国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
太平洋協定とオーストラリアの安全保障 (一九二一-三七年)
日豪関係の史的展開
マーフィー P・B福嶋 輝彦
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ジャーナル フリー

1981 年 1981 巻 68 号 p. 44-58,L3

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Throughout the 1920s mention of Australian security was normally linked to the state of the naval base under construction at Singapore. The strategy devised at the Washington Conference was generally accepted in Australia as sufficient, although delays at Singapore were inclined to arouse references to a possibly hostile Japan. In 1931 there was considerable support for the Japanese action in Manchuria, although once again the reaction was frequently one of relief that Japan had moved westward rather than southward.
Once the Manchurian crisis had proved that the League of Nations was a limited force in world affairs and circumstances in Europe began to worsen, Australia had to re-examine her security arrangements, especially as a simultaneous conflict in Europe and the Far East became a distinct possibility. In effect, the Australian reappraisal of her position was slow in coming and by 1937 the old reliance on United Kingdom initiative and leadership began to appear a serious misjudgment.
At the Imperial Conference in 1937 the Australian Prime Minister promoted unsuccessfully the formation of a Pacific Pact of non-aggression, in line with the emphasis then being placed on regional pacts in Europe. Then suggestion had been tried in several quarters since 1933 by Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom. The Australian proposal was thus an attempt to achieve something that had been tried and failed. In the circumstances it did provide the Australian electorate with the impression that security planning was a distinct priority.

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