Asymmetric Constraints on Sovereignty within Regional Organizations

Abstract

The organizational characteristics of regional organizations have been explained by supranationalism and intergovernmentalism regarding how much sovereignty is constrained. The degree of sovereignty constraints is usually measured by pooling sovereignty and delegation. Pooling sovereignty is observed when the veto of member states in regional organizations is restricted in their decision-making procedures. Delegation is to give some authority to the organs of regional organizations such as secretariats. The existing literature has treated regional organizations as a unit of analysis to identify the degree of sovereignty constraints and has paid little attention to the diversity of sovereignty constraints within regional organizations. This paper clarifies asymmetry in sovereignty constraints within regional organizations by measuring the degree of sovereignty constraints in institutional settings in security and economic fields. It takes multi-issue regional organizations from Europe, the Americas, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa as cases. Both symmetric and asymmetric types are found, implying that the level of sovereignty constraints in a specific field can determine the one in the entire organization. In some asymmetric cases, pooling sovereignty in the security field is more pronounced than in the economic field. This result revises the conventional view that pooling sovereignty is more likely to be advanced in the economic field. The paper further investigates the background of the increasing pooling of sovereignty in the security field by taking the cases of the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS). The existing literature provides functional and sociological perspectives as to why sovereignty is constrained or pooled in regional or international organizations. The functional perspective focuses on the cost and efficiency of cooperation, which leads to the introduction of majority voting. The sociological insight includes the diffusion of institutional models and policies. It argues for imitating institutional designs in pre-existing regional organizations. Incorporating the two perspectives, the paper argues, that in given insecure situations in the region, the number of member states or external actors’ assistance inducing the diffusion of institutional models could be the background for the increasing pooling of sovereignty in the security field. The LAS responded to insecurity in the region and expanded membership by establishing the Arab Peace and Security Council consisting of only five member states to prevent or settle conflicts. ECOWAS also established the Mediation and Security Council consisting of nine members, taking the United Nations Security Council as a model. The argument in this paper provides a new insight into the existing literature which has not analyzed how sovereignty is constrained in security cooperation.