国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
エジプトの政治変動 -ナセルからサダトへ-
中東:1970年代の政治変動
伊能 武次
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ジャーナル フリー

1983 年 1983 巻 73 号 p. 104-118,L13

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抄録

1. The Nasser regime was characterized as a military regime in which military officers and ex-officers occupied central and dominant positions in the economic-political system. The July Revolution of 1952 by the Free Officers implied such orientation, because they had carried out the Revolution without the participation of any other civilian groups. This reflected their intention to continue to occupy the position of political power. Under the Nasserite regime, the strategic offices in the government and state organizations were occupied by the Free Officers, who attemped to control state apparatus through their political influence.
But through the passage of time, this system has undergone change. In the midsixties and later, the influence of the technocrats increased due to the rapid expansion of the state apparatus. From the beginning of the sixties the Egyptian bureaucracy was expanded through the adoption of “Arab Socialism” as an official ideology, which demanded large scale nationalization of the economy. Military officers. could not manage such expanded organizations without the. aid of professional technocrats, whose political status was thus strengthened. Of course, they were still under the control of military officers, but they began to emerge as an important political force. This trend continued and, especially after the defeat of the June War in 1967, the balance between the two political forces began to change and it became unstable. At the same time, other objective changes coincided with this trend: a change in the army and military officers. As the military establishment expanded, military officers became less inclined to become engaged in a kind of political lobbying. In the 1960s, there was no room to carry out a movement similar to that of the Free Officers, who changed from being “the vanguard of the Revolution” to being “professional army officers.”
2. Even before the defeat in the June War, Nasser's Egypt faced a difficult situation, Nasser being forced to reassess national strategy. The Syrian secession from the United Arab Republic in 1961 led to the breakup of the union which symbolized the success of the Pan-Arab nationalist movement. From 1962 onwards Egyptian involvement in the Yemen Civil War followed, but this led to the deterioration of Egyptian-Saudi relations and, furthermore, conflict with the United States. These events had a great impact upon the economic situation as well as politics. Nasser tried to search for a new alternative in order to overcome these difficulties. One of his efforts as such was to reshuffle his cabinet. The Zakariyya Mohieddin Cabinet was thus formed to reorient Egyptian policy and especially to reactivate her deteriorated economy. But this attempt failed and Egypt entered a war with Israel in 1967.
3. The defeat in the June War further worsened Egypt's critical situation. By Israel's occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, Egypt lost two promising sources of foreign currency: money from the ships passing through the Suez canal, and oil in the Sinai. In addition to such economic impact, Egyptian leadership and prestige in the Arab world were greatly damaged. One of the important changes after the war was the decisive dependence of Egypt on the Soviet Union militarily and economically. This development restricted her freedom of action in international politics. Domestically the defeat created a crisis in Nasser's political legitimacy, because the growth of anti-military feelings among the population was a serious challenge to his military regime. Against this background, Ali Sabri, one of the Nasserite power elites, whose political base was in the Arab Socialist Union, the only political party in Egypt, capitalized on these feeling in the power struggle with the military. He succeeded in expanding his own political influence. Under strong criticism, armed forces had to recede.

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