory tightening within the Eurozone. In contrast, it resisted regulatory tightening through Basel III and demanded relaxing capital requirements in the process of implementing Basel III. One of most significant compromises can be found in the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) of European Banking Union, in which national resolution funds financed by imposing fees on banking industries are to be gradually mutualized at the European level under the European authority of the Single Resolution Board, despite Germany initially wanting this mechanism to be a network-like coordination among regulators in the Eurozone. Though the size and functions of the SRM are both limited, it can be said that Germany’s negotiating power was significantly constrained against a backdrop of the euro crisis.

Based on an analysis of different policy contexts and Germany’s positions and compromises in the two negotiation, the paper discusses factors determining major differences in the negotiation outcomes. One of the reasons behind Germany’s concessions in the Banking Union includes deepening economic and financial interdependence among euro member states. Due to possible negative financial and economic impacts resulting from any member’s exit from the euro and its political repercussion on European integration, Germany quite reluctantly had to provide emergency financial support to the euro periphery, while demanding further integration and strengthening European capacities over financial supervision. Other reasons can be found in the negotiation process and involved actors. The time schedule for negotiation was much tighter for the Banking Union, and main negotiating actors were centralized within a couple of head staff in the Federal Ministry of Finance, compared to the case of Basel negotiation, where bank regulators (such as BaFin and Bundesbank) negotiated with other countries’ regulators in close coordination with discussions among industrial groups of negotiating countries.

In spite of post-crisis centralization of institutional settings, the Eurozone still lacks a stable hegemonic power. Germany’s coercive leadership made legitimation of its asymmetric power difficult. Without legitimacy, German-led post-financial crisis reforms keep facing constant political unease and tensions, which could weaken the solidarity within the region.