中国とカナダの国交正常化交渉

――西側諸国との関係改善と「一つの中国」原則の形成――

抄録

This article examines the substance and modification of the “One-China” principle, which the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursued in negotiations seeking normalization with Canada in 1970. During this period, the PRC tried to converge domestic turmoil since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution and rebuild its foreign policy as a way to improve relations with those Western developed countries which held diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan.

From the beginning of negotiations, the PRC claimed three “constant principles” concerning Taiwan: a country, which wishes to have relations with China, (1) must recognize the government as a sole legal government of the Chinese people, (2) must recognize that Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory and sever all kinds of relationships with the ROC, and (3) must support the restoration of the legitimate rights of the PRC in the United Nations. The government strengthened their claim of the principles as negotiations progressed, and the Canadian government finally recognized the PRC as “a sole legal government” and “took note” that Taiwan was an inalienable part of China in the joint communiqué of the normalization. This result was very different from the Sino-French normalization in 1964.

Regarding the process of these negotiations, this article mainly answers the following three questions. First, the reason why the PRC claimed the three principles would deeply relate to the PRC’s internal and external circumstances at that time. As internal circumstances, the conflict between ideologists and realists in the Cultural Revolution led to excessive demand. In the international community, claims of “two-Chinas” or “one-China, one-Taiwan” were more serious than in 1964.

Second, rapprochement by the United States would explain the reason why the PRC strengthened their claim of the principles since the early summer of 1969. Considering military tensions with the Soviet Union and Nixon’s attitude toward China, Mao Zedong solidified his intent to approach Western countries at that time. The negotiations with Canada, therefore, would indicate rapprochements between them.

Third, evaluating this negotiation is controversial. On the one hand, the PRC succeeded in incorporating consent to “Taiwan [as an] inalienable part of China” in the joint communiqué. On the other hand, the agreement remained incomplete, and it was impossible to impose restrictions on any significant relations between Canada and the ROC. Both aspects were handed over to later negotiations with the Western countries.