一九三〇年代後半のオーストラリア外交-コモンウェルスと太平洋国家意識の狭間-

日豪関係の史的展開

抄録

Since her founding as a nation-state in 1901 up to at least the first half of the 1930s, Australia had lacked her own diplomacy. One can guess at the reasons. She was at the “antipodes” from the centre of world politics. Great Britain could provide her with almost all of the diplomatic resources she needed. Hence arose the idea that her best policy would be to do her utmost to maintain the integrity of the British Commonwealth, of which she was a part. She was too preoccupied with her economic development to look to the outside world.
These elements were all persistent even in the second half of the 1930s. However, underneath lay a slow but steady shift in Australia's attitude towards foreign policy: the shift from sheer dependency on Great Britain to the orientation as a “Pacific nation”. The much-delayed improvement of the diplomatic service and the proposal for a “Pacific Agreement” in 1937 were two illustrations of this. Even more important was the emergence of John J. Curtin in Australian politics. His “Australia First” policy—more energy on national interest, less on the Commonwealth bond—exerted a considerable, if not permeating, influence on Australian diplomacy.
Australia in the second half of the 1930s was at the threshold of deciding her course to follow, looking farther into the years to come. Nevertheless, she oscillated between a Commonwealth and a “Pacific nation”. In this paper the author has dichotomized Australian diplomacy into these distinct models and attempted to trace this oscillation. In doing so, its dilemmas have, the author believes, been shown even more clearly.