有田八郎 -日独防共協定における薄墨色外交の展開-

「1930年代の日本外交」-四人の外相を中心として-

抄録

The extended introduction to the essay serves the three-fold purpose of calling attention to the necessity for further study of Arita Hachiro, raising some general interpretive issues pertaining to early Showa diplomatic history which are addressed later in the essay, and introducing pertinent English-language literature.
Arita's importance in the diplomacy of the early Showa period is partially reflected in the key positions which he occupied in the Foreign Ministry's decisionmaking structure: Asia Bureau Director during “Tanaka diplomacy” and the renewal of “Shidehara diplomacy”; Vice Foreign Minister during Uchida Yasuya's “scorched earth diplomacy”; Foreign Minister during the Hirota, first Konoe, Hiranuma and Yonai cabinets.
That Arita occupied the above posts also provides a unique opportunity to examine the foreign policy decision-making problem at several levels. The major interpretive viewpoints concerning this problem in English-language literature are: the civilian cabinet members were robots of the military (R. J. C. Butow); the highest military and civilian officials were real decision-makers (J. B. Crowley); they were not robots or rubber stamps but their influence was basically limited to revising or rejecting the proposals of middle-echelon subordinates (C. Hosoya).
The case o Arita Hachiro is also of special interest with regard to the question of responsibility for the course of Japan's foreign policy during the early Showa period. On the one hand is the late Morishima Goro's claim that Foreign Ministry leaders strove to restrain and guide the military through indirect means. On the other hand is Professor Usui Katsumi's argument that the “Arita faction's” policy line “opened the way to Pearl Harbor” and that its outlook was more similar than not to that of the military. The usuzumi iro (thin ink color/grey) middle ground occupied by Arita's dipolmacy certainly allows for various interpretations of its significance.
The main body of the essay, which is part of an overall study of Arita's diplomatic career currently being undertaken by the author, is basically a case study of Arita's thought and behavior in relation to the Anti-Comintern Pact of November 1936. Of particular interest are the reasons for and the factors affecting Arita's attitude towards an agreement with Germany and his role in and influence upon the conclusion of the Pact. The main points made are: (1) Arita's approach to a rapprochement between Germany and Japan stemmed more from a negative attitude towards their common opponent than from a positive attitude towards Germany; that is, his strong conviction that the Soviet Union posed the greatest threat to Japan and the greatest obstacle to close Japan-Manchukuo-China relations was the main reason why he came to favor an agreement with Germany; (2) despite this strong anti-Soviet attitude he took a prudent, middle-of-the-road attitude with respect to dealing with the Soviet problem which was also reflected in his attitude towards an agreement with Germany; (3) in this case the Foreign Minister played a crucial role in the decision-making process since it was his view which determined the Foreign Ministry's basic attitude towards an agreement with Germany; (4) he also seems to have had a significant influence upon the formulation of the Pact; (5) since Arita was successful in obtaining a pact drawn up in “thin ink” he cannot be said to have been pressured by the Army into concluding an agreement which he did not want; on the other hand, he was by no means in complete agreement with the Army; (6) the ways and extent to which the Army determined the framework within which Arita felt compelled to carry out the responsibilities of his office should not be lost sight of.